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ABSTRACT 
Political violence in Sri Lanka is not a unique phenomenon. It is 
a prevalent tendency in many countries of the Third World. Sri Lanka, 
since 1971, has experienced a sharp escalation of political violence 
which renders it suitable as a case study of insurgency and guerrilla 
warfare in developing countries. The author's major thrust is a 
comparative review the causes, patterns, and implications of the left- 
wing Insurrection of 1971 and the Tamil guerrilla warfare up to the 
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in June 1987. This thesis highlights the 
salient socio-economic and political factors, underscoring the view 
that ethnicity is the impetus behind the continuing turmoil in Sri 
Lankan society. 
The author's main hypotheses are that the Insurrection of 1971 as 
well as the subsequent Tamil guerrilla warfare were pre-planned and 
well-organised, and that the politically violent organisations in Sri 
Lanka were mainly a result of the emergence of new social forces which 
came about due to socio-economic and political transformations. 
The analysis begins with a review of the theories of political 
violence. Of these theories Huntington's theory of modernisation 
relates more closely to the origin of the political violence movement 
in Sri Lanka. The awakening of the earliest guerrilla group, the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (J. V. P. ), in 1971 lay deeply rooted in 
socio-economic and political factors. The emergence of the Tamil 
guerrilla organisations stemmed from the long-standing competition 
between the Sinhala majority and the minority Tamils for limited 
socio-economic resources and exclusive political powers. The study 
shows that the socio-economic background of the leaders and members 
were diverse and often paradoxical, if not at odds to the groups' 
iii 
goals. The ethno-nationalist ideologies, strategies and tactics of 
the guerrilla organisations, instiled group consciousness and goaded 
otherwise ordinary citizens to commit political violence. The pattern 
of political violence in Sri Lanka was a highly emotive expression of 
anti-establishment and secessionist convictions on the part of the 
guerrillas. Finally, the study proposes politico-economic reforms 
rather than military options to cope with the problem of political 
violence in Sri Lanka. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Political violence is one of the oldest and most complex problems 
in modern politics and international relations. In a sense it. reveals 
the more harsh aspects of politics and thus has developed into a 
highly stimulating research area within the social sciences. The 
copious amount of contemporary literature on the subject of political 
violence indicates its dominant place amongst the modern disciplines 
of political science. The contemporary field of political violence is 
a relatively recent outgrowth and expansion of the combined subject of 
political science and international relations. Until the 1960s, the 
study of political violence suffered relative obscurity within the 
social sciences. Harry Ekstein observes that this neglect was 
indicative of the lack of literature on the subject. ' According to 
Ted Robert Gurr, of the 2,828 articles which appeared in the American 
Political Science Review from its inception in 1906 until 1968, it is 
apparent from their titles that only 29 articles address political 
disorder or violence. Furthermore, only 12 of these articles are 
concerned specifically with revolution, and only 15 were published 
1 Harry Eckstein, "Introduction Toward the Theoretical Study of 
Internal War", in H. Eckstein, ed. Internal War: Problems and 
Approaches, (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 1-6. 
2 
after 1961.2 Social scientists have attributed this neglect to 
several circumstances. 
The first of these claims that the methodological problems 
encountered in analysing the subject matter were a major constraint on 
the social sciences in producing studies of political violence. This 
argument maintains that the lack of theoretical processing and the 
limitations in applying analysis using the quantitative technique and 
controlled experiments, have contributed to the reluctance of social 
scientists to undertake studies of violent political behaviour. 3 
Secondly, a more widely accepted argument is that the recent 
neglect was related to the view that political violence was a 
disfigurement of political behaviour involving backward nations and 
demented individuals, or at best was a marginal phenomenon.; Finally, 
it has been suggested that the study of political violence was ignored 
because social scientists tend to be influenced in their choice of 
subject by excluding what is considered to be an illegitimate form of 
action. 5 
The gradual increase in attention devoted to the field of 
political violence since the early 1960s is largely attributed to the 
groving number of politically violent incidents. The more salient 
incidents, which distinguish this period from any other previous era, 
are the Civil Rights Movement in America, the assassination of the 
..... .... ...... ......... .. _ ................ _................. _............ . 2 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), pp. 5-7. 
3 Harry Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
} Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", 
World Politics, No. 2, (1968), p. 245, and H. L. Nieburg, Political 
Violence: The Behavioural Process, (New York: St. Martins Press, 
1969), p. 5. 
5 Bienen Henry, Violence and Social Change: A Review of Current 
Literature, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 6-9. 
3 
Kennedys and Martin Luther King Jr., and the Vietnam War. 6 In 
addition, the escalation of political violence in nations which have 
been identified as Third World countries has heightened the interest 
in this branch of scholarly research.? Furthermore, a majority of the 
social and political scientists have accepted political violence as a 
legitimate field of study. This acceptance has proved to be an 
additional impetus to the further commitment of academic resources 
toward the timely study of the problem. Political violence is 
increasingly perceived as a representation of a form of struggle and 
expressions Consequently, the subject of political violence has 
developed into an accepted sub-field in the discipline of political 
science and international relations. 
1.2 Political Violence in the Third World 
As mentioned above, political violence has been a significant 
factor in the political processes of the Third World since the World 
War II. A majority of Third World states have experienced military or 
civilian coups, insurrections, guerrilla war, ethnic riots, mutinies, 
political assassinations and political terrorism. The social and 
political evolution of the Third World countries has been wrought with 
violence in their historical development, has been conditioned by 
their colonial past, and is linked with the international environment. 
Since the World War II political violence in the Third World has 
....... .... .............................. _... _.... _.. _ 6 Von Der Mehden, Fred R. Comparative Political Violence, (New 
Jersy: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 4. 
7 The concept of the "Third World" was initially used following 
the first Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955. This concept 
emphasises the existence of a third force of states which differ from 
the western industrialised states and the socialist camp. It embraces 
all Africa except South Africa, all Asia except China and Japan, all 
Latin America, and all of the Middle East except Israel. 
S H. L. Neiburg, James C. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr are a few 
among those of this view. 
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remained a crucial factor toward national and international political 
changes. According to Gurr, between 1961 and 1968, some form of 
violent civil conflict reportedly occurred in 114 of the world's 121 
larger nations and colonies. 9 Moreover, William 0. Staudenmaier finds 
that of the wars which have occurred since 1945, approximately 85 per 
cent have been intrastate or colonial wars and over 95 percent have 
been fought outside of Europe--the traditional centre of the 'great 
power' system. 10 The forms of warfare have also changed 
overwhelmingly since the World War 11 and many can now be classified 
as guerrilla insurgencies. Furthermore, the SIPHI Year-Book (1987) 
listed 36 armed conflicts in 1986. Most of these armed conflicts were 
confined to the Third World countries; only one conflict is recorded 
for Europe and that is the Northern Ireland (Ulster) conflict. 11 
Therefore, it is significant to note that most of this protracted 
violence has been confined to the Third World. 
The Third World has come to represent an area of numerous 
conflicts which are rooted in diverse motivations and are of varying 
significance. The causes of the Third World conflicts have been 
attributed to cultural, social, economic and political factors. Udo 
Steinbach, however, has made a far-reaching study to group these 
factors into broad categories according to common denominators. He 
has defined four such broad categories as follows: national 
9 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 1970, p. 1. 
10 William 0. Staudenmaier, "Conflict Termination in the Third 
World: Theory and Practice", in The Lessons of Recents Wars in the 
Third World: Vol. 2, Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds. 
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1987), p. 228. 
11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI 
YearBook 1988: World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford University 
Press: 1988), pp. 285-286. 
5 
fragmentation, inequitable development, cultural clashes and 
liberation movements. 12 
The first, national fragmentation, and its impact on conflict in 
the Third World is examined with reference to the emergence of nation- 
states. The emergence of national states in Europe resulted from an 
historical process which was characterized by internal conflict and 
the driving forces of nationalism, and which culminated in an inner 
unification of states. The national structures introduced to the 
Third World, however, were alien to the political or cultural 
traditions of these countries, especially in the Middle East and in 
Africa. The concept of nation-states was imposed upon the Third World 
by their colonial masters or was adapted by the elites of these 
subjugated countries to achieve their own political ambitions. 
Therefore, the development of these colonies into national states 
often violated their "territorial, ethnic, religious, geographical, or 
culturo-historical traditions". 13 The ensuing consequences have been 
the further fragmentation of these states and, more specifically, 
ethnic and sectarian divisions. Many internal conflicts, including 
demands for autonomy, have been attributed to the ethnic flavour of 
national fragmentation. The ethnic and tribal conflicts which had 
been dormant came to the fore after these countries gained 
independence, and are said to have contributed to the escalation of 
political violence in many of the countries in the Third World. The 
Muslims in the Philippines, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Karen in 
Burma, and the Kurds in Iraq have been cited as examples of this 
pattern. 
12 Steinbach, Udo, "Sources of Third World Conflict, in Third- 
World Conflict and International Security", Part 1, Adelphi Papers, 
No. 166, (1980), p. 21. 
13 Ibid. p. 21. 
6 
Secondly, conflicts in the Third World countries are identified 
with the violent attempts to achieve revolutionary changes in their 
socio-economic structure and political institutions. These violent 
attempts are attributed to several causes, the chief of which is that 
Third World countries are confronted with developmental problems of a 
socio-economic and political nature. The economic development of many 
Third World countries is so retarded that even the basic needs of the 
population cannot be fulfilled. Yet the governments of these 
countries are called upon to emulate the socio-economic and political 
objectives of industrialized countries. Third World governments must, 
therefore, improve their per capita income, provide for a more 
equitable distribution of resources, and attain a certain degree of 
independence from the industrialized nations. Thus the conflict 
between what these states can achieve and are expected to achieve 
causes unrest and impatience, which subsequently leads to political 
struggle and ideological conflict. This pattern is best exemplified 
by the struggles of the Huk in the Philippines, the Naxalite movement 
in India, the J. V. P. in Sri Lanka, the 'Iupamaro in Uruguay and the 
Shining Path in Peru. The economic aspect apart, the socio-political 
problems of these countries originates from their programmes for 
industrialization. The process of modernisation in the Third World 
has not been accompanied by a reinforcement of the political 
institutions which provide greater participation for individuals, 
social groups, or religious and ethnic minorities. Neither has there 
been an equitable distribution of social and economic resources in 
favour of the underprivileged sections of Third World societies. 
Thirdly, Steinbach claims that the cultural front has become an 
area of conflict. Religious and cultural factors, he says, are 
instrinsically linked to the wider developmental problems. In spite 
of the overlapping of these factors, however, he contends that culture 
f 
and religion form unique variables in mass mobilisations. A rapid 
modernisation process which depends on the endurance of cultural 
traditions and the manner of mass mobilisation, is not similar to a 
revolutionary process which depends exclusively on social or economic 
factors. Such a modernisation process rejects western culture and 
civilization, and revives the indigenous culture by adapting it to 
meet the demands of a modern state. The internal expression of this 
conflict is the confrontation between "native chauvinism on the one 
hand and westernized elites on the other". 14 The international aspect 
of this internal conflict is the exclusion of external influence and 
power. Yet Steinbach goes on to observe that Iran is an example 
where even a chauvinist movement can be faced with new friction from 
foreign sources. 
The liberation movements of the Third World are the fourth 
category, which is closely integrated with the other three factors 
mentioned above. Some Third World revolutions have been associated 
with or have resulted from the national independence movements against 
colonial rule. From a broad perspective, the objective of liberation 
movement in developing countries is to overthrow political 
institutions and socio-economic frameworks introduced by colonial 
powers. This objective includes diverse aims varying from gaining 
independence to secessionism. The main feature of these movements is 
that they have often been supported by other Third World countries 
rather than by the developed states, reflecting the unresolved 
political allegiances in many developing states. The Polisario in 
Western Sahara and the East Timor in Indonesia can be cited as 
examples of inter-Third World assistance. Table 1.1 indicates some of, 
the Third World countries which have faced political violence and the 
primary insurgent groups involved. 
14 Ibid. p. 22. 
8 
The political conflicts in the Third World can be attributed to a 
number of factors, which interact and reinforce each other and cannot 
be strictly compartmentalized at any given time. Nationalistic 
conflicts often concern the problems of integrating ethnic or 
religious groups. Many ethnic groups fail to identify with the state 
due to the lack of access in decision-making and the denial of equal 
rights and autonomy. National conflicts are intrinsically linked to 
the failure to integrate these groups in the developmental political 
process. 
Table 1.1 Major Political Violence in the Third World 
Country Year Major Guerrilla Organisations 
Burma 1948 Karen National Union 
Ethiopia 1962 Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
Guatemala 1966 Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity 
Colombia 1966 Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia 
Philippines 1969 The New People's Army 
1970 Moro National Liberation Front 
Sri Lanka 1971 People's Liberation Front 
1972 Liberation Tamils Tigers of Eelam 
Angola 1975 National Union for the total independence of Angola 
Indonesia 1975 Revolutionary front for the independence of Timor 
Lebanon 1975 The Muslims and the Christians 
Mozambique 1976 Mozambique Resistance Movement 
W. Sahara 1975 Polisario Front 
El Salvador 1979 Armed Forces of National Resistance 
Kampuchea 1979 Khmer Rouge Forces 
Peru 1980 Shining Path 
India 1980 The Sikh 
Sudan 1984 Sudan People's Liberation Army 
Uganda 1986 Former government rebels 
Source: The Economist, "The World's Wars", (March 1988), pp. 21-24. 
Breakdowns in economic and political development in the Third 
World states lead to the presence of one or more of the following 
phenomenon: 
I. The weakness of the economy leads to discontent, provoking 
impatient groups in society to attempt power seizures. 
II. Weak political institutions are destroyed by rival, forces 
within the state. 
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III. Existing socio-political and ideological concepts are called 
into question and new revolutionary ideas are introduced. 
IV. Out-of-date traditional social structures are replaced by the 
forces of modernisation. 
V. The participation of the various ethnic or regional groups in 
the economic or political life of the state is neglected, leading to 
an intensification of tensions. 15 
Thus, the four categories of factors defined by Steinbach are 
often present simultaneously and interact to cause violence and 
conflict. The increasing, trend toward political violence in the Third 
World, in the final analysis, is a reflection of the political and 
socio-economic transformations which have been occurring in these 
countries. The political violence further indicates several other 
factors which are not overtly visible but are none the less 
significant. Outbreaks of political violence underline the gravity of 
the political instability within these countries. The spread of 
political violence has curtailed freedom and- thus has moved some 
states away from pluralism towards authoritarianism. In Third World 
states where there is less social and political cohesion the move 
towards authoritarianism has come more easily due to the weakness of 
institutional bases. 16 The Philippines and El Salvador can be cited 
as appropriate examples of Third World democracies which, when 
confronted with internal violence, moved rapidly, towards - an 
authoritarian state. 
Finally, this instability is intrinsically linked , to the 
international political processes and to the world economic system. 
The changes that are currently taking place in the Third World and the 
15 Ibid. P. 23. 
16 W. Scott Thompson, "Political Violence and the Correlation of 
Forces", Orbis, Vol. 19, No. 3-4, (1975-76), p. 1277. 
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inevitable involvement of external powers are crucial for the 
maintenance of stability in the regional and global balances of power. 
Given these factors it becomes increasingly evident that the 
concentration of political violence in the Third World renders it an 
especially crucial area of study. 
1.3 A Case Study Approach to the Study of Political Violence 
Gurr has observed that there are relatively few case studies of 
political violence related to the non-Western World and even fewer 
systematic comparative studies or attempts at empirical theory. '? The 
present study is an examination of political violence in Sri Lankal5 
from 1971 to 1987 as a case study of political violence in the Third 
World. The reasons for selecting Sri Lanka as a case study rather 
than analysing all possible cases in the Third World were substantive 
and practical. While case studies are rarely comparative in nature, 
they are often quite insightful. Furthermore, there is a tendency to 
focus on a particular type of violence rather than on the whole 
spectrum of political violence. 
Sri Lanka with its parliamentary-cum-presidential political system 
and socio-economic under-development provides a good case study of 
violent political processes in the Third World. It has been selected 
because the post-independence history of the country provides an 
appropriate framework for conceptualizing the main issues relating to 
the socio-political manifestations of political violence in the 
process of modernisation, and for exploring the broad typology of 
political violence that would be observed in many Third World 
countries. Unlike most other Third World countries, Sri Lanka has 
17 Ted Robert Gurr, op. cit., p. 6. 
18 Until 1972 Sri Lanka was known as Ceylon. Although this 
present study is based largely on material before and after 1972, the 
author wishes to use the current name for convenience. 
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developed a flexible and perhaps more viable parliamentary political 
system in which rival political parties have the opportunity to form 
alternate governments. This political structure has resulted from the 
gradual evolution of the constitutional system in Sri Lanka under the 
British Colonial Raj from 1798 to 1948. Sri Lanka's political history 
is manifest in the unlimited powers of the British governors in the 
early stages of the colonial period, in the limited responsibility 
accorded by constitutional changes with universal franchise in 1931, 
and in the complete independence in 1948. Since 1931 universal 
franchise has been used successfully and successively to elect 
representatives to the legislature. 
In many newly freed countries violent political struggles were 
launched to gain independence whereas Sri Lanka achieved its 
independence without rancour or violence. Therefore, Sri Lanka has 
been considered as a non-violent and non-volatile nation compared to 
other developing nations in Asia and Africa. 19 In 1956 the dominant 
political regime was ousted from power by means of universal 
franchise. This change of regime was not a mere transfer of power 
but a silent revolution, which changed the country's political 
orientation from liberal laissez faire to socialistic nationalism. 
The main left-orientated political parties which preached revolution 
and socialism in confrontation with the existing capitalism and 
parliamentarianism, were absorbed into the parliamentary system via 
the coalition governments formed with the moderate parties. This 
absorption of the revolutionary-motivated cadres stalled the 
possibilities of violent politics or revolution for the first 20 years 
of Sri Lankan independence. Consequently, by 1970 Sri Lanka was 
19 K. M. de Silva, "Sri Lanka in 1948: The Journal of Historical 
and Social Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1-2, (1974), p. 1. 
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acclaimed as one of the few countries in the Third World which enjoyed 
a stable parliamentary democratic government. 20 
This political stability, however, suffered a sharp reversal when 
political violence broke out in Sri Lanka in April 1971. It was the 
beginning of a period characterized by youth-dominated political 
violence which was manifested on two fronts. The first was the 
political violence inspired by the ideologically revolutionary 
motivations of the Sinhalese youth. The second strain of political 
violence was led by the Tamil youth who expressed national separatism. 
The first significant incident of political violence in Sri Lanka 
was staged by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front) 
more popularly known as the J. V. P., in April 1971. The origins of the 
J. V. P. were secretive and its organisational and political activities 
were conducted undercover and in a clandestine manner. The potential 
cadres of this movement were Sinhalese-Buddhist youth who were 
disillusioned with the existing socio-economic and political 
framework, and the orthodox Marxists who formed the contemporary left- 
wing in Sri Lanka's parliamentary politics. The origin of the J. V. P. 
dates back to 1964 although its existence and revolutionary activities 
came into the limelight much later. It was with the armed struggle to 
overthrow the government in April 1971 that the J. V. P. gained 
recognition as a left-wing guerrilla organisation which adhered to a 
revolutionary strategy. 
The historical evolution of the J. V. P. falls into three stages. 
The first stage covers the period from 1964-1971, during which it 
emerged as a left-wing guerrilla organisation. The armed struggle 
which the J. V. P. launched in 1971 was of a short duration and was 
quickly suppressed by the government in power with great force and 
20 James Jupp, Sri Lanka-Third World Democracy, (London: Frank 
Cass, 1978), p. 327. 
13 
intensity. Yet the brief conflict created a turmoil in Sri Lankan 
national politics and international relations unparalleled in its 
recent political history. As a result of the armed struggle, the 
J. V. P. was proscribed in 1971 by the regime in power. By 1972 most of 
its members had either been imprisoned or killed, or had foresworn 
their allegiance to the cause. The J. V. P. was permitted to resume 
its political activities in 1977 after the repeal of the Criminal 
Justice Commission Act by the United National Party Government. 
The second stage covers the period from 1977-1983, which includes 
the post-insurrectionary period during which the J. V. P. felt compelled 
to revive itself as a political party willing to participate in a 
democratic framework. In fact during this period the J. V. P. was 
called upon to transform itself from a covert threat into a political 
party which supported the process of parliamentary democracy. The 
J. V. P. during its early stages rejected all forms of electoral 
politics and the parliamentary system. After 1977, however, they had 
to be content with participation in the existing elective process 
beginning with the 1977 elections. 21 The J. V. P. was formally 
recognized as a legitimate political party by the Election 
Commissioner in 1982. This new image of the J. V. P. was reversed when 
ethnic violence broke out in July 1983. The J. V. P. was proscribed 
once again and forced to revert to operation as an underground 
movement. 
The third stage which deals with the post-1983 period contends 
with the J. V. P. 's renewed violent activities, particularly after the 
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987 which they vehemently opposed. The 
21 Four members of the J. V. P. participated in the 1977 General 
Election. In 1978 they participated in the local government elections. 
In 1982 the J. V. P. participated in the District Development Council 
Elections, and the Presidential Election. It collected the highest 
number of votes polled by the leftist parties in the 1982 Presidential 
Election. 
14 
ensuing presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (I. P. K. F. ) gave the 
J. V. P. sufficient cause to revive its guerrilla-cum-terrorist 
activities with greater intensity and scope. 
The failure of the left-wing insurrection in 1971 was followed by 
a new trend of political violence toward guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism led by the Tamil youth. The motivation for this struggle 
was ethnic separatism. The first overt manifestations of this 
violence occurred in 1972. The first phase of Tamil political 
violence was initiated by a group of youth who called themselves the 
"Tigers". This is a blanket term applied to the many factions of the 
Tamil youth who have operated undercover and have been responsible for 
the terrorist and guerrilla activities since 1972. The proliferation 
of factions has led to the formation of more than 35 splinter 
groups. 22 Five Tamil guerrilla groups have achieved dominance over 
all the others. These five are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(L. T. T. E. ), The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (T. E. L. O. ), The 
Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (P. L. O. T. ), the Eelam 
People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (E. P. R. L. P. ) and the Eelam 
Revolutionary Organisation of Students (E. R. O. S. ). 
Thus, since the early 1970's political violence has been a 
dominant feature in the politics of Sri Lanka. This growing trend of 
violence has not only impugned the national political authority but 
also has threatened Sri Lanka's territorial integrity and the 
established social order. Political violence in Sri Lanka cannot be 
considered as an isolated phenomenon. It is only one of many 
instances of the tendency for political violence in the Third World. 
Given this context the author has chosen to focus on Sri Lanka as a 
case study of Third World political disorder for the following 
reasons. 
22 See, Appendix 1 
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Firstly, Sri Lanka illustrates the forms of political violence 
that occur during the process of socio-economic and political 
modernisation. From a broad perspective political violence in Sri 
Lanka has been manifest in several major ways including the working- 
class turmoils (1953,1981), the ethnic violence (1956,1958,1977, 
1981,1983), political assassinations (1959,1975), coups d' etat 
(1962,1966), student violence (1965,1968,1976), post-election 
violence (1970,1977), revolutionary violence (1971) and separatist 
violence (1972-1987). Although youth violence is a recent phenomenon 
in Sri Lanka's contemporary politics, it has displayed a marked 
dissimilarity to the other dimensions of violence mentioned above. 
The differences are as follows: 
(a) The motivations of this new trend of political violence have 
been either to overthrow the existing regime and capture political 
power, as in the insurrection of 1971, or to breakaway from the 
existing state and create a separate state based on ethnicity, as 
manifest in the political violence of the Tamil guerrilla groups from 
1972 onward. The Insurrection of 1971 was the first organised armed 
struggle launched in Sri Lanka with the objective of seizing state 
power. There was no such objective in the 'hartal' (turmoil) of 1953. 
What was experienced in 1956 and 1958 were racial struggles. Although 
there may have been some political overtones in the violence before 
1971, it was not until the 1971 Insurrection that political 
motivations bacame the paramount force behind political violence in 
Sri Lanka. 
(b) The political violence from April 1971 onward was also 
organised and pre-planned in contrast to the spontaneity of the prior 
incidents. The armed confrontations which come within the purview of 
this study were pre-planned and carried out by trained cadres of 
insurgent organisations. 
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(c) The youth domination of the 1971 and post-1971 political 
violence is another significant factor. In spite of the lack of 
systematic data and information on the social character of the 
participants of the pre-1971 violence, empirical observations have 
indicated that it was comprised of individuals of a mixed age range. 
This study is concerned with political violence which displays a 
marked youth participation and organisation. 
(d) The revolutionary-motivated Insurrection of April 1971 and the 
ensuing agitation for a separate Tamil State through the use of 
terrorist and guerrilla strategies has moulded the political and 
socio-economic pattern of Sri Ltunka. Consequently, political violence 
has posed a serious challenge to the existing socio-economic system as 
well as to the political institutions of the country. No other 
politically motivated incident or organisation has had such a profound 
impact within a short period in Sri Lanka's recent political history. 
Secondly, these violent incidents and Sri Lanka's foreign 
relations have been closely linked. There is evidence to suggest that 
Sri Lanka's internal order and its place in the geo-political balance 
in South Asia are also significantly linked. In the recent past Sri 
Lanka's political violence has tended to assume an international 
dimension, especially with the intervention of India which is a 
dominant country in the Third World, particularly in South Asia. 
Thus, since 1971 there has been a progressive internationalization of 
Sri Lanka's political violence, strongly enforcing its position as a 
good case study of political violence in the Third World context. 
Moreover, the insurgency of 1971 and the Tamil separatist guerrilla 
warfare provide a unique opportunity for comparative study. 
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1.4 Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to analyse comparatively the 
nature of the political violence in 1971, and the Tamil separatist 
violence from 1972 until 1987. This task makes it necessary to 
undertake an analysis of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (J. V. P. ) in the 
South and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (L. T. T. E. ) in the North 
of Sri Lanka. To fulfil this objective it has become necessary to 
undertake the following: 
a. A summary and review of existing major theories of political 
violence; 
b. an application and analysis of some basic propositions on the 
pattern of political violence and of the conditions under which it has 
occurred in Sri Lanka; 
c. a theoretical analysis of the socio-economic and political 
factors which have given rise to guerrilla groups engaging in 
political violence within Sri Lanka's political structure; 
d. an analysis of the political participation of the youth, and 
their hopes and aspirations, as expressed in the People's Liberation 
Front (J. V. P. ) in the South, and in the Tamil separatist underground 
groups in the North; and 
e. a study of the correlation between the socio-economic forces 
and national or ethnic aspirations which contributed to political 
violence during the above-mentioned period. 
1.5 Review of Literature 
It has to be acknowledged that several scholars have studied 
political and ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, and have identified and 
discussed the several factors as contributory to the political 
violence. They are: the socio-economic and political conditions of 
the postwar period, the shortcomings in the educational system, the 
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unemployment crisis, the generation gap, the alienation of youth, the 
infiltration of radical political thought into Sri Lanka, and the 
systematic indoctrination of the youth. 23 In all these studies the 
main point of departure has been the violent incidents themselves; 
many causal factors have been analysed to justify the events. Most of 
the available studies are in the nature of event analysis, and thus 
they lack rigour and depth. Six studies on the 1971 Insurrection are 
reviewed in this section. All of these studies are socio-economic and 
political interpretations. 
Fred Halliday's study explores the socio-economic and political 
backgrounds of the 1971 Insurrection. According to Halliday, the 
nature of the socio-economic crisis caused the emergence of the J. V. P. 
as a political force. The study addresses the development of the 
J. V. P. in light of the left-wing movement. Halliday has also dealt 
with the theory and tactics of the J. V. P., the course of its 
insurrection, its subsequent repression and its responsibility for 
causing the emergency situation in Sri Lanka. 24 
S. Arasaratnam has analysed the April Insurrection in the light of 
post-independent political developments in Sri Lanka. The main focus 
of his study is the insurrection in the context of the left-wing 
movement in Sri Lank-an politics in which socialist ideas are being 
looked upon increasingly as a solution to the country's socio-economic 
and political problems. He has predicted that home-grown socialist, 
egalitarian and populist revolutionary movements will be an 
increasingly important phenomenon. 25 
23 For a comprehensive Bibliography of the 1971 Insurrection see. 
H. A. I. Goonetilake, The Sri Lanka Insurrection of 1971: A Select 
Bibliographical Commentary, (Leuven: Universite de Louvain, 1975). 
24 Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection", New Left Review, 
Vol. 69, (1971), pp. 55-91. 
25 S. Arsaratnam, "The Ceylon Insurrection of April 1971: Some 
Causes and Consequences", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 3, (1972), pp. 
356-371. 
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W. A. W. Warnapala's study examines the causes of the 1971 
Insurrection in the light of socio-economic and political factors. He 
has viewed these factors not as recent circumstances but as part and 
parcel of the post-independence socio-economic and political functions 
in Sri Lanka. He has attributed the dissatisfaction of the radical 
youth to the fragmented left-wing parties in Sri Lanka, and has cited 
the discontent as a key factor behind the emergence of the J. V. P. as a 
politically violent movement. 26 
R. N. Kearney and J. Jiggins have examined the demographic and 
socio-economic environment and the political background of the 1971 
Insurrection. They have emphasized the problems of educational 
expansion and the generation gap between the political elite and the 
youth, and have explored the origin and character of the organisation 
of the J. V. p. 27 
W. Howard W'riggins and C. H. S. Jayawardena's study examines the 
expansion of the youth population along with the educational and 
political processes in Sri Lanka. They have emphasized the changes in 
traditional values and the expansion of the expectations of the youth 
in the context of a stagnant economy. According to Wriggins and 
Jayawardena, the leadership of the J. V. P. was a vital factor in the 
1971 Insurrection. 28 
J. Jupp's study examines the 1971 Insurrection and the emergence 
of the J. V. P. in the context of contemporary political developments in 
26 W. A. W. Warnapala, "The April Revolt in Ceylon", Asian Survey, 
Vol. 12, No. 3, (1972), pp. 259-274. 
27 R. N. Kearney and J. Jiggins, "The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971", 
The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 12, (1975), 
pp. 40-64. 
28 W. Howard Wriggins and C. H. S. Jayawardena, "Youth Protest in 
Sri Lanka", in W. H. Wriggins and James F. Guyot, (eds), Population, 
Politics and the Future of Southern Asia, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1973), pp. 318-350. 
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Sri Lanka. In addition, the nature of the J. V. P. 's political 
evolution, the strategy and tactics used in the insurrection, and the 
impact of the insurgency on Sri Lankan society and politics, come 
within the purview of this study. 29 
The focus of literature on Tamil violence has invariably been on 
the impact of the official language policy and the 
institutionalization of ethnic discrimination. As a result the 
previous studies have relatively neglected the emergence of political 
violence as a paramount factor in Sri Lankan politics. 30 
Nevertheless, three studies on the Tamil guerrilla warfare are 
reviewed in this section. 
Thomas A. Marks has examined the Tamil insurgency in the context 
of ethnic divisions within Sri Lanka. He has focused attention on the 
nature of the guerrilla organisations, the nature of the government 
security forces, the government's counter-insurgency strategy and 
tactics, and the role of Indian Government in the context of the Tamil 
guerrilla warfare. 31 
Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam has examined the origin and 
development of the Tamil guerrilla movement with the emphasis on their 
ideology, programme and strategy, and has traced the links of the 
29 J. Jupp. "The J. V. P. Insurrection of 1971 and Its Impact on the 
Marxist and Socialist Movement in Ceylon", Paper for Conference on 
Social Change in Sri Lanka, The School of Oriental and African 
Studies, London University, (March, 1974). 
30 For Tamil Violence see: H. A. I. Goonetilake, "July 1983 and 
the National Question of Sri Lanka -A Bibliography", in Committee For 
Rational Development, (eds), Sri Lanka the Ethnic Conflict: Myths, 
Realities and Perspectives, (New Delhi: Navrang, 1984) and Kumar 
Rupesinghe and Berth Verstappen, Ethnic Conflict and Human Rights in 
Sri Lanka: An Annotated Bibliography, (London: Hans Zell Publishers, 
1989). 
31 Thomas A. Marks, "Peoples War in Sri Lanka: Insurgency and 
Counter Insurgency", Issues and Studies, (1986), pp. 63-99. 
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Tamil guerrillas with Indian Federal Government and especially the 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu in Southern India. 32 
Bruce Matthews has examined the Tamil political violence in the 
light of ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils 
throughout the post-independence period. He has emphasized the 
failure of successive Sri Lankan governments to arrive at a viable 
policy of autonomy, rather than the devolution of political power 
through the District Development Councils (D. D. C. ), as the main 
contributory factor toward the development of guerrilla organisations 
and warfare. Moreover, he has analysed the structure of the Tamil 
guerrilla organisations, the nature of the government security forces 
and the aspects of events on the battleground. 33 
It should be noted, however, that most of these studies were based 
purely on general assumptions. In none of these studies was there a 
systematic analysis of the causes which gave rise to these guerrilla 
organisations and their political objectives. The studies carried out 
so far have failed to analyse this important aspect which is 
essential for an in-depth study of a phenomenon of this nature. 
Consequently, this study is the first attempt to ex. -mine the deeper 
roots of Sri Lanka's political violence in a comparative context. 
1.6 Statement of the Problem 
The principal problem to be dealt with in this study are the 
causes, as well as the pattern and consequences, of political violence 
waged by organised groups or movements in Sri Lanka. The author will 
further examine the measures taken by the government to counter 
32 Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, "The Tamil Tigers in Northern Sri 
Lanka: Origins Factions Programmes", Internationales Asienforum, Vol. 
17, No. 1-2, (1986), pp. 63-85. 
33 Bruce Matthews, "Radical Conflicts and the Rationalization of 
Violence in Sri Lanka), Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1, (1987), pp. 
28-44. 
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political violence, and to reduce and end the conflict. Subsequently, 
new suggestions toward ending the continuing conflict will be made on 
the basis of this study. 
1.7 Hypothesis and Theories 
This study focuses on the following hypotheses which emphasize the 
socio-economic and political factors contributing to political 
violence in Sri Lanka: (1) political violence in Sri Lanka has not 
occurred spontaneously and out of context but was pre-ply-caned; (2) the 
political violence movements are mainly a result of the emergence of 
new social classes following recent socio-economic transformations; 
(3) political factors have been more contributive to the origin and 
development of politically violent organisations and political 
violence itself than have psychological factors; and, (4) there is a 
strong correlation between the socio-economic background of the 
leaders and members of the political violence movements and the 
pattern of political violence. 
The conventional Marxist explanation of political violence largely 
in terms of class conflict is no longer valid due to problems of its 
applicability to the countries of the Third World. Those countries 
are still in the process of evolving class boundaries and economic 
divisions which in turn are often camouflaged by other cleavages 
emanating out of ethnic, tribal, religious and cultural identities. 
Therefore, the author examines the above-mentioned hypothesis and its 
plausibility by using an analytical framework based on the following 
theories: Chalmers Johnson's theory of the Social System, James C. 
Davie's theory of the J-curve, Ted Robert Gurr's theory of Relative 
Deprivation, and Samuel P. Huntington's theory of Political 
Modernisation. The author will conduct a broad study of the 
hypothesis mentioned above within the context of these theories and 
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their applicability. Furthermore, these are some of the salient 
theories which represent the contemporary views of the phenomenon of 
political violence. 
Chalmers Johnson in his theory of social system analysis attempts 
to formulate a universal model of revolution. His approach is 
structural-functionalist, he argues that the occurence of multiple 
dysfunctions is conducive to revolution. Societal dysfunctions are 
generally attributed to new or rapidly developing processes. 
Johnson's theory has been subject to criticism but nevertheless 
presents a useful framework for analysis. 
James C. Davies' J-curve theory of rising expectations maintains 
that revolutions occur when there is an unacceptable gap between 
people's expectations and satisfaction of actual needs. He suggests 
that this gap appears when a period of general economic improvement is 
succeeded by a rapid and sharp economic reversal. More important than 
the economic circumstances is the subjective belief that economic 
gains will be lost. If the ensuing frustration and aggression is 
widespread, intense and focused on the government, then a revolution 
may follow. Thus, Davies applies the frustration and aggression 
thesis to connect a country's economic conditions to its society's 
potential for revolution. Although the J-curve theory has also been 
criticized as a theory with serious limitations, it is nevertheless an 
important theory in the study of political violence. 
Ted Robert Gurr, who is one of the major exponents of the 
behaviouralists, supports Davies' argument that widespread frustration 
and aggression directed against the government are conducive to 
revolution. Gurr identifies the systematic blocking of political and 
economic opportunities as a main cause of the frustration and 
aggression. In spite of the complexity of this theory it is widely 
accepted as an important theory. 
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Samuel P. Huntington, who is a major proponent of the political 
modernisation thesis, focuses on the question of why revolutions occur 
more frequently in modernising societies than in traditional and 
modern countries. This theory argues that the process of 
modernisation undermines the traditional political authority and 
institutions, and that revolutions are likely to take place during the 
period of transition before new institutions are established. The 
modernisation theory is important to this study as its main focus is 
on the developing countries of the Third World. It is the main thesis 
which addresses the political violence in modernising countries and, 
therefore, is particularly relevant to this study. 
1.8 Methodology 
The methodology of this study can be broadly divided into two main 
parts. They are as follows: (i) collection of data, and (ii) mode of 
analysis. 
Data has been collected from various primary and secondary sources 
for the following violence-related events: riots, terrorist attacks, 
assassinations and guerrilla warfare. The sources can be viewed as 
(i) published sources, or (ii) unpublished sources, discussions and 
interviews. The published sources include: The New York Times Index, 
The Amnesty International Reports, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
Facts on File, Britanica Books of the Year, The Annual Register of 
World Events, The Annual of Power and Conflict, Hansard in Sri Lanka 
and newspapers. Unpublished sources cover unpublished theses, the 
records of the Criminal Justice Commission (C. J. C. ) and Sri Lankan 
Government documents. Discussions and interviews were held with 
members and leaders of the political groups which were involved in 
political violence during the period under study, with other scholars 
who have already studied this area of research, and with government 
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officials who were involved in dealing with the political violence in 
Sri Lanka. 
Data collected as above has been viewed in a comparative context. 
Simple statistical methods have been applied in data analysis 
pertaining to the examination of hypotheses and theories adopted in 
this study. 
1.9 Study Procedure 
In order to achieve a more systematic and analytical approach the 
author has divided the research described in this thesis into seven 
major chapters, in addition to this first chapter, as shown below. 
The second chapter of this thesis, in which the theoretical 
approaches to the study of political violence are examined, is devoted 
to a review of relevant definitions, theories and typologies of 
political violence. The focal theories under discussion are that of 
Chalmers Johnson's Social-System theory, James C. Davies's J-curve 
theory, Ted Robert Gurr's Relative Deprivation theory and Samuel P. 
Huntington's Political Modernisation theory. 
In the third chapter, the scope of the study is narrowed to the 
long-term causes or preconditions which gave rise to the J. V. P. as an 
underground, politically violent organisation. The socio-economic and 
political processes since the end of colonial period are examined in 
this context. The fourth chapter is a review and analysis of the 
preconditions which contributed to the origin of the Tamil guerrilla 
organisations. The impact of socio-economic and political changes on 
the ethnic relationships between the Sinhalese and the Tamils before 
and after independence are also evaluated. 
The fifth chapter is devoted to the guerrilla organisations which 
have resorted to guerrilla warfare and political terrorism. They are 
examined from the following perspectives: origin and development of 
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the organisations, infrastructure, the socio-economic background of 
their membership and leaders, methods of fund raising and their 
international links. 
Inevitably the sixth chapter is concerned with the objectives, 
ideologies, programme and tactics of the guerrilla organisations which 
depend on violence as a stratagem. The seventh chapter deals with the 
mode and pattern of political violence from 1971 to 1987, the impact 
of the violence, and the measures adapted by the government to counter 
and control political violence in Sri Lanka. The pattern of political 
violence includes the methods of armed attack, participants, duration 
and intensity, the number of deaths and casualties, and the government 
response. Finally, an effort will be made in the concluding eighth 
chapter to establish which of the socio-economic and political factors 
identified in this study were most conducive to political violence in 
Sri Lanka during the period 1971-1987. This will consist of a 
comparison of the trends in contemporary Sri Lankan politics. 
1.10 Limitations of the Study 
As mentioned before, this study is concerned with political 
violence in Sri Lanka from 1971 to 1987, viewed as a case study of the 
Third World. The author has not attempted, however, to present an in- 
depth or comparative study in relation to any other guerrilla or 
terrorist organisation in the Third World. The present study is 
concerned with conflicts between the Sri Lankan Government and the 
people they govern. Therefore, another constraint of this study is 
that it does not focus on state-sponsored political violence and 
inter-group violence. Nevertheless, in spite of these limitations 
this study makes a serious attempt to examine the factors which 
impelled the youth of the Sinhalese and Tamil communities to play a 
decisive role in the guerrilla movements in Sri Lanka, and explores 
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the context within which such organisations flourished and gained 
ground. As a result this study may be particularly helpful to those 
researching similar guerrilla movements and activities in Third World 
countries in the future. 
The second chapter is concerned with the theoretical framework of 
this analysis. It focuses on the summary and criticism of four major 
approaches to the study, of political violence, and examines the 
variables of the typologies of political violence. 
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Chapter 2 
TºFX)RIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
In this second chapter the author focuses on the diverse and wide 
body of extant literature in order to build a theoretical framework 
for the study of political violence. The main objective of this 
theoretical analysis is threefold: firstly, to arrive at a working 
definition of political violence; secondly, to examine a theoretical 
framework which views political violence from an interdisciplinary 
approach; and finally, to examine the typologies of political violence 
and the variables which are used to measure it. For this purpose the 
author undertakes an overview of the definitions, theories and 
typologies of political violence on the basis of existing literature. 
Many different lines of argument and perspective are emphasized by 
researchers of this area. The author has been selective in his 
theoretical approach as a wide spectrum of theoretical techniques 
would cloud the analysis of the causes and patterns of political 
violence. Therefore, this chapter is divided under the following 
major headings: definitions of political violence, theories of 
political violence, Chalmers Johnson's Social-System theory, Davies's 
J-curve theory, Gurr's Relative Deprivation theory, Huntington's 
Modernisation theory, and the analytical model. 
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2.2 Definitions of Political Violence 
The concept of political violence is a broad area of study with 
significant variability in terms of its application and objectives. 
Its lack of independence as a specific field of study has rendered it 
a controversial and problematic concept. As P. Wilkinson observes, 
political violence is particularly difficult to clarify and analyse 
because it frequently involves the interaction and effects of the 
actions of many persons and collectives involving a multiplicity of 
motivations, psychological effects and subjective evaluations. 1 Harry 
Eckstein has observed that while earlier on the problem was the lack 
of a considered definition, the conceptualization now suffers from an 
over-abundance and too much diversity. 2 Thus, the nature of the 
concept and the wide area it covers makes it almost impossible to 
arrive at a generally accepted single definition of political 
violence. Yet, there are certain important definitions which focus on 
some of the salient aspects of political violence and provide a 
working definition. The author will touch upon some of the important 
and explicit definitions of political violence. 
Harry Eckstein in his definition of political violence chose to 
replace the term `revolution' with that of 'internal war'. He defined 
political violence as "any resort to violence within a political order 
geared to change its constitution, rulers or policies". 3 Eckstein's 
replacement of the term `revolution' with that of `internal war' has 
1 P. Wilkinson, Terrorism and Liberal State, (London: Macmillan, 
1986), p. 31. 
2 Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective 
Political Violence", in Ted Robert Gurr, ed. HandBook of Political 
Conflict: Theory and Research, (New York: The Free Press, 1980), pp. 
136-137. 
3 Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars", History and 
Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1965), p. 133. 
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raised much discussion and also criticism. One criticism is that some 
types of revolutions such as colonial revolts or military coups d' 
etat do not generally come within the purview of internal war. In 
addition, internal war is analogous to civil war and, therefore, 
rather than being unique, is best seen as one possible phase or stage 
in the development of a number of different types of revolution. 4 
Considering the criticism of this definition it becomes evident that 
Eckstein's approach presents serious limitations as a working 
definition. 
H. L. Nieburg has advanced the definition of political violence as 
"acts of disruption, destruction (and) injury whose purpose, choice of 
targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or 
effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the 
behaviour of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences 
for the social system". 5 Nieburg's definition, however, has been 
criticized on the grounds that it lacks precision and is too 
inclusive. Furthermore, the definition fails to distinguish violence 
perpetrated by the state or regime in power from the violence and 
related activities of the general populace. 6 
Samuel P. Huntington in his definition of political violence 
sought to limit the term revolution mainly to movements with 
objectives related to radical changes in the social structure, 
institutions and ideology. He defined a revolution as "a rapid, 
fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and 
myths of society, in its political institutions, social structure, 
4 Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary 
Historigraphy", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 88, (1973), p. 27. 
5 H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioural Process, (New 
York: St. : Martin's Press, 1969), p. 13. 
6 Perry Mars, "The Nature of Political Violence", Social and 
Economic Studies, Vol. 24, (1975), p. 228. 
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leadership, government activity and policies". 7 Huntington's 
definition too has been subject to criticism mainly on the premise 
that it disregards many significant types of political violence 
including peasant revolts, urban insurrections and provincial or 
national separatist rebellions. S Moreover, political violence is not 
identical with or intrinsic to what has been studied under the concept 
of revolution. Adopting such a definition for the study of political 
violence would lead to the exclusion of many dimensions both in a 
theoretical and comparative context. 
Chalmers Johnson defined revolution as a form of social change 
affected by the use of violence in government and/or regime and/or 
society. 9 Revolution in this sense means attempts made by non- 
governmental groups within a state to capture power and establish new 
political, social and economic structures. Lawrence Stone in 
analysing this definition has brought forward several serious 
limitations in its applicability. There are a wide range of 
governmental chances by means of violence which do not result in a 
mere replacement of personalities in positions of power, nor are they 
a pre-condition to the structuring of society. Furthermore, 
conservative counter-revolutions are excluded. Finally, the 
distinctions between colonial wars, civil wars and social revolutions 
are hard to define. 10 
For Ted Robert Gurr political violence meant "all collective 
attacks within a political community against the political regime, its 
7 S. P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264. 
S Perez Zagorin, op. cit., p. 28. 
9 Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, (Standford: 
The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964), pp. 4-6. 
10 Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution", World Politics, Vol. 
18,1966, p. 160. 
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actors, including competing political groups as well as incumbents, or 
its policies". 11 According to Gurr's definition armed attacks are 
political violence on the state by non-governmental political actors. 
Gurr's definition of political violence too has raised questions, the 
most obvious of which is: If political violence is comprised of 
collective attacks against a political regime, how does he define the 
collective defence of non-state bodies against attacks by a regime. 
Thus his failure to define violence originating from the regime 
weakens his definition of political violence. 
As shown above there is no general agreement on the definition of 
the subject. This leads one to conclude that political violence is a 
very broad term that is applied to all kinds of violent acts with a 
political motive. Thus, political violence is used as a term for 
events variously labelled as riots, rebellion, internal wars, turmoil, 
revolution, insurrection and other forms of violence. It will not be 
the task of this "study, however, to provide a generally agreed 
definition which covers all aspects of political violence. Therefore, 
the present study will examine political violence as pre-planned armed 
attacks by an organised group or groups to capture or change political 
power in a domestic political system. 
2.3 Theories on Political Violence 
The main purpose of this section is to give a general overview of 
the major theories pertaining to the study of political violence. 
Since the early 1960s, the growing interest in political violence has 
resulted in the formulation of numerous theories in this field. In a 
review of the literature on political violence Jack Goldstone 
identified three generations of studies. The first generation, 
11 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), pp. 3-4. 
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including works by Brinton and Edwards, was primarily descriptive in 
that it identified preconditions and stages in the process of 
revolution, but lacked a solid theoretical basis. 12 The second 
generation theorized about the determinants of revolutionary activity 
by focusing on the rebels' intentional actions, whether psychological 
in origin or rational but violent, extensions of ordinary political 
conflict. The third generation, including Skocpol's study13 has been 
more sensitive to the historical and social-structural context and 
thus is able to account for the diversity of outcomes. 14 
As mentioned above, this study does not attempt to survey 
literature on political violence as a whole but is an overview of the 
major theories belonging to the second generation from the following 
approaches: social-structural, social-psychological and politico- 
economic. The main reasons for emphasizing these three approaches are 
the following: first, that. they are basically concerned with internal 
or domestic forms of political violence. Secondly, the theoretical 
assumptions of the study are mainly derived from these approaches. 
Finally, these theories include the major theories in the field of 
political violence. As there are many arguments pertaining to these 
approaches the author will present each of the four theories in brief 
and go on to outline its major criticisms. 
12 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, (Englewood Cliffs 
N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1938); Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of 
Revolution, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927). 
13 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
14 Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third 
Generation", World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2, (April 1980), pp. 425- 
453. 
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2.4 Chalmers Johnson's Social System Theory 
This study will focus on Chalmers Johnson who is a major exponent 
of the social-system approach to political violence, having 
espostulated some of the salient points of the social-structural 
argument. He made known his theory first in Revolution and the Social 
System (1964) and later in, Revolutionary Change (1966). 
Johnson's simplest observation of violence is that it is a form of 
human behaviour. Having been influenced by Max Weber's analysis of 
social action, however, his final definition of violence is that it is 
action which deliberately or unintentionally disorients the behaviour 
of others. 15 It has to be noted that Johnson does not dwell on the 
concept. of violence but chooses to focus on a universal model of 
revolution which, according to him, is a-phenomenon of wide-ranging 
implications. By using Talcot Parsons' systems theory, Johnson views 
revolution as a means of social change which has to be studied within 
the social systems in which it occurs. 16 Revolution is the "purposive 
implementation of at strategy of violence in order to effect a change 
in the social structure". 17 
Johnson maintains that the key to both the study and the 
conceptualization of revolutionary violence lies in social system 
analysis. The main features of a social structure are defined as the 
roles, norms, status positions and the various functions of the 
components that make a structure. The emergence of pressures within a 
previously stable social system may present certain sources of change. 
The typology of social change are as follows: 
15 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little Brown, 
1966), p. 8. 
16 Ibid. p. 3. 
17 Ibid. p. 57. 
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i. exogenous (externally derived) value-changing sources such as: 
global communications; the rise of "external reference" groups, (e. g., 
the effects of the French and Russian revolutions on neighbouring 
populations); the internal mobilisations and refugee migrations caused 
by wars; and the work of groups such as Christian missionaries, and 
Communist parties. 
ii. endogenous (arising within the system) value-changing sources 
such as: the displacement of religious authorities; the corrosive 
effects on scholasticism of the theories of Bacon, Descartes and 
others; changes in values that are brought about as a result of 
intellectual developments; and the acceptance of creative innovations. 
iii. exogenous environment-changing sources such as: the 
introduction of modern medical knowledge into underdeveloped 
countries, which often rapidly alters birth and mortality rates; 
market stimulations as a result of foreign trade; imported 
technological skills; military conquest; the migration of populations; 
and intersystemic diplomatic relations. 
iv. endogenous environment-changing sources refer to the internal 
technological innovations such as the invention of the wheel or the 
railroad. 1 8 
Once the pressures of these changes are exerted on a social 
system, the system could either adapt to these changes or fail to do 
so. What is important to this theory is the inability of a system to 
cope with such pressures as it creates a condition of "multiple 
dysfunctions". In a condition of multiple dysfunctions the role of 
the political elite is significant. Within the context of such a 
society "two clusters of mutually influencing necessary or remote 
causes of revolution should be operational for a revolution to 
L8 Ibid. pp. 67-72. 
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occur". 19 First, there are the pressures created by a disequilibrated 
social system -a society which is changing and which is in need of 
further change if it is to continue to exist. One such variable is 
power deflation where the integration of a society subject to change 
depends largely on the "maintenance and deployment of force" by those 
who hold positions of authority. Afghanistan after the 1979 Soviet 
invasion is put forward as an example of a social system characterized 
by power deflation. 
The second variable occurs when "the use of force by the elite is 
no longer considered legitimate". when the use of force is thus 
considered there is a "loss of authority". 20 The existence of these 
two variables, however, does not indicate that a revolution is 
inevitable. Instead, the effective use of force may lead to a police 
state. South Africa and Iran in the year preceding the fall of the 
Shah are cited as examples of a police state. According to Johnson, 
the conditions generated by a disequilibrated social system can never 
themselves be sufficient causes of a revolution. The ultimate cause 
of revolution depends on some "ingredient", usually contributed by 
"fortune". 21 This ingredient either deprives the elite of its primary 
means of maintaining social behaviour (e. g. an army mutiny) or makes 
the revolutionaries perceive that they hold a position by which the 
elite could be deprived of their "weapons of coercion". 22 In this 
study, such final or immediate causes of revolution are referred to as 
`accelerators'. 
Thus the elite in a disequilibrated society is faced with the task 
of understanding that the society is disequilibrated and taking the 
is Ibid. P. 91. 
20 Ibid. P. 91. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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necessary measures to restore equilibrium or resist pressures for 
change. Johnson argues that there are five alternate courses of 
action for an elite to adapt. They are: "conservative change", 
"barely adequate change", "abdication of authority", "an incompetent 
response", and finally "elite intransigence". 23 It is elite 
intransigence which always "serves as a remote cause of revolution". 24 
For Johnson elite intransigence means: 
The frank, wilful pursuit of reactionary policies by 
an elite - that is, policies which exacerbate rather 
than rectify a dissynchronized social structure, or 
txolicies that violate the formal, envalued norms of 
the system which the elite is charged with 
preserving. 25 
In a society with multiple dysfunctions and elite intransigence it 
is an accelerator or a "trigger" which finally brings about a 
revolution. An accelerator is a single event which bears two main 
implications. First, it indicates that the elite is no longer in a 
position to monopolize force. Secondly, it generates an understanding 
among the revolutionaries that any resort to violence against the 
system is likely to be successful. 
This theory defines three broad types of such accelerators. The 
first type is the subversion of the armed forces as manifested in 
defeats in war and army mutinies. These accelerators are so forceful 
that they could bring about a revolution despite the absence of a 
revolutionary party. The second class of accelerator is based on a 
belief shared by the revolutionaries that they could overcome the 
forces of the authorities. Belief in divine intervention and the 
expectation that a single attack would lead to mass mobilisation are 
23 Ibid. pp. 96-97. 
24 Ibid. p. 94. 
25 Ibid. 
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among this type of accelerator. The third type relates to the 
strategy adopted by the revolutionaries, an example of which is 
Thus Johnson suggests an apparently simple guerrilla warfare. 26 
causal model of revolution which has been represented as follows: 
Changes + Multiple dysfunctions + Elite intransigence 
+ Accelerator = Revolution. 27 
In the model of revolution thus demonstrated Johnson goes on to 
discuss a typology of revolution which shall be addressed below when 
discussing the typologies of political violence in general. 
Chalmers Johnson identifies six types of political violence by 
adapting the following criteria, which have been discerned at an 
abstract level: 
a. Targets or aims of revolutionary activity: the revolution is 
aimed at substituting personnel in the government, replacing the 
entire political reime or forcing the resettlement of the community. 
b. Identity of the revolutionaries: they represent or originate 
from the elite or the masses. 
c. Revolutionary goals or ideology: eschatological, nostalgic, 
nation-forming elite or nationalist. 
d. Whether the revolution'is spontaneous or pre-planned. 28 
Johnson, finds it necessary, however, to further explain his 
criteria. In this context targets raise the first question as to 
whether a revolution results in the replacement of only a portion of 
the government, the entire regime or even the community. 29 Community 
is viewed as a dynamic concept, characterized by a division of labour, 
26 Ibid. p. 99. 
27 A. C. Cohan, Theories of Revolution: An Introduction, (London: 
Nelson, 1975), p. 128. 
25 Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and Social System, Hoover 
Institute Studies, 3, (Stanford University, 1964), pp. 27-28. 
29 Ibid. p. 28. 
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which unifies and is a means by, which people perceive their social 
life. The criterion of mass or elite-led revolution refer to those 
who perceive the dysfunctional conditions within the society. The 
criterion of ideology deals with the proposed methods of easing social 
dysfunction and the alternate regimes suggested by the 
revolutionaries. Johnson's six types of political violence are as 
follows: 
1. The Jacquerie: The target of a Jacquerie rebellion is the 
government. The rebellion has limited goals, and is characterized by 
a mass uprising of peasants who act spontaneously. The accelerators 
of this type of rebellion have immediate effects such as famines and 
wars. The conditions conducive for a Jacquerie may exist for some 
time but a particular occurrence such as a defeat in war may indicate 
that the elites are incapable of performing their role. A 
characteristic response would be a purge of local elites by the 
masses. 
2. The Millenarian Rebellion: Millenarian rebellions are defined 
as those which are caused by unidentified sources of dysfunctions. 
The alternate way of recognizing the changes that are necessary to 
elevate the dysfunctions is to rely on the belief that supernatural 
forces would cause such changes. These rebellions have taken place in 
traditional societies which have been forced to change by external 
forces such as industrialism, imperialism and secularism. 
3. The Anarchistic Rebellion: This category of rebellion occurs as 
a result of changes made in response to the dysfunctions perceived by 
the majority of the population. The motivation behind an anarchistic 
rebellion is the dissatisfaction with the previous changes and the 
perception of dysfunctions after such changes have occurred. Hence, 
these rebellions are made by members with a bleak future, and are 
aimed at the government or regime. Their ideology is based on an 
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ideal which means making additional but much more radical social 
changes. 
4. The Jacobin Communist Revolution: This type of revolution 
attempts to transform almost every substructure in a society. The 
social system is characterized by multiple systemic dysfunctions. An 
accelerator causes revolution within one group and this revolution in 
turn acts as an accelerator towards revolutions amongst other groups. 
The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution are two examples. 
5. The Conspiratorial Coup d' etat: This pattern of revolution 
narrows Johnson's typology to a micro level. The conspiratorial coup 
d' etat is an attempt by a limited and select group, who share a 
common grievance, to bring about revolutionary change. Such 
revolutions are pre-planned and are void of mass support. The ideology 
of these revolutions is elitist or tutelary, e. g. the Egyptian coup of 
1952, and the Ghana coup of 1966. 
6. The Militarized Mass Insurrection: The distinguishing character 
of this form of revolution is that it is a pre-planned revolution with 
a revolutionary strategy and mass support. Although this type of 
revolution is launched by a mass segment of the population, it is 
engineered by a "conspirational revolutionary general staff", and is 
nationalist oriented. The more widely known revolutions which come 
within the purview of this typology are the Chinese Revolution (1937- 
49), and the Algerian Revolution (1945-62). 30 
It is noteworthy that Johnson continuously juggles the terms 
revolution and rebellion as if he refers to the same type of political 
violence. Johnson does not seem to recognize political terrorism as 
part of the pattern of political violence in this typology. Johnson 
himself admits, however, that the major weakness in his criteria of 
30 Ibid. pp. 34-57. 
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differentiation lies in his failure to consider the "type of system 
and the sources of dysfunction". 31 
Johnson's theory appears to be a carefully organised model of 
revolution which discusses some of the important aspects of political 
violence. Unfortunately, in-depth studies of Johnson's approach and 
model have revealed that several shortcomings which have important 
implications for the application of his theory. The first criticism 
is related to Johnson's definition of revolution which is found to be 
inconsistent with his conception of violence and typology of 
revolution. Johnson's definition of revolution indicates that it 
involves violent social change, which means that revolutionary change 
is violent. Of the six types of revolution defined by Johnson, the 
Jacquerie, the Millenarian Rebellion, and the Anarchistic Rebellion do 
not result in a change of the existing regime. Chice the uprisings 
have been defeated, the former regimes are restored to power, thereby 
avoiding any form of social change as perceived in Johnson's 
definition. The inconsistency in definition and typology is a 
weakness of Johnson's theory which restricts its definitional value 
and applicability to the study of political violence. 
Johnson has further failed to predict the occurrence of events or 
a series of events prior to their occurrence as in any given causal 
model. His model states that multiple dysfunctions and elite 
intransigence are pre-conditions for a revolution which is triggered 
by an accelerator. Finally, what activates a revolution is the 
understanding of most of the populace that the elite no longer control 
the forces of authority. Johnson seems to have achieved a sequential 
model which merely examines a revolution "post facto", but has failed 
to formulate a causal model predicting the occurrence of a revolution 
prior to its actual manifestation. In addition, the sequence given by 
31 Ibid. p. 30. 
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Johnson is questionable as all revolutions do not follow the same 
sequential pattern. 
The concept of accelerators is crucial to Johnson's model. He 
defines three types of accelerators which mark the starting point of a 
revolution. Johnson contends that the "final cause of revolution is 
some ingredient usually contributed by fortune". The use of the 
concept of fortune or fate is hardly acceptable for the analysis of 
such a complex phenomenon as political violence. Perhaps the most 
significant limitation of Johnson's theory lies in its inability to 
deal with the socio-economic and political processes of a given 
society. Societies which have been subject to colonialism are 
particularly relevant in considering the forms of socio-economic and 
political changes which take place. Johnson's apparent neglect, of 
politico-economic changes poses a serious limitation. .1 theory based 
on a mono-causal experience thus cannot be applied to analyse 
political violence which has been subject to distinct socio-economic 
and political processes. Furthermore, according to Johnson the 
following indices are symptoms of social dysfunction: suicide rates, 
heightened ideological activity, the proportion of uniformed armed 
police forces to the total population, and the ratio of political to 
general crimes. Johnson's attempts to measure the disequilibrated 
social system can hardly be termed as even suggestive, and Johnson as 
much as admits its primitive quality. 32 As has been seen, Johnson's 
theory is characterized by definitional inconsistency, weakness in the 
application of the causal model, and inability to comprehend the 
significance of the concept of disequilibrium within the framework of 
certain Third'World societies. 
32 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., (1966), p. 
132. 
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2.5 James C. Davies' J- carve Theory 
The J-curve theory of revolution, as presented by James C. Davies, 
has been reformulated and adapted to the study of other indicators of 
political violence. In this discussion the author examines the J- 
curve theory, including one of its adaptations, and then focuses on 
its applicability to the study of political violence in Sri Lanka. 
The most systematic attempt to relate the dynamics of frustration- 
aggression to political violence is Davies's theory of the J-curve. 
He has been influenced in its formulation by the Marxist theory that 
revolutions occur when there is socio-economic degradation, and by de 
Tocqueville's theory that revolutions occur when economic conditions 
improve. Consequently, revolution is accordingly seen by Davies as 
the effect of neither poverty nor economic improvement alone but of a 
certain sequence of the two. Thus influenced, Davies maintains that 
revolutions are most inevitable in societies which first have 
experienced economic and social growth, and are subsequently faced 
with a period of "sharp reversal during which the gap between 
expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes 
intolerable". 33 The period of socio-economic improvement is marked by 
expectations to satisfy needs. What is significant is that when this 
period of growth and heightened expectation is followed by a period of 
decline, a mental or psychological condition of anxiety and 
frustration is generated. The relevance of this mental state of mind 
or social mood is emphasized in relation to its impact on the 
political instability of a society. 34 
Davies observes that people who are at a marginal state or level 
of existence and are deprived of resources, remain politically passive 
33 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", in James C. 
Davies, (ed), When Men Revolt and Why: A Reader in Political Violence 
and Revolutions, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 136. 
34 See, Appendix 2. 
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and inactive. This passivity is explained by the fact that within the 
framework of an impoverished society people tend to endure hardships 
and detach themselves from any activity other than mere survival. The 
family remains the basic unit of interaction, and social contact is 
restricted to the limits of survival. Such levels of low social 
interaction do not permit a high level of political awareness and 
participation. Davies' conclusions are based mainly on studies and 
reports of the Minnesota starvation experiment conducted during World 
War II, and the reported behaviour of victims/inmates in Nazi 
concentration camps. -35 The studies indicated a constant preoccupation 
with food on the part of people who are on the verge of starvation. 
Davies admits though that these conditions would not prove to be of 
such extremes in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, the high degree 
of passivity and concern for mere existence dominates life and erases 
the scope for community action. It is only when the influence of 
these bonds are reduced that people find themselves in a position of 
"proto-rebelliousness"-- that is, the frustration built tip in these 
circumstances could be thwarted by natural causes or minor social 
reforms. 
According to Davies, it is the dissatisfied state of mind rather 
than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of 
food, equality or liberty which produces the revolution. Thereby, he 
argues that conditions conducive for a revolution necessitate a period 
of sharp reversal after a long period of socio-economic development 
and a continued expectation of heightened opportunities to attain 
basic needs. These needs are divided into four broad categories: 
(i) physical needs (food, clothing, shelter, health and 
safety from bodily harm); 
(ii) social affectional needs (ties of family and friends); 
35 James C. Davies, op. cit., p. 136. 
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(iii) needs for self-esteem or dignity; and 
(iv) self-actualization. 36 
Each category of the "proto-revolutionary" society is affected by 
the deprivation of any of these diverse needs, and the gap differs 
from category to category. What is intrinsically important in this 
argument is that the basic needs of the would-be revolutionaries are 
threatened or are perceived of as being threatened. This threat does 
not imply that people would be reduced to impoverished conditions, but 
does create a state of mind or mood that basic needs are threatened or 
will not be fulfilled. It is a mental condition rather than an 
absolute threat which is operational within the society. Davies 
argues that "political stability and instability are ultimately, 
dependent on a state of mind, a mood, in a society".. 3 If the 
frustration which emerges from this mental condition "is sufficiently 
widespread, intense and focused on government, the violence will 
become a revolution that displaces irrevocably the ruling government 
and changes markedly the power structure of society or a rebellion 
modifying but not displacing the system within which it is 
contained". 38 In the broadest sense, he sees revolution as a series 
of violent civil disturbances which cause the displacement of one 
ruling group with another and which has a broader popular basis of 
support. 
The options of averting a revolution are two-fold. Rising 
expectations could be controlled by the use of force. The forced 
... _ .... .......... _ __........ . 36 James C. Davies, "Circumstances and Causes of Revolution: A 
Review", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, (1967), p. 255. 
37 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", op. cit., p. 
136. 
38 James C. Davies, "The J-curve of Rising and Declining 
Satisfactions as a Cause of Revolutions and Rebellion", in Hugh Davies 
Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, (eds), Violence in America: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 
415. 
46 
reduction of expectations, however, could serve as an effective means 
of overcoming revolutionary conditions only in limited circumstances. 
The most effective means, according to Davies, depends on the 
government's response to newly emerging needs. The gratification of 
dynamic needs by the ruling group eliminates the possibility of 
widespread and intense frustration building up in a society, thereby 
greatly reducing the likelihood of a revolution occurring. 
In a further development of the J-curve theory, Davies found it 
necessary to discuss the forms of violence which occur in conditions 
of regression and frustration. The J-curve argument maintains that 
the ensuing frustration from socio-economic regression gains direction 
and meaning only when it is focused against the government. The 
violence which results from such frustration could finally emerge as a 
revolution or a rebellion. Davies states that "revolution and 
rebellion differ in result but have like origins". 39 In a revolution 
the government is overthrown and far-reaching changes are made in the 
social and power structure. In a rebellion, however, the system is 
subject to modification rather than displacement. A revolution 
involves wider participation, greater depth and intensity of feeling, 
all of which have been developing for years, and which will result in 
intense political violence and thus in lasting bitterness. 
Rebellions, on the other hand, are unsuccessful revolutions because 
the anger is not sufficiently developed, intense and widespread to 
withstand the pressure imposed by the government. The economic 
conditions in a rebellion are not grave enough to produce a 
revolutionary mental condition amongst a wider population. Davies 
makes a further distinction between revolution, rebellion and civil 
war by observing that "revolution succeeds, rebellion fails and civil 
39 Ibid. p. 416. 
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wars leave the question open". 10 In addition, Davies cites riots and 
demonstrations as examples of violent outbreaks falling into the 
pattern of the J-curve. The widening of the applicability of the 
theory of revolution to other indicators of violence, however, does 
not imply that it is a universal model which covers all revolutions. 
Nevertheless, to substantiate his argument Davies discusses the French 
Revolution of 1789, the Dorrs Rebellion of 1842 (Rhode Island), the 
American Civil War of 1861, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Nazi 
revolution of 1933, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, and the Black 
rebellion of the 1960s in greater detail. 
The J-curve theory as discussed above has been the basic source 
for Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky's adaptation of a theory of 
revolution. Instead of the concept of economic growth and regression 
this theory applies the concept of "achievement". Achievement is 
perceived of as a concept with many aspects varying from socio- 
economic development to cultural and political development. A high 
rate of achievement increases aspirations which are defined as 
optimism arising from the past. Achievement and aspirations are 
interdependent variables which rise together and increase the need to 
acquire social commodities. When conditions are on the reverse, 
however, and achievement decreases, - the variable of expectations is 
introduced to approximate with the decrease in achievement. The gap 
between expectations and achievement is potentially revolutionary, and 
the widening of the gap signifies a more profound and intense 
revolution spanning a longer period of time. 41 In their approach 
Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky test the relationship between 
particular indicators of achievement and revolution. 42 
10 Ibid. p. 418. 
41 See, Appendix 3. 
42 Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, (1967), pp. 263-280. 
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At. a superficial level the J-curve theory and its adaptation give 
useful insights to the study of revolution, and together serve as a 
useful model. In applying the theoretical framework of the J-curve, 
however, it becomes evident that there are significant constraints on 
its wider applicability especially in Third World societies. 
According to the J-curve argument, the means of predicting a 
revolution depend on assessing the mood of the people. Their mental 
condition is an indicator of the level of frustration which 
subsequently leads to a revolution. Davies suggests investigative 
techniques which have been applied by other social scientists to 
assess the mood of the people during political instability. One such 
technique is that of systematic public opinion analysis. 43 Davies 
further cites strikes, employment levels, exports and cost of living 
as data from which the mood of the people could be inferred. Although, 
indices such as strikes and cost of living are more relevant in 
assessing the mood of the people, 'cruder indicators such as value of 
exports may prove useful. This technique involves the aplication of 
data collected over an extended period. 
hat is significant in discussing the possible means of inferring 
the people's state of mind is the question: How does one apply these 
methods within the socio-economic and political framework of Third 
World countries. The interview method involves assessing some overt 
expression of the people's political ideas and feelings. Many Third 
World countries are characterized by political instability, weak 
opposition and the use of government force. In light of such 
conditions the interview method has been questioned as a valid method 
of investigation, and as an effective means of inferring the people's 
43 According to Davies the same technique had been applied in 
Germany during and after the blockade of 1948. The results had 
indicated a sense of security which was lacking earlier. James C. 
Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", 1971, p. 146. 
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state of mind. For example, Sri Lanka has experienced a curtailment 
of political freedom and violence at the electoral level since the 
1960s. 44 A repressive government has sought to weaken the political 
opposition and to impose* tight control of all means of expressing 
effective political protest by the people such as strikes, 
demonstrations and elections. Any attempt to derive an assessment of 
the people's mood in this political climate should be based on other 
indicators than those derived from the interview method or those 
suggested by Davies. Davies himself admits that. where there are seeds 
of revolution, established governments are not, likely to welcome 
social scientists in search of data or allow them to conduct public 
opinion surveys inquiring about. attitudes toward the government. 45 
Political indicators would be most useful within such a context. 
Nevertheless, the J-curve theory is more concerned with the psychology 
of potential rebels than with their social or political situation, or 
the different kinds of responses they meet from other groups and 
above all from governments. 
The techniques of analysis referred to by Davies were conceived 
and have been perfected in societies which are characterized by a high 
degree of industrialization, a distinct division of labour, 
urbanization, and a highly advanced and sophisticated system of 
communication. Given the features of these societies, the population 
is characterized by socio-economic and political individuation. Third 
44 Elections have always been marred by a few acts of violence 
since Sri Lankan independence in 1948. From 1965 the pattern of 
electoral violence changed and assumed a form of systematic organized 
political revenge. Since 1970 the violence had spread to most parts 
of the country and had escalated in intensity. The violence often led 
to grave crimes, including looting, arson, destruction of property and 
even rape and murder. 
45 James C. Davies, "The J-curve of Rising and Declining 
Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained 
Rebellion", in Graham and Gurr, (eds), Violence in America, 1979, p. 
418. 
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World countries, however, are characterized by a flexible division of 
labour, a predominantly rural sector, a less complex differentiation 
of social and economic roles and, more significantly, by a less social 
and political individuation. Consequently, it is hardly possible to 
observe a sudden decline of output of goods and services after a 
period of prolonged and more or less steady economic growth in Third 
World countries such as Sri Lanka. Furthermore, evidence pertaining 
to Sri Lanka in the subsequent chapters challenges the theoretical 
weakness of the "revolution of rising expectations" where socio- 
economic and political factors are more important than a 'state of 
mind' in explaining political violence. Evidently these techniques of 
analysis and Davies' theoretical formulation were expounded in totally 
different societies which have already undergone diverse modernising 
social, economic and political processes. The disparity extant in the 
socio-economic and political context, however, is not the only reason 
for the limitations in applying the J-curve hypothesis to Third World 
societies. 
There are siginficant limitations in Davies' theoretical 
formulation as empirical applications reveal that it is impossible to 
define the extent and duration of frustration on the basis of survey 
data. In some instances Davies' analysis spans a period of about 
fifty years during which the "state of mind", is supposedly 
transmitted. The problem in this context is not only the prohibitive 
time frame but also the form in which this state of mind is 
transmitted and how it is measured. '6 Thus, the predictive power of 
the J-curve is almost non-existent, quite contrary to the expectations 
of an analysis of revolutionary situations. What Davies achieves is 
an analysis or explanation of revolutionary actions only after they 
46 Ekkart Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: 
Theories and Research, (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1983), p. 362. 
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have occurred. He cannot predict, however, when a revolutionary 
outbreak is to take place, as he acknowledges. 47 
Furthermore, Davies is unable to suggest a means by which one 
could define when the gap between expectations and gratifications 
becomes intolerable. He merely suggests that at some stage a mental 
mood develops where the gap is no longer bearable. The next criticism 
of the J-curve theory is that he fails to explain how the 
revolutionary mood or state of mind is changed into revolutionary 
action which is sufficiently intense to overthrow the regime in power. 
Another limitation in the empirical analysis of this theory is 
that it does not classify the groups which experience this frustration 
within a society and subsequently resort to political violence. Nor 
does it. disclose whether these frustrated clusters are the same 
clusters which resort to violence. In societies with class and caste 
stratifications such definitions become important in analysing 
political violence. The evidence of discontent prevails among various 
segments of society prior to revolution- as well as in social and 
political continuity. Hence what Davies fails to achieve is a 
distinction between pre-revolutionary frustrations and the 
frustrations that contribute to political continuity. 48 
Davies cites examples from the pre-revolutionary situation in 
Russia to support his argument that conditions conducive for a 
revolution exist when socio-economic growth is arrested and heightened 
expectations are frustrated. The Mexican experience, however, 
indicates that these are not essential pre-conditions for a 
47 James C. Davies, "Comments: The J-curve and Power Struggle 
Theories of Collective Violence", American Sociological Review, Vol. 
39, (1974), p. 609. 
{g Rod Aya, "Theories of Revolution Considered", Theory and 
Society, Vol. 7, (1979), pp. 53-54 
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revolution. 19 Unlike the Russian situation, the conditions of the 
Mexican peasantry were ignored by the regime in power and any changes 
led to the further deprivation of the peasantry. The mass support for 
the revolutionary violence of 1915 in Mexico was more the result of 
deteriorating conditions than of frustrated expectations of 
improvement. Hence, Davies' argument that revolutions do not occur in 
conditions of impoverishment is strongly negated. Eckstein observes 
that the chief problem with the J-curve theory is the abundance of 
counter examples. Consider for instance the many countries in which 
the Great Depression of the 1930s did not increase political 
violence. 50 
Tenter and Midlarsky's study of seventeen revolutions from 1955 to 
1960 was based on the concepts of achievement and aspiration. 
Regrettably, however, they have not. circumvented the basic weaknesses 
of the J-curve argument but have merely widened the indicators of 
violence. It has to be noted that Davies does not lay claim to the 
formulation of a complete and all-embracing theory of revolution. It 
is evident, however, that in Davies' theoretical and practical 
application, his emphasis on social and economic conditions seriously 
limits the theoretical understanding of revolution. Political factors 
and certain historical processes are some of the salient factors which 
enter into the explanation of revolution. Thus, it is a combination 
of factors rather than one factor alone which provides an adequate 
understanding of revolution. 
49 For Mexican Revolution see: Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the 
Twentieth Century, (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), PP. 3-50. 
50 Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining 
Collective Political Violence" in T. R. Gurr, (ed), Handbook of 
Political Conflict, 1980, p. 158. 
53 
2.6 Gurr's Theory of Relative Deprivation 
The social-psychological theories purport to explain the 
occurrence of political violence. They draw heavily on the 
frustration-aggression model to formulate a causal model of violence. 
In contrast to the J-curve theory which is concerned with defining the 
conditions in which a revolution may occur, the proponents of relative 
deprivation trace the origins of revolutionary motivation to the minds 
of the masses. Theorists such as Gurr, Feierabend and Nesvold have 
constructed models on the basis of this theory. Since Gurr's model of 
political violence is the most sophisticated of these, the author 
concentrates on Gurr's model of civil strife. Gurr's theory is an 
attempt to analyse the following three aspects of political violence: 
its sources, magnitude, and forms. 
In tracing a causal link in political violence Gurr finds that the 
development of discontent is followed by the politicisation of that 
discontent and finally, by its realization in "violent acts against 
political objects and actors". 51 The fundamental variable, which is 
the psychological variable, is relative deprivation. Within the 
context of this theory relative deprivation is defined as: 
Actors' perception of the discrepancy between their 
value expectations and their value capabilities. 
Value expectations are the goods and conditions of 
life to which people believe they are rightfully 
entitled. Value capabilities are the., goods and 
conditions of life they think they are capable of 
getting and keeping. 52 
Values are defined by Gurr as "the desired events, objects, and 
conditions for which men strive". 53 They are divided into three 
51 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., (1970), p. 48. 
52 Ibid. p. 24. 
53 Ibid. p. 25. 
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general sets: welfare values, power values and interpersonal values. 
Welfare values are those that contribute directly to physical well- 
being and self-realization. Power values are those that determine the 
extent to which men can influence the actions of others yet avoid 
unwanted interference in their own actions. Interpersonal values are 
the psychological satisfactions sought in nonauthoritative interaction 
with other individuals and groups. 54 Therefore, relative deprivation 
is not a discrepancy between an ideal position and reality. Rather, 
it is a discrepancy between what is perceived as being possible to 
achieve, and what one is legitimately entitled to but does not receive 
or attain. The stronger the goals that people aspire to, the higher 
the relative deprivation if they do not succeed. Deriving a causal 
link from the psychological theory, Gurr sees anger as a response to 
deprivation, and aggression as a response to anger. One of the facets 
determining the intensity and duration of this anger is defined as a 
perception of a wide discrepancy between expectations and 
capabilities, which results in a higher level of discontent. 
Furthermore, as greater importance is attached to the effected values, 
fewer alternatives are available and there is less time to make a 
decision. 55 In Gurr's analysis of relative deprivation he finds it a 
dynamic concept where the patterns of change are operational in value 
expectations and value capabilities. More formally Gurr's central 
proposition is: 
RD=Ve -Vc 
Ve 
54 Ibid. pp. 25-26. 
55 Ibid. p. 59. 
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where, RD stands for "relative deprivation", Ve stands for "value 
expectations", and Vc stands for "value capabilities". 56 
As a means of evaluating the intensity and the scope of the 
relative deprivation within such a context, three patterns of 
disequilibrium are defined. The first is decremental deprivation 
where a group's value expectations remain relatively constant but 
their value capabilities are perceived to decline. In such 
circumstances people lose what they once had or expected to obtain, 
and instead experience relative deprivation in relation to their past 
condition. Such events as decreases in the production of material 
goods, decline in the political elite's capacities to maintain order 
or resolve crises, the imposition of foreign rule, and the loss of 
faith in societal integration, beliefs and norms of action, are cited 
as instances of decremental deprivation. This form of relative 
deprivation is also considered possible among one or more segments of 
society as members of a particular group may experience loss in 
relation to other groups. Instances of such loss are: the imposition 
of progressive taxation on the wealthy and of regressive taxation on 
the poor; the loss of political influence by the elites; the barring 
of the opposition from political activity; and the loss of middle- 
class influence and status vis-a-vis the working class. 57 I 
In aspirational deprivation, value capabilities remain relatively 
static while expectations increase or intensify. The experience of 
anger is generated by the following: lack of means for attaining 
expectations; increases in demands for greater amounts of value held 
in various ways such as material goods, or more political order and 
justice; increases in demands for previously weakly-demanded values; 
56 Faye Crosby, "Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to 
filler, Bolce, and Halligam", American Political Science Review, Vol. 
73, (1979), p. 107. 
57 Ibid. pp. 46-47. 
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or demands for new values such as the participation of colonial groups 
in politics. 58 
Finally, in progressive deprivation there is a substantial and 
simultaneous increase in expectations but a decrease in capabilities. 
Gurr refers to progressive deprivation as a "generalized version" of 
the Davies model. It is said to occur when value capabilities, which 
have stabilized or declined following a long-term period of steady 
improvement in people's value positions, have led to expectations of 
continued improvement. According to Gurr, progressive deprivation is 
most common in societies in which ideological and systemic change is 
occurring simultaneously. The situations Gurr cites as being 
potentially conducive to progressive deprivation are economic 
depression in a growing economy and the articulation of the ideology 
of modernisation in societies unable to live up to this promise of 
progress. 59 All three patterns have been found to be causal for 
political violence. 
For purposes of measuring deprivation Gurr compiles two general 
types of measures, which are persistant (long-term) deprivation and 
short-term deprivation. These measures are constructed from aggregate 
indicators some of which for long-term deprivation are: '(i) economic 
discrimination (exclusion of some groups from the economic arena); 
(ii) political discrimination (exclusion of groups from the political 
arena); (iii) political separation which include separatist, regional 
or ethnic groups; (iv) the dependence upon foreign capital by the 
country in question; (v) religious cleavages; and (vi) lack of 
educational opportunity. 60 The short-term indicators are: (i) short- 
s Ibid. pp. 50-52. 
59 Ibid. pp. 52-56 
60 Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative 
Analysis Using New Indices", American Political Science Review, Vol. 
62, (1968), p. 1110, 
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term trends in trade values, 1957-60 compared with 1950-7; (ii) the 
same in 1960-3 compared with 1950-60; (iii) inflation in 1960-63 
compared with 1958-61; (iv) the GNP growth rates of 1960-63 compared 
with the 1950's; and (v) the index of `adverse' economic conditions 
from 1960-63 which includes factors such as crop failures, 
unemployment, and new restrictions on political participation and 
representation by the regime. 6' 
The causal link between discontent and participation in strife by 
the population is mediated by intervening variables within society. 
The main societal variables discussed by Gurr are coercive potential, 
institutionalization, social facilitation and the legitimacy of the 
political regime in which strife occurs. 62 Priority is given to the 
deterrent effect of punishment by the state. Gurr fails, however, to 
discern a linear relationship between increasing levels of coercion 
and declining levels of violence. Instead, he perceives force as a 
variable which intensifies resistance and invokes greater force from 
the dissidents. 63 High levels of coercion appear to limit the extent 
of strife but comparative studies have failed to establish a 
relationship. Comparative studies have indicated, however, the 
importance of "loyalty of coercive forces to the regime" as a 
deterring factor. 64 In his model of measuring the `composite coercive 
potential' Gurr applies the following formula: 
Coercive Potential = 10 L {2 (HiR)+ 
. 
1(1OR). 
__. 1+P 
61 Ibid. P. 1111. 
62 Ibid. p. 1105. 
63 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., (1970), p. 232. 
64 Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative 
Analysis Using New Indices", The American Political Science Review 
Vol. 62, (1968), p. 1105. 
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where L= "Loyalty score; HiR = the higher of the "scaled military 
and security forces participation ratios"; 1OR = the low of the 
"participation ratios"; and P= "coercive forces strife participation" 
score. 
The mediation of institutionalization is found to be a variable 
which directly affects the level of violence. Societal structures 
increase value opportunities and provide the discontented with a non- 
violent means of expression. Hence, an increase of 
institutionalization denotes a lower level of violence. 
The third variable deals with the social and environmental 
conditions that facilitate violence within a society. The two main 
facets that are subject to special consideration are the 'levels of 
previous civil strife, and the social and structural facilitation. 
The working hypothesis in this context is that the higher the levels 
of civil violence in the past and the higher the levels of social and 
structural facilitation, the higher the levels of violence. 65 
The fourth variable was arrived at by Gurr after operationalizing 
the above variables in relation to strife. Legitimacy of the regime 
means that people become less aggressive when the frustration they 
experience is perceived to be justifiable. These variables discussed 
above determine the magnitude of civil strife. 66 
In order to measure the magnitude of civil strife Gurr utilizes 
three composite variables: pervasiveness is the degree or extent of 
participation of the affected population, duration is the length of 
time the violence lasts, and intensity is the extent of human 
casualties. 67 Pervasiveness is defined in terms of participants per 
100,000 population, duration in days and casualities in terms of human 
65 Ibid. p. 1106. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. p. 1107, 
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deaths and wounded. 68 In "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", Gurr coded 
data on 1000 odd strife events occurring in 114 polities between 1961 
and 1965 to measure causality by means of mathematical analysis of 
event data. His main sources were The New York Times, The Newsyear, 
and The Africa Digest. 
In applying the correlation, regression analysis and complex 
mathematical calculations Gurr arrives at a "hypothetical curvilinear 
relationship between coercive force size and total magnitude of strife 
(T. M. C. S. )". T. M. C. S. can be examined graphically: when it goes up 
the level of coercive force present increases. 69 Within this context 
Gurr tests his premise that violence varies in magnitude with the 
level of intensity in relative deprivation. Within the course of his 
T. M. C. S. analysis Gurr concludes that in his multivariate analysis 
several important changes occur: 
None of the mediating variables appear to effect the 
relationship between persisting deprivation and 
strife, i. e., there is a certain inevitability about 
the association between such deprivation and strife. 
Persisting deprivation is moreover equally potent as 
a source of conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil. 
With the partial and weak exception of 
institutionalisation, no patterns of societal 
arrangements nor coercive potential that are included 
in the model have any consistent effect on its 
impact. 70 
Thus the conclusion of Gurr's analysis is that there is a 
persistent relationship between deprivation and levels of strife, and 
that mediating variables are not operational in such a context. In 
addition, the magnitude of coercive force and the magnitude of 
violence have a curvilinear relationship. This means that an 
68 Ibid. p. 1108. 
69 Ibid. pp. 1116-1117. 
70 Ibid. p. 1120. 
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enlargement of military and internal security forces causes a 
substantial increase in the magnitude of violence to a point but then 
a marked decrease. The countries with a higher coercive force tend to 
have more strife. Gurr concludes with the premise that force 
increases violence. 71 
Ted Gurr formulated a three-fold typology of political violence 
based on the following aspects: who participates, whether it is the 
elite or the masses, and whether or not the violence is highly 
organised. 72 Gurr goes on to define three forms of political 
violence. They are as follows: 
Turmoil: Correspondingly unplanned and unorganised mass conflict. 
It is usually found occurring in the form of political strikes, riots, 
political clashes and localised rebellions. According to Gurr, the 
difference between turmoil and the other two forms of civil strife can 
be reduced to differences in the degree of organisational clarity of 
goals and extent of citizen participation. 
Conspiracy: Planned political violence involving a few 
participants as in political assassinations, small scale terrorism, 
small-scale guerrilla warfare, coups and mutinies. 
Internal War: Large-scale, organised, widespread and mass civil 
strife involving extensive violence as in widespread terrorism, 
guerrilla war, civil war and revolution. 73 
Gurr has utilized a variety of techniques and aggregate indicators 
in an attempt to prove his theory. Paradoxically, due to the 
complexity of his techniques and their proliferation, the weaknesses 
of the theory have increased. It becomes increasingly evident from 
the data which Gurr has utilized that the validity of Gurr's theory is 
71 Ibid. p. 1124. 
72 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., (1970), p. 11. 
73 Ibid. p. 11. 
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questionable. In measuring the magnitude of violence Gurr relies 
heavily on event data derived from secondary sources. For instance, 
data on the number of participants and casualties is determinative of 
the intensity and pervasiveness of the violence. Information obtained 
in conditions of political violence regarding the number of 
participants and casualties could hardly be accurate because most of 
the data would be inaccessible and some participants would operate 
undercover. The data pertaining to these aspects of the Insurrection 
of 1971 in Sri Lanka has been contradicted by scholars and remains a 
matter of conjecture. Hence, the magnitude of the civil strife 
measured on the basis of inaccurate data could be misrepresented. 
Furthermore, the priorities and interests of the sources reporting the 
incidence of violence could vary, and such a variance effects the 
validity of the data. 
Tilly finds that: Gurr depends on quantitative analysis to 
substantiate his argument that socio-economic and political 
deprivation, collective discontent and political violence -form a 
likely pattern and a tentative base for his theory. Some of the 
salient reasons given by Tilly are that the data came from sources 
rather distant from the events under study, deal with the short term, 
and relate to the states as a whole rather than to the differences 
between them. The data further includes cross-sectional data which 
could vary in effect from country to country. 74 
Tilly further contends that Gurr's variables were reformulated and 
adjusted to be compatible with the data to which Gurr had access. 
According to Tilly, the application of the determinate models to fresh 
situations would be a more apt test to discern the validity of the 
theory. 75 Furthermore, on the basis of his own studies Tilly finds 
74 Charles Tilly, "Review of Why Men Rebel by Ted Robert Gurr", 
Journal of Social History, Vol. 4, (1971), p. 418. 
75 Ibid. p. 418. 
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that. the less the model of political violence applies, as a result of 
the discontent of a total population, the less the frustration- 
aggression argument yields. Tilly in his studies finds that an 
important part of collective violence is the violence carried out by 
representatives of the state. In Gurr's analysis this form of 
violence is subsumed as the action of dissidents, whereas Tilly 
contends that a majority of the violence is initiated and carried out 
by "troops, police and other specialized repressive forces". 76 . 
Chice again Gurr's failure to concentrate on the interactions among 
those who participate in political violence within a state has been 
highlighted by Tilly as a result of his own work. Tilly maintains 
that such an analysis could be attained by focusing on structural 
analysis which deals with aspects such as class conflict and class 
structure. 77 
Another limitation of Gurr's theory lies in his generalization of 
the "intensity of anger [and] motivation of the resentment" where he 
fails to provide scientific means of measurement. 7S Gurr's assertion 
that the magnitude of violence varies according to the available 
institutional means of expressing non-violent anger, is also found to 
be limiting, considering the practical experiences of the American 
Civil War, the endemic civil violence in post-colonial India, - and the 
intensity of civil violence in Northern Ireland. In addition, Gurr 
does not explain how or why some aggression is mediated into actual 
violence. P. Wilkinson asserts that "Why Men Rebel can be more 
accurately described as the presentation of a model than a theory". 79 
............. 
76 Ibid. p. 419 
77 Ibid. p. 420. 
78 Paul Wilkinson, "Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence", 
in Y. Alexander, D. Carlton, and P. Wilkinson, (eds), Terrorism: 
Theory and Practice, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 59 
79 Ibid. p. 59. 
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In his book Why Men Rebel and in his article, "The Causal Model of 
Civil Strife", Gurr sets out to define the causes of civil strife. 
Within the framework of his theory, however, priority is given to the 
magnitude of civil strife and the measures of assessing that 
magnitude. Thus, the conceptual question which was raised in his 
theory is subsumed in his operational effort. 80 
The models utilized by Gurr are also questionable. For instance, 
in measuring the coercive potential score Gurr uses a model which 
fails to account for data error, and relies on a model of accuracy 
which is open to manipulation. The models utilized to measure the 
other mediating variables experience similar shortcomings. 
Moreover, Gurr's theory does not offer any hypothetical 
propositions about what variables determine the kind of political 
violence that ensues. His concern is with psychological determinants 
of the likelihood and magnitude of violence, not with what determines 
the quality of resultant strife, whether it is, for example, 
assassination, mutiny, coup d' etat, civil war, terrorism, strikes or 
revolution. What is missing is a discussion of how and why such anger 
turns in some cases toward the governing regime and produces political 
violence. 
Furthermore, Gurr perceives political violence as a behavioural 
phenomenon rather than as a structural phenomenon which is inherent in 
the social structure of a society. 81 Consequently, in Gurr's theory 
there is no room for discussion of the socio-economic structures and 
political processes which are essential to any theory of the 
development of political violence. - Another definitional weakness 
SO A. C. Cohan, op. cit., p. 201. 
Si Peter Abell, and Robin Jenkins, "Why Do Men Rebel? A Discussion 
of Ted Robert Gurr's 'Why Men Rebel"', Race, Vol. 13, (1971), p. 89- 
92. 
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which Gurr fails to circumvent is the distinction between violent and 
non-violent protests. All forms of protest which reach beyond the 
institutional limits are covered by the term civil strife. 82 
Gurr's classification of political violence come under three main 
types: revolutions, guerrilla wars and civil wars. What Gurr fails 
to discern is that within the context of such violence the regime, as 
well as its adversaries, would be involved in violent interaction. 
Thus, throughout his theory Gurr perceives- of political violence as 
being derived from the relative deprivation experienced by the masses 
and not from the violence exerted by the regime. In applying Gurr's 
theory to the Third World, where regimes also have to be studied 
within the context of political violence, the author finds theoretical 
and conceptual weaknesses which reduce its applicability. 
2.7 Samuel P. Huntington's Theory of Modernisation 
Huntington, who is one of the major exponents of the modernisation 
thesis, seeks to explain the process of violence and revolution in 
terms of social changes and political development. He draws a 
distinction between countries which are governed effectively and those 
which are devoid of effective government. The countries which are 
governed effectively are characterized by a stable political system, 
by a mutually shared vision of the people and their-leaders of what 
comprises public interest and other fundamentals of a public 
community, and finally by the government's ability to command the 
loyalty and obedience of the citizenry. The countries which are not 
governed effectively depict contrary characteristics and are 
potentially revolutionary. 
S2 Terry Nadiii, "Violence and the State :A Critique of Empirical 
Political 'Theory", Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971), pp. 20-25. 
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Huntington, in widening the scope of the modernisation theory, 
perceives that the characteristics of countries which are not 
effectively governed are most evident in the modernising countries of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He observes that the predominant 
trends in most of these countries since the Second World War have been 
the following: conflict based on ethnicity and class; recurring 
incidents of rioting and mob violence; unstable political leadership 
committed to disastrous economic and political policies; the spread of 
corruption among those in authority and power; the violation of the 
basic rights of citizenship; the curtailment of the powers of the 
legislature and courts; and the fragmentation or disintegration of 
mass-based political parties. The possible impacts of these trends on 
the political sphere include: coups, revolutionary violence, 
insurrection, guerrilla warfare, tribal or communal tension, and 
dictatorship. S3 
According to Huntington, these conditions of violence and 
instability are largely attributed to the "rapid social change and the 
rapid mobilisation of new groups into politics coupled with the slow 
development of political institutions". S} This process of social 
change or modernisation is defined as a "multifaceted process 
involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity". 85 In 
spite of the multifaceted nature of the process of modernisation, 
Huntington emphasizes the relevance of social mobilisation and 
economic development to violence and revolution. 
Social mobilisation in its broadest sense result of some of the 
basic changes in social development. Literacy, education, increased 
S3 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, 
op. cit., (1968), p. 3. 
S4 Ibid. p. 4. 
S5 Ibid. p. 32. 
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communication, mass media exposure and urbanisation, which are the 
main features of social mobilisation, change the values, attitudes and 
expectations of a traditional society to those of a modern society. " 
Such changes give rise to new aspirations and hopes, and widen the 
sphere of political activity. The unfulfillment of these hopes and 
aspirations widens and strengthens political participation and 
consciousness. Since social change undermines the traditional 
political authority, it becomes necessary for political development to 
accompany the degree of social change. Wen political organisation 
and institutionalization are low, however, the potential for political 
disorder and instability are high. S7 Accordingly, "in the absence of 
strong and adaptable political institutions, such increases in 
participation means instability and violence". SS In substantiating 
his argument Huntington cites the rapid expansion of education in Sri 
Lanka from 1948 to 1956 as the cause of the ensuing political 
instability and radical changes in electoral politics. He states that 
the expansion in education was not aimed at creating a work force 
equipped with the skills relevant to the country's needs. The long- 
term result was unemployment of educated persons. Huntington 
summarises the dilemma of the unemployed thus: "the higher the level 
of education of the unemployed alienated, or otherwise dissatisfied 
persons, the more extreme the destabilizing behaviour which 
results". 89 Thus, social mobilisation is a vital aspect of 
modernisation which when combined with economic development has its 
implications regarding political development. Huntington perceives 
that economic development is a channel which satisfies the aspirations 
gs Ibid. P. 33. 
S7 Ibid. p. 5. 
88 Ibid. p. 47. 
89 Ibid. p. 49 
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generated by social mobilisation and reduces the frustration in 
society. Rapid economic growth, however, could also operate as a 
destabilizing force as follows: 
1. The economic changes undermine traditional social structures 
and create a social group who are classless and prone to 
revolutionary protest. 
2. The emergence of a "new rich" class who are not adjusted to 
the existing order, and who desire political power and social status 
compatible with their economic status, threatens the fulfillment of 
the government's compromises with the lower classes. 
3. The escalation of migration especially from the rural areas to 
the cities , venerates alienation and political extremism. 
4. An increase in the population concurrent with a declining 
standard of living leads to a wider gap between the rich and the poor. 
5. An absolute but less than proportional increase in the incomes 
of some groups heightens their dissatisfaction with the existing 
order. 
6. A curtailment of consumption in order to promote investment 
generates mass discontent. 
7. Increased literacy, education and access to the mass media may 
heightens aspirations beyond the possible levels of fulfilment. 
8. Ethnic and regional conflicts are heightened over the 
distribution of investment and consumption. 
9. Finally, the scope for group organisations is enhanced, but the 
strength of group pressure generates greater demand which the 
government is unable to meet. 90 
The operation of these variables increases the rate of frustration 
beyond the level of demand which the rate of economic development can 
achieve. Although the scope of political participation is widened, it 
90 Ibid. pp. 49-50. 
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leads only to further frustration because the political system is 
overloaded with demand. Greater social mobilisation, economic 
development and political participation thus undermine the traditional 
institutions and attitudes of society by creating heightened 
aspirations and hopes which the system is unable to fulfill in the 
short-term. Therefore, what creates political instability is the lack 
of political institutionalization which can accommodate such an 
expansion. In this context revolution is the extreme case of the 
expansion of political participation. 
Huntington views a revolution as a phenomenon confined to the 
modern context as it is dissimilar to other forms of political 
violence. His pattern of revolution are based on two variables: the 
nature pre-revolutionary society; and the nature of pre-revolutionary 
regime. Within the modern context, however, revolutions are once 
again limited to the modernising societies within which political 
development has not accompanied the level of social and economic 
development. 91 Furthermore, the "great revolutions" have occurred 
either in centralized traditional monarchies, or in narrowly based 
military dictatorships or in colonial regimes. 92 
Huntington proposes two-fold typology of revolution as the western 
and the eastern patterns. Some of the salient differences between the 
two types of revolution are as follows: 
(a) In the western version of revolution the existing political 
institutions collapse, and the participation of new groups in politics 
creates new political institutions; whereas, in the eastern version a 
revolution starts with the participation of new groups in politics and 
the establishment of new political institutions, and then is followed 
by the destruction of traditional political institutions. 
91 Ibid. p. 265. 
92 Ibid. p. 275. 
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(b) Another distinction is that in the western context there is a 
period of anarchy following a revolution marked by a struggle for 
power. The eastern revolution, on the other hand, is characterized by 
a period of "dual power" during which the revolutionaries expand their 
power and authority while the government continues to exercise its 
authority in some parts. 
(c) In the western pattern the struggle is concentrated among 
several revolutionary groups, whereas in the eastern revolution the 
struggle is polarized between one revolutionary group and the 
government. 
(d) The western revolution gains ground in the urban centres and 
then exerts its power in the countryside. In the eastern revolution 
control of the countryside occurs before the revolutionary movement 
seizes the centres of power. 
(e) The western revolution overthrows a weak, traditional regime. 
The eastern revolution, on the contrary, is directed against a regime 
which has been exposed to modernisation but is only partially 
modernised, yet is strong enough that it can only be overthrown by a 
prolonged rural insurrectionary process. 93 
The pattern of revolution having been discussed, it is relevant to 
identify the social forces participating in a revolution. A 
revolution not only requires political institutions which are 
incapable of accommodating the expansion of political participation, 
and which thus provide the additional impetus for social forces 
seeking such an expansion. Huntington identifies two such forces: the 
peasantry and the urban middle class. 94 A revolutionary peasantry is 
a necessary precondition for a revolutionary overthrow. Huntington 
notes that: "each of the major revolutions in western as well as non- 
93 Ibid. pp. 266-273. 
94 Ibid. p. 276. 
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western societies was in large part a peasant revolution". This was 
as true in France and Russia as it was in China. 95 It is the urban 
middle class, however, which provides the leadership and is the "true 
revolutionary class in most modernising societies". 96 The alienation 
of the urban middle-class intelligentsia is not a product of physical 
suffering. Rather it is an opposition which stems from purely 
psychological factors such as insecurity, personal alienation and 
guilt, and an overriding need for a secure sense of identity. 97 
Thus, revolutions are won by a coalition of social forces in which the 
peasants and the middle class are significant players. 
Charles Tilly, in analysing the theory of social change, 
mobilisation and political institutionalization, finds that the theory 
offers a "plausible" explanation of revolution, government instability 
and collective violence in the poorer countries. The explanation is 
found to be plausible in the sense that it ignores the fact that 
relatively peaceful countries are also subject to more rapid changes. 
Modernisation can cause disintegration but there is no assured 
evidence that political violence and revolution are an integral part 
of social change. 95 Tilly, who criticizes Huntington's theory, 
nevertheless finds that the theory sums up most of the relevant 
aspects relating to revolution and large-scale structural change. As 
Huntington draws from a wide range of contemporary and historical 
material, the variables are apt to suggest why the theory of 
modernisation is considered important to the study of political 
violence. 
95 Ibid. p. 293. 
96 Ibid. p. 289. 
97 Ibid. p. 371. 
98 Charles Tilly, "Does Modernisation Breed Revolution? ", 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, (1973), p. 431. 
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According to Tilly, there are several factors which distinguish 
Huntington's theory. First, Huntington's combined application of 
three factors namely, rapid social change, mobilisation and political 
institutionalization explains stability and instability, whereas other 
theorists have applied these factors separately. As a result 
Huntington's theory 'provides an acceptable explanation for the 
concentration of violence in the poorer countries of the world. 99 
Finally, Tilly finds that Huntington's departure from psychological 
variables and the pursuit of explaining "why, when and how" men become 
discontented is his most valuable contribution to the study of 
revolution. 
Tilly finds Huntington's contention, that the degree of 
instability is linked to the degree of modernisation, an invalid or 
arguable observation as the suggested evidence is questionable. 
Huntington's examples of modernising states are either based on the 
short-term experiences of the existing governments or deal with their 
support to destructive political movements. What is necessary to 
validate such an argument is information on the experiences and degree 
of "social and economic modernisation" in the same states over the 
long term. Tilly points out that similar studies have sometimes 
revealed contrary experiences. 100 The nexus between political 
instability and modernisation becomes vague as the theory develops. 
The political impact of modernisation thus remains ambiguous due to 
the theoretical weaknesses inherent in the models of social 
mobilisation, political participation and levels of 
institutionalization. 101 
ss Ibid. p. 431. 
100 Ibid. p. 432. 
101 Ibid. P. 434. 
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Huntington contends that modernisation generates corruption 
because traditional norms and values are undermined by rapid social 
and economic change. Huntington concludes: "hence, the society which 
has a high capacity for corruption also has a high capacity for 
violence". 102 This argument, however, has been refuted by Claude Ake, 
who maintains that modernisation cannot be said to increase corruption 
merely by altering the criterion of what constitutes corruption. The 
alteration of the criterion could conceivably decrease corruption. 103 
Having discussed some of these theoretical weaknesses, it becomes 
necessary to focus on Huntington's conceptualization of revolution. 
His concept of revolution is limited to a great extent to those 
revolutions which brought about rapid societal transformations. By 
virtue of his definition, he stresses the importance of fundamental 
changes in society. In this context, struggles for independence are 
excluded from his definition because they are focused on a struggle 
between different ethnic groups, and do not always result in a "rapid" 
and "violent" change in the social structure. 
Another aspect of this theory which highlights its weakness is the 
identification of social forces participating in a revolution and the 
unification of forces. The social forces are clearly defined as the 
urban middle class and the peasantry. Huntington fails, however, to 
provide data on the process of social mobilisation and the time frame 
for forming a coalition, which could also vary by type. 104 
Furthermore, his assumption of a clear cut urban-rural dichotomy 
seems unrealistically simple given the complex nature of the 
102 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, 
op. cit., (1968), p. 63. 
103 Claude Ake, "Modernisation and Political Instability: A 
Theoretical Exploration", World Politics, Vol. 26, (1974), pp. 580- 
581. 
104 Ekkart Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions: 
Theories and Research, op. cit., (1983), p. 323, 
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political, social and economic relations between the two sectors. 
The weakness in this broad urban-rural dichotomy lies in the limited 
focus on political relations between the urban and rural sectors, 
while completely ignoring the economic and social relations which, the 
author contends, are equally important in determining the level of 
political participation. The relationship between the urban and rural 
sectors in some Third World countries, such as Sri Lanka, is much more 
complex than is suggested in Huntington's analysis. This is due to 
other cleavages such as class and other stratifications based on 
economic relations. 105 For instance, in Sri Lanka, the armed uprising 
of 1971 was launched mainly by the rural youth who were frustrated 
over the lack of socio-economic and political opportunities available 
to them. Their degree of frustration, however, was not shared by the 
peasantry in general nor by the urban middle class. Hence, the 
generalization of a broad urban-rural dichotomy seems unrealistic 
considering the disparities between and within the two sectors. 
As an overall theory, Huntington fails to predict the development 
of a revolution prior to its occurrence. Huntington's theory of 
political modernisation, like other theories, has been adjudged as 
weak in many respects as a theoretical approach to the study of 
political violence in the Third World countries. 
2.8 The Analytical Model 
The study of political violence in Sri Lanka requires an 
interdisciplinary approach if a deeper understanding is to be 
attained. Of the theories already discussed in this chapter, 
Huntington's theory of modernisation is more relevant to the 
examination of the socio-economic and political changes which have 
contributed to the origin of political violence movements in Sri 
105 Ibid. p. 324. 
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Lanka. Huntington's "supposed macro" politico-economic approach, 
however, is subject to modification because he fails to address all 
pertinent aspects of the problem of political violence. Therefore, 
for the subsequent discussion of political violence in Sri Lanka the 
author proposes the following aspects as an analytical framework: 
1. The preconditions of political violence, namely, the long-term 
socio-economic and political factors which give birth to the 
political violence movements; 
2. the origin and nature of political violence movements, and 
the socio-economic background of the members and leaders; 
3. the ideologies and strategies of the guerrilla groups; 
-1. the precipitants or short-term causes of political 
violence; and 
5. the response of the successive Sri Lankan governments and the 
extent of international involvement. 
2.9 Summary 
The above discussion indicates three main factors regarding the 
literature on political violence. The first is that there is no 
general agreement on the definition of the subject. This leads one to 
conclude that political violence is a very broad phenomenon that is 
applied to all kinds of politically-motivated violent acts. Thus, 
political violence is used as a term for events variously labelled as 
riots, rebellion, internal wars, turmoil, revolution, insurrection and 
political terrorism. It will not be the task of this study, however, 
to provide a generally agreed definition which covers all aspects of 
political violence. Therefore, the study will examine political 
violence as pre-planned armed attacks by organised groups to capture 
or change political power in a domestic political context. 
Likewise, the above discussion indicates two main factors 
regarding the literature on typologies of political violence. The 
first is that there is no definite criterion for the classification of 
typologies of political violence. Therefore, each author has his own 
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classificatory scheme and set of terminology to explain the same 
process or processes. The second factor is that most typologies are 
developed on the basis of one or more of the following attributes: 
objectives, type of society, type of regime, participants, 
geographical distribution, intensity and forms of organisation. Among 
these factors a predominant amount of emphasis is based on the 
variables of "objective" and "class". Although, a number of important 
aspects have been introduced, a precise typology is yet to come. 
Finally, there is no comprehensive and generally agreed theory of 
political violence. Nevertheless, the theories which are discussed in 
this study are the important and leading theories in this area of 
study, and provide valuable insights towards the understanding of 
political violence. Several empirical, methodological, and conceptual 
problems, however, were noted. Hence, the author focuses on the 
following aspects in order to examine the political violence in Sri 
Lanka: the preconditions of political violence, forms of 
organisations, socio-economic backgrounds of guerrillas, ideologies 
and strategies of guerrilla groups, government response and 
international involvement. 
This chapter concludes the review of the major theories on 
political violence, and proposes an analytical framework which will be 
utilized in the subsequent chapters of this study. The following 
chapter examines the preconditions of political violence in Sri Lanka 
which is a case study in this context. 
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Chapter 3 
PRECONDITIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA: 
THE 1971 INSURRECTION 
3.1 Introduction 
The conditions of political violence are multiple and complex. 
Harry Eckstein makes a distinction between preconditions and 
precipitants. ' Preconditions of political violence are long-term 
socio-economic and political factors that generate discontent and pave 
the way to the creation of violent organisations. Precipitants are 
short-term factors that ignite political violence. The main objective 
of this chapter is to examine the long-term socio-economic and 
political factors which serve as preconditions for the origin of 
political violence movements (P. V. M. ) in Sri Lanka. S. P. Huntington 
claims that by the 1960s every Third World nation was subject to the 
process of modernisation and that the causes of political violence in 
these states lay within this process. 2 Therefore, of the theories 
discussed in Chapter 2, Huntington's theory of modernisation is 
particularly relevent to the preconditions of the political violence 
movements in Sri Lanka. 
Chapter 3 is an examination of the factors which led to the 
political violence movements involved in the Insurrection of 1971, 
1 Harry Ecktein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars", History and 
Theory, Vol. 4, (1965), p. 140. 
2 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 41. 
77 
while Chapter 4 is devoted to the factors which caused the political 
violence movements in the Sri Lankan Tamil community. In order to 
examine the preconditions of political violence in 1971, this chapter 
is broken down into the following sections: colonial impact, economic 
change, industrialisation and employment, peasant agriculture, 
internal migration, social mobilisation, growth of population and 
urbanisation, educational expansion, literacy, the mass media, 
expectations and aspirations, economic development, unemployment and 
underemployment, political modernisation, ruralisation of elections, 
political participation and development, the political party system, 
and left-wing parties. The socio-economic and political changes are 
not of recent origin but have had a long gestation period dating back 
to colonialism. Therefore, this study is prefaced by a brief 
historical introduction to the colonial period. 
3.2 The Impact of the Colonial Period 
Sri Lanka has a long history of colonialism under three major 
European powers: the Portuguese, the Dutch, and finally the British. 
The Portuguese annexed Sri Lanka to their colonial empire in 1505 and 
ruled the maritime provinces until the Dutch took control in 1654. 
The Portuguese and the Dutch ruled within the same boundaries for 
nearly three hundred years with only minor disruptions to the 
traditional native system. It was the British who brought about major 
changes in the socio-economic and political structure of the country 
when they captured first the maritime areas in 1796, and then the 
entire country in 1815. The British during the 150 years of their 
rule succeeded in gradually eroding the traditional system and 
introducing the modern socio-economic and political system. 
During the 19th Century, however, the British were also intent on 
accumulating wealth and collecting revenue as their predecessors had 
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done. Since the changes did not come into effect until 1833, the 
pre-colonial, socio-economic structure was retained until then. 3 It 
was not until the 1830s that the need arose to abolish the prevailing 
feudal structure in order to pave the way for a capitalist mode of 
production which entails a modernisation of the economy. The 
development of a capitalist system within the framework of a feudal 
system, and subsequently the destruction of the feudal system, 
necessitated the creation of a process of basic capital concentration, 
a labour class from the peasantry, and avenues for money and means of 
production to be concentrated among a limited number of people in the 
society. With these aims in view measures were taken to create 
certain changes and reforms. 
The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission of 1829 was appointed by the 
British Government to investigate the prevailing socio-economic and 
political system in Sri Lanka and recommend appropriate reforms 
accordingly. After thorough investigation, the Commission submitted 
recommendations which extended to all aspects of the Sri Lankan socio- 
economic and political system. Some of the salient recommendations 
which were implemented included: formally abolishing the system of 
"rajakariya" or service tenure, bringing the whole country under a 
unified administrative and-political system, setting up an Executive 
and Legislative Council, unifying the judicial system tinder the 
control of the Supreme Court, and introducing English as the 
educational medium 4 
The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms marked the beginning of a process 
of socio-economic and political modernisation in Sri Lanka. It was 
the first well-integrated attempt to develop an infra-structure for 
3 I. H. Vanden Driesen, Economic History in Ceylon, (Maharagama: 
Saman Printers, 1963), p. 2. 
4 G. C. Wiendis, Ceylon Under the British, (Colombo: The Colombo 
Apothecaries Co. Ltd., 1946), pp. 35-42. 
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capitalist economic development and was perceived as the "dividing 
line between the past and present". 5 The economy was thereby 
restructured to create the necessary framework for the introduction of 
the plantation economy. 
3.3 The Economic Change 
The introduction of the export-import oriented economy was at 
first based on coffee plantations which were cultivated extensively. 
The failure of the coffee plantations, however, rendered it necessary 
to concentrate on tea, rubber and coconut, which were potentially more 
profitable. The cultivation of such large-scale plantation crops 
necessitated the extensive availability of land. It was for this 
specific purpose the colonial government introduced the Crown Lands 
Encroachment Ordinance No 12 in 1840. This law declared "all forest, 
chena, unoccupied or uncultivated lands to be Crown lands until the 
contrary was proved' .6 Thus, the purpose of enacting, the Crown Lands 
Ordinance was to evict the peasants from their hereditary land and 
turn them into wage labourers. This would facilitate the annexing of 
their lands to the plantation economy. The onus of proving, ownership 
of the lands was placed on the peasantry, the majority of whom could 
hardly do so. Thus the "chena" (shifting cultivation) lands on which 
"slash and burn" cultivation had been practised for centuries became 
the property of the Crown. These Crown lands were subsequently sold 
to the coffee planters at nominal rates. It is estimated that between 
1833 and 1843 approximately 258,042 acres of Crown land were sold.? 
In the period 1833-1939 two and half million acres of Crown land were 
5 G. C. Mendis, Ceylon Today and Yesterday: Main Currents of Ceylon 
History, (Colombo: Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, 1963), p. 63. 
6 S. Ponnambalam, Dependence Economy in Crisis: The Sri Lankan 
Economy in Crisis, 1948-1980, (London: Zed Press, 1981), p. 7. 
7 I. H. Vanden Driesen, op. cit., 1963, p. 43. 
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sold to private individuals. 3 The land which was vital to the 
plantation economy was made available by the British colonial 
government while the necessary capital was provided by private 
companies. 
The success of the plantation economy depended to a great extent 
on the availability of wage labour. The Colbrooke Reforms of 1833 
formally abolished the system of "rajakariya" or service tenure in 
anticipation of the creation of a new wage labour force from among the 
Sinhala peasantry. 9 The wide sweeping measures to evict the peasants 
from their lands succeeded, but the intention of converting them to a 
wage labour force was far from fulfilled. This failure is largely 
attributed to the fact that the indigenous peasantry was averse to 
wage employment. '0 S. B. de Silva highlights the operation of other 
extraneous factors which deterred the peasantry from responding 
positively to wage labour. Low wages, accompanied by the infrequency 
of wage payments, was further aggravated by the exploitation of the 
peasantry by "kanganies" (foremen) and traders. In other words, the 
plantation system was not attractive as an alternative livelihood for 
the peasants. 11 
In spite of these views, there is no consensus among scholars 
regarding the factors which prevented the peasants from being absorbed 
into the labour force. It is evident, however, that the British Raj 
was unsuccessful in creating a wage labour force from among the 
S G. H. Peiris, "Agrarian Transformations in British Sri Lanka", 
Sri Lanka Journal of Agrarian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1981), p. 16. 
9 Ashoka Bandarage, Colonialism in Sri Lanka: The Political 
Economy of the Kandyan Highlands, 1883-1886, (New York: Mouton 
Publishers, 1983), p. 249. 
10 Donald Snodgrass, Ceylon: An Export Economy in Transition, 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), p. 24. 
11 S. B. de Silva, Political Economy of Underdevelopment (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 210. 
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peasantry. This trend left the British colonial government with one 
other alternative and that was to import labour from Southern India. 
Beginning with about 3,000 workers in 1839, the process of importing 
labour grew steadily until in 1844 there were about 77,000 immigrant 
labourers in Sri Lanka. During the two decades thereafter, the 
average rate of net importation of immigrant labour rose to over 5,000 
people per year. In 1891, the total immigrant labour force had 
reached 235,000, which increased to 500,000 by 1921. By the pre- 
independence year of 1931 there were 700,000 immigrant plantation 
workers in Sri Lanka. 12 According to W. H. Wriggins, the immigrant 
labour force and their families comprised 10 per cent of Sri Lankas' 
total population in 1953.13 
The colonial government evidently took every possible measure to 
provide incentives for the growth and expansion of the plantation 
sector. From about 1835, large scale coffee plantations were 
cultivated in the hinterland of Sri Lanka. The coffee plantations 
flourished for about 40 years until about 1870, when a leaf disease 
began to destroy the crops and coffee declined in importance as a 
plantation crop. The colonial planters, however, were dauntless. 
They soon replaced coffee with tea, rubber and coconut, which in that 
order of importance, continued to dominate the plantation economy far 
into the future. By the latter half of the 19th Century, plantation 
agriculture was firmly rooted as the backbone of the country's economy 
and of the capitalist mode of production. 
12 Ktunari Jayawardene, The Rise of Labour Movement in Ceylon, 
(Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1972), p. 16. 
13 W. H. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1960), p. 213. 
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3.4 Industrialisation and Employment 
Although industrialisation is usually an important variable in the 
process of economic modernisation, it has little or no bearing on the 
modernisation process in Sri Lanka. Prior to independence there was 
no industrial sector beyond those activities related to the plantation 
economy. Apart from these large-scale power-operated industries, the 
industrial sector had hardly developed. A few important factories 
were established in the private sector before 1939, which consisted of 
a cotton mill, a tile works, two match factories, two distilleries and 
a few engineering works. Until 1959, however, there was no concerted 
drive towards industrialisation. 14 
Plantation agriculture was accompanied by the development of 
transport and communication networks. Over and above this, the 
introduction of the English educational system saw the emergence of an 
English-educated middle class which was comprised mainly of lawyers, 
doctors, merchants, contractors, and transport agents. Although Sri 
Lanka has remained basically an agricultural country, Table 3.1 
indicates that approximately half of the gainfully employed population 
composed the non-agricultural labour force. 
According to Table 3.1 between 1921 and 1971 the percentage of the 
gainfully employed engaged in agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
similar pursuits declined from 62.4 to 49.4 percent. In the same 
period non-agricultural employment rose from 37.7 to 50.4 percent. 
Furthermore, about two-thirds of all gainfully employed persons, 
including more than 80 per cent of those engaged in agriculture and 
related pursuits, were paid workers. 15 The proportion of the 
14 V. H. S. Karunatilake, Economic Development in Ceylon, ( New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 176-177. 
15 Department of Census and Statistics, Census of Population, 
Ceylon, 1963, Vol. 1, Part 11, (Colombo: Government Press, 1967), pp. 
3-4. 
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workforce engaged mainly in agriculture has declined slowly: 53 per 
cent in 1953,50 per cent in 1971 and 46 per cent in 1980-81.16 
Table 3.1 Gainfully Employed Population by Major Occupational 
Groups (Percentages) 
Occupation 1921 1946 1968 1971 
Agricultural, forestry, 
Fishermen, hunters, etc. 62.4 52.9 51.6 49.4 
Craftsmen, production process, 
Transport and communications 
workers 15.1 13.5 23.0 24.4 
Sales and clerical workers 6.8 7.9 10.4 12.9 
Service and recreation workers 6.5 9.0 8.2 5.4 
Professional, technical, manager ial 
and related workers 2.1 2.9 5.5 5.2 
Others and unspecified 7.2 13.6 1.3 2.5 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Ceylon Year Book 
1950, (Colombo: Government Press, 1951), p. 221; Department 
of Census and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book of Ceylon 
1970, (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1971), p. 38; 
and Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book 
of the Republic of Sri Lanka, 1973, ( Colombo: Department of 
Government Printing, 1974), p. 26. 
It is obvious that economic development in Sri Lanka occurred at 
the expense of the agrarian society. This economic process not only 
integrated Sri Lanka into the complex network of the global economy 
but also exposed its economy to the vagaries of the international 
market. 
3.5 Peasant Agriculture 
The profound economic changes in Sri Lanka, as described above, 
had adverse effects on the agrarian sector especially on the 
independent peasant farmer. Traditional agriculture was neglected as 
the plantations received widespread attention. The technical 
modernisation of the 19th Century was confined to the plantations, 
whereas the technology of production in paddy cultivation remained 
backward and static. The existence of two systems of agriculture 
16 B. Moore, The State and Peasant Politics in Sri Lanka, 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 22. 
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within the agrarian sector marked the transformation of a feudal 
agricultural economy to a dual economy. S. Ponnambalam observes this 
situation as follows: 
By the time coffee collapsed in the 1880s, there had 
emerged in the country a dual economy. One was a 
highly developed, organised, foreign-owned, 
capitalistic plantation economy producing for export 
in the central Highlands. The other was a tradition- 
bound, primitive, self sufficing, subsistence peasant 
economy producing for domestic consumption in the 
remainder of the wet and dry zone areas of the 
country. 1' 
Under the colonial regime of the 19th Century, it was also evident 
that different policies were being applied both to the foreign-owned 
export-oriented plantation sector and to the peasant sector which 
concentrated on production for domestic consumption. As K. M. de 
Silva concltdes: 
The attitude to many problems of peasant agriculture 
can only be described as unimaginative, and misguided 
when not hard-hearted. ls 
When considered in retrospect, the economic modernisation 
policies applied by the British in Sri Lanka during the colonial 
period had long-lasting effects on the country's peasantry, which was 
gradually reduced to a state of underdevelopment and impoverishment. 
is S. B. de Silva sees it, the peasant economy settled at a lower 
equilibritun with a more impoverished peasantry. 19 The eviction of the 
peasantry from their lands generated the problems of landlessness and 
land fragmentation. Landlessness was a problem with many facets, of 
which the most important was the inability of many peasant families to 
17 S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 22. 
is K. M. de Silva, Sri Lanka: A Survey, (London: Hurst and Company, 
1977), p. 69. 
19 S. B. de Silva, op. cit., p. 233. 
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get access to irrigated paddy land and the highlands for shifting, 
cultivation. 20 The land cultivated by the peasants was limited in 
extent, the soil was infertile, and the technology of production was 
primitive. By the end of the British colonial period, the phenomenon 
of landlessness had become the main feature of the agrarian question. 
These conditions further deteriorated with the free importation of 
rice from abroad to serve plantation interests, thus reducing the 
number of profitable crops within Sri Lanka. 
The peasants in turn had to depend almost entirely on the self- 
sufficient economy prevailing in the lands held by the landowners. 
This system reduced the peasant to the status of a sharecropper. 
Table 3.2, which compares the cultivated acreage with the peasant 
population per acre, indicates the limited extent of land available to 
the peasantry in Sri Lanka between 1871-1959. 
Table 3.2 Estimated Cultivated Land and Population in the 
Peasant Agricultural Sector, 1871-1959 
Year Cultivated Annual growth Peasant Annual growth Peasant 
peasant rate since population rate since population 
Land previous year (000s) previous per acre 
year 
1871 954 --- 1,831 --- 1.9 
1881 1,092 1.4 1,996 0.9 1.8 
1891 1,243 1.3 2,219 1.9 1.8 
1901 1,370 1.0 2,541 1.1 1.9 
1911 1,544 1.2 2,818 1.0 1.8 
1921 1,676 0.8 3,051 0.8 1.8 
1931 1,809 0.8 3,921 2.5 2.2 
1946 2,076 0.9 4,941 1.6 2.4 
1953 2,206 0.9 6,044 2.9 2.7 
1959 2,351 1.1 7,297 3.2 3.1 
Source: Donald Snodgrass, Ceylon: An Export Economy in 
Transition, (Illinois: Ri chard D. Irwin, 1966), p. 48. 
Surveys conducted on land distribution found that a high 
percentage of the peasantry were landless or owned marginal plots. A 
20 p. Wickramasekera, Development and Peasantry: The Sri Lankan 
Experience, Unpublished Paper Presented to the U. N. Centre for 
Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan, (1983), p. 7. 
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survey of eight districts during 1936-1938 found that lzndlessness 
among rural families was about 44 per cent. 21 In four districts 
landlessness ranged from 50 to 56 per cent of all families. Surveys 
on landlessness carried out in 1950-51 found that 38 per cent of all 
families in the rural sector were landless. 22 
Table 3.3 indicates the ownership of land by the size of holdings 
in Sri Lanka in the 1950s. 
Table 3.3 Ownership of Land by Size of Holding (percentages) 
Extent of land Agricultural 
(acres) Families 
No land 26.3 
less than 1/2 16.0 
1/2 -1 11.8 
1-2 15.0 
2-3 9.1 
3-4 6.0 
-1 -5 4.2 
5- 10 7.4 
10 - 15 2.4 
15 - 20 0.7 
20 and over 1.1 
Non-agricultural Total 
Families 
45.1 37.7 
25.3 21.6 
11.0 11.3 
9.0 11.0 
3.9 5.9 
2.0 3.5 
1.3 2.5 
1.6 4.4 
0.4 1.2 
0.1 0.3 
0.3 0.6 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of Ceylon, 
1952, quoted from P. Wickramasekara, op. cit., p. 9. 
Agricultural land was further encumbered by a high incidence of 
onerous forms of tenancy and joint-ownership systems such as 
"thattumaru" (rotation of ownership) and "kattimaru" (rotation of 
plots). The prevailing share-cropping (ande-tenure) arrangement for 
paddy lands was quite oppressive as it entailed insecurity due to high 
rentals. This system of tenure on paddy parcels is displayed in 
Table 3.4. In the case of Sri Lanka, it is important to weigh land 
inequality by size of agricultural labour force and type of ownership 
because, as Huntington observes, in countries which have reached a 
high level of economic development, agriculture has a relatively minor 
21 Ibid., p. 11. 
22 Ibid., p. 15. 
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role, and consequently even highly inequitable patterns of land 
ownership do not pose substantial problems of social equality and 
political stability. 23 
Table 3.4 The System of Tenure On Paddy Cultivation 
System of Cultivation 
Owner Cultivated 
Share-cropped 
Leased 
Tattuunaru 
Others 
Per Cent of all Parcels 
1946 1955 
60.8 55.0 
25.9 28.7 
3.6 13.7 
6.8 2.6 
2.9 - 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of Ceylon, 
1946,1955. 
It may be inferred then from Huntington's statement that an 
examination of land ownership in Sri Lanka is pertinent if not vital 
to a thorough review of the agrarian issues. 
This process of paddy agriculture, set in motion by the British 
during the 19th Century, continued to make an impact on Sri Lankan 
agriculture well into the 20th Century. Thus, on the eve of political 
independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was in a state of underdevelopment, 
characterised by a highly dependent economy with a narrow range of 
primary commodities. The primary products were tea, rubber and 
coconut, to which a major portion of the agrarian land was devoted. 
The ownership of these plantations was mainly monopolised by foreign- 
based sterling companies and British-owned rupee companies until the 
plantations were nationalised in 1972.24 Indigenous agriculture was 
dominated by paddy cultivation and, therefore, was the most neglected 
aspect of the economy as it was limited to the growth of low profit 
secondary agricultural products. The acute land shortage aggravated 
the agrarian crisis in Sri Lanka. 
23 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 381. 
24 See, Appendix 4. 
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The misery of the majority of the peasants was further aggravated 
by their large debts. According to a study conducted by the Ceylon 
Department of Census and Statistics in 1957,54.3 per cent of the 
rural families and 60 per cent of the peasant families were in debt. 
The survey estimated the total indebtedness in the rural areas at Rs 
516 million or about Rs 424 per rural family, a figure which at the 
time constituted about 34 per cent of annual income or 9 per cent of 
the value of property owned by each f mily. 25 Thus, a combination of 
factors reduced the peasantry to a marginal level of existence. 
Fragmented land holdings, primitive modes of production, high land 
rentals and low prices for products were some of the salient factors. 
Ivor Jennings summarises the situation as follows: 
In almost all the villages surveyed agriculture and 
its related industries provide a very low standard of 
living.... The standard of living thus disclosed is 
so low that it is evident that a large majority of 
the people in the wet zone and the dry zone were 
permanently on the verge of starvation. 26 
The traditional forms of livelihood based on agriculture were thus 
no longer profitable and the rapid growth of the population limited 
the scope of expandable agricultural land. 
3.6 Internal Migration 
As a result of the country's well-developed transport network 
internal migration was considerable. The only available data, 
however, concerns the state-sponsored resettlement movement. The 
problems of landlessness and land fragmentation were mainly 
concentrated in the wet zone. This rendered it necessary to draw up a 
23 See, Department of Census and Statistics, Survey of Rural 
Indebtedness in Ceylon 1957, (Colombo: Government Press, 1959). 
26 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Economy of Ceylon, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1952), p. 59. 
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programme of resettlement in the dry zone where land was available. 
The criterion adopted in selecting settlers gave preference to 
landless peasants in the congested wet zone. The programme of 
resettlement was initiated in 1928 with the Tabbowa Resettlement 
Scheme. The objective of peasant resettlement was to ease the 
pressure on land in the wet zone. By 1948, twelve schemes with 3, '342 
allotees and 26,737 acres had been colonized. 27 W. H. Wriggins claims 
that between 1945 and 1955 nearly 20,000 acres of dry zone land had 
been made available for cultivation and nearly 100,000 peasants had 
found new homes. 2S Peasant resettlement was stepped up after 
independence. The number of allotees increased to 16,532 with an 
acreage of 118,438 being assimilated by 1953.29 
The rapid growth and expansion of the peasant resettlement schemes 
has been largely attributed to the virtual eradication of malaria 
which had been widespread, rapid infrastructural development and 
deeper government commitment to the policy of resettlement. Village 
expansion schemes within the dry zone further contributed to easing 
the pressure on land in the wet zone. 30 The extensive resettlement 
schemes, however, were not a panacea for the agrarian problem within 
Sri Lanka. The tenurial problems, primitive technology and the 
inequalities of land distribution were not addressed by the 
resettlement programmes. It is indisputable that the settlement 
schemes succeeded in reducing the landless problem in the wet zone and 
27 Vijaya Samaraweera, "Land Policy and Peasant Colonization, 
191-1-19,18", in K. M. de Silva, (ed), History of Ceylon: From the 
Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to 1948, (Peradeniya: University 
of Ceylon, 1973), p. 460. 
2S J. H. Wriggins, op. cit., pp. 292-293. 
29 B. H. Farmer, Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon: A Study in 
Asian Agrarian Problems, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 
165. 
30 P. WWickramasekara, op. cit., p. 6. 
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to some extent prevented the generation of a landless peasantry. Yet 
within the resettlement schemes themselves the availability of land 
did not coincide with population growth, and the problems of 
landlessness which were acute in the wet zone were reproduced in the 
dry zone settlements. Therefore, regardless of the intent behind the 
policies, the fact remains that there was little structural change in 
the Sri Lankern economy. S. P. Huntington observes that the inequality 
in the distribution of land ownership is among the more fundamental 
economic pre-conditions of insurgency and revolution: 
Where the conditions of land-ownership are equitable 
and provide a viable living for the peasant, 
revolution is unlikely. Where they are inequitable 
and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffering, 
revolution is likely, if not inevitable, unless the 
government takes prompt measures to remedy these 
conditions. 31 
In the 1950s, successive governments introduced tenancy reform 
laws. The first of these was the Paddy Lands act of 1953 and later 
the Paddy Lands Act of 1958. Of the two acts the latter was a crucial 
piece of legislation as it concentrated on the insecurity of tenure 
and high rentals. The 1958 Act also made sharecropping (ande-tenure) 
permanent and inheritable. Furthermore, it made provision for the 
rents on land to be fixed at a maximum level of 25 per cent of the 
crop or at 12 bushels per acre. An island-wide network of village 
institutions called Cultivation Committees was created under the 1958 
Act to function at village level and maintain the standards of 
cultivation. Prior to passage, however, the bill had been further 
amended in order to satisfy the more conservative groups within 
Parliament, thereby reducing the extent and depth of societal change 
31 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 375. 
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which the 1958 Act, as proposed, had been intended to achieve. 32 
These economic and technological changes led to social mobilisation 
which is an aspect of the broader processes of modernisation. 
3.7 Social Mobilisation 
According to Karl W. Deutsch, 'social mobilisation' is a name 
riven to an overall process of change, within a substantial part of 
the population in countries which are moving from traditional to 
modern ways of life. 33 Social mobilisation as it occurred in Sri 
Lanka will be examined under the following headings: growth of 
population and urbanisation, educational expansion, and literacy, and 
the mass media. 
3.8 Growth of Population and Urbanisation 
The rapid -growth of population in Sri Lanka was the most 
significant development following the Second World War. This was 
attributed to the high fertility rate and the declining death rate 
brought about mainly by the expansion of health and welfare 
facilities. The following Table 3.5 indicates the historical changes 
in Sri Lankan social statistics. 
Table 3.5 Changing Social Statistics Between 1946 and 1971 
Social Statistics 1946 1956 1960 1971 
Life expectancy in years 43 48 62 66 
Infant mortality per 1000 live births 141 101 71 45 
Maternal " 16 9 3 2 
Birth rate per 1000 population 37 40 37 30 
Death rate per 1000 population 20 14 9 8 
Source: James Warner Bjorkman, "Health Policy and Politics in 
Sri Lanka: Development in the South Asian Welfare State", 
Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 5, (1985), p. 538. 
32 M. More, op. cit., pp. 54-65. 
33 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilisation and Political 
Development", American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, (1961), p. 
493. 
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The death rate per 1,000 people dropped from 20 in 1946 to 14 in 
1956. From then on the death rate gradually declined to 8 per 1,000 
in 1971. On the other hand, the life expectancy at birth rose from 43 
years in 19.16 to 66 years in 1971. Consequently, as the following 
Table 3.6 indicates, the population growth within Sri Lanka increased 
rapidly from 1901 to 1971. 
Table 3.6 Population Growth in Sri Lanka: 1901-1971 
(in thousands) 
Year Population Year' Population 
1901 -1,031 1946 7,122 
1911 -1,702 1953 8,290 
1921 5,304 1963 10,641 
1931 6,053 1971 12,748 
Source: Gavin W. Jones and S. Selvarathnam, Population Growth 
and Economic Development, (Colombo: Hansa Publishers Limited, 
1971), p. 19. 
Mint is evident from Table 3.6 is that the average annual rate of 
population growth for the period 1901 to 1946 was 1.3 per cent 
compared with the period 19.16 to 1971 when it was 2.3 per cent. A 
noteworthy feature of this demographic expansion is the distribution 
of the population. Statistics on population growth reveal that a 
large proportion of the population was concentrated in the rural 
sector whereas the population growth in the urban sector was 
relatively slow. The following Table 3.7 is an illustration of the 
gap in urban and rural population distribution from 1946 to 1963. 
Table 3.7 Population by Urban and Rural Sectors (in thousands) 
Year Urban Percent Rural Percent 
1946 1917 21.3 5244 78.7 
1953 1751 21.6 6345 78.4 
1963 2310 21.8 8276 78.2 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of 
Ceylon, 1946,1956,1963. 
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Table 3.7 shows a remarkably stable balance of population between 
the urban and rural sectors, with the rural retaining its substantial 
predominance over the urban in the period 1946-63. Such limited 
growth in the urban population as took place is to be attributed 
mainly to natural increase within that sector rathar than to migration 
from rural areas. Migration in Sri Lanka during this period was 
migration from one rural area to another. 
The slow expansion of urbanisation is indicated by Table 3.8 below 
which depicts the growth of toms in Sri Lanka by size of population 
between 1946 and 1963. It is estimated that the number of towns with 
a population between 5,000 and 9,999 rose from 17 in 1946 to 23 in 
1963, while the estimation of towns with a population over 20,000- 
19,000 increased from five in 1946 to 18 in 1963. It is obvious that 
Sri Lanka has experienced a slow rate of urbanisation throughout the 
20th Century. This slow trend of population growth in the urban 
sector has been largely attributed to several factors. 
Table 3.8 Growth of Towns in Sri Lanka by size of Population, 
1946,1953 and 1963 (in percentages) 
Population 1946 1953 1963 
2,000-5,000 24 20 21 
5,000-9,999 17 13 23 
10,000-19,000 12 21 21 
20,000-49,999 56 18 
50,000-99,000 465 
100,000 and over 112 
Source: Gavin W. Jones and S. Selvarathnam, "Urbanisation 
in Ceylon: 1946-1963", Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. 1, (1970), 
p. 201. 
One of the main reasons cited is the lack of any significant 
changes in the economic structure which would otherwise have attracted 
a large segment of the rural population to the urban centres. 
Furthermore, the socio-economic policies adopted by successive 
governments accompanied by a concerted effort at social welfare 
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prevented the rural population from moving to the urban sector. 34 
. Among these the state-sponsored peasant resettlement schemes and land 
settlement schemes which were concentrated in the dry zone resulted in 
a movement of the rural population. 
another significant phenomenon was the high percentage of youth in 
Sri Lanka's demography after the Second World War. Table 3.9 depicts 
the youth component of Sri Lanka's total population, and establishes 
that the total youth aged 15 to 24 increased rapidly from 1946 to 
1971. In 1946, statistics for those aged 15 to 24 stood at 1.3 
million but by 1971 had doubled to 2.6 million. Hubert duller views 
such a rapid escalation in the youth population as providing potential 
cadres for youth movements and revolts. 35 
Table 3.9 Age Distribution of Sri Lankas Population 
(in Lhousands) 
Years of Age 1947 Per Cent 1971 Per Cent 
0-14 2-178 32.2 4998 39.3 
15-2.1 1322 19.8 2608 20.3 
26-3.1 1027 15.5 1653 13.0 
35-44 791 11.8 1304 10.3 
-15-5-1 516 7.7 970 7.8 
55 and over 523 7.9 1181 9.3 
Total 6657 100.0 12712 100.0 
Source: Kearney, R. N., "Youth and Generational Cleavage 
in the Politics of Sri Lanka: Some Preliminary 
Observations". Unpublished typescript. 
Stich a high proportion of youth in the demography of a country 
means that a large segment of the population requires access to 
education and employment. The provision of these is a burden which 
developing countries like Sri Lanka find hard to bear. 
34 Gavin W. Jones and S. Selvarathnam, "Urbanization in Ceylon, 
1945-63", Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. 1, (1970), pp. 199-212. 
3' Hubert Muller, "Youth as a Force in the Modern World", 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 10, (1968), pp. 237- 
260. 
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3.9 Educational Expansion 
The rapid expansion of education within a framework of free 
education from primary school to university is another device for 
social modernisation which has had a visible impact on political 
instability in Sri Lanka. The introduction of the Colebrooke reforms 
marked the beginning of a period of secularisation in education and a 
process of gradual expansion. The educational system in pre- 
independent Sri Lanka was a two-tiered system based on the medium of 
instruction. The missionary-sponsored schools provided instruction in 
English for a fee, and were a way of gaining access to higher 
education and the professions. The non-fee schools, on the other 
hand, taught in local languages such as Sinhala or Tamil and thus 
catered to a wider population. For a majority of youth this system 
offered it limited scope for upward mobility. The educational reforms 
of 19.15 brought about revolutionary changes in the educational system 
and had far-reaching results thereafter. 36 
The introduction of free education in 1945, with the setting, up of 
a series of Central Schools on a regionally based electoral system, 
and the subsequent change over of the medium of instruction to the 
local languages in all schools, brought about a rapid expansion in 
opportunities for higher education. 37 From a peasant's perspective, 
the widening of avenues of education was welcome at a time when 
pressure on land was becoming more and more acute. The introduction 
of free education and the use of the vernacular or `swabasha' 
languages were partly responsible for the expansion of enrolments in 
schools. 
36 D. D. Saram, "Education: An Era of Reform", Asian Survey, 13, 
(1973), p. 1169. 
37 Ibid., p. 1169. 
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The period between 1945 and 1970 saw an escalation of primary and 
secondary school enrolments from about 867,000 to 2,716,000.38 The 
expansion of primary and secondary education was followed by a rise in 
the number of university entrants. Until 1959 the medium of 
instruction at university level was English, so that university 
education was confined to those who had attended the exclusive and 
expensive schools which concentrated on English education. These 
students were mainly of urban background. This trend was arrested by 
1959, when universities were opened to students who needed instruction 
in the Sinhala and Tamil languages. In addition, the number of 
universities increased from one to four. Two of these universities 
were Buddhist seminaries ('pirivenas') which were elevated to the 
status of universities. The University College of Colombo was 
established as a separate university. The number of students seeking 
admission thus increased from 1,612 in 1948 to about 14,000 in 1970.39 
The lack of opportunity in the agrarian sector and greater scope of 
employment available to those with an education meant that the desire 
for education was the most important factor which influenced the 
thoughts, expectations and aspirations of the rural youth after 
independence in 1948. The educational reforms created a large 
student population from rural areas often with a continued marginal 
level of existence. 
G. H. Peiris observes that due to the close links which existed 
between educational achievement at secondary and tertiary levels on 
the one hand and employment opportunities on the other, education 
35 Robert Kearney, "Democracy and the Stresses of Modernisation in 
Sri Lanka", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 1, 
No. 3, (1978), p. 89. 
39 G. Uswatta Arachchi, "University Admission in Ceylon: Their 
Economic and Social Background and Employment Expectations", Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 8, (1974), p. 290. 
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functioned as a medium of social mobility. 40 The expansion of 
education, however, was not sufficiently organised and pre-planned to 
avoid major imbalances in intake and distribution. Instead of 
devising a system through which students could be evenly drawn from 
all fields of study, what was actually practised was a lop-sided basis 
of selection. In 1969, for example, 2,662 Social Science graduates 
passed from the universities, while the output from the science, 
medicine, engineering and veterinary sciences were only: 230,205,90 
and 18 respectively. Ironically in a country with nearly 80 per cent 
of the population concentrated in the rural sector, there was only one 
agriculture graduate for every 100 liberal arts graduates. 4' The 
majority of the university students following the Social Sciences were 
young Sinhala-Buddhists from the rural areas. A survey conducted in 
1961 indicates that 93 per cent of the students following courses in 
the Social Sciences and the Humanities were Sinhala, compared to 47 
per cent, 37 per cent, and 44 per cent of admissions in the faculties 
of Medicine and Dentistry, Agriculture and Veterinary Science, and 
Engineering, respectively. 42 
In addition, other studies have revealed that a majority of those 
who entered university to pursue studies in the Social Sciences and 
the Humanities had received their primary and secondary education from 
Maha Vidyalayas (Government Colleges) and Madya Haha Vidyalayas 
40 Gerald H. Peiris, "Basic Needs and the Provisions of Government 
Services in Sri Lanka: A Case study of Kandy District", International 
Labour Office Report, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1982), p. 
58. 
41 Data from National Council of Higher Education, "The Framework 
of Plan for the Development of Universities in Ceylon: 1969-1978", 
cited in International Labour Office, Matching Employment 
Opportunities and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon, Vol. 
11. p. 164. 
42 G. Uswatta Arachi, "From Highway to Blind Alley, A Note on 
Youth and Higher Education", Marga, Colombo, Vol. 1 No. 3, (1973), pp. 
75-85. 
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(Central Colleges) which are based in the rural areas. Facilities to 
pursue studies in the Natural Sciences were not available in most 
rural-based schools. Hence, secondary education in these schools 
emphasised the Social Sciences which were taught in the vernacular or 
Swabasha (Mother-tongue Sinhala or Tamil). The failure of the 
government's attempts to develop science education in the rural areas 
was largely due to the lack of qualified teachers and laboratory 
facilities. For those who were educated in the science-oriented 
courses there was no shortage of employment. 
Education and literacy kept expanding steadily after 1945. The 
generation which was reaching adulthood around 1970 had achieved 
significantly higher levels of educational attainment than the 
generations before them. 43 The differentials in educational levels 
between age groups in 1969/70 are indicated in the following Table 3. 
10. 
Table 3.10 Educational Levels by Age Groups (1969/70) by 
Percentages 
Educational levels 15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45 and over 
Years Years Years Years Years 
No schooling 6.8 8.2 12.8 21.5 33.3 
Primary school 28.4 30.6 36.1 43.0 40.7 
'Middle school 56.5 40.8 34.9 26.9 21.2 
Passed G. C. E(O/L) 7.7 17.6 14.1 7.6 4.2 
Passed G. C. E(A/L) 
and Higher 0.6 2.8 2.1 1.0 0.6 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Preliminary 
Report On the Socio-Economic Survey of Ceylon, 1969/70, 
(Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics, 1971), 
p. 10. 
According to the above Table 3.10, one-third of the population 
aged 45 and over had no schooling compared to over one-fourth who had 
completed middle school (tenth grade) or higher education. In 
43 R. N. Kearney, "Politics and Modernisation", in Tissa Fernando 
and R. N. Kearney, (eds), Modern Sri Lanka: A Society in Transition, 
South Asian Series, (Syracuse N. Y.: Maxwell School of Citizenship and 
Public Affairs, 1979), p. 72. 
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contrast, less than one-twelfth of those aged 15-19 years and 20-24 
years had no schooling. Within the 20-24 years age group, nearly 60 
percent had attained a middle school or higher education. 
3.10 Literacy and the Mass Media 
The statistics in the following Table 3.11 illustrate the 
expansion of literacy from 1881 to 1971. In 1901,8.5 per cent of the 
female population aged 5 years and over were literate as compared to 
the male population of which 42 per cent were literate. 44 The figures 
for 1971, on the other hand, depict the growth of literacy to 70.7 per 
cent of females aged 10 years and over 85.2 per cent of males. 45 
Table 3.11 Growth in Literacy Rate 1881-1971 
Census Year All Persons Males Females 
1881 17.4 29.8 3.1 
1891 21.7 36.1 5.3 
1901 26.4 42.0 8.5 
1911 31.0 47.2 12.5 
1921 39.9 56.3 21.2 
1946 57.8 70.1 43.8 
1953 65.4 75.9 53.6 
1963 71.9 79.4 63.8 
1971 78.1 85.2 70.7 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical 
Abstract of Ceylon, 1967-1968, (Colombo: Department of 
Government Printing, 1970), p. 35; Department of Census 
and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book of the Republic 
of Sri Lanka, 1973, (Colombo: Department of Government 
Printing, 1974), p. 15. 
Furthermore, advancing social mobilisation is obvious in the 
spread and coverage of the mass media. The number of licensed radio 
sets in Sri Lanka expanded from 10,000 in 1941 to 90,000 in 1954 and 
44 Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Abstract of 
Ceylon, 1967-1969, (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1970), 
p. 35. 
45 Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book of 
Sri Lanka, (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1973), p. 15. 
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405,000 in 1965.46 By 1971 the number had surpassed 467,000.4' Gurr 
perceives that expansion in literacy and education heightened 
espectations. 4S Moreover, Huntington argues, literates have higher 
aspirations and make more demands on government. 49 
3.11 Expectations and Aspirations 
A similar tendency seems to be evident among the students from 
traditional peasant families who received a secondary education or 
higher, and aspired to "White Collar" jobs which paid better salaries 
and were urban based. This development was identified by Denham as 
early as 1911 when he observed that: 
The younger generation seek escape from rural life, 
from manual toil, from work which they begin to 
regard as degrading, in an education which will 
enable them to pass examinations which will lead to 
posts in offices in the towns and so to appointments 
which entitle the holders to the respect of the class 
from which they believe they have emancipated 
themselves. 50 
The above observations stun up some of the aspirations of the 
educated rural youth. Furthermore, surveys conducted in this sphere 
revealed that youth who had completed secondary and higher education 
aspired for administrative, clerical or teaching jobs. 51 Table 3.12 
46 N. D. Jayaweera, "Mass Media 1, The Radio" in Education in 
Ceylon: A Century Volume. Part 3, (Colombo: Ministry of Education and 
Cultural Affairs, 1969), p. 1217. 
47 Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book of 
Sri Lanka, (Colombo: Government Printing, 1972), p. 92. 
48 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), p. 96. 
49 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 49. 
50 E. B. Denham, Ceylon at the Census of 1911: Being a Review of 
the Results of the Census of 1911, (Colombo: Government Printers, 
1912), p. 399. 
sl G. Uswatte Aratchchi, "From Highway to Blind Alley, A Note on 
Youth and Higher Education", Marga, Vol. 1, No. 3, (1973), p. 84. 
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further clarifies this point on the basis of job expectations of 
university students. 
survey among university students revealed that 87 percent 
desired public sector emplo. vment, 10 per cent private sector 
employment and 3 per cent self-employment. 52 Heightened expectations 
and aspirations seemed inevitable during the first decade of 
independence as education meant access to white collar employment. 
Table 3.12 Job Expectations of University Students 
Field Yes No Do Not Know 
Professionals 77 19 4 
B. Sc 71 21 8 
B. A 31 49 20 
Source: International Labour Office, Matching Employment 
Opportunities and Expectations, A Programme of Action 
For Ceylon, Technical Papers, (Geneva: International Labour 
Office, 197t), p. 118. 
This tendency, however, was not to last long. Due to the limited 
availability of employment opportunities, the government's policy of 
expanding educational facilities generated a decline in the market 
value of education. Therefore, as Lloyd Fallers observes, in many of 
the newly independent states the educated underemployed or unemployed 
are more seriously alienated and politically disaffected than 
industrial workers. 53 By the mid 1960s, high expectations based on 
education began to decline and graduates qualifying in the Social 
Sciences especially in the Swabasha medium were disillusioned by the 
scarcity of suitable employment and low salaries. R. N. Kearney, 
explains the situation as follows: 
The broadening of opportunties for university 
education for the Sinhalese-Buddhist rural youth 
52 International Labour Office, op. cit., p. 148. 
53 Lloyd Fallers, "Equality, ' Modernity, and Democracy in the New 
States", in Clifford Geertz, (ed), Old Societies and New States: The 
Quest For Modernity in Asia and Africa, (New York: The Free Press, 
1963). pp. 192-193. 
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educated in the Sinhala language led to their 
crowding into the social studies and htunanities 
curriculum, the graduates of which were in slight 
demand in the employment market. 54 
Education had previously proved to be a stepping stone to white- 
collar employment. Therefore, the young people who completed their 
education after job opportunities had been narrowed continued to 
harbour the high expectations which had been fulfilled earlier. A 
survey in 1968 found that 76 per cent of all those between the ages of 
15 and 24 years who had completed the G. C. E. (O/L) and had not 
previously been employed sought white-collar jobs. 55 Moreover, a 
high demand for clerical employment among young people with secondary 
education was found in three separate surveys conducted between 1968 
to 1971.56 Considering the nature and scope of the problems faced by 
the young people who were mainly from the agrarian rural sector, it 
becomes evident that a deep frustration seems to have been building up 
over a long period of time. R. N. Kearney points out that by the 
1970s this frustration was far more intense among the Sinhala youth 
than it was among those belonging to the other ethnic groups in Sri 
Lar-&a. 5 7 
In broad terms educational expansion becomes dysfunctional only 
when the economy remains static and underdeveloped. As a result of 
high social mobilisation, aspirations increased rapidly. Therefore, a 
high level of economic development is necessary to meet these high 
54 R. N. Kearney, "Education Expansion and Political Volatility in 
Sri Lanka: The 1971 Insurrection", Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 9, 
(1975), p. 735. 
55 International Labour Office, Matching Employment, Opportunities 
and Expectation: A Programme of Action for Ceylon, 1971, p. 33. 
56 R. K. Srivatava, and S. Selvarathnam, "Youth Employment in 
Ceylon: Problems and Prospects", Marga, Vol. 1, No. 4, (1972), pp. 43- 
44. 
57 R. N. Kearney, op. cit., p. 742. 
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aspirations. According to Huntington, economic developments 
presumably increase the capacity of a society to satisfy those 
aspirations and, therefore, should tend to reduce social frustrations 
and the consequent political instability. 5 In order to understand 
this correlation it is necessary to examine economic development in 
Sri Lanka. 
3.12 Economic Development 
From an economic perspective Sri Lanka is one of the most 
underdeveloped countries in the Third World. Its economy could be 
cited as being a classic example of an undeveloped dependent economy. 
The basis of the economy since the colonial period has been import- 
export oriented, first on coffee then on tea, rubber and coconut. 
Between 1948-49 tea, rubber, and coconut contributed 90 per cent of 
the merchandise export earnings (63% from tea, 17% from rubber, and 
10% from coconut). Between 1971-72, the proportions were almost the 
same. 39 An economy so heavily dependent on export crops is also 
exposed to the instability and vagaries of the world market. As a 
result, during the Second world tsar and the Korean War, Sri Lanka 
accumulated large sterling balances. Between 1960-1970, however, the 
prices of tea and rubber, which were approximately 80 per cent of the 
export earnings, declined by 30 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. 
As a result after 1960, the decline in demand for raw materials 
produced in Sri Lanka lead to general economic deterioration. 60 
55 S. P. Huuntington, op. cit., p. 49. 
59 H. M. Gunasekara, "The Economy of Sri Lanka, 1948-73", The 
Journal of History and Social Studies, Vol. 4, (1977), p. 787. 
E0 D. R. Snodgrass, "Sri Lanka Economic Development During 25 Years z 15 
of Independence", The Journal of History and Social Studies, Vol. 4, 
1975, pp. 119-125. 
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Both the prices of exports and imports are determined by external 
conditions and are subject to wide and unpredictable fluctuations. 
While Sri Lanka exports raw materials, it imports essential 
foodstuffs, consumer goods and capital items. While the income from 
exports declined, after 1960 import prices rose considerably. 
Consequently, after 1960 there was a growing balance of trade deficit. 
This deficit rose steadily from Rs 95 million in 1965 to Rs 328 
million in 1966, and to Rs 627 million in 1969.61 The immediate 
outcome of this trend was expanding budget deficits. This fact is 
clearly indicated in the following Table 3.13. 
Table 3.13 Sri Lanka Budget Deficits From 1960 to 1970 
Year Amount Rs/Ms Year Amount Rs/Ms 
1960-61 500 1965-66 682 
1961-62 501 1966-67 723 
1962-63 439 1967-68 850 
1963-64 510 1968-69 947 
1964-65 520 1969-70 1150 
Source: Budget Speeches, 1960-1970. 
The net result of this deteriorating economic trend was that the 
successive governments carne to rely on more foreign loans and aid to 
finance the deficits. The dependency on foreign loans increased to 
such an extent that there was a crisis in the repayment of debts. 
Debt servicing began to become an intolerable burden, with 14 per cent 
of the total earnings for 1969 being utilised for this purpose. 62 
According to statistics revealed by the Minister of Finance at his 
Budget Speech in 1970, Sri Lanka had obtained a total credit of Rs 
723.4 million from the International : Monetary Fund (I. M. F. ) between 
61 Central Bank Annual Reports, cited from A. J. Wilson, Politics 
in Sri Lanka, (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 39. 
62 Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Report of the Monetary Board to 
the Minister of Finance for the Year 1969, p. 13. 
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1965 and 1970.63 The direct results of a -growing, burden of debt were 
the devaluation of the local currency, the rupee, and a rise in the 
price of most essential consumer goods, thereby increasing the cost of 
living. The cost of living index, which stood at 103.5 in 1960 and 
121.5 in 1965 rose to 130.5 in 1970.64 In addition, the growing, 
tendency towards obtaining loans and aid from foreign countries and 
international financial institutions resulted in the increasing, 
dependency of the country on external forces. 
The declining economic conditions compelled the Sri Lankan 
Government to curtail expenditure on welfare services and subsidies. 
among these subsidies the most politically significant was the rice 
subsidy which was cut back in November 1968. Furthermore, the 
worsening economic situation in the 1960s indicated the disparities of 
income distribution and the widespread poverty levels. A survey in 
1963 indicated that 84.14 per cent of the workers received salaries 
between Rs 25 and 200 a month, and that 45.9 per cent of the workers 
received incomes between Rs 25 and Rs 75 a month. 65 According to the 
socio-economic survey of 1969-70, about four-fifths of the population 
earned less than Rs 200 and over half received incomes of less than Rs 
100 per month. 66 A Central Bank survey in April 1972 revealed that 
over 9 million of the 12.8 million population received no income, and 
of the 3.5 million who had incomes, about half received monthly 
incomes ranging from Rs 100 to 400, while the other half were paid 
63 Of this sum, Rs 301.7 million had been paid back, leaving a 
balance of 421.7 million as of 20th May 1970. See, N. M. Perera, 
Budget Speech, 1970-71, p. 11., cited in A. J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 
109. 
64 A. J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 112. 
65 Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finance 
1963, (Colombo: Central Bank, 1964), p. 61. 
66 L. P. Fernando, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: The April 1971 
Insurrection, (Unpublished M. A. Thesis: University of New Brunswick, 
1976), p. 43. 
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less than Rs 100.67 Only 175,000 of'the population earned Rs 400 a 
month. According to the World Bank report at the end of the 1970s, 
per capita incomes were still in the region of G. S. $230, and Sri 
Lanka remained among the poorest thirty-six low-income countries in 
the world. 6S Given these circumstances, Snodgrass concludes that 
opportunities for improvement were less favourable in the early 1970s 
than they had been 25 years before at independence. 69 The inability 
of economic innovation to meet the challenges posed by Sri Lanka's 
problems generated and fostered a sense of frustration particularly 
, among the educated rural youth. The deteriorating and sometimes 
stagnant economy deprived the new -generations of the means of 
fulfilling their aspirations in keeping with their educational 
backgrounds. There was a rapid growth of the labour force without a 
correspondingly rapid expansion of employment opportunities. As a 
result, what emerged was unemployment and underemployment especially 
among the rural-based Sinhalese-Buddhist youth. 
3.13 Unemployment and Underemployment 
As in many Third World countries, accurate unemployment statistics 
are not available for Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, a number of surveys 
have revealed the magnitude of the problem. Unemployment is 
undoubtedly not a phenomenon of recent origin but its impact was not 
felt in the political arena of the country until about the mid 1960s. 
A significant characteristic of the unemployment trend was that it was 
67 A. J. Wilson, "Socialism in Sri Lanka", in Helen Deffosses and 
Jacques Levesque, (eds), Socialism in the Third World, (New York: 
Pargue Publishers, 1975), P. 258. 
6S World Bank, World Development Report, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), p. 134. 
69 Donald Snodgrass, "Sri Lanka's Economic Development During, 
1%centy-five Years of Independence", The Ceylon Journal of Historical 
and Social Studies, Vol. 5, (1975), pp. 119-125. 
107 
predominantly concentrated among rural youth and young adults. From 
1959-1960 the official estimated total of unemployed people stood at 
340,000, of whom 80 per cent were in rural areas and 20 per cent in 
urban areas, and were 250,000 males and 90,000 females. 70 Between 
1969-1970 the total figure had climbed to 546,000. 
The mid-1960s were crucial years for the unemployment crisis 
faced by the rural youth. A socio-economic survey conducted between 
1969-1970 highlighted that there were some 550,000 unemployed 
comprising 13 per cent of Sri Lanka's total labour force in the age 
group of 15 and 59, or approximately 43 per cent of the total 
population. '' The following Table 3.14 indicates a comparative 
picture of tuiemployment as disclosed by the number of surveys. 
Table 3.14 Available Estimates of Unemployment in Sri Lanka 
Source Total % Of 
Unemployment Labour Force 
ILO Survey 1959-60 Low Estimate 340,000 10.5% 
High Estimate 450,000 12.8% 
Consumer Finance Survey 1963 457,000 13.8% 
Population Census Low Estimate 265,000 8.0% 
High Estimate 390,000 10.8% 
Rural Employment Survey 1964 450,000 12.5% 
Labour Force Survey 1968 450,000 11.0% 
Labour Force Survey Second Round 
1969 500,000 11.8% 
Socio-Economic Survey, First Round 
1969 552,000 13.1% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, The Economy of Ceylon, Trends 
and Prospects, (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 
1971), p. 31. 
This rate of unemployment is high by international standards. The 
unemployment problem has been and continues to be acute among the 
educated youth. By 1969 there were some 14,000 university graduates 
70 "A Survey of Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment in 
Ceylon", International Labour Review, Vol. 87, (1963), p. 2510. 
71 Central Bank Ceylon, Socio-Economic Survey of 1969-1970, First 
Round, Colombo, 1970, cited in A. J. Wilson, Electoral Politics in an 
Emergent State, (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), p. 13. 
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and 112,000 young persons with the General Certificate Examination 
(Ordinary Level) qualifications who were unemployed. 72 Around 14,000 
graduates were accommodated in the workforce after 1970, but 80 per 
cent of those received salaries between 200-300 rupees per month, 
which placed them below the poverty line. 73 The Dudley Seers Report 
further notes that the rural-based graduates who had pursued studies 
in the Social Sciences and the Humanities were frustrated by the lack 
of employment opportunities. 74 The following Table 3.15 of 
unemployment by education shows the rate of unemployment among the 
G. C. E. (O/L) qualified and above. Moreover, it reveals that the level 
of unemployment among the under-25 age group is higher than the other 
groups. 
Table 3.15 The Level of Unemployment by Age, Sex and Education 
Educational Level Age 12-24 25-34 35-39 
M F Total MF Total MF Total 
No Schooling 25.2 10.6 17.0 - 2.3 1.4 0.2 3.8 2.1 
Primary 23.5 17.2 21.7 2.8 8.2 3.9 1.1 3.1 1.4 
Middle School 39.0 53.2 42.6 7.5 23.3 9.5 0.7 2.0 0.8 
G. C. E(O/L) 50.8 79.2 63.6 6.7 3.8 13.0 1.5 7.6 2.9 
G. C. E. (A/L) 
and Above 40.0 90.0 60.0 11.1 38.2 23.3 -- - 
All Levels 33.4 40.3 35.6 5.2 14.4 7.9 0.9 3.6 1.5 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics , Prel iminary Report 
on the Socio-Economic Survey of Ceylon, 196 9-1970 (Colombo: 
Department of Census and Sta tistics, 1971), pp. 28 and 47. 
These statistics show that the educated youth had the largest 
volume of unemployment. Those with tenth or twelfth grade education 
in rural areas found it more difficult to secure employment than those 
72 A. J. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1979, (London: The 
Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 53. 
73 P. V. J. Jayasekara, "Sri Lanka in 1976: Changing Strategies and 
Confrontation", Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 2, (1977), p. 209. 
74 International Labour Office, op. cit., (1971), p. 20. 
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in the Urban areas. Thus, it is evident that a sense of frustration 
was fermenting among the educated rural youth over a period of time. 
In this context, unemployment was not the sole problem: the means 
of securing, employment was another source of frustration for the 
educated youth. From the colonial period onward there had been a 
trend towards obtaining white collar employment on the basis of one's 
family or personal contacts. This system of obtaining employment 
facilitated the youth belonging to families of influence to secure 
stable jobs, while the youth in the rural sector who invariably 
belonged to peasant families were at a grave disadvantage. The 
government in 1970 found it necessary to address this problem and as a 
result introduced the system of appointing a political authority for 
each district. The political authority was a Member of Parliament 
belonging to the political party in office. The system further 
stipulated that a person seeking a job had to obtain a letter of 
recommendation from the political authority. This represented a form 
of patron-client relationship and proved to be a barrier hampering 
those supporting, any opposition political party from securing, 
employment. This system also created ways and means of practising 
corrupt practices such as bribery. Gananatha Obeysekara describes the 
nature of corruption and its relationship to the Insurrection of 1971 
in the following manner: 
Since the jobs are scarce all competitive or open 
methods of recruitment have been abandoned, and the 
Government M. P. of the area is given tremendous power 
in their appointments. In the appointment of 
teachers for example each M. P. is given a fixed quota 
to fill. But very often the persons who get the jobs 
are kinsmen of the I. P. or those who have access to 
the patronage network through their elite 
connections. In some instances the wealthy of the 
area who are politically opposed to the M. P. in fact 
get the job owing to bribery or the capacity to 
manipulate the patronage system. Naturally the young 
men I interviewed harboured a felt sense of injustice 
a feeling which is extraordinarily widespread among 
the unemployed youth. This I think was an extremely 
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important motive for young persons to join the 
insurgent moVement. 75 
For S. P. Huntington, however, corruption is, of course, one 
measure of the absence of effective political institutionalisation. 76 
Underemployment was another facet of the youth-related problems 
predominantly affecting the rural sector. Unlike unemployment, 
underemployment eludes definition and assessment. Underemployment can 
be described generally as a person being forced to accept employment 
below his or her educational level. Definite statistics on 
underemployment are not available, but are identified on the basis of 
low earnings. There is one definite factor, however, common to both 
unemployment and underemployment, and that is a sharp escalation since 
the 1960s. Government policies and the ensuing social and economic 
processes over a period of time created a considerable rural youth 
population who were deprived of land and jobs. Moreover, the 
frustrated youth were further disillusioned by the static economic 
situation in the country during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Thus, the inadequacy of economic innovation to meet the challenges 
posed by the country's problems, generated and fostered a sense of 
frustration mainly among the educated rural youth. The deteriorating 
and sometimes stagnant economy deprived the new generations of the 
means of fulfilling their aspirations in keeping with their 
educational backgrounds. S. P. Huntington argues that the higher the 
level of education of the unemployed, alienated, or otherwise 
dissatisfied person, the more extreme the destabilising behaviour 
which results. Alienated university graduates prepare revolutions; 
75 Gananatha Obeysekara, "Some Comments on the Social Background 
of the 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 
33, (1974), p. 382. 
76 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 59. 
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alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan coups; 
alienated primary school leavers engage in more frequent but less 
significant forms of political unrest. 77 In broad terms the expansion 
of social mobilisation becomes social frustration when the economy 
remains static and underdeveloped. In this light the economic 
development of Sri Lanka could not meet the aspirations expanded by 
social mobilisation. Thus, urbanisation, the growth of literacy and 
educational expansion were not accompanied by the economic growth 
needed to facilitate greater scope and opportunity to fulfil the 
expectations and aspirations of the Youth. As a result, what emerged 
was frustration and politicisation among the rural Sinhalese-Buddhist 
youth. 
Hereinafter the author wishes to examine aspects of political 
modernisation and its nexus with political violence movements in Sri 
Lanka. 
3.14 Political Modernisation 
For S. P. Huntington, political modernisation involves the 
rationalisation of authority, the differentiation of structures and 
the expansion of political participation. 7S In order to examine this 
process, the following aspects will be covered: the nationalist 
movement, universal franchise, ruralisation of politics, the political 
party system and the left-wing movement. All these aspects have a 
bearing upon the growing trends of mass political participation and 
political mobilisation in the country. 
One of the principal effects of modernisation on politics is 
increased participation in politics by social groups throughout 
society. S. P. Huntington views the early phases of modernisation as 
77 Ibid., p. 48. 
75 Ibid., p. 93. 
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being marked by the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements as 
in Sri Lanka. 79 A more tangible challenge to the British Raj was 
exerted indirectly by the Buddhist and Hindu revivalist movements of 
the 1880s led by the Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil-Hindu intelligentsia. 
This religious-cultural assertion of the indigenous religions against 
the religion of the foreign rulers and their agents, the Christian 
missionaries, was a form of incipient nationalism. In many respects, 
opposition to the foreign occupation and to Western influences 
originated in, and was spearheaded by, the ethnocentric Sinhala- 
Buddhist nationalism. Their objective was to revive the glorious past 
of the ancient Sinhala civilisation. 50 
In more political terms, however, the formulation and founding of 
the Ceylon National Congress ( C. N. C. ) in 1919 marks the origin of the 
nationalist movement in Sri Lanka. As in other colonies in Asia, the 
nationalist movement in Sri Lanka was led by the English-educated, 
urban-based, westernised middle class. 51 As a result, the Sri Lankan 
nationalist movement was confined to this elite group and did not 
exert much influence outside its confines. 52 Their political 
agitation was confined to a series of petitions. Evidence was given 
to the constitutional Commission, urging greater representation in the 
Legislative Council. They could not mobilise the masses into politics 
within the framework of the national movement. There were no 
challenges to the authority of the British Raj because the nationalist 
79 Ibid., p. 38. 
90 A. J. Wilson, "Race, Religion, Language and Caste in the 
Subnationalisms of Sri Lanka", in Michel Robert, (ed), Collective 
Identities, Nationalism and Protest in Modern Sri Lanka, (Colombo: 
Marga Institute, 1981), p. 464. 
Si B. H. Farmer, "Social Basis of Nationalism in Ceylon", Asian 
Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. : 131-439. 
52 Ivor Jennings, "Nationalism and Political Development in 
Ceylon", (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), pp. 8-18. 
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movement was passive and subdued. In this sense, Sri Lanka was the 
ideal colony in that it saw a peaceful transition from dependence to 
independence. The Declaration of Independence in 1948 was not 
achieved by means of a politically motivated independence struggle but 
was bestowed more as an award from His Majesty's Government. 
Four and a half centuries of western colonialism had disrupted 
traditional political institutions. The creation of coherent and 
durable political institutions was among the most vital and difficult 
of the challenges confronting Sri Lanka and other developing nations 
of the Third World. The post-independent government structure, 
however, was based on the Soulbury Constitution of 1947 which 
introduced the Westminster-model of Parliament. The legislature 
consisted of a Senate and a House of Representatives, while the 
executive consisted of a Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister and the 
Governor General. 
Sri Lanka also happened to be the first British colony in Asia to 
receive the universal franchise. Nevertheless, it was not until after 
independence that political awareness and an active interest in 
politics spread widely and rapidly through the rural sector. This 
political passivity meant that independence certainly did not mark a 
breakthrough in the political structure, nor did it provide a new 
beginning and higher aspirations. It was in fact a transfer of power 
from the British to a pro-British Sri Lankan elite. The masses were 
cut off from active politics and remained as isolated from their new 
rulers as they had been under the British. 
After independence the new government was dominated by a small 
upper-class, a thoroughly Anglicised, urban elite whose political 
vehicle was the United National Party (U. N. P. ) established in 1947 on 
the basis of the National Congress. Its members were, as D. K. 
Rangnekar remarked, like the former colonial rulers in everything but 
114 
the colour of their skins. S3 S. P. Huntington describes the nature of 
this elite as follows: 
This group was overwhelmingly urban, although Ceylon 
was 70 per cent rural. It was largely Christian, 
although 91 per cent of the Ceylonese were not and 64 
per cent were Buddhist. Its language was English, 
which 92 per cent of the population could neither 
read nor write. In short, it was drawn from and 
represented a minority of less than 10 per cent of 
the population. S4 
Consequently the rural-urban gap widened and failed to assimilate 
the rural masses into the national political system. According to 
Huntington, national leaders who fail to mobilise popular support 
prior to independence do not rule for long after independence. 55 He 
identifies this process as the ruralisation of elections. 
3.15 Ruralisation of Elections 
In his study- of the ruralisation of elections Huntington finds 
that the clearest cases displayed several common major 
characteristics. Some of these characteristics are as follows: 
a. The modernising elite, who came from the urban-based 
middle classes, are driven out of office. 
b. The result is not one that has been anticipated or 
predicted by most political observers. 
c. The victorious party was able to secure their victory 
mainly because they mobilised new rural voters to 
participate. 
53 D. K. Ranadive, "The Nationalist Revolution in Ceylon", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 33, (1960), p. 363. 
S4 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 449. 
55 Ibid., p. 441. 
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d. The leader of this party is invariably a former member of 
the modernising elite who broke away from the elite and 
assumed a popular and traditional charisma. 
e. In spite of the leader being a member of the elite, the 
other key persons in this party were from the national 
rural elites. 
f. The issues which appealed to the rural voters were 
ethnic and religious issues and other marginal issues, 
which the victorious party were able to exploit. 
;. In most instances this new party secured the support of 
key religious figures in the rural sector whose work made 
a significant contribution to its victory. 
h. This victory of the opposition is viewed by its supporters 
and its opponents as a significant change in the political 
processes of the country. 
i. When this party assumes political power their policies 
are aimed at the rural sector, where a large part of its 
Supporters are concentrated. 
j. These policies, however, antagonize the modernising elite 
who resort to a military coup d' etat. 
k. In most instances the party which suffered defeat adapted 
itself to the new patterns of political participation and 
attempted its own efforts to mobilise the masses. 
1. In a few instances these parties were elected to power 
once again. S6 
These characteristics of the ruralisation of elections are visible 
in the political processes of Sri Lanka since the 1950s, which were 
the beginning of a period of rapid politicisation of the majority of 
S6 Ibid., p. 460. 
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the population. In fact this process was initiated by the national 
resurgence, along with the granting of universal suffrage in 1931. 
Consequently, issues related to religion and language became sensitive 
during this first post-independence decade and also stimulated mass 
awareness in politics, mainly in electoral politics. 
The sensitivity of these issues and the rather emotional approach 
adopted by the post-independence politicians paved the way for a 
polarisation based on religion and ethnicity between Sinhalese- 
Buddhist and Tamil-Hindu nationalism. The Sinhala language and the 
Buddhist religion were the pivot of Sinhala nationalism which was 
based on the support of the rural masses. The discontent and 
nationalist fervour of these rural masses were generated and fostered 
by a conviction that the Sinhalese-Buddhists were discriminated 
against during the colonial rule. The granting of independence did 
not change the colonial economic and political structure. The English 
language continued to be the language of administration. The medium 
of instruction in higher education was also confined to English which 
facilitated the monopolisation of public service employment by those 
with an English education. By 1953 a mere 9.4 per cent of the 
population aged 5-years and over were literate in English. The 
exclusivity of English education was largely due to the fact that such 
education was in the hands of private, mostly Christian schools which 
were concentrated in the South-West and the North, and were 
expensive. S7 The limited access to English thus convinced the rural 
masses that the English language was a major barrier to their upward 
mobility. The continued use of the English language, both in 
administration and education after independence, was perceived as an 
s' R. V. Kearney, "Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict in 
Ceylon", Pacific Affairs, (1964), p. 127. 
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instrument for the continuation of the privileged position of the 
urbanised elite. ss 
Language and religion were the issues which mobilised the rural 
masses in the 1950s. Their convictions and feelings of being 
discriminated against culminated in their making several demands. The 
first of these was that Sinhala should replace English as the official 
language. The other significant demands were the designation of 
Buddhism as a state religion, the state takeover of all privately 
assisted schools, and the declaration of Sri Lanka as a republic. The 
political leadership for this mass wave of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism was given by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (S. L. F. P. ), 
founded in 1951, and by its electoral ally the Mahajana Eksath 
Peramuna (M. E. P. ) or People's United Front. 59 The I. E. P. whose 
electoral programme responded to the national and cultural aspirations 
of the dissatisfied rural Sinhalese-Buddhist masses were elected to 
power in 1956. The M. E. P. 's electoral victory over the ruling U. N. P. 
marked a turning point in the post-independence political process of 
Sri Lanka. The deciding factor in the N. E. P. victory was its ability 
to mobilise the rural masses against the incumbent elite-based U. N. P. 
Government. 90 A number of political forces which had hitherto been 
excluded from politics gained entry to the political arena. A. J. 
Wilson observes that the most significant outcome of the M. E. P. 
victory was that the rural masses and the national-minded Sinhala 
intelligentsia had, for the first time, gained access to political 
SS S. U. Kodikara, "Communalism and Political Modernisation in 
Ceylon", Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. 1, (1970), p. 99. 
ss The Jlahajana Eksath Peramuna (M. E. P. ) or People's United Front 
was formed as a coalition of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, (S. L. F. P. ), 
the Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaja Party, (V. L. S. S. P. ), the Language 
Front and some independent members in the Parliament. 
90 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 451. 
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power. 31 Michel A. Ames semis up the I. E. P. victory of 1956 more 
explicitly: 
For the first time since colonial rule was imposed on 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) over 400 years ago Sinhalese 
villagers felt able to declare as some did when 
Bandaranaiaka's coalition succeeded to office, that 
it was now "Ape Anduwa" our goverment as opposed to 
rule by foreigners and alienated, westernised and 
christianised elites. 92 
For Calvin Woodward, what was most important was that the whole 
electoral episode made voters aware of the extent to which they could, 
through the vehicle of the political party, influence the course of 
affairs and effect the readjustment of policies vital to their oun 
well-being. 93 After coming to power, the M. E. P. implemented the main 
Sinhalese-Buddhist demands, the primary one being that "Sinhala" be 
established as the official language. As a means of further 
expanding education, two leading Buddhist monastic educational 
institutions known as "pirivenas" were elevated to the status of 
universities and came to be known as the Vidyalankara and Vidyudaya 
universities. The Katunayake Airport and the natural harbour at 
Trincomalee, which were controlled by the British, were taken over by 
the State. For the first time, a Ministry of Cultural Affairs was 
established to promote and propagate the indigenous cultures. 
Furthermore, a Buddhist Sasana Commission was appointed to make 
recommendations and to uphold the "sangha" (Buddhist clergy) 
organisation. 
91 A. J. Wilson, Electoral Politics in the Emergent State: The 
Ceylon General Election of May, 1970, (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 
23. 
92 M. A. Ames, "Westernisation or Modernisation, The Core of the 
Sinhalese Buddhism", Social Compass, Vol. 20, (1973), p. 144. 
93 Calvin A. Woodward, "Sri La k-a's Electoral Experience", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 47, (1974), p. 469. 
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Economic reforms were rather limited in scope and consisted of the 
nationalisation of the Port of Colombo and of the private transport 
services. 94 The foreign policy of Sri Lanka moved away from the pro- 
western foreign policy of the U. N. P. Government to a more moderate and 
middle path which maintained diplomatic ties with the Socialist bloc. 
The voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 years in 1959. In the 
meantime, the V. L. S. S. P. led by Philip Gunawardena, broke away from 
the I. E. P. government and Prime Minister S. W. R. de Bandaranayike was 
assassinated. The other aspirations and demands of the Sinhalese- 
Buddhist majority, however, such as the state takeover of assisted 
schools, employment in the state sector, and the armed forces being 
based on proportional religious representation, were realised during 
the S. L. F. P. regime of 1960-1965. In 1965 the U. N. P. was able to 
secure power only by adapting its appeal in such a manner as to 
compete with the S. L. F. P. Consequently, the Sinhalese-Buddhist rural 
masses had been mobilised into the electoral politics. On the other 
hand, their entry into politics also changed the dominant style, 
semantics, policies and the leadership within that system. 95 
Thus, post-independent Sri Lanka did witness some significant 
changes though these changes were not sufficiently profound to alter 
the basic power structure inherited from the British. 96 The U. N. P. 
and the S. L. F. P. were not successful in breaking the bonds of a 
dependent economy and their policies proved futile in the face of 
increasing unemployment, inflation and deteriorating standards of 
living. Thus, the changes and reforms were minor compared to the 
94 E. F. C. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 248. 
95 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 452. 
96 Tissa Fernando, "Elite Politics in the New States: The Case of 
Post-independence Sri Lanka", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3, (1973), 
p. 377. 
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deeper problems of society and failed to address the problems of a 
declining economy. In spite of the fact that the official language, 
employment and education were subject to change, the socio-economic 
and political supremacy of English education prevailed. Tissa 
Fernando defines the situation as follows: 
Sinhala may be the official language but those who 
know English in addition to the local languages are 
at a distinct advantage in obtaining superior 
employment. English is used less widely today than 
it was three decades ago. But the attitudes, values 
and life style of the English-speaking society are 
still widely accepted by the Ceylonese elite. 97 
With the granting, of independence, however, a cider social strata 
became involved in the political process as it was perceived that 
politics provided an avenue for reaching solutions to the acute 
problems within the context of Sri Lanka's underdeveloped economy and 
multi-:; roue society. 95 Since the 1950s electoral politics in Sri 
Lanka have permeated the thinking, expectations and aspirations of the 
rural population. The following Table 3.16 depicts the voter turn- 
out in Sri Lanka in Parliamentary Elections between 1947 and 1970. 
Table 3.16 Voter Participation in Parliamentary Elections 1947-70 
Year of Election Number of Voters Percentage 
1947 1,701.150 55.9 
1952 2,114,615 70.7 
1956 2,391,538 69.0 
1960 : 1arch 2,889,282 77.6 
1960 July 2,827,075 75.9 
1965 3,821,918 82.1 
1970 4,672,656 85.2 
Source: Department of Elections, Results of Parliamentary General 
Elections in Ceylon, 1947-1970, (Colombo: Department of 
Government Printing, 1971), p. 6. 
97 Ibid., p. 378. 
99 A. J. Wilson, "Politics and Political Development Since 1948", 
in K. M. de Silva, (ed), Sri Lanka-A Survey, op. cit., p. 283. 
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According to the above Table 3.16, in 1947,55.9 per cent of the 
eligible voters cast their votes. In 1960, it increased to 75.9, and 
rose to 85.2 per cent in 1970--a clear indication of the increasing 
participation in electoral politics in Sri Lanka. The level of 
politicisation is indicated by the voter turn-out since independence. 
It is the highest in Asia. 
Before universal franchise was accorded to those over 18 years, 
the youth were mobilised mainly towards securing votes for the 
opposition and promoting its campaign against the incumbent party. 
After 1959, however, they were involved directly in political parties 
which encouraged young people to believe in the inevitability of 
progress and the fulfilment of their hopes. All the major parties 
have founded and encouraged youth leagues, some of which have a wide 
membership. As they are dynamic, the youth leagues have made overt 
efforts to attract an ever wider membership. The competition for 
power motivated the parties to make rather exaggerated promises to the 
youth leagues; the party that made the greatest number of promises 
likely won the elections. Thus, the young people were motivated to 
participate more actively in electoral politics, especially in the 
elections of 1965 and 1970. 
The signs of the political participation of youth appeared in the 
mid 1960s in the form of student demonstrations, student strikes and 
the youth league activities of the left-wing parties. As an 
additional impetus the revolutionary and radical political approach at 
a global level also had its impact on the Sri Lankan youth. They were 
inspired by the romanticised exploits and the revolutionary valour of 
Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, the liberation struggle in Indo-China, 
and the growing student militancy in the Western countries-99 These 
99 Sirilaka, a L. S. S. P. oriented daily, translated Che Guevara's 
Diaries between august 25th and November 15th 1968. Sidney 
Wanasinghe, of Young Socialist translated and published Guevara's 
Guerrilla Warfare, in three parts in 1968 and 1969. 
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young people, who were the children of the nationalist forces which 
had supported the S. L. F. P. in 1956 against the pro-Western elites, 
were now attracted to the revolutionary forces operational in Sri 
Lanka. 100 As Huntington observes, the social and economic changes 
encouraged by the policy innovation lead new groups to demand entry, 
into the political system and required the expansion of the system. '°' 
The potential of the political system in Sri Lanka to meet the 
increased participation and growing demands will be examined through 
the political development there. 
3.16 Political Participation and Development 
Political development has been viewed in terms of the capacity of 
the political system to implement collective goals, resolve the 
issues by which it is confronted, and adapt to challenges involved in 
the emergence of a modern polity. S. P. Huntington states that in 
modernising societies, building the state means enlarging the 
bureaucracy, but more importantly also means establishing an effective 
party system capable of structuring the participation of new groups in 
politics. 102 The precondition of political stability is a party 
system capable of assimilating the new social forces produced by 
modernisation. 103 Thus, Huntington defines political development in 
terms of the institutionalisation of political organisations and 
procedures-- that is, the processes by which they acquire stability. 
100 Mervin De Silva, "Sri Lanka: The End of Welfare Politics", 
South Asian Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, (1973), pp. 91-109. 
lnl S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. 
cit., p. 145. 
102 Ibid., pp. 12-24, and "Political- Development or Political 
Decay", World Politics, Vol. 17, (1965), p. 401. 
103 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. 
cit., pp. 420-421. 
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according to Huntington the level of institutionalisation of a 
political system could be measured by the adaptability, complexity, 
autonomy and coherence of its organisation and procedures. 1°4 For the 
nation seeking political order through democratic processes and broad 
popular participation, the evolution of an institutionalised political 
party system is of crucial importance. The following statement by 
Huntington, indicates the importance of political parties in Sri Lanka 
in terms of their relevance to political stability: 
where new states emerge from colonialism with little 
or no inheritance of political institutions the 
stability of the polity depends directly on the 
strength of the party-105 
Although there is difficulty in operationalising all these 
criteria, the author wishes to examine some of them by means of 
focusing upon the political parties in the country with special 
attention being given to the left-wing parties. 
3.17 The Political Party System 
The introduction of universal franchise in 1931, independence from 
the British Raj in 1948, and the adoption of a British-style 
parliamentary system of government, resulted in political parties 
which have played decisive roles in Sri Lank-an politics since 
independence. At independence in 1948, there were only a few 
political parties such as the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Lanka Equal 
Society Party) which was founded in 1935, the Communist Party (C. P. ) 
founded in 1943, the Tamil Congress (T. C. ) and the United National 
Party, (U. N. P. ) founded in 1947. Other parties were formed later as 
follows: the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, in 1951; the Federal Party, in 
104 Ibid., pp. 12-24. 
105 Ibid., p. 91. 
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1949; and the Viplavakari (Revolutionary) Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 106 
in 1951. Consequently, by the mid-1950s a competitive party system 
had evolved in Sri Lanka. The growth of the party system is evident 
in the decline of independent candidates in parliamentary elections 
between 1947 and 1970. The number of elected independent candidates 
declined sharply between 1947 and 1970. In the election of 1947,21 
independent candidates were elected while in 1970 only two such 
candidates were elected. 107 The growth and development of competitive 
party politics encouraged the widening of political involvement and 
the proliferation of channels for political activity. Wider political 
participation generated a popular belief that the government was 
responsible for the welfare and progress of the people. 
Once the parties were elected to power, however, these heightened 
expectations were barely realised due to inadequate material resources 
and administrative incapability. The recurrence of such unfulfilled 
promises made the rural youth aware of the fact that their ambitions 
and aspirations could not be achieved within the limitations of the 
existing system. Moreover, the significant political parties were 
dominated by older statesmen from elite backgrounds, leaving little or 
no opportunity for the rural Youth to have an impact on their 
policies. '05 Nor did the parties provide opportunities for younger 
members to participate in responsible positions. Although youth were 
given chores at election time, after elections the permanent structure 
of the principal parties remained impermeable to the more enthusiastic 
106 The Party was called the V. L. S. S. P. from its founding in 1950 
to 1959. Since then it has been renamed the M. E. P. 
107 Calvin A. Woodward, "Sri Lanka's Electoral Experience", 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, (1974), p. 456. 
IOS Power in two major parties in Sri Lanka has always been highly 
centralized, partly because of the personalized rule which two 
families have exercised. The U. N. P. is dominated by the two related 
Senanayake and Jayawardena families. The S. L. F. P. is dominated by 
Bandaranaike family. 
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or dedicated young people. '°9 
political parties as well as in 
the younger age groups and this 
main spheres of politics. Table 
age distribution of members of p< 
1971. 
The decision-making positions in the 
Parliament remained impenetrable to 
generation gap was reflected in the 
3.17 below gives an insight into the 
irliament and the general populace in 
Table 3.17 Age Distribution of Members of Parliament, and 
Total Population 15 Years of Age and Over (1971, Percentages) 
Age group Members of Total 
Years Parliament Population 
15-19 - 17.6 
^0-24 - 16.4 
25-29 1.4 12.3 
30-34 3.4 9.4 
35-34 8.8 9.4 
. 10-44 15.1 
7.6 
45-49 23.2 7.0 
50-54 18.5 5.4 
55-59 13.7 4.5 
60-64 8.9 3.5 
65 and over 6.8 7.0 
Source: R. N. Kearney, Politics and Modernisation in Modern Sri 
Lanka: A Society in Transition, South Asian Series, No. 4, 
(1979), p. 77. 
Table 3.17 reveals that 95 per cent of the Members of parliament 
were 35 years or older. Politics in Sri Lanka is the main avenue of 
upward mobility. Yet few political parties, if any, in Sri Lanka 
are capable of absorbing the large number of politically ambitious 
individuals who emerged with the broadening of political 
participation. In this respect all the major political parties seemed 
equally unpromising for the career prospects and political aspirations 
of youth. 
Furthermore, developments within the left-wing movement during the 
decade prior to 1971 played a significant role in the creation and 
character of the J. V. P. and other underground organisations. Hence 
109 W. H. Wriggins, op. cit., p. 30 
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it is important to trace the development and nature of the left-wing 
parties in Sri Lanka in order to understand their failure to absorb 
the rural youth and the emergence of politically motivated violent 
movements in general. 
3.18 Left-Wing Parties 
Prior to 1960, the L. S. S. P., C. P. and the M. E. P. were the three 
main left-oriented political parties in Sri Lanka. The crisis in the 
Left from 1960 onward, however, proved to be an obstacle to attracting 
and absorbing, the emerging youth population. This crisis (which shall 
be dealt with later in more detail) was caused mainly by fragmentation 
and disunity among the left-wing parties. 
The history of the left-win; movement in Sri Lanka is 
characterised by fragmentation and disunity regarding their guiding 
ideologies. The first such ideological dispute materialised in 1939 
on the question of Trotskyism versus Stalinism within the L. S. S. P. 
While the majority of the Central Committee members supported 
Trotskyism, the minority supported Stalinism. The outcome of this 
dispute was that both the pro-Soviet group and the Stalinists were 
expelled from the L. S. S. P. As a result, a new party emerged, the 
United Socialist Party, which in 1943 became the-Communist Party of 
Ceylon. 110 The original L. S. S. P. had pledged support to the Fourth 
International and Trotskyism. The C. P. remained loyal to the Soviet 
Union and Stalinism. At the end of the Second World War, the 
L. S. S. P. faced yet another crisis when another group of Trotskyists 
broke away and organised the Bolshevik Leninist Party. By 1951, the 
L. S. S. P. and this breakaway group, known as the B. L. P., decided to 
reunite. This decision, however, caused yet another dispute and 
110 W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 127. 
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break-up in the L. S. S. P. The new group was led by Philip Gunawardwna, 
and came to be known as the Viplawakari (Revolutionary) L. S. S. P. As 
Calvin Woodward observes much of the disunity might have been 
prevented if the movement had developed a centralised organisation 
relatively soon after its formation. 111 
By 1960, the fragmentation of the left-wing parties was not yet at 
an end. From 1960-1966, the process was repeated several times. 
Firstly, the decision taken by the L. S. S. P. to form a coalition with 
the S. L. F. P. Goverment in 1964 had grave repercussions for the Party, 
and caused a further rift in the L. S. S. P. The anti-coalition faction 
formed the L. S. S. P. (R). This rift had serious implications for the 
L. S. S. P. as it was expelled from the Fourth International and was 
replaced by the break-away L. S. S. P. (R). 
Moreover, the ideological dispute between the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (C. P. S. U. ) and the Chinese Communist Party (C. C. P. ) 
in the context of the international Communist movement was the next 
cause of a rift in the Sri Lankern C. P. in 1963-64. The Sri Lanl: an 
C. P. came to be divided into the pro-Moscow C. P. and the pro-Peking 
C. P. The C. P. (M) which was in the majority was committed to the pro- 
Moscow line internationally and advocated a parliamentary strategy in 
order to gain power. The C. P. (P), on the other hand, rejected the 
parliamentary strategy and upheld the revolutionary strategy adopted 
in the Maoist Chinese Revolution. By 1970 the ideological disputes 
had led to an increase in the number of left-wing parties in Sri Lanka 
to six. A left-wing movement in Sri Lank-an politics had been needed 
since 1960 in order to absorb the radical forces, which had been 
increasing due to the unfavourable socio-economic changes that had 
taken place. What emerged, however, was not a strong unitary radical 
111 C. A. Woodward, "The Trotskite Movement in Ceylon", World 
Politics, Vol. 14, (1961-62), p. 315. 
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force capable of giving leadership to the politicized rural youth of 
the country, but rather a fragmented movement which was united only 
briefly, from 1963 to 1964, as a left-wing front. Obviously, a 
movement so lacking in unity and strength failed to assimilate the 
rural youth. 
The generation gap and the wider socio-economic and educational 
disparities of the left-wing leadership and the radical youth further 
alienated the latter from the established left-wing political parties. 
The leaders of the left-wing parties were from the wealthy upper 
stratum of Sri Lankan society who had been educated at British 
universities. Of the 25 Marxist M. P. 's elected in 1970, seven had 
been enrolled at overseas universities' and another five had attended 
the University of Ceylon or the Colombo Law College. At least 12 had 
been educated at leading Colombo schools, such as the St. Thomases, 
Royal and Annanda colleges. 112 Without exception they were all over 
50-years of age, and were engaged in the elite professions as doctors 
or lawyers. By 1971, the left-wing movement had been active for 35 
years, yet to a great extent its leadership was still confined to the 
first generation of founders. S. P. Huntington explains this situation 
as follows: 
So long as an organisation still has its first set of 
leaders, so long as a procedure is still performed by 
those who first performed it, its adaptability is 
still in doubt. 113 
According to J. Jupp, the Marxist parliamentarians were no more 
representative of the people than anyone else. Because of their 
derivation from the English-speaking, professional classes, they were 
112 J. Jupp, Ceylon: Third World Democracy, (London: Frank Cass, 
1978), pp. 295-296. 
113 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 14. 
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even less representative than the S. L. F. P. They were a world away 
from the village-educated youth of the 1970s. 114 
From their very inception, the left-wing parties had focused on 
the urban working class and the minority castes in the urban coastal 
areas. At an electoral level their main power bases were concentrated 
in the low country Sinhalese areas of Southern Sri Lc-aka. Their 
preoccupation with the urban corking, class made them ignore the rural 
masses, especially the peasantry, thereby isolating a vital part of 
the population from left-wing politics. S. P. Huntington, relates the 
significance of the rural sector as follows: 
The source of political modernity is the city, the 
source of political stability is the country-side. 
The task of the Party is to combine the two. One 
major test of the institutionalisation of a party and 
the adaptability of its leadership is the willingness 
of the latter to make the concessions necessary to 
win the support of the countryside. The strong 
parties and the stable party system are those which 
meet this test. 115 
The Sri Lankan left-wing parties, however, tended to ignore the 
radical potential of the rural masses and the gradual but steady 
radicalisation of the unemployed rural youth. 
The political image of the left-wing parties was a barrier to the 
assimilation of the rural youth. In their early years, the left-wing 
parties identified themselves with orthodox 'Marxist parties which were 
dedicated to the cause of independence. A governing factor was the 
objective of the left-wing parties to defeat Colonialism and 
Capitalism and to install an independent Socialist regime. "" 
114 J. Jupp, op. cit., p. 296. 
115 Ibid., p. 434. 
116 G. L. Lerski, Origin of Trotskyism in Ceylon: A Documentary 
History of the Lanka Sama Samajaya Party, 1935-1942, (Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institution For War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968), 
p. 27. 
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According to W. H. Wriggins, in the beginning the platform of the 
L. S. S. P. had independence as its first plank, and socialism as its 
second. 117 During the pre-independence period the left-wing parties 
were theoretically committed to the Marxist concept of revolution but 
had no practical strategy to capture power. The dedication of the 
left-wing parties to a peaceful path precluded their active 
participation in the agitation for independence from the British Raj. 
After independence, the left-wing parties continued to be devoted to 
parliamentary politics while preaching socialism. Sri Lanka's first 
general election in 1947 indicated the extent of support secured by 
the parties of the left-wing. They were elected as the main 
opposition party, thereby maintaining their stability within the 
framework of parliamentary politics. In spite of the fact that the 
left-wing parties had contested general elections since 1947, they did 
not make a clear-cut attempt to gain political power until March 1960. 
The election victory of the I. E. P. in 1956 was an event of 
tremendous impact on the left-wing movement in Sri Lanka. After the 
victory of the I. E. P. the approach of the left-wing parties to the 
parliamentary system changed. It is clear that the main left-wing 
parties were mostly inclined towards parliamentary politics as the 
means for achieving a socialist state. Therefore, for the first time 
in 1960, the left-wing parties attempted to obtain a mandate to form a 
government. The General Election of March 1960 was thus a highlight 
in the history of the left-wing parties because the L. S. S. P., the 
I. E. P. and the C. P. nominated candidates for 101,89, and 53 
constituencies, respectively. At this election, however, the 
L. S. S. P. and the M. E. P. managed to get only 10 seats each, and the 
C. P. only four seats. It is also significant to note that, as shown 
in Table 3.18 below, the percentage of votes secured by the left-wing 
117 W. H. Wriggins, op. cit., p. 125. 
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parties declined from 20.5 percent in 1947 to 13 per cent at the 
General Election of 1970. 
Table 3.18 Performance of Marxist Parties of Sri Lanka in 
Parliamentary Elections 
Election Parties Votes 
1947 3 387,544 
1952 3 439,661 
1956 2* 393,929 
1960 March 3 790,041 
1960 July 3 417,045 
1965 6 528,663 
1970 3 648,994 
Percentage Seats Won 
20.5 18 
18.9 13 
14.7 17 
25.7 23 
13.8 19 
13.1 15 
13.0 25 
The VLSSP, which contested as a part of the MEP, is not 
included. 
Source: R. N. Kearney, "The Marxist Parties of Ceylon" in Paul 
R. Brass and Marcus F. Frando, (eds), Radical Politics in South 
Asia, (Cvnbridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1973), p. 405. 
Defeat at the general elections did not result in a reformulation 
of party strategy or a withdrawal from electoral politics. What 
emerged was an intermediate path in parliamentary politics in which 
the left-wing parties either arrived at a `no contest' pact with the 
moderate political parties or formed coalition governments with them. 
From 1960 onward, the L. S. S. P. and the C. P. fought all the consecutive 
general elections in alliance with the S. L. F. P. The L. S. S. P. joined 
the S. L. F. P. Government in 1964, and the C. P. supported this coalition 
government. On the, other hand, in 1965, the M. E. P. chose to join the 
U. N. P. Government. The continuous trend of forming alliances with the 
moderate political parties had grave repercussions not only for the 
parties of the left but on the left-wing movement in general. The 
entire scenario had a demoralising effect on the emerging radical 
youth who had cause to believe that the principles of radical politics 
had been betrayed by forming governments, alliances and coalitions 
with the moderate parties. S. P. Huntington vividly explains a similar 
situation as follows: 
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When it first appears each new party seems like a 
harbinger of progress and reform because it embodies 
the interests of a newly emerging social force. Once 
it has achieved a position within the political 
system, however, it changes as its constituency 
changes, and it eventually becomes the spokesman for 
vested interests. 11S 
The lack of an adequate strategy through which political power 
could be captured, in addition to the fact that they entered into a 
coalition government with the moderate political parties, 
disillusioned the younger generation. The image projected by the left 
leaders was not an image which would appeal to the Swabasha-educated 
rural youth. 
In the initial stages, two splinter groups from the orthodox left 
parties, the R. L. S. S. P. and the C. P. (P), attracted the young. These 
two parties posed a challenge to the theory of peaceful transformation 
in achieving socialism by advocating the concept of revolution based 
on an armed struggle. Of the two parties, the C. P. (P) became a 
rallying point for the radical element of the rural youth. It 
absorbed a layer of ambitious rural radical youth into the politics of 
the left. These young people were in search of a political 
organisation through which they could express their grievances and 
also implement immediate social changes. 
Subsequently, the ideology and programme of action adopted by 
these two parties failed to retain its appeal for the youth of the 
rural areas. Ideologically, the C. P. (P) expounded the blueprint of 
Mao's thought, while the R. L. S. S. P. was committed to pure Trotskyism. 
Their limitations were mainly in the sphere of mobilisation as these 
two parties confined their activities mainly to trade unionism and 
failed to arrive at a viable mechanism through which the disillusioned 
115 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 429. 
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rural youth could be mobilised. Though these political groupings were 
called parties, they lacked the continuing organisation and social 
support which, according, to Huntington, are the essence of the 
party. 119 
Given these circtunstances, those who joined either the C. P. (P) or 
the R. L. S. S. P. with aspirations of attaining revolutionary change were 
soon to be disappointed and broke away from the parties. The further 
fragmentation of the left-wing parties created more than half a dozen 
left-wing groups which were eager to mobilise the rural youth for an 
armed uprising. S. P. Huntington observes this situation as follows: 
In every society affected by social change new groups 
arise to participate in politics. Were the 
political system lacks autonomy, these groups gain 
entry into politics without becoming identified with 
the established political organisations or 
acquiescing in the established political 
procedures. 120 
The political hierarchy consisted of an older generation that not 
only failed to come to drips with the socio-economic crisis 
encountered by the rural youth, but also failed to assimilate them 
into the existing political system. With the onset of economic 
deterioration there had been signs of political decay. This situation 
further led the youth to seek other means of creating an impact in the 
political arena. It is evident that the radical youth seemed to have 
arrived at the following conclusions: The U. N. P., the S. L. F. P. and 
the United Front were incapable of solving Sri Lanka's politico- 
economic problems within the framework of a parliamentary system. The 
left-wing parties were too degenerate to make a significant 
contribution to the revolutionary cause and, therefore, a 
119 Ibid., p. 413. 
120 Ibid., p. 21. 
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revolutionary party had to be built up in order to achieve a socialist 
society by means of politically motivated violence. 
The above mentioned preconditions, spanning several decades of Sri 
Lanka's socio-economic and political development, led to the origin of 
the J. V. P. and similar political violence movements. 
3.19 Summary 
The socio-economic and political factors provide the preconditions 
for the origin of political violence movements in Sri Lanka. It is 
argued that the Colebrooke Reforms marked the beginning of a process 
of socio-economic and political modernisation in Sri Lanka. In their 
wake came the plantation economy which made systematic inroads into 
the traditional socio-economic fabric consequently leading to its 
disintegration. The traditional agricultural system was neglected and 
issues of land shortages and rural indebtedness loomed large in the 
ensuing agrarian crisis. This agrarian crisis, however, was 
accompanied by social mobilisation which was characterized by a rapid 
growth of population, slow urbanisation, a significant expansion of 
education especially with the advent of free education, and a high 
rate of literacy and media growth. As a result, expectations rose 
particularly in the crisis-effected rural sector. 
The economic conditions which were imperative in meeting these 
high aspirations, however, were lacking because of the stagnation from 
the 1960s onward. The symptoms of economic decline since the 1960s 
were the rising budget deficits, rising inflation, unemployment and 
underemployment. Consequently, the semi-urban and rural youth found 
their aspirations falling far short of fulfilment and so were subject 
to a process of disillusionment and politicisation by the mid-1960s. 
Political modernisation was overtly manifest in the national 
movement, universal franchise, and the growth and expansion of 
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political parties. The national movement which was ethnic and elite- 
based was incapable of mobilising the masses. Therefore, it was not 
until the 1950s that ruralisation of elections and mass political 
participation in Sri Lanka were realised. The victory of the M. E. P. 
in 1956 broadened political awareness and participation within the 
rural sector. The measures taken by the I. E. P. or the successive 
U. N. P. and S. L. F. P. governments, however, failed to fulfil the 
aspirations of the semi-urban and rural youth and absorb them into the 
political system. 
Given this political vacuum the rural youth were politicised and 
radicalised by and attracted to the left-oriented political parties 
within Sri Lanka. Because these parties lacked organisation, unity 
and coherent programmes, the youth were not assimilated into the 
political party system. These were the preconditions which proved to 
be conducive to the origin and fostering of clandestine organisations 
which aimed at political violence within Sri Lanka. 
In the following Chapter 4 the author wishes to examine the 
preconditions which paved the way for the origin and development of 
political violence movements within the confines of Sri Lankan Tamil 
ethnicity. 
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Chapter 4 
PRECONDITIONS OF TAMIL GUERRILLA WARFARE 
4.1 Introduction 
In this fourth chapter, the author concentrates on the 
preconditions which gave rise to guerrilla organisations among the 
Tamil community of Sri Lanka. Several observations have been made 
regarding political violence based on ethnicity. According to Martin 
0. Heisler, ethnic divergencies have been the single most important 
source of long-term conflict leading to civil war and insurgencies and 
even to the disintegration of states. 1 
Viewed in this context, political violence among the Tamils makes 
it imperative, firstly, to examine the factors which caused ethnic 
conflict primarily between the Sinhalese majority and the major 
minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils. K. M. de Silva observes that the 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is not a simple and straightforward 
confrontation between callous majority and an oppressed minority. 2 
It is traceable directly to the widening social changes and the 
process of modernisation at work within the country. The thesis 
presented in this chapter is that the socio-economic and political 
changes contributed to the ethnic conflict, separatism and the origin 
Martin 0. Heisler, "Ethnic Conflict in the World Today: An 
Introduction", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 433, (1977), p. 1. 
2 H. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tension: Sri Lanka, 1880-1985, 
(Lanham: University Press, 1986), p.. 12 
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of the Tamil guerrilla organisations which waged political violence. 
In order to examine the preconditions behind the political violence 
among the Tamil community, this chapter is broken down into the 
following sections: ethnic pluralism, impact of the colonial period, 
internal migration, the policy of official language, state employment 
and unemployment, the policy of university admission, origin and 
development of ethno-political organisations, the role of the Federal 
Party, government response, the 1972 Constitution, separate state and 
the Tamil youth radicalisation. 
4.2 Ethnic Pluralism 
According to Huntington, colonialism and ethnic heterogeneity 
would seem to be much better predicators of insurgency than poverty. 3 
Furthermore, according to T. R. Gurr, theories of revolution and state 
violence tend to agree with the postulate that sharp internal 
cleavages along lines of class, ethnicity and/or religion contribute 
to violent conflict. } Thus, the ethnic factor is one of the many 
impulses leading to political violence in the Third World. 
Therefore, the pluralistic nature of Sri Lankan society necessitates 
an examination of the ethnic composition of the country before 
embarking on a study of the preconditions of its political violence. 
Sri Lanka is a multi-racial, multi-religious society of which 74 
per cent of the total population are Sinhalese, while the main ethnic 
minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils, represent 12.6 per cent of the total 
population. The representation of the other minorities is shown in 
Table 4.1. The size and rate of increase of a minority group is an 
3 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 42. 
4 Ted Robert Gurr, "Persistent Patterns of Repression and 
Rebellion: Foundation for a General Theory of Political Concern", in 
Margaret P. Karns, (ed), Persistent Patterns and Emergent Structures 
in a Waning Century, (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 159. 
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important factor in ethnic conflict. 5 As shown in Table 4.1 an 
outstanding characteristic of the ethnic structure is the numerical 
preponderance of the Sinhalese majority. 
Table 4.1 Ethnic Composition of the Population of Sri Lanka 
Nationalities Number Percentage 
Sinhalese 10,985,666 74.0 
Sri Lankan Tamils 1,871,535 12.6 
Sri Lankan Moors 1,056,972 7.1 
Indian Tamils 885,233 5.6 
Malays 43,378 0.3 
Burghers 38,236 0.3 
Others 28,981 0.2 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census 
of Populations and Housing in Sri Lanka, Preliminary 
Release, No. 1, (Colombo: Department of Census and 
Statics, 1981), p. 3. 
The ethnic communities in Sri Lanka are divided by differences in 
race, language, religion and territorial concentration. The Sinhalese 
majority, who are said to be descendants of the Aryans of Northern 
India, speak Sinhala, an Indo-European language related to the 
language of Northern India. 6 Ninety per cent of the Sinhalese are 
Buddhists. Despite the fact that there is a pattern of regional 
concentration on an ethnic basis, this has been somewhat flexible. 
The Sinhalese are concentrated mostly in the southern, the western and 
the highland regions of Sri Lanka. The dry zone, which lies between 
the highland and the northern areas of the country, and which was once 
sparsely populated, has absorbed the surplus population from the 
western and highland regions. 
5 Christopher Hewitt, "Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative 
Survey of Ethnic Violence", The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political Science, Vols. 429-434, (1977), p. 157. 
6 Historically the first Sinhalese migrants led by Prince Vijaya 
and his 700 followers migrated from Northern India to Sri Lanka some 
2,500 years ago. Given the myth of their early migration from 
Northern India, as well as their belief in their royal descent the 
Sinhalese enjoy a sense of priority. 
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The Tamils are said to originate from the Dravidian stock of 
Southern India and speak Tamil, a Dravidian language which is also 
spoken in Southern India.? Most Tamils are Hindus. Both the 
Sinhalese and Tamil communities, however, have been exposed to the 
influence of Christianity. Most Sri Lankan Christians are Catholic 
Sinhalese living along the western coast. Table 4.2 shows the 
religious composition of Sri Lanka. 
Table 4.2 Population by Religion in Sri Lanka 1981 
Population Numbers Percentage 
Buddhists 10,291,000 69.3 
Hindus 2,302,000 15.5 
Muslims 1,128,000 7.6 
Christians 1,114,000 7.5 
Others 15,000 0.1 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of 
Populations and Housing in Sri Lanka, Preliminary Release, 
No. 1, (Colombo: Department of Census and Statics, 1981). 
The Tamils are concentrated mainly in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces with only about one-third of them found in the other seven 
provinces. S Thus, the Tamils have a relatively well-defined 
territorial base. Arend Lijphart observes that clear boundaries 
between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of 
limiting mutual contacts and consequently of reducing the chances of 
ever present potential antagonisms erupting into actual hostility. 9 
7 Although both the Moors and the Indian Tamils speak the Tamil 
language, they are in many ways different from the Sri Lankan Tamils. 
The Moors identify their ethnicity in terms of religion and culture 
and not language. The Indian Tamils, while sharing the common bonds 
of language and religion with the Sri Lankan Tamils, are different 
socially. 
s Sri Lankan Tamils formed a majority of the populations of the 
Jaffna, ! Mannar, Vavuniya, and Mullaitivu districts in the Northern 
Province. In the Eastern Province they were a majority in the 
Batticaloa district and were large minorities in the Trincomalee and 
Ampara districts. See, Appendix 5. 
9 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural: Societies -A Comparative 
Exploration, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 88. 
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Moreover, the past relations between the two ethnic groups have 
had a profound influence in shaping their present relationships. 
Historically, the Sinhalese and the Tamils were involved 
intermittently in power struggles for either the seizure of the 
Sinhalese throne by Tamil adventurers or the contest for parts of the 
Sinhalese kingdom, or participated in the wars between the Sinhalese 
kings and Southern Indian armies. Those historical battles between 
the Sinhalese and the Tamil kings were probably motivated more by 
feudal and territorial considerations than by ethnic factors. 10 
Centuries of mutual separation accentuated their differences. 
On the other hand, both communities developed clearly defined 
ideas and attitudes about the other. A few studies have been made of 
these attitudes. Howard Wriggins examined this aspect by using a 
study based on a sample of Sinhalese and Tamil students. According to 
this study the Sinhalese students characterised the Tamils as follows: 
cruel, clever, poor, thrifty, diligent, arrogant, clannish, 
mathematically-minded, self-centred, simple-living and loquacious. 
The Tamil students considered the Sinhalese to be lazy, proud, bold 
and selfish-11 Consequently, there is no doubt that the two major 
ethnic communities display distinct ethnic dissimilarities. In fact, 
the existence of ethnic differences, often conceived of as primordial, 
can be viewed as problematic social constructions, not irreducible 
social components. Therefore, the fact that ethnic differences exist 
is not sufficient for ethnic conflict to occur. Clifford Geertz 
observes that Sri Lanka's aggravated primordial problem is not a mere 
legacy, an inherited impediment to her political, social and economic 
10 See, W. I Siriweera, "The Dutthagamini-Elara Episode: A 
Reassessment", in The Social Science Association, (ed), Ethnicity and 
Social Change in Sri Lanka, (Colombo: Karunarathna and Sons, 1984), 
pp. 54-73. 
11 W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemma of a New Nation, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 232-233. 
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modernisation; rather it is a direct and immediate reflex of her first 
serious--if still rather ineffective--attempt to achieve such 
modernisation. 12 
Given Huntington's belief that communal ties are ascriptive, 
scholars often think of them as traditional in character. Communal 
conflict, consequently, is thought of as a more traditional form of 
conflict than say, conflict among social classes. Although, communal 
characteristics may be ascriptive, communal consciousness is creative 
and malleable. It is indeed often intensified, and in some cases 
initiated by the process of modernisation. 13 
Parallel to Huntington's argument is the observation that the 
origins of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka are deeply rooted in the 
process of modernisation initiated during the occupation of the 
British Raj. The process of modernisation has stimulated communal 
conflict between the two communities by means of a variety of 
factors. The author, however, wishes to focus primarily on the 
factors which developed after the granting of independence in 1948. 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to make an in-depth study of the 
post-independence period in isolation. Such a study has to be viewed 
in the context of the impact of the colonial period. 
4.3 Impact of the Colonial, Period 
when the Portuguese arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505, the island had 
been divided into three separate kingdoms. There were two Sinhalese 
kingdoms: Kotte was based in the south-west maritime regions; Kandy 
12 Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial 
Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States", in Clifford Geertz, 
(ed), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia 
and Africa, (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 123. 
13 S. P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of 
Development", in "Civil Violence and International System", Adelphi 
Papers, Part 2, No. 83, (1971), p. 11. 
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was Located in the Central Highlands. There was also a Talnil kingdom, 
centred around Jaffna in Northern Sri Lanka. 14 By 1594, the 
Portuguese had secured possession of the southwestern districts and in 
1619, they annexed the Jaffna kingdom. Those areas were later 
conquered first by the Dutch in 1658 and then by the British in 1796. 
The Eandyan kingdom, on the other hand, remained unconquered until the 
British finally succeeded in annexing it to their empire in 1815. For 
the first time the island was united under foreign rule. From the 
very beginning, the European powers administratively divided the 
Sinhala and Tamil areas into separate territories, leading to distinct 
and separate social formations characterized by different socio- 
economic and political structures. This administrative division was 
operational until 1833. 
The impact of both the Portuguese and the Dutch periods on the 
ethnic conflict was minimal. The ethnic divisions between the two 
communities originated with the socio-economic and political 
development. of the country particularly during British colonial rule. 
Certain socio-political recommendations of the Colebrook-Cameron 
Commission in 1833 marked the beginning of a differential social 
mobilisation between the Sinhala and Tamil peoples of Sri Lanka. The 
Commission's recommendations incorporated far-reaching changes in the 
form of a uniform and centralised system of governmental 
administration, English education and the Legislative Council. 
14 It should be noted that there is a controversy among scholars 
about the precise time and period during which the Jaffna Kingdom was 
founded, its boundaries, the nature and scope of its power and its 
level of independence. For the Tamil version of the Jaffna kingdom 
see, S. Pathmanathan, The Kingdom of Jaffna, Part 1, Circa A. D. 1250- 
1450, (Colombo: Rajendran, 1978). For a Sinhalese version see, C. W. 
Nicholas and C. Paranavithana, A Concise History of Ceylon, From the 
Earliest Times to the Arrival of the Portuguese in 1505, (Colombo: 
Ceylon University Press Board, 1961), and K. M. de Silva, "Traditional 
Homeland of the Tamils of Sri Lanka: A Historical Appraisal", Paper 
presented at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, (Sri 
Lanka, 1987). 
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For purposes of administration, the island was divided into five 
administrative provinces: the Western, Northern, Eastern, Southern and 
Central provinces, all of which came tinder the purview of a government 
agent. 15 In 1873, some provinces were further subdivided. The 
North Central Province was formed from the Northern Province. Two 
additional provinces were demarcated in the Central province and were 
named the Uva and Sabaragamuwa provinces in 1886 and 1889, 
respectively. The centralisation of government and administration, 
combined with the development of transport, brought the Sinhala and 
Tamil communities into closer contact. 
The plantation economy opened the scope of economic advancement to 
employment in the governmental and private professional fields. The 
introduction of English education created direct competition for 
limited resources, e. g., for governmental employment and for the 
professions based on English education which became the primary means 
of economic advancement, social mobility and elite status. From the 
inception of the plantation economy the benefits of English education 
were reaped by the Burghers, 16 the Tamils and the low-country 
Sinhalese. 17 For the Tamils, the geo-economic conditions during the 
colonial rule, especially in the Northern Province, limited their 
options for social mobility to education. Missionaries also 
concentrated on improving English education in this region. For 
example, in 1911,4.9 per cent of Sri Lankan Tamil males were literate 
in English, as opposed to 3.5 per cent of the low-country Sinhalese 
males and 0.7 per cent of the up-country Sinhalese males. Those 
1' G. C. Mendis, Ceylon Under the British, (Colombo: The Colombo 
Apothecaries, 1946), p. 34. 
16 The Burghers are descendants of the Portuguese and the Dutch. 
They speak English and are Christians by religion. 
1i The Sinhalese themselves are divided into low-country Sinhalese 
and up-country Sinhalese. The majority are low-country Sinhalese. 
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factors facilitated the Taunils in securing more professional jobs in 
both the public and private sectors which resulted in a 
disproportionately higher representation of Tamils in employment than 
in the total population. This observation is supported S. J. Tambiah's 
examination of the ethnic representation in Sri Lanka's public 
administrative services from 1870 to 1946.18 Furthermore, Tambiah 
sees as the reasons for the Tamils' preponderance in English literacy 
and high economic standing the following: 
The Ceylon Tamils also found attractive avenues of 
employment in the administrative services and the 
professions. Coming from the Northern region of 
Ceylon where land was both scarce and infertile, they 
had no scope for large scale agricultural activity 
which was possible in the case of the Sinhalese- 
especially those in the low country. 19 
The low-country Sinhalese, however, who also had the advantage of 
an English education entered the higher governmental services and 
private professions in direct competition with the Tamil community. 
According to Howard Wriggins there have always been more low-country 
Sinhalese than Tamils in the Sri Lankan civil service. In relation to 
the total of each community in the population, there have been 
proportionately more Tamils and many more Burghers than Sinhalese in 
the public services. A service-wide census taken in 1951 showed that 
out of a total of 123,194 reported employees of the central 
government, those with Sinhalese background represented 81,374 and 
those with Tamil background represented 21,768. Of the remaining 
20,000 who had an exclusively English educational background it would 
be plausible to assume that 10,000 were Sinhalese, 5,000 were Burghers 
and 5,000 were Tamils. This would yield a total of 27,000 Tamils out 
is S. J Tambiah, "Ethnic Representation in Ceylon Higher 
Administrative Services, 1970-1946", University of Ceylon Review, Vol. 
13, Nos. 2-3, (1955), pp. 113-134. 
19 Ibid., p. 130. 
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of the total public service force of about 123,000, or roughly 22 per 
cent. 20 Differential social mobilisation widened the socio-economic 
cleavages and generated a new kind of ethnic competition between the 
two communities, particularly after independence. Huntington aptly 
observes a similar situation as follows: 
Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully 
side by side in traditional society became aroused to 
violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the 
tensions, and the inequalities generated by social 
and economic modernisation. Modernisation thus 
increases conflict among traditional groups, between 
traditional groups and modern ones, and among modern 
groups. 21 
Moreover, Joseph Rothschild claims that for the consolidation of 
ethnic groups two main factors are essential. The first is the 
competition over relatively limited and valued resources and goals 
within the wider society, a competition which may lead to the 
mobilisation of the main ethnic group who feel challenged and 
minorities who feel disadvantaged. The second is an elite with an 
ability and desire to mobilise those with a common objective into a 
self-conscious group. 22 In order to understand how the already 
existing competition between the two communities developed into 
conflict and then into a full-blown political violence movement, the 
socio-economic and political development of post-independent Sri Lanka 
will be examined. The most important factors for study are the 
policies of: internal migration through state sponsored land 
settlement schemes, official language, public sector employment, and 
university admission. 
20 W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, op. 
cit., (1960) p. 235. 
21 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 39. 
22 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptural Framework, (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 1981), p. 29. 
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4.4 Internal Migration 
The main pattern of migration within the island is discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this study which involves the movement of persons, mainly 
Sinhalese, from the densely populated Southwestern wet zone to 
districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The impetus given to 
peasant resettlement schemes especially after independence was met by 
stiff opposition from the Tamil community. Their objections to the 
government sponsored "Colonies", sometimes situated within or at least 
in the peripheral regions of the Northern and Eastern provinces, were 
interpreted as a serious threat to the regional demarcation of the 
"traditional Tamil areas". 
When land resettlement was stepped up in the 1930s, landlessness 
and land fragmentation became acute problems for the Sinhalese as well 
as a substantial number of Tamils. Those problems were of particular 
concern to the Tamils because of their relegation to the nonarable 
lands and the lack of irrigable land for the expansion of agriculture. 
The opposition posed by the Federal Party (F. P. ) to the resettlement 
programme was attributed to their claims that preference was given to 
Sinhala settlers over Tamils in the selection of allottees for the 
said schemes which were located in predominantly Tamil districts. 
Table 4.3 illustrates the ethnic composition of the peasant colonies 
in the Northern and Eastern provinces at the end of 1953. Overall it 
is evident that in areas where the Tamil population predominated, 
resettlement was much less than in the Sinhalese-dominated areas. In 
the Eastern Province, a total of 479,312 hectares of land were 
alienated to 16,532 allottees between 1931 and 1953. Of the land 
allotted, only 17.4 per cent was allocated to Tamils. 23 
23 B. H. Farmer, Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 229. 
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Table 4.3 Sinhalese and Tamils in the Colonies of the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces 
Provinces Total Sinhalese Tamil Tamil as a% of Sinhalese 
Northern 656 0 656 100 
Eastern 5,199 2,979 2,223 75 
Whole 16,532 2,976 2,879 17 
Source: B. H. Farmer, Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 208-209, quoted 
from C. Manogaran, op. cit. 1987, p. 91. 
Consequently, as Table 4.4 indicates, the demographic distribution 
of the Sinhalese population in these areas changed between 1911 and 
1981. 
Table 4.4 Sinhalese in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
(Percentage) 
Districts Sinhalese 
1911 1946 1971 1981 
Jaffna 0.1 1.1 0.9 0.6 
Mannar 2.7 3.8 4.1 8.1 
Vavunira/ Mullaitivu 10.7 16.6 16.8 11.4 
Trincomalee 3.8 20.7 29.0 33.6 
Batticaloa/Mmparai 3.7 5.8 17.7 21.8 
Total, North and East 1.8 4.9 11.0 13.2 
Source: R. N. Kearney and Barbara Diane Miller, Internal 
Migration in Sri Lanka and Its Social Consequences, 
(London: Westviews Press, 1987), p. 97. 
C. Manogaram estimates that more than 165,000 Sinhalese were added 
to the population in the Eastern and Northern provinces. This 
development dates from the advent of the peasant resettlement 
programme especially between 1953 and 1981.24 Wriggins elaborates on 
the impact of colonisation and on the suspicions and discord between 
the Sinhalese and Tamils: 
Clearing and irrigating jungle land to be settled by 
peasants from the overcrowded Sinhalese and Tamil 
areas became a bitter apple of discord between the 
two communities. The land had lain under the rule of 
24 C. Manogaram, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 97. 
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malaria, empty, and desolate until D. D. T. made its 
reconquest possible. Tamils consider these new lands 
to be areas they have traditionally inhabited. The 
Sinhalese see much historical evidence to prove that 
Buddhist civilization once flourished before the 
jungle and malaria made their conquest. Both argue 
that the settlement of' peasants from other 
communities represent encroachment. And since 
political representation goes according to 
territorial constituencies, a significant change in 
the population structure of such areas would alter 
the balance of communal representation in the House 
of Representatives. Hence even land development has 
sharpened group conflict. 25 
Thus, internal migration through the land settlement schemes has 
sharpened ethnic conflict. It was the issue of official language, 
however, which brought the ethnic conflict to the forefront of Sri 
Lankari politics. Until then the Tamil politicians had not been very 
successful in mobilising the Tamil people to support the party's 
objectives. 
4.5 Policy of Official Language 
The policy of official language has been the major factor behind 
the ethnic conflict between the two communities since independence. 
The British Raj established the English language as the language of 
the government, the professions and higher education. Therefore, 
those receiving an English education were at a tremendous occupational 
advantage and could expect a higher social mobility than those who had 
been taught in the indigenous languages. The importance of this trend 
in language is indicated in Table 4.5. 
According to Table 4.5,80 per cent of the population did not have 
access to an English education and, therefore, were illiterate in 
25 W. H. Wriggins, "Impediments to Unity in New Nation, The Case of 
Ceylon", in T. S. Fuikle, and R. W. Gable, (eds), Political Development 
and Social Change, (London: John-Wickey, 1961), pp. 568-569. 
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English. 26 It was to address this imbalance that in 1944 the Sri 
Lank-an Legislature agreed that both Sinhala and Tamil should replace 
English as the official language. The theme of the Government's 
political slogan was that "Swabasha", the vernacular languages, should 
be given their rightful place. Until 1954, the main political parties 
were committed to the policy of Swabasha. The Tamils, however, were 
not enthusiastic about Swat-kasha because the British policies put the 
Tamils at an advantage and they were thus in a better position to gain 
access to an English education. 
Table 4.5 Languages Spoken by Persons of 3 Years of Age 
and Over by 1953 
Languages Spoken Numbers Percentage 
Sinhala Only 1,289,957 58.9 
Taunil Only 1,570,084 21.6 
English Only 11,066 0.2 
Sinhala and English 719,194 9.9 
Sinhala and Tamil 307,570 1.2 
Tamil and English 146,549 2.0 
Sinhala, Tamil and English 233,567 3.2 
Total 7,280,987 100 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of 
Ceylon, 1953, Vol, 3, part 1, (Colombo: Government 
Press, 1960), p. 604. 
The vernacular movement gained momentum after independence. The 
national resurgence, which extended as far back as the 19th Century, 
was merged with the vernacular movement and had a significant impact 
in the political arena. The introduction of universal franchise and 
the need for a literate population, able to participate actively on a 
mass basis, was increasingly important for the English-educated Sri 
Lankans. 27 The vernacular movement, however, gained more momentum 
26 English is spoken among the upper socio-economic strata in all 
ethnic categories and especially among the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka 
Tamils. 
27 Jane Russel, "Language, Education, and Nationalism- The 
Language Debate of 1944", Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social 
Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1978), p. 47. 
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when the Sinhala language was proposed as the official language 
instead of swabasha. 
The introduction of mass politics led to the mobilisation of 
forces which had hitherto been excluded from active politics. This 
and the pressure exerted by the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist forces 
compelled the S. L. F. P. to change its policy of Swabasha to Sinhala 
only, with the provision of reasonable use of the Tamil language in 
1955. At the level of mass politics, the U. N. P. was also compelled 
tactically to change its Swabasha policy to one of Sinhala only. 23 
This change in language policy went hand in hand with popular slogans 
like "Sri Lanka for the Sinhalese". 29 Once the Swabasha policy was 
changed, the U. N. P. was rouble to mobilise the support of the Tamil 
community, and the policy of "responsive co-operation" and the T. C. 
itself lost its validity and viability among the Tamil community. 
The General Election of 1956 was to be one of the most significant 
elections in the electoral history of Sri Lanka and its impact was to 
have lasting effects on Sri Lanka's ethnic relationships and trends. 
The official language issue was foremost in the election campaign. 
The election manifesto put forward by the M. E. P. in 1956 stated that 
Sinhala would be Sri Lankas's only official language but that the 
Tamil language would receive due recognition through its "reasonable 
use". 30 The language debate transformed a relationship based on 
competitive co-existence into a phase of overt ethnic conflict between 
2.5 On the 18th of February 1955, the United National Party 
unanimously decided at its conference in Kelaniya that the Sinhala 
language alone should be the state language of Sri Lanka 
29 Tarzie Vittachi, Emergency 58: The Story of the Ceylon Race 
Riots, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1958), p. 33. 
30 R. N. Kearney, Cor®unalism and Language in the Politics of 
Ceylon, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 77. 
151 
the Sinhalese and Tamils. M. R. Singer sees the election of 1956 as 
the official beginning of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka. 31 
The issue of language reached its climax in June 1956 when Sinhala 
was declared the official Sri Lankan language by the M. E. P 
Government. 32 It also marked the beginning of a new phase in the 
Sinhala-Tamil ethnic relationship. As the Tamils saw it, to make 
Sinhalese the sole official language put Tamils in an inferior 
position and would no doubt give the Sinhalese-speaking people a 
competitive advantage in the entrance to public service, teaching, 
education and other desirable careers. 33 Consequently, in the Tamils 
view, Sinhala as a sole national language was a threat not only to 
their culture and identity but also to their public sector employment 
and education. Bandaranaiake's original intention to write into the 
act certain statutory safeguards pertaining to the reasonable use of 
T, =il was abandoned when he succumbed to pressure from the Sinhalese 
nationalists. 34 The generally peaceful climate within which the 
Sinhalese and Tamils had competed for resources since 1948 was 
abruptly changed into a phase of ethnic conflict after June 1956. The 
prime motive of the Sinhala only policy was initially as a protest 
against the privileged position of the English-educated elite. In the 
long term, however, the policy was instrumental in triggering an 
ethnic conflict between the Sinhala majority and the main Sri Lankan 
ethnic minority, the Tamils. - 
31 M. R. Singer, "National Government in Ceylon: A Year of 
Reconciliation", Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 2, -(1966), p. 90. 
32 Although passed by Parliament in 1956 the Official Language Act 
No. 33) was not in fact enforced until 1961. 
33 W. H. Wriggins, "Impediments to Unity in a New State: The Case 
of Ceylon", American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, (1961), 
p. 317. 
34 S. U. Kodikara, "The Separatist Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka: An 
Overview", India Quarterly, Vol. 37, (1987), p. 187. 
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The impact of the Sinhala-only policy on the ethnic conflict will 
be examined further under the role of the Federal Party. It may be 
asserted at this point, however, that the official language issue has 
been the main bone of contention in the country since the 1950's 
because of its relevance to public sector employment and to education 
as a medium of instruction. 
4.6 Public Sector Employment and Unemployment 
In Sri Lanka, the state government has been the largest employer 
partly due to a rapid expansion of state administrative services and 
of governmental involvement in the economy. The middle classes of the 
the Sinhalese and Tamil communities were the main competitors for 
public sector employment. It was this competition which gave the 
language issue a communal dimension. The geo-economic conditions in 
the predominantly Tamil areas were not conducive to any other source 
of employment and so the public service remained the main employer. 
Post-independent economic stagnation, especially in the 1950s, limited 
the scope for employment within the public sector. While employment 
dwindled, education expanded and modernisation increased. This 
stimulated the number of people seeking employment in the public 
sector, predominantly among the low-country Sinhalese. As Sinhala was 
Sri Lanka's official language, the Sinhalese sought to correct the 
obvious imbalance of representation in public sector employment. The 
enactment of Sinhala as the official language in 1956 offered better 
prospects for the Sinhala-educated to secure employment in the 
government sector. The Tamils perceived the Sinhala-only policy as a 
countermeasure aimed at ousting or excluding them from state 
employment and the private professions. Their fears were further 
reinforced by an additional requirement that those seeking state 
employment have a working knowledge of Sinhala. From a Tamil 
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perspective these measures seemed to have been designed to exclude 
large proportions of otherwise eligible Tamils from gaining access to 
state employment and thereby from attaining social mobility. 
Unemployment and the lack of opportunities for employment were 
phenomena faced by both the Tamil and Sinhalese youth from the 1960s 
onward. The Sri Lankan Tamil community still claims that Tatnils have 
been denied fair access to employment and have been severely 
discriminated against in other ways. According to the data on the 
ethnic composition of unemployment, however, the Tamils have a low 
rate of unemployment compared with the Sinhalese community. Table 4.6 
depicts the ethnic composition of tuiemployment in the country. 
Table 4.6 Unemployment by Ethnicity (Percentages) 
Community As a% of Population 
in the Community Group 
1963 1973 
Sinhalese 9.0 17.6 
Tvni1 3.5 5.3 
Indian Tamil 3.7 6.3 
Moors 4.0 5.4 
Malays 0.7 11.7 
Burghers 5.9 6.3 
Others - 9.1 
Al Ethnics 4.4 8.1 
As a% of Work Force 
in the Community Group 
1963 1973 
30.2 53.0 
11.6 17.7 
6.7 12.3 
14.9 21.3 
2.8 13.5 
21.9 21.2 
- 28.6 
13.8 24.0 
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey of Sri Lanka's 
Consumer Finances, 1973, (Colombo: Central Bank, 1974), p. 49. 
Nevertheless, R. N. Kearney notes that: 
A rapidly worsening employment situation was felt 
with particular severity by Tamil youth as they 
suffered not only from the general dearth of 
employment opportunities but from disadvantages and 
discrimination in obtaining the few existing jobs. 35 
3' R. N. Kearney, "Political Mobilisation in Contemporary South 
Asia", in Robert I. Crame, (ed), Aspects of Political Mobilisation in 
South Asia, (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs, 1975), pp. 49-50. 
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Channels of employment and recruitment in the state sector were 
gradually politicised and became increasingly so after 1960. 
Competition increased among the Sinhalese for limited career prospects 
including state employment especially after Sinhala had become the 
medium of education and had been declared the official language. 
Thus, demands for access to this state employment--even though the 
state was the largest employer--led to a system of political patronage 
in which the ruling parties made a habit of recruiting from party 
cadres. The absence of Tamil politicians from government after 1956 
placed the Tamil youth in a most disadvantageous position. Newton 
Gunasinghe states thus: 
irrespective of the regime being U. N. P. or S. L. F. P., 
opportunities existed for Sinhala youth to build up 
patron-client linkages with local politicians and 
press themselves forward. The Tamil Youth, especially 
those of the north and the east, did not enjoy this 
advantage, as their local politicians represented 
regional ethnic parties, enjoying no power at the 
centre. 36 
Table 4.7 depicts the decline of Tamil recruitment to the state 
sector between 1956 and 1970. 
Table 4.7 Percentage of Tamils Employed in the State Sector 
Services 1956 1965 1970 
Sri Lanka Administrative Services 30 20 5 
Clerical 50 30 5 
Professions 60 30 10 
Aimed Forces 40 20 1 
Labour 40 20 5 
Source: U. Phadnis, "Ethnicity and Nation Building in South 
Asia", India Quarterly, Vol, 35, Part 3, (1979), p. 348. 
36 N. Gunasinghe, "Open Economy and Its Impact for Rational Ethnic 
Relations in Sri Lanka", in Committee for Rational Development, Sri 
Lanka: The Ethnic Conflict, Myths Realities and Perspectives, (New 
Delhi: Navrang, 1984), p. 199. 
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The ratio of Tamil representation in the state sector is 
significantly lower than the ratio they enjoyed three decades ago. 
Prior to independence, 30 per cent of those employed in the government 
services in Sri Lanka were Tamils, but by 1975 the figure had dropped 
to nearly 6 per cent. 37 A publication of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs entitled "Tamils in Sri Lanka" explains the situation of the 
state employment as follows: 
Prior to the granting of independence in 1948, the 
Tamils had an advantage over the Sinhalese in 
securing admission to the state services because 
educational facilities were readily available to 
them, as a result of a number of mission schools 
being set up in the Northern Province. With the 
granting of independence and the development of 
educational facilities in the non-Tamil areas it was 
to be expected that this advantageous position that 
they occupied would be steadily excluded. Over the 
years the intake of Sinhalese into the state sector 
had been comparatively increasing. 38 
The loss of the Tamils long-standing dominance in government 
services, however, created frustration and disappointment among the 
Tamil youth. This situation was further aggravated by the new 
university admission policies introduced by the United Front (U. F. ) 
Government. 39 The Sinhalese and Tamil conflict in the 1950s and 1960s 
over land settlement, language, and employment in the public sector 
was followed in the 1970s by the disagreement over the policy of 
university admission. 
3i Walter Schwarz, "The Tamils of Sri Lanka", London, Minority 
Rights Groups Report, No. 25, (1975) p. 13. 
38 Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs, "Tamils in Sri Lanka", 
Colombo, Department of Government Printing, (1976). 
39 The United Front consisted of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, 
(S. L. F. P. ), the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, (L. S. S. P. ) and the Communist 
Party(M) (C. P. M). 
156 
4.7 The Policy of University Admission 
University education in Sri Lanka represented an opportunity for 
social and economic mobility. The rapid growth of university 
education is evident from the increase of the student population from 
904 in 1942 to 19,723 in 1965.40 
Consequently, a significant feature of this growth was the 
changing ethnic composition of the university student population. 
Table 4.8 which indicates the percentage of university students by 
ethnic origin, reveals that in the mid 1960s the Sinhalese emerged as 
a privileged group, while at the same time, the Sri Lankan Tamils and 
Burghers lost their educational privileges. The reason was the 
introduction of Sinhala and Tamil languages as the medium of 
instruction at secondary schools and universities and an increase in 
the number of universities within Sri Lanka. 
4.8 Distribution of University Students by Ethnic 
Origin (Percentage) 
Ethnic Group 1947 1953 1965 
Sinhalese 61.7 60.2 78.1 
Tamils 29.4 33.7 19.1 
Moors and Malays 2.8 1.7 2.0 
Burghers 4.9 3.2 0.4 
Indian Tamils - - - 
Others 1.2 1.2 0.8 
Source: D. L. Jayasuriya, "Development of University Education: 
The Growth of the University of Ceylon, 1942-1965", University 
of Ceylon Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 1-2, (1965), p. 89 
There were discrepancies, however, in the distribution of 
facilities between the Sinhalese and the Talnils communities for 
scientific education and liberal studies. The rapid development of 
secondary education in the natural sciences dating from the 1950s, was 
given an added impetus when social science graduates found it 
40 D. L. Jayasuriya, "Development of University Education: The 
Growth of the University of Ceylon, 1942-1965", University of Ceylon 
Review, 23, Nos. 1-2, (1965), p. 84. 
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increasingly difficult to secure employment during the 1960s. It 
became evident that the only assurance of employment lay in studying 
the natural sciences. Consequently, pressure and competition for 
admission to science-based courses at university level had increased 
by the 1960s. Tamil students who had been groomed for professional 
courses since the 1950s were better equipped to gain admission to 
science-related faculties than in the past. In addition, Tamil 
representation in these courses in the 1960s was fairly high compared 
to their lower ethnic representation in the wider population. The 
attraction of guaranteed employment was irresistible to the Tamil 
community which otherwise faced only limited opportunities in state 
employment. Table 4.9 indicates percentage of university students by 
faculty and ethnicity in 1964. 
Table 4.9 University Students by Faculty and Ethnicity in 
1964 (Percentage) 
Ethnic Arts Science Medicine Agriculture All 
Group Law Engineering Dentistry Veterinary Faculties 
Sinhalese 85.0 59.0 54.5 54.7 73.1 
Tamils 12.0 37.2 40.5 41.9 23.4 
Moors/Malay 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.1 
Burgher 0.5 1.1 1.1 - 0.7 
Others 0.5 0.2 1.5 0.8 0.7 
Total 4,183 1,279 1,601 177 7,180 
Source: U. L. Jayasuriya, op. cit., p. 91 
According to Table 4.9, by 1964,85 per cent of the university 
students studying social sciences, law and the humanities in Sri 
Lankan universities were Sinhalese. The percentage in the science- 
based faculties, however, were much lower: 59 per cent in science and 
engineering, 54.5 per cent in medicine and dentistry, and 54.7 per 
cent in agriculture and veterinary sciences. On the other hand, Sri 
Lankan Tamils, though representing only 12. per cent of the students 
in the social sciences, held 37.2 per cent of the places in the 
science and engineering courses, 40.5 per cent in medicine and 
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dentistry, and 11.9 per cent in the veterinary and agricultural 
sciences at the University of Sri Lanka. 41 By 1970, Tamils had 
secured 35.3 per cent of the total admissions to science courses at 
the university, of which 10.8 per cent of the places were in 
medicine. 12 It was in the 1970s that the ethnic imbalance in the 
admission, to the science, engineering and medical faculties of the 
universities surfaced as a major issue between the two communities. 
The Sinhalese community, on the other hand, viewed this situation 
as a denial of equal opportunities. Those sentiments were further 
aggravated by allegations brought forward by some sections of the 
community regarding the honesty of Tamil examiners. The marks for 
examinations given in the Tamil medium recorded a much higher average 
than for those given in the Sinhala mediums. As a result, there were 
suspicions that Tamil examiners leniently marked the answer scripts of 
Tamil students. The allegations of favouritism became more intense as 
the number of Sinhala students applying for entry to the science and 
engineering faculties increased dramatically in the 1970s. The 
allegations were investigated but were never substantiated. 43 
Sinhalese pressure led to a change in the system for admission to 
the Sri Lankan universities for education in the natural sciences. 
Thus, in the early 1970s, the U. F. Government took measures to reform 
the system of university admissions in order to take into 
consideration the previous extremely limited facilities available to 
some students in the rural sector. Once again the changes impacted 
primarily the Tamil youth. The system of university admission up to 
41 Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
42 C. R. de Silva, "Weightage in University Admission, 
Standardization and District Quotas in Sri Lanka", Modern Ceylon 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1974), p. 172. 
+3 G. R. de Silva, "The Politics of University Admission: A Review 
of Some Aspects of the Admission Policy in Sri Lanka, 1971-1978", Sri 
Lanka Journal of Social Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, (1978), p. 87. 
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1972 was based on the results of the final examination at the U. G. E. 
. Advanced Level. Under the new admissions system the pattern of 
marking examinations was readjusted based on the media of study and a 
district quota system. In 1974 the government found it necessary to 
again readjust the admissions system adopted the previous year. There 
were four such readjustment schemes: standardization of admissions in 
1973; standardization and district quotas in 1974; standardization and 
100 per cent district quotas in 1975; and standardization, 70 per cent 
on marks and 30 per cent on district quotas in 1976.44 The government 
introduced a standardization procedure based on the marks achieved for 
university admissions in terms of which "persons taking the 
examination in the Tamil language were required to achieve a higher 
score than those taking the examination in Sinhala in order to gain 
admission to the university". 45 
The introduction of the standardization and district quota system 
reduced the number of Tamil students entering university education. 46 
Table '1.10 indicates the decline in the intake of Tamil students to 
science-based faculties in universities between 1970 and 1975. This 
shortfall is most evident for the period 1973 to 1976. For instance, 
the percentage of Tamil students entering engineering courses fell 
from 40.8 per cent in 1970 to 24.4 per cent in 1973, and 13.2 per cent 
in 1976. The percentage of Tamil students enrolled in science 
44 C. R. de Silva, "The Impact of Nationalism on Education: The 
School Takeover (1961) and the University Admissions Crisis", 1970- 
1975, in Michel Robert, (ed), Collective Identities Nationalism and 
Protest in Modern Sri Lanka, (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1979), p. 
488. 
45 R. N. Kearney, "Language and Rise of Tamil Separatism", Asian 
Survey, Vol. 18, No. 5, (1978), p. 531. 
46 According to `standardization system' science students in urban 
areas needed to obtain higher `raw marks' than students in rural 
areas. According to `district quotas system' admission to the 
university from each area is according to a quota which was determined 
by its population. 
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courses fell from 35) per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent in 1978. The 
number of Tamil medical students declined from 50 per cent in 1970 to 
30 per cent in 1973,26 per cent in 1974 and 20 per cent in 1975. 
Table 4.10 University Admission by Ethnicity From 1970 To 1975 
(Percentage) 
Year Science 
Sinhalese Tamils Others 
1969/70 57.7 39.8 2.5 
1970/71 60.6 35.3 4.1 
1971/72 63.6 33.6 1.8 
1973 67.4 29.5 3.1 
1974 75.4 20.9 3.7 
Arts 
Sinhalese Tamil s Others 
88.4 7.5 4.1 
88.9 7.6 3.5 
92.6 4.8 2.6 
91.5 6.1 2.6 
86.0 10.0 4.0 
Source: C. K. de Silva, "Weightage in University Admissions: 
Standardisation and District Quotas in Sri Lanka, 1970-75", 
Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1974), pp. 172-173. 
C. R. de Silva assessed the impact of the standardization and 
district quota system on the ethnic conflict, and states that there is 
little doubt that it represented a major blow to the Sri Lankan 
Twuils. 47 Overall, the admission of Tamil students to science- 
oriented courses dropped from 35.5 per cent in 1970 to less than 21 
per cent in 1973.45 At the opposite end of the scale, the Sinhalese 
emerged as the main beneficiaries of the new system. The 
representation in science-based courses rose from 75.4, per cent in 
1974 to over 80 per cent. 49 
The systematic but drastic cutback in university admissions 
compelled the frustrated Tamil youth, who found themselves confronted 
with the limited access to higher education and the grim problem of 
unemployment, to seek a way out by founding a separate state. The 
47 G. R. de Silva, "Weightage in University Admissions: 
Standardisation and District Quotas in Sri Lanka, 1970-1975", Modern 
Ceylon Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1974), p. 165. 
413 C. Nanogaram, op. cit., p. 125. 
49 C. R. de Silva, "Impact of Nationalism on Education", op. cit., 
p. 490. 
161 
sentiments of Tamil youth are expressed in the following quotation, 
said to have been made in 1976: 
If we are not wanted and are discriminated against, 
then what future do we have? Government jobs are 
closing down on us. We do have enough lands to 
survive, but one does not want to live on bread 
alone. Some of us would like to go for medicine, 
engineering and government services, but even if we 
make the grade initially, we will not reach the de 
facto decision-making centres. It is a question of 
our own honour and dignity as a community, to get 
what is our due merit basis, without discrimination 
and patronage. If this is not possible why not have 
the parting of ways. 50 
Thus, political rivalries between communal soups intensified with 
the removal of colonial rule and the socio-economic changes that. 
widened concern for educational opportunities, non-agricultural 
employment and governmental services. The government policy of 
reducing the imbalance in land, state employment and education in 
favour of the Sinhalese community served to intensify the Tamils' 
communal consciousness and political mobilisation. Huntington 
observes a similar situation as follows: 
The efforts to create a nation state, where one did 
not exist before, also raise new issues to inflame 
group conflict. So long as the state did not 
penetrate the society and the people did not 
participate in the state, many of these problems 
could be avoided. Once the state begins to play a 
more important role in society, questions concerning 
national symbols, language, education policy become 
of critical importance. 51 
Consequently, the above-mentioned socio-economic changes since 
independence have broadened political participation in keeping with 
50 Urmila Phadnis, "Ethnicity and Nation Building in South Asia: A 
Case Study of Sri Lanka", India Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 3, (1979), P. 
337. 
51 S. P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and Process of Development", 
in "Civil Violence and International System", Adelphi Papers, (1971), 
P. 11. 
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the formation of political parties along ethnic lines. This has served 
to reinforce and politicise ethnic competition. Nevertheless, the 
author wishes to examine the development of ethno-political 
organisations and parties within the context of the constitutional 
reforms during the British period. 
4.8 Origin and Development of Ethno-Political Organisations 
The origin and development of ethno-political organisations and 
their principles played an important role in the development of ethnic 
consciousness and competition after the introduction of ethnic 
representation in the Sri Lankan Legislature by the British in 1833. 
The Legislative Council from 1833 to 1920, however, was not 
constituted on the basis of racial proportion. There were about the 
same number of unofficial members of Sinhalese and Tamils on the 
Council despite the Sinhalese clear majority in the Sri Lankan 
population. Despite this discrepancy the English-educated middle- 
class leaders of both communities did not display any of the ethnic 
conflict. that existed between the two communities. The unity of the 
Tamil and Sinhalese leadership was manifested in the election of Sir 
Ponnambalam Ramanathan to the council in 1912 by limited franchise and 
by the organising of the Ceylon National Congress ( C. N. C. ) in 1919.52 
This political consolidation was also exhibited by the the Tamil 
leadership in 1915, when they supported the Sinhalese in the 
Sinhalese-Muslim riots. 
52 In the Election of 1912, the Sinhalese-Govigama caste voted for 
Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan who was from the Tamil-Vellala caste rather 
than for the candidate from the Sinhala-Karava caste, Sir Marcus 
Fernando. As Bryce Ryan has pointed out, from the end of the, 19th 
Century until about 1925, some of the bitterest fulmination in Sri 
Lanka was not inter-communal but inter-caste. See Bryce Ryan, Caste 
in Modern Ceylon: The Sinhalese System in Transition, (New Brunswick, 
N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), pp. 332-35. 
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The political homogeneity and integration of leadership, however, 
was not to last long due largely to changes in the representation 
introduced by the Constitutional Reforms of 1920. The 1920 reforms 
combined communal and territorial representation, causing an imbalance 
in the ratio of legislative representation in favour of the Sinhalese 
majority. The disequilibrium resulted in a confrontation between the 
elite politicians of the two communities. While the Tamils wished to 
maintain the system of communal or ethnic representation, the 
Sinhalese upheld the territorial principle. 53 As a result, the Tamil 
leaders in 1921 broke away from the National Congress and formed a 
separate ethuio-political organisation known as the "Tamil Mahajana 
Sabha" (the Great Council of the Tamil). The Mahajana Sabha provided 
the means by which the Tamils could articulate their demands as a 
minority community. The breakaway also marked the beginning of a 
trend of forming political organisations based on mono-ethnic rather 
than national motivations. The visible manifestations of the trend 
were the formation of the "Sinhala Maha Sabah" (the Great Council of 
the Sinhalese) in 1936, the Ceylon Indian Congress in 1939, and the 
Tamil Congress in 1944. The competition among these ethnic groups for 
a share of colonial political power by means of constitutional 
reforms, increased with the formation of the Tamil Congress. 
Consequently, the subsequent years were marked by communal conflict 
over reforms on representation leading towards independence. 
Furthermore, the introduction of universal franchise in 1931 
widened the scope of Sri Lanka's process of political development 
based on greater participation. Although universal franchise 
broadened the constituency of the political elite for all ethnic 
groups, it thereby aggravated the existing inter-group tensions. In 
53 W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, op. cit., 
pp. 83-84. 
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its wake, therefore, was left a further strain on the already 
deteriorating relationship between the Tamil and Sinhalese political 
elites. The positive effects of universal franchise benefited the 
Sinhala majority who already held about two-thirds of the seats in the 
State Council, which had been introduced by the Donoughmore 
Constitution. 54 By 1931, of the 50 elective seats out of a total of 
61 seats in the House, 38 seats had been secured by the Sinhalese 
majority. 55 As a result of universal franchise, the Sinhalese leaders 
sought changes to improve the conditions of their electorates in order 
to retain their power base. On the other hand, the Tamils felt 
neglected and dominated by the Sinhalese and, therefore, demanded a 
system of `balanced representation' under which 50 per cent of the 
seats in the legislature should be reserved for the minorities as a 
safeguard. Minority safeguards in such a context, however, guaranteed 
constitutional barriers that would protect the advantageous positions 
of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the public services. 56 Consequently, the 
competition for representation between the Sinhalese and Tamil 
political elites between 1920 and 1948 served as a barometer of their 
ethnic conflict. The overt political competition was underlined by 
economic competition between the middle classes of the Sinhala and 
Tamil communities for well-paying public service employment. By the 
54 The Donoughmore Constitution was the outcome of a British 
Government investigation undertaken by a four-man commission from 
November 1927 to January 1928. These commissioners were as follows: 
The Earl of Donoughmore (the Chairman), Sir Geoffrey Butler, Dr. T. 
Drummond Shiels and Sir Mathew Nathan. For other pertinent studies 
see, Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemas of a New Nation, (Princeton: 
1960), pp. 85-90; S. Namasivayam, The Legislature of Ceylon. 1928- 
1948, (London: 1951), pp. 110-115; and, T. P. Meththananda, The 
I)onoughmore Constitution in Ceylon, 1927-1931, (Oxford University: 
1974). 
55 C. R. de Silva, "Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic Rivalry, from Independence 
to Statehood", in Robert B. Goldmann and A. J. Wilson, (eds), The 
States of South Asia, (London: France Printer, 1984), p. 112. 
56 A. J. Wilson, "The Tamil Federal Party in Ceylon Politics", 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 4, (1966), p. 117. 
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time Sri La ka was granted independence in 1948, the seeds of ethnic 
disharmony and conflict had already been sown, and were being fostered 
in the public and private sectors. 
Soon after independence the Tamil Congress (T. C. ) joined the 
U. N. P. government and were guided by the political formula of 
`responsive co-operation'. 57 The T. C. mainly represented the Colombo- 
based public servants of Jaffna origin. Hence the T. C. saw that 
mutual co-operation would be the best means of preserving employment 
and the general interests of its supporters. 58 C. R. de Silva observes 
that this formula of responsive co-operation was a loosely knit 
political compromise based on the following four considerations. 
Firstly, the dominance of the English language was gradually replaced 
by the Sinhala and Taunil languages as the official languages; 
secondly, all minority groups were protected from discrimination by 
section 29 (2) of the 1948 Constitution; 59 thirdly, provision was made 
for proportional representation of the minorities in the electoral 
system; and, finally, government was founded on the concept of the 
secular state where all religions would enjoy equal status. 60 
57 The Tamil Congress was of the view that there were responsible 
members of the Sinhalese community who were willing to co-operate with 
the Tamils and give the latter a fair deal. Co-operation, therefore, 
was actually viewed as a two-way process, not merely as a 
subordination of the Tamils to the Sinhalese majority. Hence the term 
responsive co-operation'. 
58 J. Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy, (London: Frank Cass, 
1978), p. 139. 
59 Section 29(2) of the 1948 Constitution states that: "No law 
shall make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities 
or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are 
not made liable; or... confer on persons or on any community or 
religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons 
of other communities or religions". 
60 C. R. de Silva, "The Sinhalese Tamil Rift in Sri Lanka" in A. J. 
Wilson, and D. Dalton, (eds), The State of South Asia: Problems of 
National Integration, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1982), p. 159. 
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an area of conflict was to soon emerge between the two communities 
over the citizenship and voting rights of the Indian Tamil plantation 
workers. The Citizenship Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani 
(Citizenship) Act of 1949, and the Parliamentary Election (Amendment) 
Act of 1949 were designed to confine the granting of franchise to 
those who were eligible to vote either by descent or by 
registration. 61 Eventually, what resulted from these legislative acts 
was that the vast majority of the Indian Tamils became stateless and 
disenfranchised. Of the total of 825,000 Indian Tamils residing in 
Sri Lanka, 250,340 applications for citizenship were filed; of these 
applicants only 13.1,188 were successful, representing exactly 16.2 
per cent of the total Indian Tamil population in Sri Lanka. 62 This 
disenfranchisement had significant implications for electoral politics 
in Sri Lanka. At an election held in 1947, the Ceylon Indian 
Congress (C. I. C. ) had seven parliamentary candidates in the estate 
region, of whom six were of Indian origin. When a large proportion 
of Indian Tamils lost their voting rights, these seats were 
monopolised by the Sinhala majority. 63 For instance, the number of 
seats held by the Sinhalese in the Legislature rose from 67 per cent 
of all elective seats in 1947 to 73 per cent in 1952.6; This 
sl I. D. S. Weerawardena, "Minority Problems in Ceylon", Pacific 
Affairs, (1953), p. 284. 
62 S. U. Kodikara, Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Since Independence, 
(Colombo: Ceylon Institute of World Affair, 1965), pp. 113-114. 
63 The Srima-Shastri Agreement in 1964, and the Sirima-Ghandhi 
Agreement in 1974 solved the problem of the disenfranchisement of the 
Indian Tamils. The main terms of the agreement of the Srima-Shastri 
Pact was that India would take back 525,000 Indian Tamils over a 
period of 15 years during which Sri Lanka would admit another 300,000 
to citizenship. A subsequent agreement in 1974 regarding the 
remaining 150,000 Indian Tamils confered citizenship on 75,000 of 
them. See, S. U. Kodikara, Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Since 
Independence, ( Colombo: Ceylon Institute of World Affair, 1965). 
64 S. U. Kodikara, "Communalism and Political Modernisation in 
Ceylon", Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. 1, (1970), p. 98. 
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situation paved the way for the emergence of a new Tamil political 
Party. The emergence and development of the Federal Party as a 
considerable force in Sri Lankan politics since 1949 has further 
intensified the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic conflict there. 
4.9 The Role of the Federal Party 
The issue of citizenship for Indian Talnils did not create a major 
conflict between the Sinhalese and most Sri Lank-an Tamils. Its 
impact, however, was felt in the Tamil Congress when in 1949 a section 
of the Tamil politicians broke away and founded the Federal Party 
(F. P. ), also known as the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (The Tamil State 
Party). A. J. Wilson gives a vivid explanation of this breakaway: 
The immediate pretext for the F. P. 's emergence in 
December 1919 was the objection of two T. C. M. P. 's 
and a T. C. Senator to the legislation of 1948 and 
1949 against the Indian Tamils. 65 
The F. P. sought as objectives the creation of a national flag, the 
solution of the citizenship problem related to the Tamil population of 
Indian origin in the plantation sector, and the abolition of the 
system of state-aided colonisation by the Sinhalese people in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces. These goals were reflected in the 
F. P. 's first pamphlet in which it also called for the demarcation of 
an autonomous state on the basis of language and an ethno-political 
framework in a "Federal Union of Sri Lanka". 66 In later years, 
however, the term `autonomous Tamil State' was amplified to mean 
'autonomous Tamil states'. As James Jupp points out, there was a 
degree of ambiguity regarding the specific aims of the F. P. The party 
65 A. J. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979, (London: The 
Macmillan, 1979), p. 151. 
66 Ibid. 
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vacillated between adopting the federal system of Switzerland versus 
that of India. In the eyes of the Sinhalese the F. P. 's objectives 
represented efforts by the Tamil community to restore the independent 
Tamil Kingdom. The Sinhalese worst fears were rooted in an 
assumption that such a separate state would be merely a pawn of Tamil 
Nadu imperialism which was attempting to annex the Tamil areas of Sri 
Lanka. 67 Consequently, the founding and development of the F. P. 
marked a significant landmark in the relationship between the 
Sinhalese and Tamil communities. 
The F. P. became the basis for political activity by the 
nationalist element. within the Sri Lankan Tamil community. The F. P. 
having adopted the rhetoric of Tamil nationalism, articulated a claim 
that the Tamils were a distinct nation distinguished by Language, 
territorial demarcations, and a definite history and destiny. The 
rudiments of the party's ideology are inherent in the following 
resolution of 1951: 
The Tamil-speaking people in Sri Lanka constitute a 
nation distinct from that of the Sinhalese by every 
fundamental test of nationhood, firstly that of a 
separate historical past, in this island at least as 
ancient and as glorious as that of the Sinhalese; 
secondly by the fact of their being a linguistic 
entity, entirely different from that of the 
Sinhalese, with an unsurpassed classical heritage and 
a modern development of language which makes Tamil 
fully adequate for all present day needs; and finally 
by reason of their territorial habitation of definite 
areas, which constitute over one-third of the 
island. 68 
The F. P. was opposed to the links established between the T. C. and 
the U. N. P. Government on the basis of mutual co-operation which lasted 
67 J. Jupp, "Constitutional Development in Ceylon Since 
Independence", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 41, (1968), p. 176. 
Eg "The Case for a Federal Constitution for Ceylon: Resolution 
Passed at the First National Convention of the Federal Party" [Ilankai 
Tamil Arasu Katchu], (Colombo: Federal Party, 1951), p. 1. 
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from 1948 to 1956. On the other hand, the F. P. was committed to the 
cause of a nationalist movement based on Tamil ethnicity in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces. The F. P. 's opposition to the T. C- 
U. N. P. alliance was, therefore, an obvious attempt to appeal to the 
nationalism of the Tamil people and hark back to the days before the 
advent of the Portuguese, when there was a separate Tamil kingdom in 
Northern Sri Lanka. A. J. Wilson perceives that the F. P. was 
determined to safeguard the distinct identity of the Tamil people and 
concludes that: 
For the first time there had emerged a group which 
had begun to think in terms of an economic future for 
the Ceylon Tamils, not in the public service or in 
the common exploitation by Sinhalese and Tamils but 
in the preservation and development in isolation of a 
"Tamil homeland". 69 
Thus, the emergence of the Federal Party marked a significant 
change in the politics which had been followed hitherto by the Sri 
Lankan Tamils. From the time of the formation of the F. P. in 1949, 
four major issues formed the impetus for the party's agitations. 
These issues, as identified and discussed above, were the internal 
migration of the Sinhalese peasants in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces through state-sponsored resettlement schemes, the adoption 
of the vernacular languages as the official languages, and competition 
for public sector employment and admission to universities. 
The F. P. viewed the Northern and Eastern provinces as the Tamil 
`traditional homelands'. The F. P. was convinced, therefore, that any 
incursion into these areas by the Sinhalese was proof of Sinhalese 
designs to transform the predominantly Tamil areas into Sinhala 
69 A. J. Wilson. "The Tamil Federal Party in Ceylon Politics", op. 
cit., p 118. 
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areas. 70 The concept of a traditional homeland was derived mainly 
from the vague historical evidence of a Jaffna Kingdom. S. J. Tarnbiah 
interprets this rhetoric of a traditional homeland as apolitical move 
to reassure the security of the Tamil community. 71 Although the F. P. 
did not have the power to obstruct or prevent the colonisation 
programme, it was successful in arousing an ethnic consciousness by 
using the concepts of a Jaffna Kingdom and a traditional homeland. 
K. H. de Silva assesses the role of the F. P. as a sizeable contribution 
to Tamil politics as follows: 
This was the Federal Party's great contribution to 
Tamil politics. Not only did they draw attention to 
the possession of a Tamil territorial unit, and the 
memory of a independent Tamil kingdom, (which 
survived from the thirteenth century to the beginning 
of the seventeenth), they also emphasised the role of 
language as the determinant of nationhood. 72 
when it was formed in 1949, the F. P. campaigned vigourously for a 
federal system of government to be instituted in place of the existing 
unitary system. These campaigns, however, were not met with much 
enthusiasm by the Tamil population itself. The English-educated 
Tamil intelligentsia, Tamil traders and the Tamil professionals in the 
Sinhalese provinces argued that more would be gained by the T. C. 's 
policy of co-operation with the U. N. P. Government. In addition, the 
Tamil Christians looked upon the F. P. with suspicion, fearing that if 
federalism became a reality they would be a minority within a minority 
and might suffer at the hands of a Hindu majority. Consequently, the 
Roman Catholic Church in the Tamil areas were hostile to the F. P. 
70 C. R. de Silva, "Tamil Ethnic Rivalry from Independence to 
Statehood", op. cit., p. 120. 
71 S. J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka, Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling 
of Democracy, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986), p. 80. 
72 K. M. de Silva, "Nationalism and Its Impact", The Ceylon Journal 
of Historical and Social Studies, Vol. 4, Nos. 1-2, (1974), p. 69. 
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until 1956, while the Tamil Protestants were apathetic and at times 
even inimical to the F. P. 's objectives . 73 The lack of support for a 
federal system is indicated in the results of the second General 
Election of 1952 when the F. P. was successful in securing only two 
parliamentary seats. 
It was the issue of official language which brought the F. P. to 
the forefront of Sri Lankan politics. Until then it had not been very 
successful in mobilising the Tamil people to attain the F. P. 's 
objectives. The F. P., by virtue of its policies, felt compelled to 
express its opposition to the official language act. The F. P. viewed 
the new orientation of the vernacular movement, which emphasised 
Sinhala only, as a serious threat to the distinctive identity of the 
Tamil nation. The suspicions of the Tamil community are explained by 
Kearney: 
To the Tamil, the language controversy symbolized the 
threat of domination by the Sinhalese majority and 
appeared to endanger their existence as a unique and 
separate group. %} 
Given these circumstances, the F. P. found it necessary to take up 
the issue of the Tamil language, an issue which they felt had not 
received enough consideration. One F. P. Member for Parliament stated 
his reasons for taking up the language issue: 
We speak often and repeatedly about the language 
because that is so fundamental to us. Language today 
is the basis for our culture and our nationality. 75 
73 A. J Wilson, op. cit., p. 130. 
71 R. N. Kearney, "Nationalism Modernisation and Political 
Mobilisation in a Plural Society", in Michael Roberts, (ed), op. cit., 
1979, p. 452. 
75 Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 39, Col. 409, cited in R. N. 
Kearney, op. cit., (1967), p. 97. 
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As these suspicions and fears gained momentum, the F. P. demanded 
parity of official status for the Tamil language along with the 
Sinhala language. The victory of the M. E. P. in 1956 not only brought 
hitherto suppressed layers of society to the fore but it also brought 
the F. P. into the mainstream of Tamil and national politics. From 
1956 onward, the Tamil peasants, school teachers, and English-educated 
Tamil intelligentsia in the Northern and Eastern provinces became the 
solid base of the F. P. The Tamil Christian minority in these 
provinces turned to the F. P. for protection from the rising tide of 
Sinhalese-Buddhist revivalism. Tamil public servants, traders and 
professionals also switched their support to the F. P. Consequently, 
the F. P. won six of the nine Northern Province seats and four of the 
Eastern Province seats. During the five subsequent elections the F. P. 
succeeded in winning about two-thirds of the Tamil constituencies in 
the North and East. As rioted earlier, the language factor had an 
intrinsic link with state employment. The language issue, therefore, 
impacted on the wider Tamil community by politicising them tinder the 
leadership of the F. P. After 1956 the F. P., as the chief spokesman 
for the Taunil community, was concerned with protecting and promoting 
the interests of the Tamil community throughout Sri Lanka. R. N. 
Kearney observes this situation as follows: 
The party's justification for existence rests on the 
assumption of the primary of communal identification 
and solidarity in politics and the belief that the 
common political interests of all members of the 
community by virtue of their ethnic bonds out-weigh 
political interests which internally divide the 
community. 76 
's R. N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of 
Ceylon, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 94. 
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in 1956, the F. P. convened a conference in Trincomalee and passed 
the following resolutions to resolve the problems faced by the Tamil 
community in Sri Lanka. The F. P. 's demands were as follows: 
1. The adoption of a federal constitution and the creation of one 
or more Tamil linguistic state or states enjoying the widest 
autonomous and residuary powers consistent with the unity and external 
security of Sri Lanka; 
2. recognition for Tamil, with absolute parity of status with 
Sinhalese as an official language; 
3. amendment of the relevant laws to grant citizenship on the 
basis of residence in Sri Lanka; and 
1. the immediate cessation of colonisation of the traditionally 
Tarnil-speaking areas by the Sirilialese. 77 
The F. P. 's demands were made not to achieve political 
independence, but rather to secure some measure of devolution of 
national power. To achieve its objectives the F. P. employed a two- 
fold strategy. The first was to launch campaigns of non-cooperation 
and a full-scale satyagraha (non-violent resistance) and civil 
disobedience movements in the Tamil-speaking areas of the Northern and 
Eastern provinces. Secondly, the F. P. sought to bargain alternately 
between the S. L. F. P. and the U. N. P. in exchange for parliamentary 
support. It is evident from the following discussion that these 
strategies did have a significant impact. These demonstrations and 
other party activities widened the political participation of Tamils, 
introducing an ethnic dimension which had hitherto been less overt. 
Consequently, the communalisation of politics has certainly 
''' The Federal Party of Ceylon, Ceylon Faces Crisis, (Colombo: 
Sutantiran Press, 1957), pp. 31-32. 
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contributed to the increased political consciousness and participation 
within the Tamil commtuiity in Sri Lanka. 
4.10 Government Response 
Given these circumstances, the government's response to the Tamil 
demands were vital in terms of the assimilation of the Tamils into Sri 
Lanka's political system. Two major efforts were made by both the 
S. L. F. P. (1956-60) and the U. N. P (1965-70) governments to arrive at a 
political accommodation with the Sri Lankan Tamils to ease the problem 
of ethnic conflict. The first attempt in this regard was the 
Bandaranaiake-Chelvanagam Pact (B-C Pact). The B-C Pact campaigned 
for legislation that would recognize Tamil as the language of the 
national minority and as the dominant language of the Tamil areas. 
The B-C Pact also included a plan for Regional Councils which would be 
empowered to resolve educational and agricultural issues and select 
colonists for state-sponsored colonisation schemes. Moreover, the 
Prime Minister assured the F. P. that he would take the necessary steps 
to solve the problems involved with granting citizenship to the Tamils 
of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. 'g 
Every concession to the Tamils, as K. M. de Silva points out, was 
bitterly fought over by forces within the S. L. F. P. led by Bhikkhus, as 
well as by opponents of the Government e. g. the U. N. P. 79 The U. N. P., 
in fact, opposed the B-C Pact largely on the grounds that it would 
prevent colonisation by the Sinhalese in the Tamil areas. 80 The 
............ ........ . 78 The Test of the Bandaranayike-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957 is 
contained in R. N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of 
Ceylon, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 144-46. 
79 R. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic 
Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985, (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1986), p. 179. 
50 B. H. Farmer, Ceylon: Divided Nation, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1963), p. 179. 
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Buddhist clergy responded by staging a sit-iri. outside Bandaranaiake's 
home which exerted a great deal of pressure on the Prime Minister. 
Finally, he was forced to succumb to the pressures: the pact was 
withdrawn. S. J. Tambiah observes that this was a missed opportunity 
to settle the Tamil question forever. 81 The F. P., disillusioned by 
this withdrawal, reacted by obliterating the Sinhala letters 'SRI' 
which appeared on the number plates of automobiles registered in Sri 
Lanka. This campaign, which was directed at vehicles travelling to 
Northern Sri Lanka, climaxed in 1958 in an outbreak of ethnic 
violence. Thus, the years 1956 and 1958 were marked by turmoil and 
ethnic violence. The ethnic violence of 1956 and 1958, however, 
further strengthened the disharmony between the two communities and 
the F. P. 's demands for a federal state. 
In spite of the repudiation of the B-C Pact by the Prime Minister, 
the pact still had a major impact on the Sinhala-Tamil relationship. 
By virtue of the federal policy contained in the B-C Pact, it gave 
both validity and recognition to the claim of the Tamil nationalists 
that the Northern and. Eastern provinces were Tamil areas. From the 
F. P. 's point of view, the recognition of the Northern and Eastern 
provinces as Tamil areas was a strategic gain. Thereafter, the pact 
was a bargaining point between the F. P. and the moderate political 
parties such as the U. N. P. and S. L. F. P. seeking support of the stands 
taken in the pact. Thus, the pact, though officially defunct, 
continued to provide the basic legitimacy and recognition for future 
agitation, first for federalism and later for separatism. 
The Bandaranaiake Government made another attempt to address the 
language issue by ratifying the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) 
Act No 28 of 1958. As a result of the Act, the use of Tamil in 
Si S. J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of 
Democracy, (London: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1987), p. 71. 
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education, public service entrance examinations and administrative 
matters was granted in the Northern and Eastern provinces. 32 These 
concessions were a recognition of the demands of the F. P. which fell 
short of granting the Tamil language parity of status with the 
official language, Sinhala. The drawback in these proposals was that 
although they were passed in 1958, to become effective they first had 
to be gazetted, which was not done until January 1966.83 Thus, the 
concessions had only a limited effect on the diffusion of both racial 
tension and Tamil agitation. Before the defeat in the Parliament of 
the U. V. P. minority government in April 1960, the S. L. F. P. came to an 
understanding with the F. P. that they would implement minor 
modifications to the B-C Pact. This understanding, however, was not 
honoured after the S. L. F. P. came to power in July 1960.54 
Another attempt was made by the Prime Minister of the later U. N. P. 
Government (1965-1970) to negotiate a settlement with the leader of 
the F. P., Chelvanayakam, under the Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam 
Pact (I)-C Pact). The basic tenets of this pact were to provide 
specific guarantees pertaining to the status of the Tamil language, to 
establish district councils, and to set the conditions for 
repatriation of citizens of Indian origin. 85 The main outcome of the 
D-C Pact was the formation of a coalition government between the F. P. 
and the U. N. P. in 1965. For the first time since 1956, a member of 
the Tamil community was included in the Cabinet. In accordance with 
the demands of the D-C Pact, the Tamil Language Act in 1958 was 
82 James Manor, The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 269. 
83 S. U. Kodikara, op. cit., p. 197. 
84 Robert N. Kearney, "The New Political Crisis of Ceylon", Asian 
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85 The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1965, in S. Ponnambalam, 
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(London: Zed Books Ltd., 1983), pp. 257-258. 
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gazetted in an official language in the Northern and Eastern provinces 
of Sri Lanka. Follow-up measures were also taken to draft in June 
1968 a "White Paper" comprising the proposals to set up district 
councils. This proposition had to be abandoned due to opposition 
both from within and without the coalition government. Not long 
thereafter the F. P. withdrew from the coalition government. 
Donald L. Horawitz observes these objections as follows: 
The U. N. P. feared that the left parties might take 
control of some localities if councils were set up. 
Members of parliament feared the district council 
chairman would become a rival local power. The Sri 
Lankan Moors, an important Muslim minority in the 
east, feared that local councils there would be Tamil 
dominated. The Tamil Congress remained wedded to a 
unitary state and argued that district councils could 
be used to oppress the Tamil minority in the South. 56 
Thus post-independent governments in Sri Lanka have not. been 
willing to undertake structural changes which such a response to 
ethnic imbalance requires. 57 
In the final analysis, it is evident that both pacts were futile 
because of pressure from a third force: the Sinhalese-Buddhists. 
There was widespread opposition from the Sinhalese-Buddhist areas each 
time there was a constructive attempt at compromise. This opposition 
was grounded mainly on fears and suspicions that any form of 
constitutional devolution would only lead to a separate Tamil state, 
which would subsequently be annexed by the South Indian Tamil state, a 
major force in the wider ambit of the region. The Sinhalese who 
constituted the minority group in the region were the majority in Sri 
Lanka. The Sinhalese-Buddhists viewed Sri Lanka as their land and 
believed that the future of the Sinhalese nation was linked with the 
gE Donald L. Horawitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985), p. 390. 
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survival and propagation of Buddhism. This vision is embodied in two 
concepts: the `Dhammadipa' (island of the Dhamma or religion) and the 
`Sinhadipa concept' (island of the Sinhala people or Sinhalese). sg 
Consequently, the demand for Tamil political autonomy clashed with the 
Sinhalese aspirations to preserve the uncompromised political unity of 
the entire island of Sri Lanka. Hence, the Sri Lankan Tamils were 
viewed with suspicion by the Sinhalese. According to James Manor the 
failure of politicians on both sides to arrive at a political 
accommodation was due partly to the lack of political integration in 
Sri Lanka. Furthermore, he argued that the lack of a developed 
grassroots organisation made it. impossible for any government party to 
mount a campaign to convince its followers of the need for 
accommodation. ss 
The failure of both the S. L. F. P. and U. N. P. to reach a productive 
agreement with the F. P. led the Tamils to conclude that neither camp 
could fruitfully respond to Tamil interests and aspirations. 90 Thus, 
peaceful means of negotiation and co-operation were not satisfactory 
avenues for the greater Tamil community to achieve its goals. S. P. 
Huntington observes that the successful absorption of the Tamils into 
the Sri Lankan political system was far more problematical simply 
because the political elites of the country had no such highly 
developed and institutionalized procedures for handling the problem. 9' 
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Furthermore, the Republican Constitution of 1972 gave a new dimension 
to the ethnic conflicts in the country. 
4.11 The 1972 Constitution 
The 1972 Constitution was a triumph for the Sinhalese-Buddhist 
nationalists. The Constitution changed the secular name of Ceylon to 
the indigenous name of Sri Larika. The Constitution declared that "it 
shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism". 
Article 29(2) dealing with the rights of minorities was replaced by a 
chapter entitled 'Human Rights'. 92 The Constitution, however, did not 
provide for the Tamils' longstanding expectations to share political 
power. It. also ignored their main demands for a federal system of 
government and the parity of their language. The constitution 
further iris ti tutional ized the concentration of power at the central 
government and rationalized the unitary state system. As Donald L. 
Horowitz observes, the 1972 Constitution was a decisive symbolic 
rebuff to the Tamils. 93 The following statement summarises their 
reaction: 
The infamous constitution which was passed on the 
22nd May 1972 brought an end to Tamil participation 
in the sharing of state power and created a condition 
of political alienation of a nation of people. 94 
The Tamils reacted to the 1972 Constitution by declaring a three 
day `hartal' (general stoppage of work) and a period of mourning for 
the Tamil people. The Tamil M. P. 's who had supported the enactment of 
92 The Constitution of Sri Lanka, Colombo, Department of 
Government Press, (1972). 
93 Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism", 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 23, (1981), p. 183. 
94 A. Balasingham, Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom 
Struggle, Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Eelam, Book 
publication, No. 4, (1983), p. 22. 
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the Constitution in 1972 -were publicly threatened with 
`liquidation'. 
The degree of the intensity of communal conflict is determined by what 
Huntington has termed the `autonomy' of the society's political 
institutions. To quote Huntington: 
Political institutionalization, in the sense of 
autonomy, means the development of political 
organisations and procedures that are not simply 
expressions of the interests of particular social 
groups. A political organisation that is the 
instrument of a social group--family, clan, class-- 
lacks autonomy and institutionalization. 95 
Nevertheless, in Sri Lanka, political institutions wider both 
major political parties came to be identified with the interests of 
the Sinhalese-Buddhist, community, thereby impairing their legitimacy 
in the eyes of the Tamil minority at both national and regional 
levels. Consequently, they lost their legitimacy and institutional 
effectiveness for the wider society. Robert Nelson and Howard Wolpe 
further observe that when political institutions lack institutional 
wholeness and appear to be manipulated by one communal group, the 
other groups which do not have equal access to power and position will 
begin to doubt the legitimacy of the institutional order and will be 
politically motivated to secede. 96 
There is no escaping the fact that the failure of two governments 
to accommodate the Tamils into the existing political system has made 
Sri Lanka's moderate ethnic demands far more extreme than it would 
otherwise have been. From its inception in 1949, the F. P. demanded a 
federal form of government for Sri Lanka and rejected the concept of 
separatism. The idea of separate statehood was dismissed as 
95 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 20 
96 Robert Nelson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernisation and the Politics 
of Communalism", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 
4, (1970), p. 1120. 
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economically untenable because of the lack of resources in the Tamil 
areas. 97 These remained the F. P. 's views until 1972, their demands 
being confined to a fair share of power. The F. P., though a minor 
party in the wider arena of Sri Lankan national politics, was a strong 
force at a regional level in the Tamil areas. According to Duverger: 
If a party is clearly a minority in the country as a 
whole but in a majority in certain districts its 
attitude becomes autonomist or even secessionist, 
which may imperil the unity of the country. 98 
When the 1972 Constitution failed to recognise the significance of 
the concept. of federalism for the Tunils, for the first time Tamil 
politicians postulated the idea of separatism. The idea of separatism 
represents the climax of Tamil nationalism. It introduced a new 
dimension of hostility between the Tamil community and the government. 
4.12 Separate State 
In May 1972, all Tamil political parties and organisations 
including the F. P., the T. C. and the Ceylon Workers Congress (C. W. C) 
united. This merged force came to be known as the Tamil United Front 
(T. U. F). The adoption of the 1972 Constitution was the immediate 
catalyst for the formation of the T. U. F. The goals of the T. U. F. 
were no longer based on federalism, but rather were based on an 
independent Tamil state for the Tamil-speaking people. For' two 
decades, the F. P. had argued that the Sri Lankan Tamils were a 
distinct nation with a separate language, culture, traditional 
homeland and history. This nationalist rhetoric had succeeded in 
convincing the Sri Lankan Tamils that they had a history and tradition 
97 A. J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 119. 
9'8 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (London: Methuen and Co. 
Ltd, 1967), p. 294. 
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of their own which was not shared by the Sinhalese or Indian Tamils. 
In this phase of Tamil nationalism the Tamils sought to opt out of Sri 
Lank-an politics. R. N. Kearney observes that the shift in demands for 
separatism was followed by nearly two decades of frustrating efforts 
to secure concessions from a series of governments put in power by 
Sinhala voters. 99 
The slogan for a separate state taken up by the T. U. F. was later 
pursued with greater determination by the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (T. U. L. F. ). 100 As the aims of the front strengthened it was 
indicated by means of the added identification with "liberation'". 
Their strategy for separatism, however, was based on non-violent 
means. Nevertheless, this commitment to non-violence was fragile in 
the face of the unrest and frustration among the Tamil Youth. 
4.13 Youth Radicalisation 
By 1970 the most significant development in the Tamil areas was 
the emergence of a cadre of militant Tamil youth who were as deeply 
involved in the process of radical politics as were their counterparts 
in the South. Frustration and restlessness had captured the mood of 
the Tamil youth. Since 1970 these feelings have been a phenomenon to 
be reckoned with. The gradual transformation of the somewhat 
conservative and passive Tamil youth into violent radicals, can be 
largely attributed to the competition for non-agricultural employment 
and to the general lack of employment opportunities produced by social 
modernisation and the absence of a political settlement for the Tamil 
problem. 
99 R. N. Kearney, "Ethnic Conflict and Tamil Separatist Movement in 
Sri Lanka", Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 9, (1985), p. 905. 
100 The Ceylon Workers Congress left the T. U. F. before the general 
election in 1977. The faction of the T. C. split over the selection of 
candidates in the 1977 election and left the T. U. F. under the 
leadership of Kumar Ponnambalam. 
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Moreover, the standardization of university admissions became a 
salient factor in the process of radicalization among the Tatnil youth. 
The impact of the changes made in the system of admissions on the 
Tamil youth is graphically explained by C. R. de Silva, as follows: 
Nevertheless, the question of university admission is 
clearly one which mobilised the youth in Jaffna and 
produced the Tamil United Front leadership to declare 
in favour of a separate state. 101 
The founding of a university campus in Jaffna in 1974 as a 
response to a demand by the F. P. came too late and was too little to 
satisfy the Taunil youth. For them, standardization was no more than 
a discriminatory measure. The only way to circumvent these 
discriminatory measures was to form a separate state. Just as the 
socialist state represented a multi-faceted solution to the problems 
of the Sinhala radical youth, for the Tamil youth a separate state 
represented a panacea to the problems of language, education and 
employment. The process of radicalization and militancy escalated 
among the Tamil youth both within and without the confines of the 
T. U. L. F. youth organisation. The Tamil youth had been exposed since 
the 1960s to the strategy of protest politics adapted by the Tamil 
leaders in the form of school boycotts, the picketing of government 
offices, the hoisting of black flags, and the performance of 
`satyagraha' (passive resistance). 
When protests proved futile the Tamil youth realised that their 
political leaders, with their party politics and parliamentary 
tactics, had failed to make any major inroads into the power politics 
of Sri Lanka. Although these views were shared by their counterparts 
in the South prior to the armed uprising. Although the Insurrection 
101 C. R. de Silva, "The Impact of Nationalism on Education: The 
School Takeover (1961) and the University Admission Crisis 1970-1975", 
in Micheal Roberts, (ed), op. cit., 1979, p. 497. 
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of April 1971 did have an impact on their future' politics, the Tamil 
youth did not play a substantial role in the insurrection. The 
uprising, however, introduced political violence as an alternative 
approach to the problems caused by the oppression of the Tamils. The 
formation of a separate state in Bangladesh strengthened their 
convictions further and kindled a lingering hope of assistance from 
India in the event of a similar movement in Sri Lanka. 102 When the 
Dravida Munnethra Kazagam (D. M. K. ) came to power in 1967, the Tamil 
political parties found sympathy and moral support for their 
oppositional political role. The Tamil militant youth had received 
some encouragement from expatriate Tamils. Therefore, the" support 
extended by Tamil Nadu and the expatriate Tamils for the Tamil cause 
acquired an ominous significance, which will be further examined in 
Chapter 5. 
Such was the context within which the Tamil youth pressured the 
T. U. L. F. for more swift and drastic action. The T. U. L. F. demands for 
a separate state, however, were confined to rhetoric as'they had no 
viable strategy to achieve this goal. In the face of an overwhelming 
majority for the government in 1970, as well as in 1977, the Tamil 
youth could not depend on their parliamentary strength. As a result, 
the T. U. L. F. had to depend on an alternative strategy of extra- 
parliamentary means. The following statements by the leader of the 
T. U. L. F., A. Amirthalingam, 103 indicate that their extra-parliamentary 
tactics were well within the scope of parliamentary politics: 
If the government failed to take any meaningful steps 
towards the solving of the problems facing the-Tamils 
102 S. arasaratnam, "Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils" in 
Micheal Roberts, (ed), op. cit., p. 515. 
103 A. Amirthalingam became the leader of the Federal Party and 
the Tamil United Liberation Front (T. U. L. F. ) in 1976. From 1977 to 
1983 he was the leader of the opposition. In 1989 he was assassinated 
by the L. T. T. E. 
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within a reasonable period of time, then the T. U. L. F. 
would launch a struggle or start a civil disobediance 
campaign against the Government. 101 
Thus, the T. U. L. F. was totally committed to a policy of non- 
violence which depended heavily on demonstrations and satyagraha to 
prove their point but which in the long run had little impact. The 
T. U. L. F. failed to attract the impatient youth due to its inability to 
resolve any of the major grievances. This situation paved the way for 
more disappointment and loss of faith among the militant Tamil youth 
both within and without the T. U. L. F. The left-wing parties, which 
theoretically should have absorbed these disillusioned cadres, failed 
to do so because they too had been deradicalized by this time. On the 
other hand, the left-wing movement had hardly made any impact either 
on the Tamil masses or on the political leadership. 105 The existing 
political parties were seen to be conservative and rigid in a 
situation where flexibility was needed. The impatient Tamil youth 
became restive. The commitment to a separate Tamil state was so 
deeply entrenched in the minds of the Tamil youth that they sought to 
attain their goal by means of an armed struggle. P. Wilkinson 
observes such a development as follows: 
When governments and majorities adamantly withhold or 
oppose such reforms, then aggrieved minorities may 
well lose faith and confidence in the democratic 
system and peaceful methods of opposition and turn to 
violence. 106 
104 The Scribe, "Party Round Up: The T. U. L. F. " Tribune, Ceylon 
News View, Vol. 22, No. 23, (1977), p. 16. 
105 Edward Appathurai, "Communal Politics and National Integration 
in Sri Lanka", in Milton Israel, (ed), National Unity: The South Asian 
Experience, (New Delhi: Promila and Co., Publishers, 1983), p. 231. 
106 p. Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), p. 120. 
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Given these circumstances, what emerged was a polarisation of 
radical youth who were closely linked with the youth league of the 
T. U. L. F. and were committed to organising a political violence 
movement. 
4.14 Summary 
In summary, the preconditions for the origin of the Tamil 
political violence movement lie in the background of ethnic conflict 
between the Sinhalese majority and the major minority, the Tamils. 
The ethnic conflict, however, is not a clash of fundamentally 
different ethnicities rooted in the longstanding antagonisms of 
opposed political communities. The socio-economic changes initiated 
by the British Raj had a positive impact on the Tamil community, which 
benefited and was sustained by these changes. It was the policy 
innovations during the post-independent era, namely land settlement, 
the official language, state employment and university admission which 
had an adverse impact on the Tamil community. Consequently, the 
political participation within this community gained ground and 
broadened in terms of a demand for a federal state. Once again the 
government failed to introduce precise political reforms which would 
have eased the growing discontent among the Tamil community. 
Furthermore, unemployment and the lack of opportunities for university 
admission to science-oriented faculties which would ensure employment 
in the state sector alienated the Tamil youth. The result was an 
escalation of political participation by the Tamil youth based on a 
more radical demand for a separate state. The moderate Tamil 
political parties were unable to impress on the central government the 
significance of these demands which were made by legitimate and 
peaceful means. This progressive failure gave rise to underground 
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groups comprised mainly of the youth cohorts of the Tamil population. 
They were committed to violent tactics. 
The above-mentioned socio-economic and political changes formed 
the preconditions for the origin and development of the guerrilla 
organisations within the Tamil community. The political violence 
waged by the J. V. P. and the Tamil guerrilla organisations were 
precipitated by a combination of two factors. First, the propensity 
for political violence within these organisations made them volatile 
and susceptible to political violence. Second, the failure of 
successive governments to present a viable solution to the political 
problems and their determination to resort to counter violence 
triggered political violence. The author further examines these 
political organisations in Chapter 5 and their ideologies in Chapter 6 
while the counter violence comes under further discussion in Chapter 
7. 
188 
Chapter 5 
ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND FORM OF GUERRILLA ORGANISATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In analysing political violence in Sri Lanka the socio-economic 
and political factors are intrinsically significant, but the 
limitation of this study to such factors would be insufficient and 
misleading. The very origin and development of political violence 
movements are stages of political violence. According to Lucian W. 
Pye, the organisat. ional form of an insurrectionary movement is another 
major factor that determines the pattern of the struggle. ' 
Furthermore, the author contends that the nature and composition of an 
insurgent organisation affects the pattern of the political violence 
that it commits. Therefore, the author contends that it is necessary, 
amidst other aspects, to examine the origin, development and form of 
any organisation which resorts to political violence in order to 
broaden the understanding of such a phenomenon. Consequently, this 
chapter focuses on the organised political groups that on a protracted 
basis deliberately plan and engage in acts of political violence. 
The genesis of the organisation that staged the insurgency of 1971 
dates back to the mid 1960s. This period was marked by a 
proliferation of underground political violence movements among the 
1 Lucian W. Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency" in Harry Eckstein, ed. 
Internal War: Problems and Approaches, (New York: The Free Press, 
1964), p. 163. 
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Sinhala youth. The main organisations were the Gin! Pupura (Iskra) 
group, the Peradiga Sulaga (East Wind) group, the Revolutionary 
Communist League (R. C. L. ), the Sumith Devinuwara group, The Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (J. V. P. or the People's Liberation Front) and the 
Mathrubhumi Arakshaka Sangamaya (the Society for the Protection of the 
Motherland). These clandestine organisations were splinter groups of 
either the C. P. (P), or the L. S. S. P. (R. ). The Ginipupura, the Peradiga 
Sulaga, the Sumith Devinuwara and the J. V. P. in the mid 1960s broke 
away from the C. P. (P). The R. C. L. was a splinter group of the 
R. L. S. S. P. The ? Iatthruhhumi Arakshaka Sangamaya was a breakaway group 
of the J. V. P. The proliferation of such groups led to keen 
competition amongst them for supremacy in the sphere of underground 
activity in Sri Lanka. In spite of the competition for hegemony, 
however, these groups shared three common factors: the first was the 
common objective of achieving socialism; the second was their 
opposition to parliamentary government and to orthodox left-wing 
parties, though for different reasons; and finally was their 
perception that. a violent struggle was the means of achieving state 
power. The J. V. P. emerged as the most significant and active group 
that was capable of attracting a wider membership. The other groups 
were not only politically less attractive, but were also less active 
in terms of political violence. In addition, a number of Tamil 
guerrilla organisations also engaged in political violence, thus 
widening the effect throughout Sri Lankan society., 
Due to the complexity of this area of study, and for purposes of 
lucidity, this chapter is sub-divided into two main parts: the first 
deals with the pattern of organisation and related factors inherent in 
the movement which was responsible for the insurgency of 1971; while 
the latter examines the nature of the Tamil guerrilla organisations. 
Therefore, in the first part of this chapter the author concentrates 
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on the study of the J. V. P. as an organisation by mainly focusing on 
the following aspects: the origin and development of the organisation, 
background of the membership, infrastructure of the organisation, 
background of leadership, division of labour, funding and 
international links. 
5.2 The Origin and Development of the J. V. P 
The J. V. P, in its origin, has a background similar to those of the 
other contemporary underground groups in Sri Lanka. The founder of 
the J. V. P, Rohana Wijeweera, 2 claimed that the initial stages of the 
organisation were formulated on the 21st of May 1964.3 The authentic 
origin of this organisation, however, can be traced back to the 
Marxist Study Circle at the People's Friendship University (Lumumba 
University) in Moscow during the early 1960s. A. C. 11les confirms 
that Wijeweera was the architect and moving force behind the J. V. P. 4 
Furthermore, Janice Jiggins also credits Wijeweera as having been 
undoubtedly the chief theoretician and the most mature political mind 
in the J. V. P. 5 Therefore, in order to examine the origin and 
development of the J. V. P., it is necessary to examine Wijeweera's 
political background. 
He came from a left-oriented family which had its roots in the 
Southern city of Tatara, which is also a bastion of the C. P. (M). 6 
2 His proper name is Patabandige Don Nandasiri Wijeweera. 
3 Rohana Wijeweera, "Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna C. I. A. Karayo, " 
("J. V. P. C. I. A. Agents"), speech given on the 14th July, 1970, to the 
Sri Lanka Vidyodaya (Nugegoda) University Socialist Society, in 
Gangodawila, p. 4. 
a A. C. Allas, The Insurgency 1971, (Colombo: Apothecaries, 1976), 
p. 1. 
5 Janice Jiggins, Caste and Family in the Politics of Sinhalese, 
1947-1976, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 139. 
6 James Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy, (London: Frank 
Cass, 1977), p. 297. 
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Influenced by his father who was a supporter of the C. P., Wejeweera 
became a member of the C. P. Youth league. S. A. Wickramasinghe, who 
was the leader of the C. P. (M), was his political mentor.? This left- 
oriented background enabled him in 1962 to obtain a scholarship to 
study medicine at the Lumumba University in Moscow. Apart from 
pursuing his education, Wijeweera was exposed in Moscow to the radical 
political trends which were being advocated by students from Asia and 
Africa. Other than the general, radical political atmosphere at 
Lumumba, certain individuals appear to have had a significant impact 
on Wijeweera's political philosophy. Among them were: Murad Aidit. h, 
Kassim Hansa, and Sheikh Abeld Karume. S 
The other noteworthy influence on Wijeweera's future political 
thought and activities was exerted by Professor yletropolski of Lumumba 
University. Wijeweera himself admits that "it was this great man's 
ideas that helped me to give up my love for medical science and become 
a revolutionary rather than a doctor". 9 Thus, the cumulative 
political influences which were operational at the Lumumba University 
had a significant impact on Wijeweera. 
As a student he became involved in the activities of the union of 
Sri Lankan students in Moscow, and was elected as its deputy 
secretary-10 Together with another fellow Sri Lankan student activist 
7 Rohana Wijeweera, "Speech Given to the Criminal Justice 
Commission", in Robin Blackburn, (ed), Explosion in a Subcontinent: 
India Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ceylon, (London: Penguin Books, 1975), 
p. 225. 
S Murad Aidith was a brother of the chairman of the Indonesian 
Communist Party who died in the abortive military coup in 1965. 
Sheikh Hassim Hanga was a former student of the London School of 
Economics, who happened to be at Lumumba in the 1960s. Sheikh Abeid 
. Amani 
Karume was a student from Zanzibar, who later led the one-day 
revolution in January 1964, and became President of the People's 
Republic of Zanzibar. 
9 Rohana Wijeweera, op. cit., p. 226. 
10 Victor Ivan., 71 Aprel Keralla (The '71 April Insurrection), 
(Colombo: Lake House Investment Ltd Co., 1978), pp. 3-4. 
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named Dharmakeerthi, who was a keen supporter of the C. P. of Sri 
Lanka, Wijeweera organised the Marxist Study Circle. 11 The student 
organisation later proved to be the pioneer group which gradually 
developed and expanded into the J. V. P. 
The immediate political background which influenced Wijeweera, 
however, was permeated by the wider circle of international politics 
in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1960s. This dispute 
was to have a lasting impact on Wijeweera's political destiny. He 
perceived this dispute to be more of an ideological struggle between 
reformism and revolut. ionism than a national or border dispute. Due to 
the influence of Murad Aidith, Wijeweera became a keen supporter of 
the stand taken by the Chinese Communist Party. Wijeweera was 
convinced that the Chinese interpretation of Communism was more in 
accordance with the teaching of Marx and Lenin than the stand taken by 
the Soviet Government, which was deteriorating in favour of a 
capitalist form of government. 12 Thus convinced, and while still at 
Lumumba University, he established close contact with the Maoist 
faction of the Sri Lankan C. P. through an ex-M. P. Premalal Kumarasiri, 
who in turn happened to be an admirer of the North Korean leader Kim- 
I1-Sung. When the Maoist faction broke away from the C. P. and formed 
the C. P. (P) in late 1963, Wijeweera extended his support to the 
breakaway faction. Wijeweera's continued support and association 
with the C. P. (P) had repercussions when he applied for a visa to 
return to the Soviet Union after a short visit to Sri Lanka in 1964. 
His application was turned down by the Soviet-Embassy on the basis of 
his involvement in anti-Soviet propaganda and his links with the 
C. P. (P) in Sri Lank-a. 13 This was a turning point in his political 
11 In 1962 Dharmakeerthi died in a plane crash near Moscow. 
12 A. C. Alles, op. cit., p. 5. 
13 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement to the Police on 24th September, 
1971, unpublished, p. 2 
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activities as he changed his relationship with the C. P. (P) from that 
of a mere sympathizer to that of an active candidate of the party. 14 
Thus in tracing the origin of the J. V. P. it becomes necessary to focus 
next on Wijeweera's participation and involvement within the C. P. (P). 
5.3 Activities Within the C. P. (P) 
In 1965 Wijeweera became a full-time activist for the C. P. (P) and 
was later appointed as the assistant secretary of the party's Youth 
League. As assistant secretary, he came into close contact with the 
party's youth cadre some of whom he succeeded in converting to his own 
political philosophy. His converts later joined him in forming the 
J. V. P. Wijeweera's ambitions within the C. P. (P) were more far- 
reaching, and lie had obvious motives for gathering a group of 
followers. From the initial stages of membership he was governed by 
an ambition to assume power within the C. P. (P) by ousting its leader, 
N. Shanmugadasan. 
Mien Wijeweera joined the party, there were internal conflicts and 
strife over issues of authority and ideology. One of the primary 
conflicts was between the leadership and the youth membership of the 
party. Wijeweera used these internal rivalries and crises to- his 
advantage by stressing certain shortcomings and deficiencies which 
would be most useful in ousting the party's leader. - The main issues 
capitalised upon were: the defeat of the party's candidates including 
its leader in the General Election in 1965; 15 the emphasis and 
priority given to trade union activities rather than to general 
political activity; and the special attention paid to the Indian 
plantation workers rather than to the peasantry. On the strength of 
14 Victor Ivan, op. cit., p. 4. 
15 The C. P. (P) contested four seats in the General Election of 
1965, but all of its candidates lost. 
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these issues he succeeded in organising a rival group which supported 
the removal of N. Shanmugadasan from the leadership of the C. P. M. 
Wijeweera's faction, however, was not the only political group which 
flourished within the C. P. (P) during this period. There were three 
other such groups as follows: the Ginipupura (Iskra) led by Kalyananda 
Thirznagama; the Peradiga Sulaga (East Wind ) led by Gamini Yapa; and 
the Samajavadi Sangamaya (Socialist League) led by Nihal Dias and 
Sarath Wijesinghe. 16 
Within this framework of factionalism, Wijeweera and his followers 
in 1966 attempted to capture power in the party's Youth League 
Federation, but the attempt proved futile. He and his followers were 
soon expelled from the party. The overt reasons given by the C. P. (P) 
for their expulsion were that of establishing and running two youth 
farms without informing the party leadership, and that of 
participating in a demonstration without prior permission from the 
leadership. The expulsion was yet another step in the formation of 
the underground movement which came to be known as the J. V. P. Having 
been expelled from the C. P. (P), Wijeweera and his followers in 1967 
held a meeting in Kalaththawa an isolated dry zone village near 
Anuradhapura. 17 The focal point of the discussion was their future as 
a political faction. It was decided that they should continue their 
political activities as an independent political movement. This 
16 Kalyananda Thiranagama was a graduate of the University of 
Colombo, and later became an attorney of law. Gamini Yapa, whose real 
name was Wimal Ranasinghe, was a science graduate from the University 
of Colombo. Nihal Dias and Sarath Wijesinghe were social science 
students at the University of Peradeniya. The latter died in April 
1971 while instructing fellow members how to use a shotgun. 
17 The other attendees were Sanath Boralucatiya (Wijesena G. 
Vithana), W. T. Karunarathna, and Nimalasiri Jayasinghe (Loku Athula). 
Sanath who was a teacher, W. T. Karunaratna who was a clerk at the 
government department, and Loku Athula who was unemployed, were on the 
Board of Secretaries in the J. V. P. Sanath died in the 1971 
Insurrection, and the other two left the J. V. P. during the subsequent 
trial. 
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decision was crucial, in the sense that it marked the beginning of an 
underground movement which would later resort to political violence. 
For the next three years the movement operated and functioned as a 
clandestine movement. 
5.4 The J. V. P. 's Underground Period: 1967-1970 
From 1967 to 1970 the movement pioneered and organised by 
Wijeweera, did not display a distinct identity and was rather 
secretive in its activity. Until the General Election of 1970 there 
was no name for this underground movement. It was identified by its 
members as the `Viyaparaya' (movement) rather than by an acronym. 
Some newspapers identified it as the "Che Guevara" group, in spite of 
the fact that it was not entirely founded on Che Guevara's political 
ideology. The movement's association with Che Guevara's name, 
however, was attractive to the Sinhala youth who perceived him as a 
revolutionary hero. 
During this period, the J. V. P. initiated a series of 
indoctrination classes and acquired a definite strategy. In these 
early stages, the J. V. P. contemplated mobilising the support of the 
peasantry and the working, class, mainly through the Trade Union of the 
Land Development Department. 18 While their attempts to mobilise the 
participation of the working class and the peasantry were futile, the 
response of the Sinhalese youth was enthusiastic and widespread. 
Consequently, the J. V. P. made rapid progress as an underground 
movement with support from all the Sri Lankan university student 
organisations. The main supporting organisations were the Socialist 
League of the University of Peradeniya, a substantial section of the 
C. P. (M)-oriented student society of the University of Vidyalankara, 
18 The J. V. P. 's dependence on this particular trade union was 
based on the support extended by D. B. Danapala, the secretary of the 
Trade Union who was also a founding member of the J. V. P. 
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headed by D. I. G. Dharmasekera, 19 and a breakaway faction of the 
C. P. (M) from the University of Vidyodaya led by M. Wijesekara. 20 
During this period the Viyaparaya focused its attention on 
mobilising those rural youth cadres who were most responsive to the 
prospects of a radical clandestine movement. It was really nothing 
more than a concentrated effort toward ideological indoctrination and 
crude military training. The clandestine nature of the J. V. P., 
however, did not last long. This early period in the J. V. P. 's 
development is paradoxical in the sense that although it was said to 
have been secretive and undercover, the methods by which the J. V. P. 
actually conducted political debates, contested student council 
elections, and organised student strikes, were quite contrary to the 
supposedly clandestine nature of the movement. 21 As a result, the 
first police report of the existence of the underground movement was 
presented to the Cabinet as early as 1968. 
As the J. V. P. movement expanded, not only was its clandestine and 
secretive nature subject to metamorphosis, but also its cohesion. 
Thus, internal rivalries and factionalism flourished; by 1969 a split 
was imminent. The break away occurred later that year. The new 
group was called the Mathrubhumi Arakshaka Sangamaya (the Society for 
the Protection of the Motherland). 22 The increasingly overt nature of 
19 D. I. G. Dharamasekera, more popularly known as Castro Dharme, 
for his advocacy of a Cuban-style revolution, broke away from the 
J. V. P in 1969. 
20 Mahinda Wijesekara, left the J. V. P. after the trial related to 
the 1971 Insurrection and became an attorney at law. A short time 
later he led a party called the Mahajana Vimukthi Pakshaya (People's 
Liberation Party) and then joined the S. L. F. P. In the General 
Election of 1989, he was elected to the National Assembly. 
21 The pro-J. V. P. students were behind the clash in 1968 between 
the army and the students at the University of Peradeniya. 
22 Later known as the Mao Youth Front (M. Y. F), it was the group 
responsible for the attack on the 6th of March 1971 on the U. S. 
Embassy in Colombo during which a police inspector was killed. 
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the J. V. P. movement soon became a primary concern of the police. 
Wijeweera and some other members of the movement were taken into 
custody on the eve of the Parliamentary Election of 1970.23 In order 
to secure their release, the J. V. P. applied a strategy of arousing 
public awareness by means of a widespread poster and leaflet campaign 
under the name of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (J. V. P. ). Another 
strategic measure was the unanimous support extended by the J. V. P. to 
the U. F. coalition against the U. N. P. in the campaign for the General 
Election of 1970. The J. V. P. had serious reservations regarding the 
post-election role of the U. N. P., believing that if the incumbent 
U. V. P. Government was defeated, the U. N. P. would resort to a military- 
aided dictatorship rather than relinquish power. On the basis of this 
assumption the J. V. P. prepared for an armed confrontation with an 
anticipated dictatorship. Furthermore, the J. V. P. conducted a 
propaganda campaign in which it urged the Sri Lankan masses to make 
ready for an uprising. 24 After the 1970 elections, however, there 
was a peaceful transfer of power without any of the anticipated 
resistance, and Wijeweera and his followers were released by the U. F. 
Government. 25 This was the beginning of yet another stage of the 
transition of the J. V. P. from a clandestine movement to a semi- 
clandestine organisation. 
5.5 The J. V. P. 's Semi-Clandestine Period 1970-1971 
During this period the J. V. P. assumed a dual role of continuing 
its illegal and underground activities in preparation for an armed 
23 Fred Halliday, "The Ceylon Insurrection", New Left Review, No. 
69, (1971), p. 190. 
21 Wijeweera Athulu Deshapremi Tharunayan Vaha Nidahas Karanu, 
(Release Wijeweera and all other Patriotic Youths immediately) [no 
date), a cyclostyled leaflet. 
25 A J. V. P. activist named P. Siriwardena, however, was tried for 
an attempted coup d'etat. 
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struggle. At the same time, the J. V. P. undertook overt activities 
such as mass meetings and poster campaigns to gain public support, and 
held public meetings in most of the major cities in Sri Lanka. 26 As a 
result, the J. V. P. 's capacity to expand its membership was enhanced 
during this period. The rapid expansion of the J. V. P. 's cadres and 
the increased extent of its activities can be largely attributed to 
two main factors: first, the rather overwhelming defeat of the U. N. P. 
in the General Elections of 1970 and the resulting disarray within 
their ranks reduced the effectiveness of the U. N. P. as an opposition 
party. Secondly, the U. F. Government failed to fulfil their campaign 
promises, especially those effecting the youth population. Thus, the 
vacuum created by the lack of a strong opposition to the U. F. was 
filled by the J. V. P. and led to the increasing hostility between the 
U. F. Government. and the J. V. P. On the whole, this hostility was more 
advantageous to the J. V. P. in recruiting new members. This phase of 
the J. V. P. 's existence was confined to increased political 
mobilisation which involved the building up of a disciplined, 
dedicated revolutionary cadre, and the organising of mass support. 
There is no evidence that the J. V. P. used violence prior to April 
1971. 
In order to gain a detailed insight into the J. V. P. the author 
wishes to examine the background of the group's membership. It is 
first necessary to examine the recruitment procedure of the J. V. P. 
26 The J. V. P. held 16 public meetings between August 1970 and 
February 1971. See, Victor Ivan, op. cit., p. 186. 
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5.6 Recruitment Procedure of the J. V. P. 
The clandestine nature of the organisation necessitated that the 
methods of recruitment. be confined to individual trust and friendship. 
Thus, there were no applications for membership. The recruitment of 
new members was done on the basis of personal relationships. The 
following statement made by a prominent member of the J. V. P. clarifies 
the procedure of recruitment: 
I know one Chandrasena, who was in a lower class to 
mine in college.... Somewhere in September 1968 
Chandrasena met me in Ambalangoda town and spoke to 
me of the left-wing movement in the country and made 
out that they were not true to the policies they 
preached. Later one day, . lmaradasa met me. He was a 
member of our youth league. He told me that there 
was a movement trying to organise a socialist party 
and suggested that we join it.... Later again 
Chandrasena met me and I told him that I was keen on 
joining, this movement. He then told me to come for a 
class to his house. I went for this class with 
Amaradasa to the house of Chandrasena. 27 
Thus, the procedure of recruitment was on the basis of personal 
contact and friendship channelled through existing members of the 
organisation. Those seeking membership were initially involved in an 
elementary discussion which dealt with the prevailing political 
situation in Sri Lanka. Potential members were then eligible for 
further indoctrination classes which were held in secret. The 
J. V. P. 's ideology was explained at the first four of five 
indocrination classes. If the potential recruits shared the views 
expressed in the four initial lectures, they were admitted to the 
fifth lecture which dealt with the J. V. P. 's "strategy of revolution". 
After the course of classes had been completed, the prospective 
members were observed in order to verify their allegiance to the 
organisation. Once their loyalty was proven satisfactorily, the 
27 W. T. Cicil Chandra, Statement Given to the C. I. D., (1971), 
unpublished, pp. 1-2, 
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recruits were entitled to formal membership in the organisation. 
Thereafter, the new members were assigned the task of propagating the 
views of the organisation for further recruitment of prospective 
members. In light of this recruitment procedure, it is evident that 
ideological conviction was not the only criterion instilled during the 
recruitment and training of members. Trust and dedication were 
characteristics of equal importance in expanding the J. V. P. 's 
membership and were reflected by the way in which membership was 
structured. All members of the J. V. P. were classified into two 
lists: List A and List B. List A contained the names of the most 
trustworthy and loyal members, all of whom had completed the five 
indocrination classes. They were assigned to combat units, and were 
generally more active than prospective members. 2S In terms of the 
analysis of Eric Hoffer List A J. V. P. members should be seen as the 
true believers, men of fanatical faith ready to sacrifice their lives 
for what they considered a holy cause. 29 
List B, on the other hand, contained the names of the would-be or 
prospective members who the J. V. P. utilised mainly for propaganda 
activities, such as poster campaigns. Both lists were compiled by the 
secretary of the regional committee. Wijeweera, in defining the role 
of the two categories within the organisation, stated that those on 
List A were entitled to all rights within the party as well as the 
privilege of presenting their views and ideas regarding the 
organisation and its decision-making process. The members on List B 
were totally excluded from the deliberative process. 30 In practice, 
however, the members on List A were not given the opportunity to 
28 A. C. Allas, op. cit., p. 33. 
29 Eric Hoffer, The True Believers: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass 
Movements, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1951), p. xii. 
. 30 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement to the C. I. D., op. cit., p. 132. 
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express their views or participate in decision making. Furthermore, 
contact between members was totally discouraged in order to prevent 
information from being leaked to the police and to otherwise ensure 
secrecy. The anonymity of the J. V. P. 's members was maintained by the 
use of the blanket word 'Mahaththya' (Gentleman) instead of individual 
names. This word replaced the popular word `Sahodaraya' (Brother) 
applied by the left-wing parties. The leader of the movement was 
referred to as `Loko yahaththya'(Boss). 
Once recruited, the functions of the J. V. P. 's members were similar 
to those of any left-wing underground movement.. They were to contact 
and recruit new members, finance the organisation, and popularise the 
ideology and activities of the organisation by means of propaganda. 
In addition to these common requirements all members received physical 
training and crude military instruction in preparation for the 
forthcoming armed struggle. Each member was instructed to collect a 
uniform and kit consisting of a gun, box of cartridges, boots, 
stockings, black trousers, blue shirt with pockets, an army belt, 
black running shorts, black vest, steel helmet., knife, torch, 
Lighter, haversack, first aid box, and canvas cloth. 31 Another 
aspect of the training was the rather rigid discipline imposed on 
members. The consumption of alcohol, smoking, viewing of films, and 
emotional attachments between the sexes (except those in which both 
partners were involved in the activities of the J. V. P. ) were strictly 
prohibited. 
The members of the J. V. P. 's hierarchy were drawn from both the 
full-time and part-time membership. This categorisation was derived 
mainly from the extent of commitment and dedication of the members. 
The full-timers devoted their lives entirely to the operational 
31 B. A. R. Kurukulasuriya, Statement to the Police, (no date), 
unpublished, p. 8. 
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aspects of the organisation, and to its expansion through the 
popularisation of the movement. 32 They were usually members of List A 
and were merely identified by pseudonyms. According to Wijeweera, 
at the beginning of 1970 there were 500 such full-time members, each 
capable of delivering the indoctrination classes. 33 These members, in 
spite of their total commitment to the organisation, were not entitled 
to any remuneration for their services, but rather were supported and 
maintained by other members and sympathisers. The part-time members, 
on the other hand, were either employed or were pursuing their 
studies, and devoted their spare time to the activities of the group. 
As a whole, irrespective of the extent of their commitment, these 
members played a vital role in the organisation and functions of the 
J. V. P. 
The accurate number of total membership is subject to conjecture. 
The conspiratorial and secretive nature of the organisation eludes 
exact figures. It is known that prior to 1970 the membership was 
confined to a viere 2,000, but by 1970 it had increased to about 3,000. 
Loku At. hula, who was a leading figure in the J. V. P., claims that in 0 t3 
spite of the 8,000 names appearing on List A in 1971, approximately 
50,000 had actually participated in the political classes conducted by 
the J. V. P. 34 Contrary to these claims a former cabinet member 
estimates the number of members, based on their participation in the 
1971 Insurrection, as having been between 5,000 and 7,000.35 There 
are further claims that the number of people associated with the 
32 A. C. Allas, op. cit., p. 33. 
33 Ibid., p. 33 
33 Nimalasiri Jayasinghe, (Loku Athula), "Evidence In the, 
Criminal Justice Commission, (C. J. C. )", Ceylon Daily News, (18 January 
1973). 
35 Felix R. Dias Bandaranayake, "The Recent Events in Ceylon", 
Ceylon Today, Vol. 20, (1971), p. 54. 
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J. V. P. might have been 10,000 or higher. 36 These figures are also 
contradicted by Urmila Phadnis, who claims that the J. V. P. 's 
membership varied from 20,000 to 80,000, excluding sympathisers who 
numbered about 30,000.37 From the contradictory statistics given 
above, it is evident that there is no consensus regarding the number 
of people who have been involved in the J. V. P. It is manifest in this 
context, however, that the J. V. P. had a fairly widespread membership. 
Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to examine the socio- 
economic background of this membership. 
5.7 Socio-Economic Background of the J. V. P. 's Membership 
The socio-economic background of the membership of the J. V. P. not 
only gives an insight into the subsequently violent nature of this 
organisation, but also sheds light on the factors which led to the 
mobilisation of the youth cadres in Sri Lanka. Different aspects of 
their socio-economic background such as sex, ethnicity, religion, age, 
caste, education and profession will be examined. Most of the 
relevant factors will be derived from a study conducted by Gananath 
Obeysekara on the social background of the participants of the 1971 
Insurrection. Obeysekara based his study on a sample of 10,192 
suspected members of the J. V. P. 38 
It is obvious from an examination of Obeysekara's sample that the 
participation of women in the J. V. P. was marginal due to the 
36 Robert N. Kearney and Janice Jiggins, "The Ceylon Insurrection 
of 1971", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 
(1971), p. 54. 
37 Urmila Phadnis, "Insurgency in Ceylon", Economic and Political 
Weekly, (? fay 1971), p. 967. 
38 Gananatha Obeysekara, "Some Comments on the Social Backgrounds 
of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)", Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, (1974), pp. 367-383. 
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overwhelming number of male members. Of the 10,192 suspected 
insurgents, 9,976 were male and the remaining 216 were female. Hence, 
like other underground movements in the Third World, the J. V. P. was 
male dominated. It is a reflection of the social norms of the wider 
Sri Lankan society where females were assigned a secondary role. The 
role of the female members of the J. V. P. was confined to supporting 
duties such as operations as couriers, tailors and nurses. In terms 
of ethnicity, there is no specific data upon which one can 
statistically analyze ethnic participation. Religion in this context, 
however, serves as an indicator of ethnicity. The following Table 5.1 
further clarifies the religious background of the J. V. P. membership. 
Table 5.1 J. V. P. Membership Based on Religion 
Religion Number Per centage 
Buddhist 9,597 94.2 
Hindu 82 .8 
Muslim 57 .5 
Christian 382 3.8 
unspecified 74 .7 
Total 10,192 100.0 
Source: Gananatha Obeysekara, "Some Comments on the 
Social Background of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri 
Lanka (Ceylon)", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 33, 
No. 3, (1974), p. 370. 
According to Table 5.1, approximately 94 per cent of members were 
Buddhist and, therefore, were Sinhalese. The next largest group, the 
Christians, were more or less Sinhalese; less than one per cent were 
Hindus and, therefore, were Tamils. The Muslims who are ethnically 
either Moors or Malays were only 0.5 per cent of the membership. 
Overall, the data reveals that less than six per cent of those 
involved in the activities of the J. V. P. were non-Buddhists and were 
non-Sinhalese. Considering the orientation of the above-mentioned 
data one could safely infer that the J. V. P. was dominated and 
activated by the Sinhala-Buddhists. This Sinhala-Buddhist dimension 
of the J. V. P. aroused criticisms that it was a communally chauvinistic 
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organisation which was largely governed by a hostile approach to the 
minorities. Another significant aspect was the age distribution of 
the J. V. P. 's membership. Table 5.2 highlights the rather obvious 
weighting of the organisation towards the youth population. 
Table 5.2 Members of the J. V. P. by Age 
Age Ntunber Per Centage 
0-141 36 4.4 
15-24 7330 71.9 
25-34 2349 22.1 
35-44 375 3.0 
15-54 141 1.0 
55 and over 61 .6 
ToUll 10,192 100.0 
Source: Gananath Obeysekara, op. cit., p. 377. 
. Xs 
indicated in -Takle 5.2,98 per cent of the J. V. P. membership 
were under 3; 5 years of age while about 72 per cent were between the 
ages of 15-21. The average age of the J. V. P. members was around 20 
years, thus emphasising the significant role of youth within the 
movement. Ethnically 98 per cent were Sinhala, while on the basis of 
age 98 per cent came within the purview of the youth population in Sri 
Lanka. A combination of these factors clearly indicates that the 
J. V. P. was an organisation dominated by Sinhala-Buddhist youth. 
In this context, education appears as a pertinent factor which 
requires further examination. Table 5.3 concerns the levels of 
education attained by the membership of the J. V. P. The sample data in 
Table 5.3 indicate that a mere 19 per cent of the membership were 
poorly educated. The majority had attained an average standard of 
education while some others had achieved a much higher standard. A. 
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Arasarathnam, however, disputes the representation of university 
students within the sample. He contends that more of them were 
involved in J. V. P. activities than is shown in Table 5.3.39 
Table 5.3 Membership by Level of Education 
Level of Education Number Percentage 
No Education 250 2.5 
Grade 1-4 1739 17.1 
Grade 5-8 4315 42.3 
G. C. E. (0/L) 3282 32.2 
G. C. E. (A/L) 419 4.1 
University 158 1.6 
Unspecified 29 0.2 
Total 10,192 100.0 
Source: Gananath Obeysekara, op. cit., p. 377. 
Apart from the mobilisation of radical youth cadres within the 
universities, the J. V. P. 's potential membership was drawn from the 
radical young secondary school teachers, and students from the rural- 
based high schools, which are called Maha Vidyalayas and Madya Maha 
Vidyalayas (Central Colleges). Although data on the representation of 
the urban/rural-based population within the J. V. P. is not available, 
Table 5.4 gives an insight into the urban/rural-based membership in 
the J. V. P. by type of school attended. 
Table 5.4 Members of the J. V. P. by Type of School 
Attended 
Educational Institution Number Percentaged 
Unspecified 23 .2 
No schooling 240 2.4 
Private Schools, Tutory, 210 2.1 
Maha Vidyalaya 8081 79.3 
Madya Maya Vidyalaya 652 6.4 
Technical, Training Colleges 189 1.9 
Universities 202 1.9 
Others 595 5.8 
Total 10,192 100.0 
Source: Gananath Obeysekara, op. cit. p., 376. 
39 S. AArasarathnam, "The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971: Some Causes 
and Consequences", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 3, (1972), pp. 356- 
372. 
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Table 5.1 indicates that. almost 85 per cent of the J. V. P. 's 
members were educated either in Maha Vidyalayas or tiladya Maha 
Vidyalayas which are mainly located in the rural sector and provide an 
education in the social sciences, with the indigenous language serving 
as the medium of instruction. These schools were deprived of the 
facilities to provide an education in science and technology, which 
were the major areas within which employment was available. Table 5.4 
also indicates that those who had received an urban elite education 
were hardly attracted to the J. V. P. Rather, the J. V. P. held allure 
for those from the Sinhalese rural background. This trend is further, 
clarified in the occupational status of the membership as shown in 
Table 5.5. 
Occupations in administration, medicine, engineering, and law, 
which fell mainly within the elite category, together represent a mere 
.2 per cent of the J. V. P. membership. Thus, the participation of the 
urban intelligentsia in the J. V. P. was insignificant. The rural-based 
nature of the J. V. P. deterred the urban intelligentsia from 
participating. S. P. Huntington, states that a peasant or rural-based 
revolutionary movement may have difficulty in appealing to the urban 
intelligentsia. }° The middle-class categories which include the 
Ayurvedic (indigenous) physicians, the middle grades in government 
service, the clerks, teachers, and other grades in government service, 
were poorly represented in the J. V. P. 
The lower to middle positions, at 20% of the total membership, 
were fairly well represented in the J. V. P. This category is comprised 
of minor grade government employees, technicians, fishermen, traders 
and security services. It was the low income category which includes 
40 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 304. 
208 
workers, labourers and cultivators, that had a significant impact on 
the J. V. P. membership. 
Table 5.5 Occupational Status of the Members in the 
J. V. P. 
Occupational Status Number Per Centage 
Administrative positions in 
Govt. and private sector 10 .1 
Doctors (Western trained) 2 .0 
Engineers 1 .0 
Lawyers 2 .0 
Officers-police and security 
services 6 .1 
Ayurvedic physicians - 9 .1 
Middle grade in govt. 2,17 2.1 
Govt. clerks 117 1.1 
Teachers 214 2.1 
Other ranks in security services 26 .3 
Minor grades in govt. 660 6.5 
Technicians and artisans 698 6.8 
Fishermen 25 .2 
Estate labourers 198 1.9 
Traders 434 4.3 
Cinnamon peelers 55 .5 
Barbers 63 .6 
Washermen 20 .2 
Textile weavers -17 ti 
Beedi wrappers 205 2.0 
Casual labourers 1091 10.7 
Cultivators 2737 26.9 
Students 1270 12.5 
Unemployed 1783 17.5 
Others 110 1.1 
Clergy (Buddhist) 34 .3 
Unspecified 128 1.3 
Total 10,192 100.0 
Source: Gananath Obeysekara, op. cit., p. 373. 
Statistically, the unemployed were also fairly well represented at 
17.5 per cent of the J. V. P. membership. It was this proportion which 
served as a basis for contradicting the argument of the spokesmen of 
the U. F. Government, who denied the impact of the high rate of 
unemployment in Sri Lanka on the armed uprising of 1971.41 
What these statistics fail to account for is that the number of 
students involved in the J. V. P. represented a potentially separate 
41 N. M. Perera, Budget Speech, 1971-72, Colombo, (1971), p. 1, 
cited in Robert N. Kearney and Janice Jiggins, op. cit., p. 48. 
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unemployed or underemployed category. As noted elsewhere herein, the 
underemployed had a higher level of education or developed skills, but 
were forced by unfavorable socio-political factors to seek employment 
below their qualifications. The majority of J. V. P. members were 
Sinhala-Buddhist rural youth. (Tables 5.1 and 5.2), including a 
significant proportion who were unemployed or underemployed. The 
tension and frustration within these two groups contributed 
substantially to J. V. P. militancy. The following Table 5.6 on 
occupational status of fathers of the J. V. P. members reinforces the 
above-mentioned socio-economic background. 
5.6. Occupational Status of the Fathers of the 
J. V. N. Members 
occupational Status No. % of Total 
High positions 47 .4 
Middle positions 553 - 5.4 
Lower Middle 1979 19.4 
Underemployed 1969 19.7 
Unemployed 260 2.8 
Unspecified 2214 21.7 
Unspecified but employed 168 1.6 
Clergy (Christian, Hindu) 2 .0 
Total 10,192 100.0 
Source: Gananath Obeysekara, op. cit., p. 375. 
Table 5.6 indicates that a majority of fathers of the J. V. P. 
membership came from the low income strata and held correspondingly 
low-status occupations. The socio-economic background of the J. V. P. 
membership, however, cannot be confined to the analysis of the above- 
mentioned factors. In the context of Sri Lankan society, where class 
stratification coexists with a less overt stratification of caste, the 
caste factor too is a significant aspect. Furthermore, the caste 
dimension of the movement has been brought to the fore by a widespread 
belief that the J. V. P. was mainly motivated and stimulated by the 
`oppressed' castes. This argument is correct when it is applied to 
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the leadership of the J. V. P. This contention, however, does not apply 
to the movement as a whole especially as depicted in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 refutes the argument that the J. V. P. was a lower caste- 
based movement as over 50 per cent of its members belonged to the 
Govigama caste, which is at the apex of the caste structure. As 
W. A. W. Warnapala contends, however, there is valid evidence that the 
so-called 'oppressed' castes were mobilised in certain areas where 
their demographic strength was the highest. According to Warnapala, 
within the Kegalla district, where the J. V. P. was widespread, the 
caste factor was fully exploited and young men belonging to the 
'oppressed' castes12 constituted a sizeable segment of the support 
base. 43 
Table 5.7 Caste Background of the Members in the J. V. P. 
Caste Traditional Occupation Number Percentage 
Govigama Farmers 5962 58.9 
Karava Fisheries 636 6.2 
Sala; ama Cinnamon Peelers 193 1.9 
Vahumpura Juggery Makers 1038 10.2 
Dhoby Washermen 204 1.9 
Hunu Lime Burners 35 .3 
Batgama Servants to govigama 944 9.3 
Nawruidanna Smiths 159 1.6 
Rodiya Untouchable beggars 2 .0 
Durava Toddy Tappers 267 2.6 
Berava Drummers 156 1.5 
humbal Potters 27 .2 
Paraiyar Tamil Castes 17 .1 
Vellala 16 .1 
Pandaram 2 .0 
Kaunda 1 .0 
Nadar 1 .0 
Harijan Untouchable 10 .1 
Unspecified 520 5.1 
Total 10 , 192 100.0 
Source: Gananath Obeysekara, op. cit., p. 371. 
42 In Table 5.7 all other castes than Govigama, Karava, Salagama 
and Vellala are known as oppressed castes in Sri Lanka. 
13 W. A. W. Warnapala (Politicus) "The April Revolt in Ceylon", 
Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1972), p. 268. 
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In the final analysis, the socio-economic base of the J. V. P. seems 
to further establish the author's contention that factors which 
gathered momentum over a long period of time, especially in the rural 
sector, culminated in the formation, expansion and mobilisation of the' 
rural youth into a revolutionary organisation. The social and 
economic context of the movement which appears to be crucial permeates 
all aspects of the movement. 
5.8 Infrastructure of the J. V. P. 
Infrastructure in this context denotes the internal organisational 
structure of the J. V. P. including its informal and formal network. 
Due to the J. V. P. 's clandestine nature, until 1970, it did not have a 
formal politico-military structure and contacts between members were 
made on a personal basis within limited confines. Consequently, the 
J. V. P., in its initial years of existence, was loosely organised, and 
was centred around dominant personalities. The foundations of a 
formal politico-military organisation were laid after the General 
Election of 1970, and were ordered from top to bottom on the basis of 
Lenin's model of the Bolshevik party. 
At the lowest level of the structure were the primary 
organisations called `cells'. The cells were popularly known as the 
'pane committees' each of which consisted usually of five members. 
These committees, were sometimes expanded, however, to include a 
maximum of nine members. The head of each committee was appointed by 
the local leader of the J. V. P. The committee heads were responsible 
for maintaining links with the higher echelons of the organisation. 
Only the the most hardworking and trustworthy members were selected as 
committee leaders. It was compulsory for these committees to meet at 
least once a month and for their members to train and willingly 
participate in an armed struggle. The meetings also served as a forum 
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for criticism, including self-criticism. The operating areas of the 
committees were confined to the immediate environment such as a sub- 
area, school or work place. The narrow confines of scope and the 
isolated nature of these cells largely contributed to the anonymity 
assured to the members and served as a safeguard against betrayal and 
police infiltration. The cell-system kept members not only isolated 
but also ignorant of the J. V. P. 's overall plans. 
Within the hierarchy of the organisational structure of the J. V. P, 
the village committees were comprised of the five secretaries of the 
Iahe committees and, therefore, ranked above the pahe committees. 44 
Each village committee was headed by the most active full-time or 
part-time member of the J. V. P. in the village, and its activities were 
confined to the village area. The local committees which came next in 
the order of ascendancy were also known as "police committees". 
Although the J. V. P. emulated the structure of a political party, its 
regional base was not organised on an electoral level but rather on 
the basis of the police divisions in Sri Lanka. Each police 
committee was formed by the full-timers in the local or police area, 
and by the secretaries of the village committee. - The police 
committees were each led by a secretary appointed by either a district 
secretary or the higher echelons of the J. V. P. leadership. The 
secretary was charged with preparing an armed attack on the local 
police station, and organising and co-ordinating the activities of the 
cells and village committees. 
The district committee which was next above the police committee 
in the J. V. P. 's hierarchy was the important nucleus of the 
organisational structure. Except for the Tamil-dominated districts of 
Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa, the J. V. P. had succeeded in 
44 B. A. W. Kurukulasuriya, Statement Made to the Police on 20 
April, 1971, (unpublished), p. 30. 
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organising the other districts. The district committees were formed 
by the most active secretaries of the police committees. Hence, the 
members of the district committees varied according to the number of 
police committees within the district, and were led by a secretary who 
was appointed by the leadership of the J. V. P. He was the medium of 
communication between the leadership and the secretaries of the police 
committees. 
Neither the central committee or politbureau existed within the 
formal memorialised structure of the J. V. P. Therefore, the number of 
members and the method of selection are matters of controversy. Loku 
. \thula claimed 
that there were 25 members on the central committee, 
and 12 members on the politbureau. 45 Hohana Wijeweera, the leader of 
the J. V. P, however, disagreed with Loku Athula's claims regarding the 
politbureau and declared that the politbureau had only eight 
members-16 The members of the central committee and politbureau were 
selected from amongst. the district secretaries and other senior 
members of the J. V. P. It can be stated with certainty that members 
were not elected by means of a party congress but on the strength of 
their personal friendships and contacts with the higher echelons. 
According to Feliks Gross, secrecy is an important element in any 
underground movement. The leader at the top of the underground 
hierarchy knows more about the whole organisation than do members of 
the individual cells, and only a few members of the central committee 
know all the details. The cadre are informed as to their own 
responsibilities in strengthening the ranks of the organisation, and 
spreading the ideology of the resistance, but beyond that they can ask 
45 (Loku Athula) Nimalasiri Jayasinghe, Statement to the G. I. D. 
cited by R. N. Kearney and Janice Jiggins, op. cit., p. 53. 
46 Rohana Wijeweera, op. cit., p. 310. 
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no questions. {' The J. V. P. too followed this universal procedure as 
outlined by Gross. The structure of the J. V. P. leadership was not 
disclosed to its members as exemplified in the following statement 
made by a leading member: 
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in principle refused to 
disclose in full the nature of its party 
organisation even to its members. It was only 
after I came to prison, that I myself came to know, 
that the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna had a politbureau. 
The four who were the party's leaders for life were 
the first to decide on all issues.... [the J. V. P. 's] 
members were made to act as mere puppets of the 
four. 
The members of the central committee and politbureau were not 
empowered to make decisions. As shown above, it was not only the 
lower level cells, but also the higher echelons of the central 
committee and the politbureau that were undemocratically constituted. 
Almost all the appointments and decisions within the J. V. F. were made 
by the secretarial committee, which was composed of four senior 
members including Wijeweera who was the general secretary and leader 
of the J. V. P. 19 The nature of this self-appointed leadership is 
explained by Wijeweera himself in his statement to the C. I. U. in 1971. 
I was the chief secretary. If any of you gentlemen 
question me as to who elected me the chief secretary 
; 
Jr 
.. I accepted that office sir, once I was released. 
Wicramanayake, asked me whether I knew that we 
would be suppressed, taken to task one day. I knew. 
As they gave me that office. I told them that they 
were putting the noose around my neck. I knew what I 
was in for. Understand. When the party decided to 
make me the chief secretary, I knew that I would be 
held responsible for everybody's actions. But there 
should be someone to do it.... There was no election 
47 Feliks Gross, Seizure of Political Power, in a Century of 
Revolution, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 353. 
48 S. A. Piyatilake, Statement Made to the Criminal Justice 
Commission (C. J. C. ), (1973), [unpublished], p. 2 
49 The other three members were Sanath, Karunaratna and Loku 
Athula. 
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of chief secretary as such. Do you know where it was 
announced first of all, that I was chief secretary? 
At that .... press conference. A Daily News editor, 
or a reporter, asked me in which capacity I was 
speaking. Sanath and I knew that the question would 
arise; so we decided beforehand. We thought of 
saying, party leader. But in a Marxist-Leninist 
party it had to always be a chief secretary.... That 
was the system. So I said `chief secretary'. Sir, 
this was the first reference to myself as the chief 
secretary. You question anyone under arrest as to 
who was elected the chief secretary. No one did so. 
What I mean is, it was a self-appointment. 50 
Thus, the system of decision-making was taken from the top and 
flowed to the bottom. This pattern of appointment and decision- 
making accounts for the authoritarianism exerted by the leadership 
over the members of the J. V. P. 
Martha Crenshaw, in discussing the models of terrorist 
organisations, finds that there are two such organisational structures 
which are widely applied. The first is a cellular structure within 
which decisions are made at the apex of the pyramid and communicated 
downwards through subordinates in compartmentalized units. Only the 
top echelon has any knowledge of the comprehensive organizational 
structure or the identities of the leaders. The second form of 
structure resembles a wheel with central leadership at the hub in 
direct contact with the encircling units. 51 The organisational 
structure of the J. V. P. came within the purview of the first 
structure, which is pyramidical. 
In the context of the organisational structure it becomes 
necessary to examine the distribution of activities within the J. V. P. 
Therefore, the author next focuses on the division of labour within 
the organisation as it has existed since 1970. The activities of the 
50 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement to the C. I. D. op. cit., PP. 106- 
107. 
sl >fartha Crenshaw, "An Organisational Approach to the Analysis 
of Political Terrorism", Orbis, Vol. 29, No. 3, (1985), p. 469. 
216 
J. V. P. were divided mainly between four divisions. Wijeweera 
explained that each division was assigned the task of dealing with one 
particular aspect of activity. The four divisions were propaganda, 
education, organisation and arms, with each division being headed and 
supervised by one of the four members of the secretarial committee. 52 
The propaganda division was in charge of organising and carrying 
out the propaganda activities of the J. V. P., and was the only division 
which conducted its activities overtly. The propaganda activities 
varied from publishing newspapers and organising public meetings and 
speeches, to conducting poster campaigns. For these activities the 
J. V. P. used its auxiLiary bodies such as the Samajavadi Shishya 
Sangamaya (Socialist Student League), the Bikku (Buddhist Clergy) also 
known as the Deshapremi Bikku Pei amtuia (Patriotic Monks Front), and 
the Women's organisation. The educational division was assigned the 
task of politically indoctrinating the members at training camps in 
preparation for the series of five classes, especially recruits who 
were willing to work for the movement either as part-time or full- 
time members. The educational division was also responsible for co- 
ordinating the continued indocrination of members within the J. V. P. 
The weapons division also was assigned the crucial task of supplying 
arms to the J. V. P., including self-manufactured ordnance if necessary. 
The personnel were also charged with safely accumulating the materiel 
in secure locations, and with training the members in the manufacture 
and use of weaponry such as hand-grenades and Molotov cocktails. 
Thus, the preparation for armed violence was an inherent part of the 
J. V. P. 's organisation. The weapons sections were assigned a crucial 
role which, due to extraneous factors and weaknesses inherent within 
the organisation, was unsatisfactorily fulfilled. 
52 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement to the C. I. D. op. cit., p. 107. 
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5.9 Background of the Leadership of the J. V. P. 
In order to understand the socio-economic background of the 
district and national leadership in the J. V. P. the authour will 
examine the following variables: sex, ethnicity, religion, education, 
area of residence, occupation and political background. 
As previously noted in section 5.7 herein, a small number of 
women were accepted into the J. V. P. membership. None, however, 
appeared among the district or national leadership. Consequently, the 
district and national leadership of the J. V. P. was male-dominated. 
The author has also shown in section 5.7 above that nearly all of the 
. J. V. P. 
's members came from the Sinhalese ethnic majority, and were 
Buddhists. 
Table 5.8 gives an insight into the occupational status of the 
members of the district committees. It shows that a majority of the 
district committee members were either students or unemployed youth. 
Table 5.8 The Status of the Members of the District Committees 
District Student Unemployed E}nployed Total 
Kandy 9 e1 3 16 
Badulla 5319 
Galle 962 17 
Kegalle 14 41 19 
Polonnaruwa - 13 2 15 
Trincomalee 9-2 11 
kurunagala 2 10 - 12 
Anuradhapura 633 12 
Source: Janatha Sangamaya, (People's League) 71 April 
Nagiteema, (71 April Uprising) (Dehiwela: Allen Printing 
Press, 1980), p. 20. 
The high representation of students and unemployed on the district 
committees is further reflected in the occupational status of the 
district secretaries, a majority of whom were also on the central 
committee. Most of the district secretaries were students or 
unemployed. A close examination of Table 5.8 and other statistics 
clarifies the occupational distribution of members by district. Of 
the 23 district secretaries within the J. V. P. fifteen were students, 
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three were unemployed, two were government clerks, two were teachers 
and one was a farmer. In terms of age, 16 secretaries were between 
the ages of 20-24 years and eight were between 25-30 years of age. 53 
S. P. Huntington observes that students are the most coherent and 
effective revolutionaries within the middle class in most modernising 
countries. 54 According to Leiden and Schmitt, students are frequently 
the centre of revolutionary ferment because they are anxious'about 
their own future with its limited opportunities, are moved by a sense 
of responsibility as an educated elite in backward societies, and are 
motivated by nationalism in economically dependent countries. 55 
In terms of socio-economic background, there is no visible 
difference between the J. V. P. 's membership and leadership. In terms of 
ethnicity, all were Sinhalese; and in regard to religion, all were 
Buddhist. Furthermore, twelve of the politbureau members belonged to 
the Karava caste, which was also the caste of the J. V. P. leader, 
Wijeweera. As Janice Jiggins points out, of the 11 alleged leaders 
appearing before the Criminal Justice Commission ( C. J. C. ) fourteen 
belonged to the Karava, eleven were Govigama, four were Vahumpurä, and 
only orte belonged to the Batgama. 56 The educational background of 
twelve of the 14 members of the politbureau was recorded, and is as 
follows: one medical student, one science graduate, two social science 
undergraduates, four advanced level students, three G. C. E. (O. /L. ) 
students, and one who was educated up to secondary scale level. Five 
53 Janatha Sangamaya, (People's League), 71 April Uprising: 
Background and Politics, (Dehiwela: Allen Printing Press, 1980), pp. 
16-17. 
5; S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 290. 
55 Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: 
Revolution in the Modern World, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc, 1968), p. 87. 
56 Janice Jiggins, op. cit., p. 127. 
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were from the same school, 57 and seven had belonged to the C. P. (P) 
prior to joining the J. V. P. Further examination of the politbureau 
members shows that eleven of them were less than 30-years old. In 
terms of occupation, one politbureau member was a teacher, one a 
clerk, one an engineer, one a labourer, one a lino operator, six were 
students, and two were unemployed-58 All of them were based in urban 
areas either by birth or education. Consequently, it may be 
concluded that the J. V. P. leadership was comprised of Sinhalese- 
Buddhist youth who were primarily urban based. According to S. P. 
Huntington, the urban middle class provides revolutionary leadership 
in modernising countries. 59 When considering the social forces 
represented in the J. V. P., however, it is evident that in contrast to 
the rural background of the wider membership, the leadership 
originated from the urban petit bourgeois and not the urban middle 
class-60 
5.10 Sources of Funds of the J. V. P. 
An analysis of the financial support extended to a clandestine 
organisation such as the J. V. P. is vital to understanding its 
operational aspects, and determining whether such an organisation can 
achieve its goals. At the outset it should to be noted that no 
definite avenues of financial assistance to the J. V. P. have been 
established. Therefore, it remains a matter of conjecture as to how 
57 G. B. Keerawella, "The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the 1971 
Uprising", Social Science Review, (1980), p. 52. 
58 Ibid., p. 127. 
59 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 288-290. 
60 The gap between middle class and petit bourgeois is obvious in 
a country like Sri Lanka. Middle class is a social class between 
capitalist and working class. Petitbourgeois is the class between 
middle class and working class. Generally lower middle class is 
assumed to be a petit bourgeois. 
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the J. V. P. financed its activities. There is no evidence of financial 
assistance from any foreign governments or formal organisations. 
Closer investigation reveals that funds were raised through several 
legitimate and illegitimate means within Sri Lanka. One source was 
donations collected from members and sympathisers. In a press 
conference given on the 20th of September 1970, Wijeweera explained 
that every employed member of the J. V. P. contributed from three to 30 
per cent of his earnings depending on his income level. 61 In 
addition, university students who were either members or sympathisers, 
were also expected to make contributions from their scholarship or 
bursary funds. 62 The few female members also contributed a portion of 
their income, and donated their jewellery to the organisation. Funds 
were also raised at political meetings and public gatherings conducted 
by the J. V. P. 
Apart from these fairly legitimate sources, a considerable amount 
was raised from robberies and thefts. The J. V. P. was unconcerned 
about the legality of the means of fund raising, and thus sanctioned 
any method of acquiring funds for its activities. A. C. Alles 
compiles the following account of the number of thefts and robberies 
committed by members of the J. V. P: in November 1970, a rural bank 
robbery in Okkampitiya netted the stun of Rs. 65,000; in November 1970, 
a mail bag robbery at the Badulla Station yielded an undisclosed 
amount; in February 1971, a bank clerk employed at a Bank of Ceylon 
misappropriated a sum of Rs. 57,000.63 Victor Ivan, a prominent 
activist in the J. V. P., provides the following list of robberies 
committed by the J. V. P. to raise funds. 
61 A. J. Wilson, "Ceylon: The People's Liberation Front and the 
Revolution that Failed", Pacific Community, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1972), p. 
371. 
62 A. C. Allas, op. cit., p. 40. 
63 Ibid., p. 41. 
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Table 5.9 Number of Robberies Committed by the J. V. P. 
Year Place Amount (RS) 
1970, April Urubokka sub-post office 6,000 
1970, September Rural Bank 65,000 
1970, November Post-Mail Train 10,000 
1971, January Peoples Bank 30,000 
1971, February 11 9. 2,000 
1971, February Bank of Ceylon 57,000 
1971, March C. T. B. Depot. 8,000 
Source: Victor Ivan, 71 April Keralla, (71 April Insurrection, ) 
(Colombo: Lake House Investments, 1978), pp. 180-181. 
The total commitment of its members thus resulted in several 
major sources of funds for the J. V. P. through legitimate and more 
often illegitimate means. 
Finally, the author wishes to identify and analyse the 
international links of the J. V. P. 
5.11 International Links 
The international links maintained by the J. V. P were vague and 
thus are an issue which has raised controversy and debate amongst 
scholars. The J. V. P leadership convinced their followers that 
supplies of arms and moral support would be forthcoming from 
governments or insurgent groups in foreign countries. There is 
evidence that the J. V. P. made serious attempts to secure arms and 
support from overseas during the crucial period 1970-71. The J. V. P., 
by virtue of its ideology, was not an ally of the C. P. Chinese Wing, 
or the C. P. Moscow Wing and therefore, could not expect aid from those 
powers. Instead, the J. V. P. tried to establish contact with the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (P. L. O. ), the Naxalite Movement in 
India, the Communist Party of Kerala in south India, and Vice- 
President Karume of Tanganika. These attempts at establishing 
international contacts proved futile with the exception of the 
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sympathetic hearing extended by South Yemen, which promised to deliver 
arms indirectly through another source of supply. 64 
Paradoxically, the U. F. Government in their propaganda denounced 
the J. V. P. as C. I. A. agents while the C. P. (P. ) accused them of being 
agents of the K. G. B. Investigations before and after the 1971 
Insurrection, however, failed to produce any supporting evidence for 
either claim. The involvement of North Korea and the People's 
Republic of China have been subjects of considerable speculation both 
within and outside Sri Lanka. During the 1971 Insurrection, the Sri 
L ankam Government ordered the North Korean Government to withdraw its 
diplomatic representatives and temporarily terminated foreign 
relations with the said state. Despite the measures taken by the Sri 
Lanka Government, there is no valid evidence that the J. V. P. 
maintained contacts with the North Koreans. The official explanation 
given by the Prime Minister was that the North Koreans had indulged in 
overenthusiastic and indiscreet propaganda which had not been curbed, 
despite being cautioned by the Sri Lank-an Government. 65 The 
propaganda in question were the full-paged advertisements in Sri 
Lank-an newspapers featuring the revolutionary thoughts of Kim I1 Sung 
and the distribution of literature on guerrilla warfare. As Anthony 
Burton points out, however, the exact nature and extent of the North 
Korean involvement could have exceeded the mere boundaries of 
propaganda. 66 The J. V. P. had attempted to establish links with the 
People's Republic of China through the P. R. C. 's embassy in Sri Lanka, 
but these attempts also proved-futile. 67 Other than the thwarted 
64 James Manor, and Segal Jeralad, "Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean 
Strategy", Asian Survey, Vol. 25, (1985), p. 1169. 
65 Ibid., p. 1169. 
66 Anthony Burton, Revolutionary Violence: The Theories, (London: 
Leo Cooper, 1977), p. 96. 
67 A. C. Allas, op. cit., pp. 76-83. 
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efforts at establishing links with the North Koreans and the P. R. C., 
there is no evidence of the J. V. P. 's having had links with any other 
foreign governments. The evidence of the J. V. P. 's negligible contacts 
with foreign governments or organisations led the Sri Lankan Prime 
Minister to conclude that there had been no outside support or 
interference. 68 The crude weapons and equipment utilised in the 1971 
Insurrection and the poor military training of its members were 
further evidence of the absence of foreign assistance to the J. V. P. In 
summary, it could be said that the J. V. P. was an entirely home-grown 
guerrilla organisation. 
5.12 The Tamil Guerrilla Movements 
While the J. V. P. was gaining ground as a clandestine movement 
among the Sinhala-Buddhist rural youth, another major strand of 
political activity began to emerge among their Tamil counterparts. 
Precisely when the Tamil underground movement came into existence, 
however, remains a subject of debate. The Tamil guerrilla 
organisations were collectively identified as the "Tamil Tigers" in 
formal terms, but the Tamil community referred to them as the 'boys'. 
From the outset this political strain was never a monolith, but 
rather was a proliferation of over 30 uncoordinated- groups. 69 
Although some of these groups were rather insignificant in the sense 
that they had few members, all were actively involved in political 
violence at one time or another. 
By the early 1980s, five of these groups emerged as the dominant 
underground movements, as follows: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
6S Text of Broadcast to the Nation by the Hon. Prime Minister 
Sirimao Bandaranaike, on April 24,1971, (Department of Information 
Press Release, 24 April, 1971), cited in Kearney and Jiggins, op. 
cit., p. 42. 
69 See, Appendix. 1. 
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Eelam (L. T. T. E. ), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (T. E. L. O. ), 
the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (P. L. O. T. ), the 
Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (E. R. O. S. ), and the Eelam 
People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (E. P. R. L. F. ). Of the five 
groups, the L. T. T. E. claims to have been the pioneer group. Whatever 
its past, the L. T. T. E. developed into the most organised, cohesive, 
and powerful guerrilla organisation, with an expansive membership rund 
particularly ruthles tactics. Unlike the Sinhalese youth-dominated 
underground organisations the Tamil guerrilla organisations, 
especially the L. T. T. E., from their inception have been more action- 
oriented than theory-oriented. Therefore, the author finds it 
necessary to focus in particular on the L. T. T. E. There is little or 
no detailed information available regarding the L. T. T. E. as there was 
concerning the J. V. P. because its guerrilla activities are still on- 
going. Perhaps the most important factor contributing to the 
information gap is that while members of the J. V. P. were captured or 
surrendered, the L. T. T. E. guerrillas have followed a code of suicide 
to avoid capture. Furthermore, several of the founders of the Tamil 
groups and their associates have been killed in action. Hence the 
data on the Tamil guerrilla organisations is often sparse and vague. 
In this study the author wishes to focus attention on the following 
aspects: the origin and growth of the Tamil guerrilla groups, 
background of the members, organisational structure, background of 
leaders, source of funds, and international links. 
5.13 The Origin and Growth of the Tamil Guerrilla Movements 
The orgin of the Tamil guerrilla groups is a complex web of mostly 
circumstantial evidence. Unlike the J. V. P. it is not possible to 
clearly trace the origins of the Tamil groups nor can they be linked 
with the left-wing movement in Sri Lanka. Instead they have their 
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roots either in the Federal Party or the T. U. L. F. student or youth 
organisations. These major groups, therefore, either belonged to the 
Tamil Ilanar Iyakkam (Tamil Youth Movement), which is the youth wing 
of the F. P., or to the Tamil Manavar Peravai (Tamil Student Union), 
which is the student wing of the F. P. and the T. U. L. F. These 
organisations could thus be characterised as the nurseries within 
which the entire strand of Tamil guerrilla activity was nurtured and 
fostered. 
As mentioned above, the L. T. T. E. is the foremost Tamil group that 
has indulged in political violence. Its origins can be traced to the 
Tamil Student Movement (T. M. P. ). which gained publicity, or perhaps 
more appropriately notoriety, during the early 1970s by burning buses 
and national flags, destroying public property, organising protest 
marches, and hoisting black flags as signs of protest. As a result 
by 1974,41 Tamil youth had been detained under the emergency 
regulations, but they were released to appease the T. U. L. F. before the 
by-election at Eankesanturai. 70 
In 1975, a faction calling itself the Talnil New Tigers (T. N. T. ) or 
the Liberation New Tigers broke away from the T. M. P. The T. N. T. was 
the precursor of the Tamil guerrilla movement; most of the other Tamil 
guerrilla organisations emerged later. 71 Three pioneer members of 
this Tamil youth group, Vallupillai Prabakaran, Pathmanathan, and 
Chetti Thanabalasingham, gained stature throughout the various groups 
in the Tamil guerrilla movement. Prabakharan was the chief architect 
of the future L. T. T. E. Just as Wijeweera pioneered and led the 
J. V. P., Prabakharan proved to be the driving force of the L. T. T. E. 
70 T. D. S. A. Dissanayake, The Agony of Sri Lanka, (Colombo: 
Swastika Press, 1983), p. 32. 
71 "Tamil Struggle: The Origin", India Today, (31 March 1984), p. 
91. 
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Prabakharan was born in 1956 to a middle-class family from 
Velvetithurai, which is a fishing village in Northern Jaffna notorious 
for smuggling goods from Southern India. He apparently dropped out of 
school after grade five, and by the age of sixteen was involved in 
guerrilla activities. He began operating undercover when he was 19- 
years old. To his fellow members in the L. T. T. E., he was more fondly 
known as "thambi" which means young brother. His earliest involvement 
with the Tatnil guerrilla groups began when he and other Tamil youth 
formed T. N. T. Soon after the formation of T. N. T., Prabakharan 
assassinated the original leader, Thanabalasingham, and assumed the 
leadership of the group. 72 Prabahkaran also became the de facto 
leader of the Tamil guerrillas. As Rohan Gunarathna points out., the 
T. V. T. was the first Tamil separatist group to have indulged in fierce 
violence. 
From 1972 to 1975, the T. N. T. was a relatively anonymous group. 
Nevertheless, it came to the centre of attention when Prabahl: aran 
masterminded and participated in the assassination in 1975 of Alfred 
Dureppa, the Mayor of Jaffna, the capital of the Northern Province. 
This episode resulted in notoriety for the Tiger movement in general 
and for Prabahkaran in particular. 7' The T. N. T. renamed itself the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L. T. T. E. ) in 1976. It gained 
popularity in the Tamil community as the L. T. T. E. when, in 1979, it 
began to claim responsibility for a number of assassinations. 75 
Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (P. T. A. ) imposed in 1979, the 
72 Robert C. Oberst, "Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers", Conflict, Vol. 8, 
Nos. 2-3, (1988), p. 191. 
73 Rohan Gunarathna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka, (Kandy: Institute 
of Fundamental Studies, 1987), p. 14. 
74 T. D. S. A. Disanayake, op. cit., p. 33. 
75 S. Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka: The National Question and the Tamil 
Liberation Struggle, (London: Zed Books Ltd. 1983), p. 200. 
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L. T. T. E. and other Tamil underground movements were proscribed, thus 
compelling them to function as fully clandestine organisations. After 
the implementation of the Act, the L. T. T. E. began actively operating 
as a guerrilla movement in the Tamil community. By 1980, the L. T. T. E. 
was cooperating with T. E. L. O., another major guerrilla group. This 
coalition, however, did not last long due to the capture in 1982 of 
the prominent leaders of T. E. L. O. As S. Ponnambalam observes, from 
July 1982, the Liberation Tigers came into their own in the Tamil 
areas of Northern Sri Lanka, and attended the first "World Eelam Tamil 
Conference" which was held in New York in 1982. i6 The L. T. T. E. did 
not make significant inroads in terms of recruitment until mid 1983, 
perhaps because the escalation of its activities was only gradual. 
The ethnic violence in 1983, however, was a landmark in the growth and 
expansion of the entire Tamil guerilla movement.. 
Apart from the ethnic violence of 1983, there are two other 
factors which contributed to the growth of the L. T. T. E. and similar 
organisations. First, the military intervention in Northern and 
Eastern Sri Lanka heightened ethnic tension and created an ambience 
for the growth of the guerrilla movement, which was based on 
ethnicity of the Tamil community. The L. T. T. E. decried this situation 
as the occupation of the motherland by a foreign army. Secondly, the 
Sixth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution placed M. P. 's of the 
moderate T. U. L. F. in a vulnerable position, and so they sought to 
exclude themselves from Parliament. 77 Once the legitimate political 
forces were excluded from the mainstream of political activity, the 
environment was conducive for the L. T. T. E. and similar organisations 
to flourish. 
76 Ibid., p. 219. 
77 The Sixth Amendment requires members of the National State 
Assembly and Government to swear allegiance to a Unitary State. 
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It was first necessary, however, for the L. T. T. E. to gain 
dominance over the other guerrilla groups which had previously 
proliferated. Towards this end the L. T. T. E. began to eliminate any 
groups which posed a threat to their supremacy. Their first victims 
were the moderates within the T. U. L. F. in 1985. Soon thereafter, they 
entered into an alliance with the T. E. L. O., the E. P. R. L. F. and 
E. R. O. S., all of which came to be known as the Eelam National 
Liberation Front (E. N. L. F. ). 78 After the formation of the alliance 
the L. T. T. E. pursued a strategy of gaining international recognition 
by applying some tactics pioneered by the P. L. O. The E. N. L. F. soon 
fell apart, however, as had previous alliances. The L. T. T. E. again 
began to systematically liquidate the other guerrilla groups with the 
objective of emerging as the foremost guerrilla group in the Tamil 
community. The T. E. L. O. was singled out as the first victim in this 
process of elimination. Between April and May 1986, nearly 150 
members of T. E. L. O. including its leader, Sri Sabarathnam, were killed 
by the L. T. T. E. The operations of P. L. O. T. were banned by the 
L. T. T. E. in Jaffna, and the E. P. R. L. F. was disbanded and 
systematically destroyed. Once these major groups had been subject to 
the 'process of elimination', the L. T. T. E. was left with a clear 
field. From then on, the L. T. T. E. was recognised as the de facto 
representative of the Tamil guerrillas. Consequently, from 1985 
onward, the L. T. T. E. took virtual control of the Jaffna peninsula. 
The author at this point finds it necessary to further describe 
some of these major groups. The T. E. L. O. was founded in 1975 by 
Thangadorai and Kuttimani, and from its formation competed with the 
L. T. T. E. for seniority. Thus the T. E. L. O. was one of the pioneer 
guerrilla groups in the Tamil community. Until 1983, it was second to 
i8 Degenhardt W. Henry, (ed), Revolutionary and Dissident 
Movements: An International (meide, (London: Longman, 1988), p. 349. 
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the L. T. T. E. in terms of membership and military strength. The death 
of its founders and leadership in the prison massacre of 1983 was the 
beginning of its deterioration. 79 The intense struggle with the 
L. T. T. E. for supremacy in 1986 further debilitated the group. The 
breakaway of the Tamil Liberation Army (T. E. L. A. ) and the Tamil Eelam 
Army (T. E. A. ) was almost the final blow to its survival. 
The P. L. O. T. was also a breakaway group from the L. T. T. E. 8° It 
was formed in 1980 by Uma Maheswaren, the former chairman of the 
central committee of L. T. T. E., but was not proclaimed as a group until 
1981. With the deterioration of T. E. L. O., the P. L. O. T. assumed a 
position second only to the L. T. T. E. in terms of strength and power. 
As Dissanayake observes, however, the P. L. O. T. had the highest 
casualties of all the guerrilla groups within the Tamil community., S1 
Internal rivalries led to a split in 1985 and this greatly reduced the 
political activities of the group. Thereafter, the P. L. O. T. continued 
to operate in alliance with several smaller guerrilla groups such as 
the T. E. L. A., the Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (T. E. L. F. ), the Tamil 
Eelam Republican Army (T. E. R. A. ), and the National Liberation Front of 
Tamil Eelam (N. L. F. T. ). 
: Another major component of the Tamil guerrilla movement is 
E. R. O. S. which originated in 1975 in London and, therefore, is the 
only externally-based Tamil guerrilla group. E. R. O. S was formed by 
the Eelam Research Organisation, which comprises a powerful secretive 
student body. Furthermore, E. R. O. S. is the only group which has been 
closely associated with the L. T. T. E. E. R. O. S. also has the 
79 During the ethnic violence of July 1983,52 detainees belonging 
to the Tamil guerrilla groups were killed by other prisoners in the 
Velikada prison in Colombo. Most of the dead belonged to the T. E. L. O. 
See, Sinha Ratnatunge, Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lanka 
Experience, (Melbourne: Global Press Ltd., 1988), pp. 49 and 54. 
SO The underlying motivations behind this faction are not known. 
Si T. D. S. A. Disanayake, op. cit., p. 40. 
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distinction of masterminding violence outside the Northern and Eastern 
provinces of Sri Lanka. As a result, E. R. O. S. has sometimes been 
tagged as 'the mouthpiece of the L. T. T. E. ' in the South. The 
publication Frontline, on the other hand, has identified E. R. O. S. as 
the dark horse of the Tamil militant groups. S2 
Another significant Tamil guerrilla organisation is the E. P. R. L. F. 
which broke away from E. R. O. S. and is a relatively new group compared 
to the others. The E. P. R. L. F. became widely known when in 1984 its 
members kidnapped an Amercan couple working in Jaffna. -S3 This group 
is distinctive ideologically in the sense that it is more militant 
and has an ethnically-mixed membership. Whereas the other groups 
emphasise terrorist and guerrilla tactics, the E. P. R. L. F. emphasises 
the ideological orientation of the movement. 
Thus, the Tamil underground movement is rife with disputes about 
authority, responsibility and ideology. In short, internal rivalries 
for power have. flourished. Despite the differences, however, all the 
groups share common objectives which shall be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. Their common beliefs may be summarised at this point as 
follows: all the groups believe strongly that the Sri Lank-an Tamils 
have been penalised; that a separate state is their solution to the 
Tamils' problems; and that violence is the primary means of achieving 
that end. It is widely accepted that the shared objectives of this 
movement supersede the rivalries and factionalism within. 
5.14 Recruitment and Training of the Tamil Guerrillas 
The Tamil guerrilla groups were operating as underground 
movements. Therefore, recruitment was conducted in secret and was 
restricted. This earnest secrecy was maintained mainly to prevent the 
42 Frontline, (28 June-11 July 1988), pp. 18-19. 
83 See, Chapter 7. 
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infiltration of police informers. In this section the author will 
address the L. T. T. E. 's methods of recruitment, and the training and 
duties of its membership. 
The process of gaining membership was long and drawn out, and the 
criteria were selective. A person seeking membership in any of these 
groups had to prove himself bona fide. In this context the L. T. T. E. 
checked the background of its potential members for criminal records 
or anti-social activities. A clear record and high moral standards 
were expected of its members. '84 It was also mandatory for a 
prospective member to undertake a task as'a test of his good faith. 
Once these requirements had been satisfactorily accomplished, a member 
was eligible for training in -guerrilla warfare and handling weapons. 85 
Thus recruitment to the Tamil guerrilla movement was said to be 
voluntary, and it was open to both sexes and persons of all ages. 
Despite the emphasis on voluntary mobilisation, there is evidence that 
forced recruitment was also implemented. 96 There has been speculation 
that the L. T. T. E. made demands on the Tamil people to enlist at least 
one member of each family into the guerrilla movement. '? 
The training of L. T. T. E. members, which was much more 
sophisticated than that of the J. V. P., was conducted in camps where 
members were exposed to instruction in the use of weapons and to 
physical endeavours. The extent and type of teaching, however, varied 
from group to group. The training programmes of the L. T. T. E. 
emphasized the use of weaponry such as the AK-47, M-63, M-16, SLR 
. 303 and other riflery, revolvers and grenades. In addition to the 
54 Frontline, (10-23 January 1987), p. 21. 
85 Frontline, (15-28 November 1986), p. 119. 
86 Far Eastern Economic Review, (20 June 1985), p. 8, and Sinha 
Ratnatunge, op. cit., p. 262. 
S7 The Economist, (3-9 November 1990), p. 78. 
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training in the handling of firearms, members were also instructed in 
the basic practices of guerrilla warfare. This aspect was comprised 
of training in military tactics and operations such as field craft, 
ambush, frontal attacks, raids, handling of explosives, radio 
communications and basic first aid. The period of instruction varied 
from six months to one year. Select members were also given 
specialised training in communications, intelligence, advanced first 
aid and politics. 
once the military training was completed, the full-fledged members 
were assigned duties depending, on his/her ability, choice and 
preference e. g., in research, political literature, social work, 
political propaganda or social welfare. Irrespective of their choices 
and aptitudes, all members were required upon completion of training 
to participate in military action when called for by the regional 
commander. The L. T. T. E. deemed it. imperative that its members 
participate in armed violence. During the days of relative calm the 
cadres participated in shramadana (volunteer) activities like the 
laying of roads, or engaged themselves in cultivation or political 
propaganda. They also worked in the L. T. T. E. 's food production units 
such as bakeries or helped run the numerous shops in the villages. 95 
In a broad sense, the members of any Tamil guerrilla movement 
including the L. T. T. E. could be divided into three main categories as 
follows: the fighting cadres, the propaganda units and the reservoir 
of sympathisers. The first two categories are the active members of 
the movement who were directly involved in the violence and who used 
pseudonyms. 
According to the code of discipline imposed in most if not all 
guerilla groups, it was compulsory for members to adhere to the code 
S8 "Spotlight on the L. T. T. E. ", Frontline, (10-13 January 1987), 
p. 21. 
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of conduct and ethical principles which bound them to the 
organisation. In this respect the L. T. T. E. also imposed an iron 
discipline on its members and leaders. : accordingly, cigarettes, 
liquor, drugs and casual relationships with the opposite sex were 
diligently prohibited. In addition to these demands, it was mandatory 
that members take an oath swearing total allegiance to the leadership, 
even staking their very lives for the cause of the `Liberation of 
Tamils'. The L. T. T. E. imposed additional rules on those who were in 
the combat cadre. 
Members of the L. T. T. E. were compelled to carry their identity 
cards with them at all times and to wear cyanide capsules around their 
necks in the form of a pendant. The features of a suicide squad were 
most evident in their preference to death rather than capture. 39 The 
discipline imposed on its members by the L. T. T. E. was so rigid that 
the group did not accept any dissidents or breakaway factions from 
other guerrilla groups. To complement this policy, similar rules 
applied to those leaving the L. T. T. E. The members of the L. T. T. E. 
could leave the group only with prior consent. Members who left the 
L. T. T. E. were not permitted to join another group or organise a new 
group. 90 
Characteristically as in most underground movements, it is not 
possible to ascertain accurate figures on the number of members: the 
Tamil guerrilla groups are no exception. Furthermore, there are 
several factors which obfuscate the true strength of these groups. 
First, for security and propaganda reasons none of the groups have 
ever divulged their true strength. Second, due to the clandestine 
nature of these groups most members operated undercover and in secret, 
99 As of 1987, about 300 L. T. T. E. guerrillas had committed suicide 
by swallowing cyanide capsules. Sri Lanka News, (11 March 1987), p. 
1. 
90 Frontline, (15-28 November 1986), p. 119. 
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thereby exposing their very existence to only a few individuals. 
Finally, due to the armed attacks and counter-attacks, the number of 
recorded casualties varies as does the number of deserters. 
Furthermore, the membership of these groups fluctuated, thereby 
eluding specific statistics. On the whole, it is a complex area 
within which data is hardly ascertainable. 
As Bruce Matthews aptly points out, the membership figures for 
these organisations vary, and are dynamic in the sense that membership 
oscillated with the level of activity and the amount of governmental 
counter-insurgency. 91 It. is widely known, however, that at the 
inception these groups were comprised of very few members. Prior to 
1975, the number of hard core activists in all Tamil guerrilla 
organisations was confined to a mere 50 members. According to Marshal 
R. Singer, during the interim period from 1975 to 1983, before the 
ethnic violence, the conditions were not conducive for mobilisation. 
Consequently, as of 1983 the membership had expanded to only 200 hard 
core members. 92 In 1986, however, The Economist estimated the total 
membership within the entire Tamil guerrilla movement at 10,000.93 
Numerically, the L. T. T. E. has always been the largest group within 
the Tamil guerrilla movement. In 1985, it was estimated that the 
L. T. T. E. had around 2,500 trained guerrillas and 5,000 untrained 
recruits. 94 One of the local guerrilla commanders claimed in 1986 
that there were about 1,500 guerrillas from the L. T. T. E. operating 
91 Bruce Matthews, "Radical Conflict and Rationalization of 
Violence in Sri Lanka", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1, (1981), p. 
34. 
92 Marshal H. Singer, "Report on the Pressures and Opportunities 
for a Peaceful Solution to the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka", Journal 
of Developing Societies, Vol. 11, (1986), p. 14. 
93 The Economist, (August 1986), p. 16. 
94 The Economist, (August 1985), p. 43. 
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within the Jaffna peninsula. 95 Kittu, the L. T. T. E. military commander 
of Jaffna, claimed in 1987 that his group had mobilised more than 
10,000 regulars throughout Sri Lanka. 96 It is noteworthy that a 
majority of the L. T. T. E. members were from the Northern Province 
rather than the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Jaffna, the capital of 
the Northern Province, was the nucleus of the L. T. T. E. The T. E. L. O. 
had about 800 trained members and another 3,000 poorly trained members 
before its confrontation with the L. T. T. E. in 1986. According to the 
Economist the E. P. R. L. F. had, as of mid 1988, around 1,500 
guerrillas. 97 The E. R. O. S. now has approximately 500 trained members. 
The membership of the P. L. O. T. has not been divulged though it is 
known. As mentioned earlier, that the P. L. O. T. had the highest 
casualties amongst the Tamil guerrilla groups. 
5.15 Socio-Economic Background of the Tamil Guerrillas 
As mentioned previously, literature pertaining to the Tamil 
guerrilla movement is limited, and the author adds the observation 
that the literature regarding the socio-economic background of the 
membership is also minimal. Ethnically, nearly all members of the 
surviving Tamil guerrilla groups are Sri Lank-an Tamils. There is no 
evidence of Sinhalese participation in the L. T. T. E. The ideology of 
the L. T. T. E. is such that it never did, and still does not permit 
Sinhalese participation. 98 There are indications, however, that a 
minor percentage of Muslims and Indian Tatnils have participated in 
L. T. T. E. activities. The P. L. O. T. too is said to have a few Muslims 
among its membership, and a low percentage of Indian Tamils have been 
95 The Economist, (9 August 1986), p. 40. 
96 Asia Week, (8 February 1987), p. 25. 
97 The Economist, (3 August 1988), pp. 43-44. 
93 See, Chapter 6. 
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involved with the E. P. R. L. F. and E. R. O. S. On the other hand, the 
E. P. R. L. F. and P. L. O. T. are believed to have some connections with 
certain Sinhala radical groups. The E. P. R. L. F. has associated itself 
with the Vikalpa Kandayama (Alternative Group) while P. L. O. T. has 
become linked with the J. V. P. Nava Pravanathawaya (New Tendency). 99 
It is obvious that both groups are open to Sinhala involvement in the 
Tamil guerrillas movement. Despite the contacts maintained with the 
Indian Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese, however, none have ever been 
represented in the regional or local leadership of Tamil guerrilla 
groups. Thus, one can conclude that the involvement of the other 
communities has been rather tepid and that the Tamil guerrilla 
movement is in fact dominated by the Sri Lankan Tamils. 
In Sri Lanka, ethnicity reveals the religion of the various 
communities. Consequently, Hinduism is the main religion followed by 
the Sri Lankan Tamils, and thus a majority of the members of the T-unil 
guerrilla groups are Hindus. There is evidence of the involvement of 
Taunil Christians in the movement though they are not represented in 
significant numbers. 
The age range of the Tamil guerrillas is similar to that of the 
J. V. P. members. A majority are said to be between 18 and 25 years of 
age with only a few in their thirties. 100 Thus, most of the current 
Tamil cadres are young teenage men and women. The youthfulness of 
these members is further indicated by the word the Tamil people still 
use to identify the guerrillas: `thambi' (boy). As the overall 
composition of this movement has always been youth based, these 
groups could be identified as youth guerrilla organisations. 
99 Robert C. Oberst, op. cit., p. 194. 
100 R. N. Kearney "Youth Protest In Sri Lanka", Sociological Focus, 
Vol. 13, (1980), p. 306. 
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The educational attainment of the Tamil guerrillas reflects 
another similarity with the J. V. P. membership. A majority of the 
guerrilla fighters have passed their G. C. E. (O/L) or G. C. E. (A/L) 
examinations, while a few have obtained a university education. R. N. 
Kearney points out that most of them have been educated in their 
indigenous language `Tamil' and, therefore, are unfamiliar with the 
English language. 101 The J. V. P. 's members have received a similar 
education which has ensured fluency in the mother tongue and a very 
limited knowledge of the English language. 
By comparison, the urban/rural-based nature of the J. V. P. and the 
Tamil guerrillas is quite different. An overwhelming proportion of 
the J. V. P. membership are from the rural sector while the Tamil 
guerrillas seem to hail from both the urban and rural sectors. The 
ethnic orientation of the Tamil guerrilla movement obfuscates the 
class, caste and economic Use of its members. Since 1983; it has 
been increasingly evident that the guerrilla groups represent almost 
all strata of Tamil society. A sizeable proportion appear to come 
from an affluent middle-class background and a fairly large number are 
from families of higher socio-economic status. The majority of the 
rank and file, however, belong to the lower middle class or its 
economic equivalent. 
The caste structure, which is an inherent part of Tamil society, 
is of significance when considering the background and social 
composition of the Tamil guerrilla groups. Few scholars have focused 
on caste as it is manifest in these groups perhaps because little 
information is available. It is known, that the caste base varies 
from group to group. The L. T. T. E. and T. E. L. O. have drawn their 
membership mostly from Velvetithurai, Vadimaratchi and Point Pedro, 
which are major fishing villages in the Northern Province of Sri 
101 Ibid., p. 306. 
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Lanka. Hence, the leadership and a majority of the members in these 
two groups are from the Karaiyars or fishermen's caste. A significant 
number of Mukkuvar (fisherman) and Koviyar (domestic servant) castes 
are also represented in the L. T. T. E. The T. E. L. O. is said to contain 
a large number of members from the the Karaiyars, Mukkuvars and 
Koviyars castes. Most members of P. L. O. T. are drawn from Vavunia, an 
area devoted primarily to agriculture, and as a result, a majority of 
its leaders and members are from the Vellala (cultivators) caste, 
which is one of the highest castes in the Tamil caste structure. 102 
The majority of members of the E. P. R. L. F. were apparently from the 
VeLlala and Mukkuvar castes. It is not possible at this point, 
however, to establish the exact figures of caste origin in the Tamil 
guerrilla movement as no definite pattern has yet emerged. 
5.16 Organisational Structure of the Tamil Guerrilla Groups 
The internal structure of Tamil guerrilla groups give insight into 
the operational nature of these groups. As mentioned earlier, these 
groups are primarily, action-oriented rather than theory-oriented. 
Therefore, the basic structure of a majority of these groups is that 
of a guerrilla force rather than a political party. The 
organisational patterns of these groups are not uniform. Of all the 
groups the L. T. T. E. is the most tightly structured and autocratically- 
led group. At the same time, the internal structure of the L. T. T. E. 
has remained intact without any visible fissures. 103 
As mentioned above, the L. T. T. E. is organised as a liberation 
army. Although the organisation is divided into political and 
102 Bryan Pfaffenberger, "Fourth World Colonialism: Indigenous 43 
Minorities and Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka", Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars, Vol. 16, (1984), p. 21 
103 "Spotlight on the L. T. T. E. ", Frontline, (10-13 January 1987), 
p. 21. 
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military sections, the two wings do not operate separately. The 
political wing is subordinate to the military wing. The L. T. T. E. 's 
organisational structure does not permit a separate political party 
structure independent of the military wing because of its Guevarist 
orientation rather than a Leninist or Maoist approach. The P. L. O. T. 
and T. E. L. O. are similar organisationally to the L. T. T. E. The 
E. P. R. L. F. and the E. R. O. S., however, have adopted a contrary approach 
by establishing separate political and military wings, with the 
military wing subordinate to the political wing. 104 
The military wing of the L. T. T. E. is mainly confined to the 
Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The L. T. T. E. has 
subdivided the two provinces into five military districts: . Jaffna, 
Mannar, Vanni (including Vavunia) and Mulathivu, Trincomallee and 
Batticaloa. Each region is under the charge of a regional commander 
who is appointed by the L. T. T. E. 's supreme leader on the basis of 
seniority and merit. There is evidence that these commanders are 
usually the most trusted and closest associates of the supreme leader. 
Feliks Gross aptly observes that relations between the leaders in 
underground organisations are based to a high degree on personal 
confidence and often on personal friendship. '05 In a broad sense 
these regional commanders enjoy a degree of autonomy within the group, 
and are in a position to make local decisions which effect their 
regional commands. This is particularly the case with decisions 
pertaining to military action such as attacks on Sri Lankan military 
personnel and convoys. Once such operations are completed, the 
regional commanders report the results to a superior officer or 
perhaps to the supreme leader himself. In the case of political 
loo The military wing of the E. P. R. L. F. is called the People's 
Liberation Army (P. L. A. ). 
105 Feliks Gross, op. cit., p. 353. 
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issues concerning the ethnic crisis, the leader-of the L. T. T. E. has to 
be consulted and his approval must be obtained before any decision is 
taken. 106 
Generally the regional council in each of the five districts are 
further subdivided into smaller military and political units which are 
commanded by the local guerrilla leaders. Thus, the council in each 
regional district is equipped with a regional army and political 
structure. 107 The organisational structure of the group is further 
divided downward to the local and cell levels. The local councils of 
the L. T. T. E. are under the regional council, and are headed by the 
local commanders who are appointed by the regional commanders. 
Furthermore, there are twenty local committees under each of the five 
regional councils of the L. T. T. E. 
The L. T. T. E. 's military wing, has military bases and sub-bases 
which have been assigned code names. By 1986, the L. T. T. E. had set 
tip 25 military bases and many more sub-bases within the Northern 
Province. Each of the major military bases were manned by about 60 to 
70 members while 25 to 30 members operated from each of the sub-bases. 
As mentioned earlier, the political wing of the L. T. T. E. is 
dominated by the military wing. The leader of the political wing is 
appointed by the supreme leader of the organisation. The main 
function of this wing is propaganda, and the political adviser is the 
key figure in assuring its successful operation. The political wing 
also controls the front organisations such as student groups and 
foreign lobbies. In late 1986, the L. T. T. E. organised a political 
party named the Tamil Eelam People's Organisation (T. E. P. O. ). The 
main objectives of this party were to inform and educate the masses on 
the political developments occurring in Sri Lanka and worldwide. The 
106 Frontline, (10-13 January 1987), p. 21. 
107 Ibid., p. 21 
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hierarchical structure of the Tamil guerrilla groups is also 
vertically divided into separate units on the basis of the division of 
labour into specialised fields. The L. T. T. E., for example, contains 
the following units: military, science, research, communications, 
medical, social, economic and cultural. 108 
Within the organisational structure of the L. T. T. E. there is a 
central committee and a polfit bureau. The central committee is 
composed of the military commander, regional commanders and senior 
members of the organisation. These sub-bodies, however, exist more in 
theory than in practice. There is no uniformity in the pattern of 
leadership in the Tamil guerrilla groups. Thus, the leadership 
structure varies from group to group. The L. T. T. E. and T. E. L. O., 
though do share the common characteristic of a . heavy dependency on 
personal leadership. Most of the major guerrilla groups have a very 
charismatic leader who provides the driving force behind the 
organisations. The E. P. R. L. F. and the E. R. O. S., however, are said to 
have an elected leader from a central committee. The E. R. O. S., on the 
other hand, is the only Tamil guerrilla group with a collective 
leadership made up of a three-member executive committee. 109 Thus, 
the L. T. T. E. and some of the other key groups are dominated by strong 
personal leadership and are strictly hierarchical in structure 
5.17 Background of the Leaders of the Tamil Guerrilla Groups 
In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the structure 
and operation of the Tamil guerrilla organisations, it is also 
necessary to examine the socio-economic and political background of 
the their leaders. The Tamil guerrilla leaders share a similar socio- 
economic background with the exception of their different caste 
108 Frontline, op. cit., p. 21. 
109 "E. R. O. S. the Dark Horse", Frontline, (11 July 1987), p. 19. 
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or"gins. All of the top leaders are Sri Lank-an T mils and Hindu as 
are all or most of their followers. On the other hand, like the 
J. V. P., the Tamil guerrilla groups are strictly male-dominated. Tamil 
women have been ascribed a secondary role in the political violence 
movements in Sri Lanka and, therefore, none has succeeded in assuming 
the leadership of any of the movements which come within the purview 
of this study. The leaders of the Tamil guerrillas are, on the 
whole, in their late twenties and tend to be fairly well-educated. 
Nearly all the leaders of the major Tamil guerrilla groups come from a 
particular area in Jaffna, namely Velvettiturai, an urbanised area in 
the Northern Province. Their professional background, however, 
varies. l'ma Maheswaran, the leader of P. L. O. T. was a surveyor, but 
Prabahikaran, the leader of the L. T. T. E., did not have any professional 
experience prior to forming the L. T. T. E. The founding leaders of 
T. E. L. O., Thangadorai and Kuttimani, were smugglers. It is 
significant that none of these Tamil guerrilla leaders were exposed to 
the left-wing movement before joining the respective guerrilla 
organisations. 
As mentioned earlier, the caste background of the Tamil guerrilla 
leaders varies. The leaders of the E. P. R. L. F. are from either the 
Vellala or Karaiyar castes. The leaders of E. R. O. S. are from the 
Karaiyar caste. The L. T. T. E., which is the most powerful Tamil 
guerrilla group, is led by V. Prabahkaran who is from the Karaiyar 
caste. The P. L. O. T., the L. T. T. E. 's major rival group, is led by Uma 
Maheswaren who is from the Vellala caste. It is evident, however, 
that there is no significant link between the caste differences and 
the conflicting political ideologies of the groups. 
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5.18 Sources of Funds 
The Tamil guerrilla organisations have diverse and varied sources 
of funding. A consistent source of funds, for example, have been 
the expatriate Tamils based in the United Kingdom, the United States 
of America, the Middle East, West Germany, Australia, Canada and other 
countries. 110 Another source are donations collected from 
sympathisers and supporters in Sri Lanka. The T. E. L. F. has collected 
funds by selling lottery tickets, a unique fund-raising method for a 
guerrilla group. " Illegal sources, however, such as the 
kidnapping of wealthy businessmen and collection of ransom money, have 
provided far more funds. 
There is convincing evidence that, as with many guerrilla groups 
throughout Asia, the Sri Lankan Taunil guerrillas have resorted to 
narcotics trafficking as a means of fundraising. 112 For example, the 
Indian Narcotics Bureau in 1985 detected ten cases of opium and heroin 
smuggled by Tamil guerrillas. 113 The L. T. T. E. and P. L. O. T. are said 
to be the two main groups involved in this trade. The Taunil 
guerrillas have little or no control over or involvement in the 
production and processing of drug-yielding crops as do the Karen 
guerrillas of Burma, or the Afghan guerrillas who fought the Soviet 
Union. Rather the Tamil guerrillas act as couriers, as part of a link 
in the wider narcotics trade of the "Golden Crescent" which extends 
from North West Asia to"Europe. Thus European drug addicts have 
unwittingly become an important source of funds for Sri Lanka's Tamil 
110 "No End in Sight", Far Eastern Economic Review, (20 September 
1984), p. 27. 
111 Rohan Gunarathna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka, op. cit., p. 25. 
112 K. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic 
Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880-1985, (Lanham, NY: University Press of 
America, 1987), p. 352. 
113 The Island, (6 April 1986), p. 9. 
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guerrillas. 111 The Sunday Times further confirms that members of the 
Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla movement are trafficking in drugs in order 
to raise funds. 115 
Several daring but sporadic bank robberies have served the same 
aim by generating substantial sums for guerrilla activities. The 
banks located in the Northern and Eastern provinces where most Tamil 
guerrilla operations occur, have been especially subject to this 
threat. It has become the most lucrative method of finance for the 
Tamil guerrilla groups. The following Table 5.10 illustrates the 
number of robberies known to have been committed by the Tamil 
guerrilla groups between 1976 to 1984. 
Table 5.10 Robberies by Tamil Guerrilla Groups 1976-1084 
Year Group Place 
1976 - People's Bank, Puttur 
1976 - Co-operative society, Pulaly. 
1978 LTTE Post-office, Thinnaveli. 
1978 - People's Bank. 
1978 - People's Bank, Nallur. 
1979 - hilinochchi mail bags. 
1980 - M. P. C. S., Thunakai 
1981 TELO Urembasiddi Pawnshop 
1981 PLOT Neeraveli People's Bank 
1982 - Chavakachcheri Rail Station 
1982 - Kilinochchi People's Bank 
1983 - Jaffna mail bags 
1983 - Mankulam petrol station 
1984 TEA Kattankudy (Batticolo) Bank 
Amount (Rs) 
668,000 
350,000 
10,000 
1,080,000 
1,120,000 
20,000 
20,000 
80,000 
8,000,000 
35,000 
4,400,000 
20,000 
45,000 
50,000,000 
Source: T. D. S. A. Disanayake, Agony of Sri Lanka, (Colombo: 
Swastika Press 1984), pp. 29-73, and Tamil Terrorist, A Record of 
Murder and Robbery, Ministry of State Publication, Colombo, 
Government Press, [no date]. 
In summary, donations from Tamil expatriate supporters and 
sympathisers, but more importantly illegal means such as ransom 
114 John Harris, "Drugs, Guns, and Tamil Terrorism", The Asian 
Wall Street Journal, (9 September 1985), p. 8. 
115 The Sunday Times, (30 August 1987), pp. 1-3. 
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demands, drug, trafficking and robberies, have become the major sources 
of funding, for the Tmil guerrilla groups. 
5.19 International Links 
Any analysis of the Tamil guerrilla movement would not be complete 
without focusing on their international links with forqign state and 
non-state institutions and organisations. At the outset the author 
admits that the true nature and full extent of this network of 
international links remains undiscovered, although some literature 
provides limited insight into its possible scope. There is no doubt 
that foreign support in terms of funding, arms, training bases and 
sanctuary is essential for the successful operation of any guerrilla 
movement. Furthermore, the Tamil guerrilla groups have been seeking 
international assistance not only for funding and materiel, but more 
importantly for acknowledgement equal to that of the P. L. O., Namibia 
and Polisario movements as a prelude to diplomatic recognition should 
the Tamil guerrillas come to political power in Sri Lanka. Hence, 
contrary to the J. V. P. which has been comparatively isolated, the 
Tamil guerrillas have established international ties. Evidence of 
these associations is best traced through the sophisticated weapons 
and equipment and thorough guerrilla training that the Tamil groups 
have received from foreign sources. 
The main international links have been with the expatriate Tamils, 
who have played a vital role in furnishing the Tamil guerrillas with 
financing, and also with propaganda which emphasises racial 
discrimination and the plight of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The 
Tamil expatriates are responsible for the build-up of a global network 
of Eelam bodies particularly in the U. K., the U. S. A., Australia, West 
Germany, and Canada. 116 Thus the major Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla 
116 India Today, (31 March 1984), p. 90. 
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groups have established front organisations in many countries in 
collaboration with their expatriates. According to the publication, 
Frontline, the L. T. T. E. has bases in more than 100 countries. 117 The 
T. E. L. O. also has a powerful branch force in France. The author 
admits that there is no systematic study regarding the role of the 
expatriate Sri Lankan Tamils in the phenomenon of political violence. 
The following passage by A. J. Wilson provides some insight into the 
objectives and strategies of the propaganda campaign masterminded by 
the expatriate Tamils, as follows: 
There are militant Tamil expatriate groups in India, 
West Germany, Britain, Canada, and the United States 
and they have achieved a measure of success. Their 
principal tactics are to expose discrimination by 
successive Sinhalese-dominated governments against 
the Tamils in Sri Lanka, bring to the world's 
attention violation of the Tamil human rights, lobby 
government, and international lending agencies 
against providing economic aid to Sri Lanka, invite 
the attention of foreign investors and tourists to 
the political instability in the island and 
popularise the cause of Eelam. 11S 
The Tamil guerrillas have not confined their international links 
only to Tajuil expatriates. There is overwhelming evidence of their 
contacts with international guerrilla and terrorist organisations. In 
an interview, the leader of the L. T. T. E., V. Prabahkaran, admitted 
that the L. T. T. E. maintained relationships with other liberation 
movements throughout the world. 119 The L. T. T. E. established contact 
with the P. L. O. in order to obtain military training for its 
117 Frontline, (10-20 January 1987), p. 21. 
116 A. J. Wilson, "Sri Lanka and Its Future: Sinhalese Versus 
Tamils", in A. J. Wilson, and D. Dalton, (eds), The States of South 
Asia: Problems of National Integration, (London: C. Hurst and 
Company, 1982), pp. 300-301. 
119 Anita Pratap, Sunday, (11-17 March 1984), pp. 86. 
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members. 120 Roth the L. T. T. E. and the P. L. O. T. have central fighting 
cores that have been trained by the P. L. O. 121 The other international 
guerrilla groups which have been actively linked with the L. T. T. E., 
are the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Z. A. P. U. ), and the African 
National Congress (A. N. C. ). 122 
The P. L. O. T., on the other hand, established ties with the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P. F. L. P. ), a breakaway faction 
of the P. L. O. 123 Rohan Gunarathna observes that the Dera camp in 
Damascus was a popular training base for P. L. O. T. members. 124 Sri 
Lankan intelligence sources have confirmed that several top Tamil 
guerrillas have received training in guerrilla warfare at. P. L. O. camps 
based in Lebanon. 125 Sri Lanka's C. I. D. investigation into the 
Liberation Tiger Movement has revealed that at least 20 Tamil 
guerrillas have received training abroad as have some members of 
international terrorists groups such as the I. R. A. and the Baader- 
Meinhoff group. 126 Thomas darks believes that Libya is also aiding 
the Tamil guerrilla movement. It is not known, however, whether any 
of the Tamil groups have had any contact with the Soviet Union or with 
its current or former proxies. 127 
120 Thomas Marks, "People's War in Sri Lanka: Insurgency and 
Counter-insurgency", Issues and Studies, (1986), p. 92. 
121 India Today, (31 March 1984), p. 90. 
122 Ibid., p. 90. 
123 The Sunday Telegraph, (14 April 1985), 
124 Rohan Gunarathna, op. cit., p. 34. 
125 K. Pathmanaba, the general secretary of the E. P. R. L. F., is 
said to be one of the members who received training in Lebanon. See, 
The Economist, (19 May 1984), p. 59. 
126 ww" Siriweera, "Sinhala-Tamil Relations", Asian Survey, Vol. 
20, No. 9, (1980), p. 907. 
127 Thomas Marks, op. cit., p. 92. 
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The role of the Indian national and state governments, 
particularly that of the Indian state government of Tamil Nadu, within 
the guerrilla movement will not be explored in detail. Despite the 
well- established links between the Sri Lankan guerrillas and the 
various Indian state governments, the complexity and extensiveness of 
those links would not permit an in-depth analysis within the confines 
of this study. The examination of such links are confined here 
primarily to those with other guerrilla organisations. This study 
would not be complete, however, without at least ,a brief overview of 
the links between the Tamil guerrilla movement and the Indian Federal 
and state governments. 
While the Indian Federal Government acts as mediator with the 
Taunil guerrillas on behalf of the Sri Lankan Government, that 
representation is both paradoxical and ambivalent in nature in view of 
the fact that the Indian governments have always been deeply involved 
in assisting the Tamil guerrillas. The mediation offered by the 
Indian Federal Government, therefore, can hardly be viewed as a 
disinterested effort. During the rule of Indira Gandhi (1979-1984), 
the Tamil guerrillas were considerably indulged by the Indian national 
authorities. 128 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi acknowledged in 1983 
that the Research and Analysis Wing (R. A. W. ), India's foreign 
intelligence agency, had established contacts with a number of Tamil 
guerrilla groups. 129 The T. E. L. O. and the P. L. O. T. were closely 
linked with India at the initial stages of that intelligence 
operation. Moreover, The Times reports that in 1982, R. A. W. agents 
recruited T. E. L. O. members and brought them to India for training in 
espionage and sabotage. 13° The T. E. L. O. has achieved noteriety as 
128 Far Eastern Economic Review, "Tamil Separatists Also Fight 
Among Themselves", (12 June 1986), p. 29. 
129 Thomas Marks, op. cit., p. 91. 
130 The Times, (8 October 1987), p. 16. 
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India's `little soldiers' because the T. E. L. O. has been, in major 
part, funded, trained and armed by the R. A. W. Sri Sabarathan, the 
leader of T. E. L. O., clearly revealed the nature of those ties with 
India when he said: We will be soldiers, let India decide our 
politics. '3' 
The complexity of India's involvement is further accentuated by 
the guerrilla training camps in India, whose existence has been 
reported in foreign and local magazines and newspapers. The following 
Table 5.11 depicts the locations of Tamil guerrilla military training 
bases in Vorthern India and the number of guerrillas processed. 
Table 5.11 Military Training of Tamil Guerrilla Groups in Northern 
India 
Group No. Trained Location of the camp 
TELO Not Known The camp near Great Kailas 11, in 
New Delhi 
TELO Not Known Sadtagen development area adjoining 
Cannal Park in New Delhi 
TELO 300 At a location about 2 hours journey 
by bus from New Delhi Railway Station 
TELO 362 A camp in Uttar Pradesh close to the 
Himalayan foothills 
TELO 60 Green Park, New Delhi, close to the 
medical college 
TELO Not Known A camp in Uttar Pradesh close to the 
Himalayan foothills 
PLOT Not Known The army camp close to the 
International Airport, New Delhi 
EROS 56 A camp in Uttar Pradesh close to the 
foothills of Himalaya 
Source: Denzil Peiris, Colombo Rides the Tigers, Overseas 
Information Series, No. 30, Colombo, Department of Government 
Printing, Sri Lanka, (1985), p. 12. 
The Indian Government, however, has diligently denied the 
existence of training camps and related facilities for Tamil 
guerrillas. The Indian Government's continued denials is especially 
ironic in light of Indian journalists' extensive coverage of these 
131 Vityal Etu, (June 1986), p. 3. 
250 
camps and bases. 132 It is claimed that the Indian Government's first 
involvement preceded May 1983 with the training of P. L. O. T. and 
T. E. L. O. insurgents at a camp close to the New Delhi International 
Airport. 133 The Indian Government has also permitted the Tamil 
guerrilla groups to establish bases in southern India, which have 
served as the nucleus of their operations. Thus, the Tamil guerrillas 
have been allowed to amass arsenals of sophisticated arms in India and 
ship them to Sri Lanka, operate training camps, install communication 
facilities, create `Eelam' information centres, and move freely 
between India and Sri Lanka. 134 Moreover, the Indian Government has 
refused to undertake military operations to dislodge the Tamil 
guerrillas from India's Tamil Nadu Province. 
Although the links between the Tamil guerrilla groups and the 
Indian Government. are varied and complicated, the guerrillas' links 
with the Tamil Nadu state government are more readily discernible. 
The long-standing ethnic, cultural and religious ties between the Sri 
Lankan ramils and the Indian Tamils in Tamil Nadu, have reflected a 
strong tradition of open support and sympathy for the Sri Lankan 
guerrilla movement. Consequently, the guerrillas' links with Tamil 
Nadu are sustained by the local sympathisers who are sometimes 
motivated by deeper political ambitions. In view these circumstances 
it is no surprise that most of the major Tamil guerrilla groups are 
based in Southern India. When the Sri Lankan Government declared an 
emergency situation in the Northern Province in August 1979, the Tamil 
guerrilla groups took refuge at their bases in Southern India. 135. 
132 See, India Today, (March 1984), pp. 88-94. 
133 Rohan Gunarathna, op. cit., p. 50. 
134 p. Venkateahwar Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India's 
Role and Perception", Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4, (1988), p. 424. 
135 A. J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 301. 
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Since then, the headquarters of all Tamil guerrilla groups have been 
based in the Tamil Nadu capital of Madras which has been transformed 
into a breeding, ground for and haven of Tamil guerrillas. 
In addition to this sanctuary and continued support provided in 
India before and after the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka in 1983, the 
Tamil guerrillas in Tamil Nadu have been trained by retired Indian 
army officers. 136 Thus Tamil Nadu has been the cite of several 
training facilities for T. E. L. O., P. L. O. T. and T. E. L. A. Table 5.12 
below illustrates the location of the military training camps and the 
identity of each guerrilla group trained in Tamil Nadu. 
Table 5.12 Military Training of Tamil Guerrillas' in Tamil Nadu 
Group No. Trained Location of Camp 
TELO Not. Known Laie house at No. 777, or 977 
TELO Not Known Parangimali and at a place about 40 km. 
from the Madras Airport 
TELO 300 Salem, Kollimalai, Kanjipuram 
TELO Not Known Kollimalai, Kanjipuram 
TELO 360 Kollimalai, Kakavel 
CELO 21 1st visi t Anna Nagar, Parangimalai in 
close proximity to Meenamba. kkam Airport 
700 Salem 
TELO 350 Kanchipuram 
PLOT Not. Known Sengalpattu, Presawakkam 
PLOT Not Known Sengalpattu, Thanathur, Kongurukolam in 
Erode 
TELA 300 Valachchari and Thenikramam 
Source: Denzil Peiris, op. cit. pp. 6-7 
The Tamil guerrilla links with Tamil Nadu, however, are maintained 
not as a collective front but rather on the basis of the personal 
contacts established by each group. The Anna Dravida Munnethra 
Kazagam (A. D. M. K. ), which currently forms the Tamil Nadu state 
government, supports the L. T. T. E., while the opposition party, the 
Dravida >lunnethra Kazagam (D. M. K. ), supports T. E. L. O. In 1987 the 
136 The Economist (1 April 1984), and The Guardian (3 April 1984). 
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Tamil Nadu state government announced that it had granted aid to the 
L. T. T. E. worth U. S. S 2,400,000.137 
The overt support extended to the Tamil guerrillas by both the 
Indian Federal and state governments has led K. M. de Silva to conclude 
that the Sri Lankan Tamil guerrillas operate in Tamil Nadu with an 
amount of freedom and publicity for which the only parallel is the 
P. L. O. and its various factions in the Arab world. 138 
5.20 Summary 
The origin and development of guerrilla movements represent the 
most crucial phases of political violence. The organisational aspects 
of the J. V. P., therefore, are as important to this study of political 
violence as those of the Tamil guerrilla movement. Consequently, from 
the above discussion it is evident that although t. hese two strains of 
political violence movements have displayed some similarities, their 
organisational differences have been far more profound. 
The J. V. P. broke away from the left oriented C. P. (P. ) in 1966. 
Except for a very brief period in 1970-1971, and its legitimate 
political activity in 1977-1983, the J. V. P. has operated as a 
clandestine organisation. The J. V. P. 's members have been under the 
continued close supervision and scrutiny of its leaders and are mainly 
drawn from the Sinhalese-Buddhist, rural, and fairly` well-educated 
young Sri Lankans. The participation of the peasantry and the middle 
class in the J. V. P. were insignificant. Its organisational structure 
is characterised by an informal and personal dimension under a 
pyramidical structure where decisions and authority converge at the 
top and filter down through the cadre to the lower ranks. Like many 
guerrilla organisations in the Third World, the J. V. P. is primarily a 
137 W. Henry, op. cit., p. 350. 
135 K. M. de Silva, op. cit., p. 347. 
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paramilitary organisation, following such guerrilla practices as 
assumed names, a secret language, weapons training and rigid 
discipline. Moreover, it has displayed all the characteristics of an 
indigenous guerrilla organisation where foreign support has been 
almost non-existent. 
Unlike the J. V. P., the Tamil guerrilla groups originated in the 
student movement of the moderate T. U. L. F in the 1970s. They have 
abided by a rigid procedure of recruitment, with the membership having 
been drawn mainly from the Sri Lankan Tamil-Hindu youth, who represent 
both the rural and urban sector, and who like the Sinhala guerrillas, 
are fairly well-educated. A majority of the Tamil groups have been 
organised as armies geared for combat rather than as politically- 
motivated factions. As a result, their membership are well-trained 
and equipped for military operations against the Sri Lankan Government 
and competing guerrilla factions. The response of the Tamil 
community, both within and without Sri Lanka, has been supportive and 
enthusiastic. Nearly all the groups have secured international 
networks of contact and support, including covert assistance from the 
India Federal and state governments, especially that of Tamil Nadu. 
The limited features akin to the J. V. P. are their clandestine nature, 
their youthful membership and their secret procedure of recruitment. 
The covert and tightly structured nature of these guerrilla 
organisations has had an impact on their ideologies, programmes and 
strategies. Their different ideologies have played a key role in 
determining the nature of each group's attitudes and doctrines as well 
as their programmes and strategies regarding the use of political 
violence. Therefore, the author devotes the following Chapter 6 to an 
examination and comparison of these aspects in both the Sinhalese and 
Tamil guerrilla movements. 
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Chapter 6 
IDEOLOGIES, STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMMES 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to explore the ideologies, 
strategies and programmes of the left-wing J. V. P. and the Tamil- 
underground organisations which have indulged in political violence in 
Sri Lanka. For Chalmers Johnson, revolutionary ideology supplies the 
answers to the questions what, how and why. That is to say, it offers 
a critique of the socio-political conditions which- lead guerrilla 
groups to resort to political violence in order to change those 
conditions and implement their vision of an improved society. 1 
According to Rex D. Hopper, the following elements are usually present 
in the ideology of a revolutionary movement: a statement of the 
objectives, purposes, and premises of the movement; a body of 
criticism and condemnation of the existing social order which the 
movement is attacking and seeking to change; a body of defence 
doctrine serving to justify the movement; and a belief system dealing 
with policies, tactics, practical operations and the myths of the 
movement. 2 
1 Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy of People's War, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1973), p. 104. 
2 Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of 
Revolutionary Movements", Social Forces, Vol. 28, No. 3, (1959), p. 
276. 
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None of these aspects have been explicitly memorialised by those 
organisations, nor for that matter have scholars bothered to delve 
deeply into these areas. Yet a comparision of the various ideologies 
offers invaluable insight into the goals and motivational factors 
behind those guerrilla movements, their methods of achieving their 
goals, and their plans of action thereafter. In this context the 
author has found it necessary to examine closely their indoctrination 
classes, training camps, public lectures, and publications such as 
papers, pamphlets and wall posters in order to achieve an 
understanding of their ideologies, strategies and programmes. As in 
the previous chapter, this chapter is also divided into two main 
parts: the first deals with the J. V. P. and some of its contemporary 
organisations; and the second is devoted to a closer examination of 
the L. T. T. E. and some of its related organisations. Guided by the 
above observations, the author focuses on the following aspects of 
guerrilla procedures and operations: political objectives, origin, 
indoctrination classes, social views, and guerrilla strategy, tactics 
and programme. 
6.2 Political Objectives 
According to P. Wilkinson, the long-term objectives of any 
guerrilla movement are naturally determined by its ideological 
alignment. 3 The original political objectives of the J. V. P. were 
based on its perception of Sri Lankan politics and society. The 
J. V. P. characterised Sri Lanka as a typical new colony of Anglo- 
American "imperialism", and also claimed that the country was 
increasingly coming under the influence of "Indian Expansionism". 4 
3 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and Liberal State, (London: 
Sfacmillian, 1986), p. 110. 
4 Bertie Gajameragedera, "Internal War and International 
Intervention: A Study in Theory and Practice", Seminar for Asian 
Studies, University of Peradeniya, No. 20, (1985), p. 14. 
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Consequently, the declared main objective of the J. V. P. was to 
"liberate the oppressed people from Anglo-American new-colonialism and 
Indian Expansionism" and to "usher in a socialist society according to 
the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse Tung. "5 
Thus the J. V. P. and the other left-wing organisations shared a common 
objective of overthrowing the capitalist system in Sri Lanka and 
replacing it with an independent socialist system. The socialist 
nature of this objective through national liberation was explicitly 
stated by the J. V. P. in its newspaper: 
The J. V. F., which was born out of the suffering of 
the masses, is pledged to redeem the mother land and 
her children from the darkness of subjugation and 
march them towards the light of socialism. 6 
Thus, the overthrow of the constitutionally elected government and 
the transition to a socialist system was an attractive option. The 
transformation of the political system was to be achieved by means of 
an armed struggle or revolution. The J. V. P. firmly believed that such 
a change could not be achieved within the confines of Sri Lanka's 
existing constitutional framework., The J. V. P. 's ideology, however, 
had several dimensions which elude a straightforward analysis. The 
political origins of this ideology further explicate its influences 
and orientations. 
6.3 Political Origins 
The ideological orientations of some of the J. V. P. 's contemporary 
underground groups were strongly influenced by the ideological trends 
in the international Marxist movement. The Peradiga Sulanga (The East 
5 Janatha Vimukthi (People's Liberation), The Newspaper of the 
J. V. P., (1 August 1970). Translated from Sinhalese. 
6 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Wind), the Ginipupura (the Spark), and the Sumith Devinuwara group 
adhered to Maoism and were especially impressed by Mao's strategy of a 
protracted people's war. The Mathrubhumi Arakshaka Sangamaya too were 
ideologically influenced by Maoism but preferred the Cuban strategic 
model. The Revolutionary Communist League (R. C. L. ) was committed to 
both Trotskyism and the Soviet model. The J. V. P., on the contrary, 
developed its own distinct political ideology, programme and strategy 
which were manifested in many facets of the organisation. 
The J. V. P. claimed that the nucleus of its ideology was a Marxism- 
Leninism which had been adapted to Sri Lankas's own indigenous 
political and cultural ethos. Rohana Wijeweera, the J. V. P. 's leader, 
sought to explain these adaptations in the following context: 
Marxism-Leninism is a universal truth. It has a 
common utility all over the world, irrespective of 
land, race, nationality, caste, and area. But every 
country has special and peculiar conditions. We 
should adapt Marxist-Leninism to suit these special 
eonditions. 7 
This definition of the J. V. P. ideology as an adaptation of 
Marxism-Leninism, however, has been disputed. A close analysis of the 
J. V. P. 's ideology strongly indicates that it was more an eclectic 
mixture of various elements of Marxism ranging from Stalinism, Maoism, 
and Guevarism to nationalism, mainly Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. 
The manifestations of Stalinism were most evident in their antipathy 
towards Trotskyism. The international debate between Stalinism and 
Trotskyism created a rift in Sri Lanka's left-wing movement after 
1939. The J. V. P. in developing its own ideology, adopted a strong 
anti-Trotskyism stand claiming Trotskyism to be a reactionary 
ideology. In spite of the J. V. P. 's tendency to support Stalinism, 
7 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement to the C. I. D. [unpublished], 
(1971), p. 4. 
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there is little doubt that the crux of -the J. V. P. 's ideology was 
heavily influenced by Mao's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. 
Consequently, the J. V. P. actually found Soviet-Communism to be 
decadent and, therefore, supported China against the Soviet Union in 
the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet interpretation of Communism as it 
had developed from the postrevolutionary period of the Soviet Union 
was found by the J. V. P. to be lacking in the fundamentals inherent in 
the revolutionary concept of Marxism. The Soviet system was perceived 
by the J. V. P., therefore, as a transition from a socialist system to a 
capitalist system rather than to the anticipated advanced socialist 
system. Viewed in this context, the J. V. P. found the then existing 
version of Soviet Marxism-Leninism to be a modern version of 
revisionism. The essence of the J. V. P. 's attitude toward Soviet 
socialism is summarized thus: 
Soviet Russia is reverting back to capitalism- 
socialist imperialism. It is an imperialist country 
which has used great ingenuity to absorb the 
neighbouring countries like Mongolia into colonies. 
It owns colonies. 8 
Thus the J. V. P. 's ideology vehemently opposed the "modern 
revisionism" and "social imperialism" of the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, the J. V. P. 's ideology remained closer to Maoism in 
holding that revisionism in the Soviet Union began after Stalin's 
death, rather than subscribing to the Trotskyist tradition that the 
Soviet Union's departure from Marxist-Leninist Communism began with 
Stalin's defeat of Trotsky in the 1920's. While the J. V. P. censured 
the Soviet Union, its members were strongly attracted to Maoism and 
believed Mao's dictum that political power was developed through the 
barrel of the gun. The emphasis on the suppressed position of the 
5 Ibid., p. 336. 
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peasauitry seems to have been largely derived from Maoism. Quite 
contrary to the J. V. P's concern for the peasantry, the orthodox left- 
wing parties in Sri Lanka were preoccupied with how to radicalise the 
working class. The J. V. P. 's emphasizes the agitation of the rural 
sector under the tutelage of the already enlightened urban working 
class, in an excerpt from the J. V. P. 's newspaper: 
The rural population represents a considerable 
proportion of the entire population. Of this rural 
population the majority belong to the oppressed 
classes. Due to the vastness of the number of the 
rural poor, they are the moving force of the 
Ceylonese revolution. The socialist revolution would 
succeed in Sri Lanka only when the oppressed 
peasantry become politicised and, under the 
leadership of the working classes, begin their class 
struggle. 9 
By adopting the peasantry as the vanguard of the Sri Lankan 
revolution the J. V. P. divorced itself from the ideology of the 
orthodox left-wing parties. Wile other left-wing parties in general 
were pre-occupied in mobilising the urban working class as a 
revolutionary vanguard, the J. V. P. acted on the conviction that the 
peasantry were a trite revolutionary force. In stressing the 
revolutionary role of the peasantry in the ideology of the J. V. P., the 
J. V. P. moved away from the ideology of the long-established Marxist 
parties in Sri Lanka. Thus convinced, the J. V. P. 's ideology focused 
on the plight of the peasantry and the many problems they countered. 
The capitalist economic system had swallowed up the 
fertile land in the up country and in the wet zone 
areas creating a great shortage of land for the 
Ceylonese people. Liptons, Brooke Bonds and other 
white imperialist companies owned thousands of acres. 
Ninety per cent of the local families share one 
acre. (sic) The so-called left-wing leaders of our 
country have said that the peasantry is not 
revolutionary and that they are against socialism. 
These leaders can never understand the problems of 
9 JanaLha Vimukthi, (30 September 1970). 
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Ceylon. There has been no attempt to establish a 
worker-peasant alliance and no attempt to unite all 
the oppressed classes and to work towards a socialist 
revolution. It was only socialism that could 
permanently liberate the tip country landless peasant, 
the peasant of the wet zone whose crops are 
constantly destroyed by floods, the Dry Zone peasant 
who is the victim of drought, the agricultural 
labourers, chena cultivators and the share 
croppers. 10 
The J. V. P. 's reliance on the peasantry as a revolutionary force 
was expressed as follows: 
The joy of emancipation will rise tomorrow from the 
peasantry of the up-country and the dry zone who on 
this day shed tears and cry through immense suffering 
without food and water. 11 
The nature of the revolutionary forces thus determined, the J. V. P. 
once again rejected the ideology of the orthodox left in the country. 
In spite of being influenced by Leninism, Maoism, and Guevaraism, 
however, the J. V. P. contrived to formulate its own distinct ideology, 
strategy and programme. One of its theorists summarized the 
limitations of foreign influences exerted on the J. V. P. 's ideology as 
follows: 
We are definitely admirers of Che, Mao and Ho Chi 
Minh, kaut we have our own plans and theories". 12 
Therefore, to ascertain an insight into any of the aspects 
discussed in this chapter it becomes necessary to examine closely the 
J. V. P. and its related groups. The ideology of the movement was best 
10 Janatha Vimukthi, (5 September 1970). 
11 Janatha Vimukthi, (30 September 1970). 
12 A. J. Wilson, "Ceylon: The People's Liberation Front and the 
Revolution that Failed", Pacific Community, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1972), p. 
369. 
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expressed in their indoctrination classes, more popularly known as the 
five political lectures. These lectures were mainly derived from the 
J. V. P's perception of the country's socio-economic and political 
problems and the alternative solutions offered by them. 
6.4 Classes of Indoctrination 
Tho J. V. P. 's five indoctrination classes were geared mainly as an 
effective means of attracting potential cadres to the J. V. P. and 
convincing them to join the J. V. P. 's fight to implement a socialist 
system in Sri Lanka. Hence, the fundamentals of the J. V. P. 's 
ideology, which were a fusion of ideas derived from other theorists as 
well as their own indigenous adaptations, were imbibed in these five 
classes. The session was entitled "the Present Political Conditions" 
and divided under the following headings: "Economic Crisis", 
"Independence", "Indian Expansionism", "the Left-wing Movement" and 
finally "the Path of Sri Lankan Revolution". 13 
The J. V. P. strongly believed that the five lectures contained the 
essence of Marxism-Leninism in so far as it could be adapted to 
indigenous conditions. The headings of the classes coincided with the 
major socio-economic and political issues in Sri Lanka. Moreover, the 
content was contrived to mobilise potential cadres, and to educate the 
masses on the current socio-economic and political problems 
confronting them. The political consequences of these classes were 
assessed by Wijeweera when he said: 
We had to first deal with day to day problems, the 
socio-economic problems of the masses, the problems, 
the root causes of which were not known to the 
masses--the problems for which no solutions had been 
sought. (sic) We had to enlighten the masses on 
Marxism-Leninism and through that to interpret the 
causes of their problems and to win them over to 
13 Rohana Wijeweera, op. cit., p. 57. 
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Marxism by showing them a scientific solution to 
their problems. '; 
The five classes which also served in place of a policy doctunent 
or manifesto for the J. V. P. will be viewed in isolation at this 
juncture as they contain the very essence of its ideology. 
6.5 On Economic Crisis in Sri Lanka 
as would any other Marxist adherents, the J. V. P. too felt that the 
economic dynamics in any society were crucial in the analysis of 
social forces. The J. V. P. viewed the Sri Lankan economy as a crisis 
area in which socio-economic deficiencies were having severe 
repercussions on the wider society. This crisis was largely 
attributed to the adverse impact of colonialism and neo-colonialist 
capitalism. 15 The J. V. P. perceived the plantation economy, which had 
been introduced and firmly established by the British Raj at the 
expense of the indigenous rural sector, as the root cause of the 
economic deterioration which loomed large in Sri Lanka. The J. V. P. 's 
views were thus expressed: 
The primary root of the burning economic problems of 
the country is the collapse of a simple self- 
sufficient economy. The birth of the tea plant at 
the expense of the Kurakkan (Millet) plant is the 
main cause of the economic crisis. 16 
The focal point of the J. V. P. 's argument was the crisis in the, 
agrarian sector where landlessness, drought and lack of irrigation 
14 Rohana Wijeweera, op. cit., p. 62. 
15 Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission, (Insurgency 
Inquiry), No. 1, (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1976), p. 
118. 
16 Janatha Sangamaya (Peoples' League), 71 April Negiteema (71 
April Uprising), (Dehiwela: Allen Printing Press, 1980), p. 96. 
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facilities for agriculture beset the dry zone while the wet zone was 
faced with acute soil erosion and floods. The agricultural areas, 
upon which a large part of the population depended, was a nerve centre 
of Sri Lanka's society. The problems which were acute in this sector 
affected a wider population and, therefore, were of added 
significance. Thus, according to the J. V. P., the introduction and 
stabilization of the plantation economy not only destabilized the 
agricultural sector but also led to a process of pauperization of the 
peasantry. Lastly, the J. V. P. concluded that the frustration and 
crisis prevailing in the agrarian sector had transformed an economic 
crisis into a political crisis which could be overcome only by means 
of a class struggle. '' The J. V. P. 's solution to the economic crisis 
in Sri Lanka will be discussed in section 6.11 under the heading 
programme . 
6.6 On Independence in Sri Lanka 
The second of the five lectures focused on and analysed the impact 
of colonialism before and after independence from a social, political 
and cultural perspective. The J. V. P. viewed the independence granted 
on the 4th of February 1948 as a pseudo-independence void of full- 
fledged political and economic freedom. 18 The J. V. P: considered the 
independence conferred by the British more as a manoeuvre to protect 
the colonial system of property ownership from the anti-British 
political trends that had evolved in Sri Lanka during the Second World 
War. 19 The other ties which reinforced the colonial representation 
within Sri Lanka were said to be certain clauses in the Sri Lankan 
17 Judgement of the C. J. C. op. cit., p. 118. 
18 Rohana Wijeweera, "Speech to the Ceylon Criminal Justice 
Commission (C. J. C. )", in Robin Blackburn, (ed), Explosion in a 
Subcontinent, (1975), p. 237. 
19 Judgement of the C. J. C. op. cit., p. 118. 
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Constitution of 19,18, the structure of governmental institutions, the 
legal system, the cultural ties and more significantly the post- 
independence reliance on a plantation economy. The J. V. P's perception 
of Sri Lanka's independence and its significance began with the blunt 
statement: 
We have no independence. What we still have is the 
Queen's government. If we consider the constitution, 
the legal system, the cultural field, the colonial 
system of education which prevails up todate all this 
show that this thing called independence is a mere 
farce. In other words, it is a colonial device. 20 
Viewed in this context the J. V. P. found Sri Lankan independence a 
pretence contrived by the British to appease the clamour for 
independence by Sri Lankan nationalists. The J. V. P. maintained that, 
authentic independence could only be achieved by means of an armed 
struggle. Their method of achieving total independence was described 
thus: 
It was under the cannon fire of the imperialists that 
we lost the freedom of our motherland, which had been 
kept guarded with lives and blood. The way to win 
that freedom lost through the power of the gun also 
lies in the barrel of the gun. 21 
In this context the J. V. P. 's views on colonialism and independence 
was quite similar to the views expressed by Frantz Fanon. 22 
6.7 On Indian Expansionism 
Of the five classes, the lecture on Indian Expansionism was one of 
the most controversial and debatable. The different aspec:, s discussed 
20 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement to the C. I. D., op. cit., p. 38. 
21 A. C. Alles, Insurgency-1971, (Colombo: The Apothecaries, 1976), 
p. 50. 
22 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (London: Penguin, 
1986). 
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by the J. V. P. 's indoctrinators under this heading were the Indian 
plantation workers in Sri Lanka, the Federal Party, and the role of 
the neighbouring Indian Federal Government. The J. V. P. 's ideology 
pertaining to this particular area was strongly influenced by the 
stand taken by the Chinese Communist Party during and after the Indo- 
China Border War of 1962. The People's Republic of China viewed India 
with suspicion claiming that the Indian Government was motivated by 
territorial ambitions as well as by its economic prowess. It was 
further argued that India planned to subjugate the smaller states 
within its immediate environs. The Communist Chinese attributed 
India's alleged expansionary ambitions to its dependency on foreign 
investment and aid, and consequently on India's supposed need to 
market the products of the capitalist monopolists. The Communist 
Chinese designated the process matter of factly as `Indian 
expansionism'"23 
The J. V. P., who found these ideas ideologically appealing, 
borrowed them and integrated them into its lecture on Indian 
Expansionism. The J. V. P. further reasoned that India had interfered 
in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs, and was a threat to the Sri Lankan 
economy, its political sovereignty and its survival as an independent 
state. One reason given by the J. V. P. to justify its accusations of 
Indian expansionism was the apparent monopoly of Indian business 
interests within Sri Lanka. The J. V. P. gave several other reasons as 
follows: the smuggling to and from India, the role of the Sri Lankan 
Federal Party, the organisation known as "We are Tamils" (Nam 
23 This concept of Indian Expansionism was further discussed in 
two articles published by the editorial board of the Chinese Communist 
Party's daily newspaper Renmin Rebao, and entitled "The Chinese Indian 
Border Struggle" and the "Nehru Doctrine". The articles were exposes 
on the Indian capitalist class and its basic philosophy which 
accordingly was to spread its economic and political hegemony over 
India's much weaker and smaller neighbour states. Rohana Wijeweera, 
Speech to the C. J. C. op. cit., p. 238. See, Neville Maxwell, India's 
China War, (London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 277-309. 
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Tamilar), the cultural influences exerted by Southern India, illicit 
immigration and the Indian plantation workers. 24 
The J. V. P. 's fears regarding Indian Expansionism were not, as of 
the 1960s, of recent origin but dated back to ancient times when 
raiders from Southern India had dethroned the Sinhala Kings and 
destroyed their kingdoms, though the remnants of the Sinhala kingdom 
later regained some of the lost territory in the the Elara-Dutugamunu 
War in the first century B. C. Viewed in this historical context, the 
strong element of Sinhala nationalism inherent in the J. V. P. 's 
ideology appears to have been at least partly responsible for the 
J. V. P. 's accusations against. the Indian Government. 25 
The crucial tart of the lecture, however, focused on the Indian 
plantation workers. The left-wing parties in Sri Lanka looked upon the 
plantation workers as part of the proletariat class which according to 
Marxism-Leninism was the revolutionary force. The J. V. P. 'did not. 
accept this reasoning, but instead maintained that the problems of the 
plantation workers were an integral part of Indian Expansionism, and 
that the workers themselves were more a reactionary element than a 
revolutionary host. The J. V. P. further argued that the Indian 
plantation workers had not integrated themselves into Sri Lankan 
society and culture, but rather had adhered to their Indian identity, 
and continued to think of India as their motherland and of its leaders 
such as Gandhi and Nehru as their own. 
The J. V. P. instructors also compared the plight of the Chena 
cultivators (shifting cultivation) in the dry zone with that of the 
plantation workers. They found that the plantation workers enjoyed 
considerably improved living conditions compared to the former. The 
24 Janatha Sangamaya, op. cit., p. 90. 
25 Kumari Jayawardana, Ethnic and Class Conflict in Sri Lanka, 
Centre for Social Analysis, (Dehiwela: Navamaga Printers, 1985), p. 
86. 
267 
plantation workers not only lived in the more fertile wet zone but 
also had greater access to housing, education and health facilities 
than did the dry zone cultivators who were deprived of many of these 
basic facilities. The dry zone was not only malaria endemic but also 
was an area of limited facilities. Thus, the J. V. P's stand on the 
Indian plantation workers was negative and uncompromising, and 
highlighted the relative advantages those workers enjoyed compared to 
other sections of the peasantry. 
The major ethnic minority, the Sri Lank-an Tamils, were another 
segment of society which the J. V. P. found necessary to analyse. The 
J. V. P. perceived the Tamils' major political party, the Federal Party 
of Sri Lau ka, to be a pawn of Indian Expansionism and possibly a 
medium by which the Tamil state of South India and Tamil-dominated 
Northern Sri Lanka would merge. As a whole the J. V. P. not only 
adopted an unfavourable approach to the influences exerted by Indian 
and Sri Lankan Tamils as an ethnic minority but also, as a policy, 
opposed India. 
6.8 On the Left-Wing Movement in Sri Lanka 
The J. V. P. 's class on the left-wing movement in Sri Lanka sought 
to emphasize the failure of that movement and the supposed causes of 
such a failure. The J. V. P. 's instructors began the lecture with an 
examination of the movement from its inception in the 1930s and traced 
its growth and activities thereafter. Rohana Wijeweera himself stated 
that the purpose of this lecture was to draw a lesson from the 
unpleasant experiences of the old left-wing movement and to understand 
the reasons for its failure, so that the J. V. P. could avoid similar 
mistakes and achieve the proletariat aim of building a new left-wing 
movement. 26 
26 Judgement of the C. J. C. op. cit., p. 120. 
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The J. V. P. asserted that by the mid-1960s the traditional left was 
on the wane, and stressed the need for a new left-wing movement to 
attain the aspirations of the empoverished masses. This decline of 
the traditional left was mainly attributed to the switching of 
strategies from the revolutionary path to a parliamentary course, and 
to the formation of coalitions with the capitalist parties. In this 
context the J. V. P. viewed the orthodox left-wing movement as having 
more of a revisionist than socialist nature. These ideas are further 
elaborated in the J. V. P. 's newspaper in the following passage: 
The left-wing movement was born in December 1935 and 
was congenitally a social revisionist movement. It 
was not a haphazard event. It was the beginning of a 
Lamentation. 2i 
The J. V. P. 's criticisms were not confined to the policies and 
activities of the left-wing movement; its leaders also were subject to 
strong criticism. The J. V. P. launched personal attacks on the leaders 
of the orthodox left-wing parties maintaining that the leaders of 
those parties had failed in Sri Lanka not because the masses were less 
revolutionary but because those leaders were not true Marxists. The 
substance of this criticism was as follows: 
What did these old leaders do? They entered the law 
courts in the morning adorned in black cloaks and 
served the capitalist for money they earned through 
the Roman Dutch law. Arguing that the mortar or the 
haystack was responsible for the murders committed by 
the affluent murderers, they saved them from the 
gallows and went home and changed their clothes to 
white trouser and red shirts, approached the workers 
and incited them to struggle to win their cup of 
gruel, and finally went home fully drunk after 
enjoying ball room dancing with Colombo seven 
(socialite) ladies, at the Otters club or the Eighty 
club and returned home drunk and unsteady. Marx 
wrote " Capital" against (the power of) capital. But 
27 Janatha Vimukthi, (20 January 1970). 
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our leftist leaders destroy themselves because of 
capital. 25 
It is evident that the J. V. P's lecture on the left-wing movement 
in Sri Lanka was not only an indictment of the existing left-wing 
parties but also of their leaders. The J. V. P. used this opportunity 
to present itself as a alternative. 
The fifth lecture dealt with the crucial subject of a Sri Lankan 
revolution and the strategies that should be adopted for such an 
event. To facilitate a clear explication the author discusses the 
fifth lecture on strategy separately in section 6.10. From the 
indoctrination classes hitherto discussed it is evident that they were 
more action-oriented and agitational than concerned with issues of 
theory and ideology. This dimension was carefully construed to appeal 
to the indigenous rural masses, who at the time were faced with many 
of the problems discussed during the lectures. 
6.9 Views of Society 
The J. V. P. 's views on contemporary society were based on the 
Marxist interpretation of society which evolved from the concept of 
the mode of production. From this perspective it was observed that 
Sri Lanka represented a neo-colonial social structure ridden by class 
stratifications. The J. V. P. identified the predominant social classes 
in Sri Lanka as follows: proletariat, petit-bourgeois, middle class, 
national bourgeoisie and comprador-bourgeoisie. This was analogous 
to Mao's analysis of China's pre-revolutionary society. 29 By 
definition, however, there was a difference between J. V. P. 's 
28 G. B. Keerawella, "The J. V. P. and the 1971 Uprising", Social 
Science Review, No. 2, (1980), p. 35. 
29 See, Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese 
Society", in Selected Reading From the Works of Mao-Tsetung, (Peking: 
Foreign Language Press, 1971), pp. 11-19. 
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identification of the working class and that of Marxism-Leninism. 
According to the Communist Manifesto, the proletariat was comprised of 
the wage earning class or working class. 30 The J. V. P., on the other 
hand, defined the proletariat as comprising the peasants, the students 
and unemployed youth. In the following passage Rohana Wijeweera 
explained this interpretation further: 
Some people don't like when we call them the 
proletariat class. They say we should call them the 
working class? What is meant by the working class? 
Isn't that a part of the proletariat? It is a part 
of this proletariat class who are employed all over 
the country and sell their labour. There are yet 
others all over the country who don't have any chance 
to sell their labour and earn their living. Take for 
example the unemployed youth in the villages, the 
chena cultivators and share croppers. To which class 
do they belong. What means of production do they 
have? I do not know whether there is another 
proletariat class in Sri Lanka if they, these poor 
people, do not belong to this proletariat class. 31 
Thus, the J. V. P. by virtue of its social base could not ignore the 
other deprived segments of society and, therefore, were compelled to 
deviate from orthodox Marxism and recognize the complexity of such a 
definition. Their adaptation of the Marxist-Leninist approach is 
further evident in their sympathetic attitude towards the peasantry 
rather than the working class. 
The J. V. P's lack of concern for the working class was due mostly 
to its perception that the Sri Lankan working class was passive and 
lethargic. Consequently, the J. V. P. 's neglect of the working class 
was reflected in their attitude towards the trade unions and strikes. 
Strikes were dismissed by the J. V. P. as feeble struggles for equally 
insignificant demands and were often called "kanda koppa satana" which 
30 See, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 124. 
31 Rohana Wijeweera, Rathu Lanka (Red Ceylon), A Paper of the 
J. V. P., (15 March 1971), p. 4. 
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means `struggles for a cup of porridge'. Moreover, strikes were 
viewed as a device to protect the capitalist system, rather than as a 
means by which the working class could safeguard its rights. In a 
speech given by Wijeweera, he explained the J. V. P. 's indifferent 
approach to the working-class trade unions and strikes as follows: 
At first Goonesinghe32 and his like started forming 
trade unions. Later, all the revisionists started 
forming trade unions. What did they do? They 
organised the workers in factories. They placed the 
carrot of economic demands for a full thirty years? 
Every year there were hundreds of strikes for a 
better standard of living. It is a universal truth 
that the working class cannot get relief within the 
prevailing social system - this capitalist system. 
To obtain relief within the prevailing system the 
working class demand greater pay. When demands are 
made some of them are granted. But a hundred times 
more than what is given is taken back. 33 
It is obvious that the J. V. P's ideology sought to deviate from 
Marxism-Leninism according, to indigenous conditions in Sri Lanka. In 
their endeavour to adapt Marxism to their own ideology the J. V. P. 
absorbed a strong nationalist dimension, which was wrapped in 
socialism. The nationalism was evident in the J. V. P's ideological use 
of the word "patriotism" which often appeared in their literature. The 
J. V. P. interpreted the patriotism as: 
the aggregate of the class hatred against the 
imperialist enemy in all the structures oppressed by 
imperialism and old and new colonialism.... In its 
struggle against imperialism, Marxism-Leninism is 
nothing but patriotism. 34 
32 E. A. Goonesinghe is a pioneer of the Trade Union movement in 
Sri Lanka. 
33 Rohana Wijeweera, "Trade Union Politics and Workers Union 
Politics", speech given on 13th September 1970 at the New Town Hall. 
in Colombo, Quoted in G. B. Kerawella, op. cit., 1981, p. 37. 
34 Patriot ( Deshapremi), a newspaper of the J. V. P. (8 August 
1970), p. 1. 
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The J. V. P. often referred to the peasants and workers as 
`patriotic peasants and workers', and its student front was a 
'patriotic students front'. Furthermore, the J. V. P. 's Bikku (Buddhist 
Clergy) organisation was called the 'Patriotic Bikku Front', while the 
women's front was named the 'Patriotic Women's Front'. The armed 
uprising for which the J. V. P. was preparing was called a 'patriotic 
struggle'. The concept of patriotism was emphasized over and over 
again by the J. V. P. in every possible way. The J. V. P. 's meaning of 
this concept was explained as follows: 
The colonial economy, the Queen's government, the 
Roman-Dutch law and the imperial traditions which 
arrived in the country through the guns and bullets 
of foreign imperialists will be chased out of the 
country by the patriotic traditions and the guns and 
bullets of patriotic people. 35 
The strong nationalist element inherent in the J. V. P. 's ideology 
was manifest in all its endeavours. This patriotic stance was 
carried still further in their slogans such as 'Mathrubima Nat. hnam 
Maranaya' ('Motherland or Death'). The historical heroes who strongly 
represented the Sinhala-Buddhist images were idealized in J. V. P. 
literature. Some of these heroes were those who had agitated in the 
19th Century against foreign occupation, such as Keppetipola and Puran 
Appu, and who were thus held in high esteem as those who had struggled 
for freedom. 36 The J. V. P. 's nationalism did not, however, embrace 
the diverse ethnic and cultural entities within Sri Lankan society, 
but merely represented the predominant Sinhala-Buddhist image. Hence, 
the J. V. P. has been accused of advocating Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism 
rather than Sri Lankan nationalism. This chauvinistic element is 
35 Janatha Vimukthi, (1 August 1970). 
36 Keppetiapola was a Kandyan chieftain who in 1818 led an armed 
rebellion against British Colonial rule. Puran Appu was a leader of 
the peasant uprising in 1848 against British rule. 
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further evident in their approach to minority problems in Sri Lanka, 
as well as in their conception of Sinhala culture and the manner in 
which they practiced Buddhism. 
Viewed from such a perspective it is apparent that the J. V. P. 's 
attitudes and political vision concerning the grievances of the Sri 
Lankan minority communities were biased and rather negligible. 
Consequently, on the question of Sri Lankas's official language, the 
J. V. P. maintained that the Official Language Act of 1956, which 
pronounced Sinhala as the official language, was justifiable, and 
totally disagreed with the C. P. and L. S. S. P. on their advocation of 
parity of status for the Sinhala and Tamil languages. Furthermore, 
the J. V. P. 's views of the peasant resettlement schemes in Northern and 
Eastern parts of Sri Lanka were a strong indication of their arbitrary 
approach. Peasant resettlement has been represented as a panacea for 
social and economic evils by successive post-independent governments. 
The Tamils, however, had contrary views and posed counter arguments 
for such a programme. Their main contention was that resettlement 
represented a state-sanctioned threat to their territorial and 
linguistic identity. The J: V. P. totally disregarded these counter 
arguments. As Kumari Jayawardena'observes, the J. V. P. 's strategy was 
to resettle the Sri Lankan Tamils in such a manner that they would be 
widely scattered throughout Sri Lanka rather than being concentrated 
in strong regional pockets. Such a resettlement would strike a strong 
blow to the Tamils' territorial claims and distinctive ethnic 
identity. 37 
The J. V. P. 's emphasis on Sri Lanka's culture was mainly confined 
to the Sinhala-Buddhist tradition and ethos. Their disciplinary code 
was derived from Buddhist ethics, and its leadership and membership 
were bound to adhere to this code. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
37 Kumari Jayawardena, op. cit., p. 88. 
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main guidelines were based on the prohibition against smoking tobcco, 
consuming alcohol, viewing films of a pornographic or violent nature, 
adopting western habits and fashions, and finally, getting involved in 
casual emotional attachments between the sexes. The J. V. P. manifested 
particularly strong opposition to the infiltration of western culture 
and insisted that its members strictly, adhere to the tenents of the 
indigenous culture. In this context what was really meant by 
`indigenous culture' was the Sinhala-Buddhist culture. The J. V. P. 's 
approach to Buddhism was not explicitly stated in any of their 
literature, nor was it discussed during any of the five political 
classes. Wijeweera, however, offered his personal concept of Buddhism 
in his statement to the C. I. U. He said: 
I do not accept. Buddhism as a religion but as a 
philosophy - of course I definitely accept it. It is 
a progressive philosophy. 3S 
It is thus evident that the J. V. P. 's political ideology had a 
Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist flavour. Furthermore, this aspect of 
the J. V. P. 's ideology again emerges in the selection of pseudonyms 
which were adopted to protect the true identity of its leaders and 
full-time members. The pseudonym adopted by Wijeweera, the J. V. P. 's 
leader, was "Rohana", which happened to be the historical name of the 
present Southern Province, the heartland of Sinhala nationalism. 
Gananatha Obeysekara observes that Rohana not only represented the 
nucleus of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism but also presented itself as 
the centre of resistance to Tamil nationalism. 39 Legend has it that 
whenever the threat of foreign invasion loomed, especially by India, a 
Sinhala hero emerged from the `Ruhuna' or Rohana to resist the 
33 Rohana Wijeweera, op. cit., p. 229. 
39 Gananatha Obeysekara, "Sinhala Nationalism and Culture in 
Relation to the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka", [unpublished), 
(1975), p. 2. 
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invaders. The basic sentiments of this legend were embodied in the 
historical annals of the Dutu; ammnu-Elara War which was fought by the 
Sir-diala King Dutugamunu to regain the lost kingdom of : Anuradhapura 
from the Tamil King Elara in the first century B. C. The second 
ranking member of the J. V. P. assumed the name `Athula', which was 
derived from an historical novel by Martin Wickramasinghe based on the 
Dutugamunu-Elara war. The novel describes one of its characters, 
Athula, as King Dutugamunu's most trusted lieutenant. Thus, some of 
the J. V. P. 's appeal was derived from Sinhalese-Buddhist history and 
mythology. 
The J. V. P. 's choice of a flag in 1971 was another symbolic 
indication of its culturally chauvinistic approach. The flag depicted 
a lion on a red backgrotuid - the lion being the symbol of the Sinhala 
nation. Members were ordered to hoist this flag at all the captured 
police stations. 
The ideological orientation of the J. V. P. considered thus far 
strongly indicates that. it was action-oriented, concentrating on 
agit. ational issues rather than grappling with theoretical issues. 
Consequently, as The Economist observes, it was "richly compounded, 
variously spiced and unmistakably home-made". 40 Moreover, the violent 
nature of the J. V. P. 's ideology is further elaborated in the following 
excerpt from a cross-examination in 1973 of Loku Athula (Nimalasiri 
Jayasinghe) at the Criminal Justice Commission (C. J. C. ) trial at bar. 
The text clarifies that the J. V. P. was concentrating on an armed 
struggle rather than developing and expanding a broad-based political 
ideology which could cover wider socio-economic and political problem 
in Sri Lanka: 
Q. Was it an armed struggle or a political philosophy that the 
J. V. P. presented as a socialist Revolution ? 
40 The Economist, (3 July 1971), p. 33. 
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A. Both, a political philosophy and an armed struggle. 
Q. Stiere these two correlated 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the J. V. P. give the first place to the political philosophy 
or to the armed strategy ? 
A. Actually, it gave first place to the armed struggle. 4' 
In this context it is obvious that the J. V. P. endeavoured to form 
its ideology for an armed uprising within a short gestation period. 
The action-orientation was conducive to the mobilisation of rural 
youth toward the capture of state power by means of political 
violence. 
The basic elements of the J. V. P. ideology clearly indicate that it 
incorporated most of the pressing problems in the rural sector and 
emphasized a practical rather than a theoretical or abstract approach. 
This appealed to those among the Sinhalese community who were most 
disadvantaged by indigenous socio-economic and political conditions. 
The rather sparse information on the alternative political system 
proposed by the J. V. P. indicates that they concentrated more on 
capturing, state power and had no intention of seeking to change the 
existing political structure through legitimate means. The J. V. P. 's 
ideology was not easily identifiable either with Marxism-Leninism, 
Stalinism, Maoism, or Guevaraism. 42 Their ideology on the whole was 
eclectic, incorporating the concepts of Marxism-Leninism, a Maoist 
urge for violent action, a Che Guevaraist obsession with instant 
revolution, and last but not least Sinhala-Buddhist ethnocentrism. In 
other words, the J. V. P. wanted to develop a wholly Sri Lankan 
41 Loku Athula ( Nimalasiri Jayasinghe), "Evidence to the C. J. C. ", 
Daily News, (15 February 1973). 
42 James Jupp, Sri Lanka - Third World Democracy, (London: Frank 
Cass, 1978), p. 306. 
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character as they saw all other modes tainted by outside influences or 
peculiar to those other cultures. What emerged as a result of this 
fusion of ideology and concepts was, as Urmila Phadnis observes, an 
anti-capitalist, anti-western, anti-traditional leftist and anti- 
Indian ideology. 43 Many of the J. V. P. 's beliefs and perceptions were 
indigenous, and it preached a national socialism. Consequently, the 
J. V. P. 's ideology was not influenced by Western radical thinking. 
Rather it was an oriental ideology viewed through rural Sinhalese- 
Buddhist eyes. This ideology had the necessary power to mobilise the 
Sinhalese-Buddhist rural youth to political violence against the 
government. Their strong opposition to the established order and 
system are thus made obvious, and the fusion of ideology is further 
exemplified in their strategy. 
6.10 Strategy and Tactics 
The J. V. P. 's pre-planned strategy to capture state power was 
embodied in the fifth and final lecture of their indoctrination 
classes, titled "the Path of the Sri Lankan Revolution". 
Revolutionary warfare was the ultimate means for the J. V. P. of 
achieving state power and they totally rejected the electoral process 
which, they maintained, was futile. According to Wijeweera, the fifth 
lecture dealt with a theoretical explanation of the path to a 
socialist revolution. In this context it dealt with. issues which were 
then under debate within the left-wing movement in Sri Lanka. The 
first was the anticipated Sri Lankan revolution, which, the orthodox 
left espoused, should be completed in two stages. The orthodox left 
held that in the absence of a democratic revolution as in Europe, a 
democratic revolution and then a socialist revolution should be 
43 Urmila Phadnis, "Insurgency in Ceylon Politics: Problems and 
Prospects", Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, 
(April 1971), pp. 596-597. 
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launched in Sri Lanka. }; The Sri Lank-an C. P. (P) and its breakaway 
groups such as the `Peradiga Sulanga' (East Wind) and the `Ginipupura' 
(Spark) having been influenced by : Maoism, also advocated this 
programme. The J. V. P. rejected this two-phase revolution and favoured 
a single-phase path, i. e., the socialist path. 'Likewise, as regards 
to tactics the J. V. P. rejected an idea of a popular front approach. 
The second aspect combined the strategy and tactics of a socialist 
revolution. In this context it was contended that socialism could not 
be achieved by applying a strategy which had been successful 
elsewhere, but that it had to be achieved by a indigenous strategy 
devised according to the given conditions. Considering the historical 
experience of the international revolutionary campaign, Wijeweera 
concluded that. the Sri Lankan revolution had to be achieved after 
considering, the conditions peculiar to Sri Lanka. '5 It is evident 
that the J. V. P. did not accept a tuiiversal strategy of revolution but 
firmly believed that the course of revolution taken in one country at 
a particular time, given specific conditions, would differ from the 
revolutionary process in another country. They totally rejected the 
idea of accepting, either the Leninist, the Maoist or the Cuban 
strategies. The Maoist model of guerrilla warfare, which advocated a 
`protracted peoples' war launched against the urban centers from the 
rural areas, was rejected due to demographic and topographic 
restrictions in Sri Lanka. The Soviet and the Cuban models were also 
found to be unsuitable as Sri Lanka is a comparatively small country 
with a contrasting geo-physical environment. The accepted 
revolutionary strategies thus found to be inapplicable, the J. V. P. set 
about devising its own strategy which they believed was in accordance 
with the indigenous conditions. 
44 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement, op. cit., pp. 57-59. 
15 A. C. Alles, op. cit., p. 45. 
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The J. V. P. planned a strategy- which depended on a one-day armed 
attack accompanied by a general strike by the working classes. The 
general strike was intended to destabilize the politico-economic 
system in synergy with the attack for maximum disruption. Hence, if 
the general strike did not take place, the J. V. P. devised an alternate 
plan to disrupt the system of communications, including the telephone 
lines and the supply of electricity. The basic strategy of a one-day 
revolution was to launch a simultaneous night-time attack on the 
police stations and military bases throughout Sri Lanka. Thus, the 
strategy of the J. V. P. was an island-wide armed insurrection which 
depended on a single swift blow, designed to capture political power 
within a very short time frame. In spite of their advocacy of a 
one-day attack, the J. V. P. was aware that strategically such an 
attack would be far from viable unless it was launched in two stages. 
In the first stage the aim would be to capture arms and ammunition for 
a major attack on stronger bases. By virtue of this strategy the 
smaller police stations were to be the first targets. When launching 
their attack, their main tactic would be to overpower the opposition 
by the sheer strength of numbers rather than superiority in weapons 
and ammunition. It was also deemed necessary to cut off all forms of 
communication including the supply of electricity in order to totally 
isolate the police stations before launching the initial attack. 
Parallel to their attacks on police stations, the J. V. P. planned to 
seize the important state institutions and capture significant members 
of state. The final stage of the strategy was the mobilisation of the 
masses for the final attempt to secure state power after capturing 
arms and ammunition from the police and Sri Lank-an military forces. 16 
46 Anura Kurukulasuriya, "Statement to the Police", 1971, 
(unpublished), p. 36. 
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T}he theoretical concepts which defined the J. V. P. strategy 
determined that an army of professional revolutionaries could mobilise 
the masses for political action and the seizure of power. The J. V. P. 
ignored from thereon, however, tested theoretical concepts such as 
those of the Maoist and Cubans models which said that if the initial 
attack was unsuccessful the revolutionaries were advised by theory to 
retreat to the main natural reserves and forests. In the J. V. P. 's 
case that would have meant hiding in the Wilpattu near the 
Anuradhapura district, the Sinharaja in the Kalutara district and the 
Nacules range in the Matale district, as a means of self-preservation. 
Convential Marxist theory would have further instructed the launching 
of a protracted struggle from the hinterland. The J. V. P. 's strategy, 
however, did not contain an alternative strategy for a protracted 
struggle in the event the one-day attack failed. The J. V. P. reasoned 
that as Sri Lanka is a small island, its police unpopular and its 
military services weak, a one-day armed revolution could succeed. 
According to the J. V. P. 's interpretation of Marxist-Leninist 
theory, revolutionary pre-conditions were not imperative conditions 
for a revolution. Despite the lack of emphasis on pre-conditions they 
believed that the mere ambience created by the government's repression 
of the J. V. P. would forment a revolution. Wijeweera further 
explained this belief when he said: 
We will strike when we are provoked to do so by the 
armed forces.... We caution the government not to 
send us underground. The revolution will commence 
on the day that our group is banned as we would have 
no alternative but to retaliate. 47 
The J. V. P. was nonetheless devoid of logical consistent tactics. 
Before 1970 total secrecy and armed attack were the hub of their 
47 Rohana Wijeweera, "Speech at Hyde Park Meeting", (27 February 
1971), Daily Mirror, (28 February 1971). 
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tactics, and they declined mass mobilisation as part of their 
strategy. The General Election of 1970 marked a change in their 
strategic course. Thereafter, the J. V. P. launched a campaign of overt 
agitation by means of mass rallies and propaganda. Theirs was a dual 
strategy in which open incitement would be accompanied by a serious 
stepping tip of recruitment for their clandestine activities. The 
J. V. P. 's strategy, like those of other Marxist revolutionaries, was a 
conspiratorial one amongst a few professional revolutionaries who 
would lord over the masses both throughout the anticipated 
revolutionary process and after they had seized political power. It 
was not to be a Maoist people's war, but rather a left-wing putsch. 
The J. V. P. 's plan for a one-day struggle was not a unique strategy as 
it was derived from the Zanzibar Uprising of 1964. The Zanzibar 
Uprising was carried out by about 600 trained rebels under the command 
of Field Marshal John Okello. Okello's revolutionaries siezed the 
armouries and swiftly overpowered the military within twenty-four 
hours .; S 
The J. V. P. was also heavily influenced by the Castro-Guevara 
revolutionary tradition as elaborated by Regis Debray. Pursuant to 
Guevaraist theory, the J. V. P. anticipated that a band of determined 
revolutionaries could overthrow the existing state apparatus, capture 
state power, and subsequently convince the masses of their legitimacy. 
Thus, Guevara's theoretical postulation that popular guerrilla forces 
could resist and overcome the military was assimilated into the J. V. P. 
ideology. Moreover, they agreed with Guevara's idea that limited 
conditions conducive to a revolution could be created and would not 
require further development before launching the revolution. As a 
result the J. V. P. drew away from and put the least emphasis on the 
48 Keesings Contemporary Archives, (14-24 March 1964), pp, 19951- 
3. 
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mass-mobilisation approach, opting instead for the quick one-day 
revolution. After the events of 1971 the J. V. P., in reviewing its 
past. political performance, assessed the impact of these political 
thoughts in the following perspective: 
There is no doubt that the fact that the revolution 
in Cuba tritunphed without a revolutionary party, had 
been in our minds when the capitalist class was 
suppressing the J. V. P. and there was also no doubt 
that it influenced our activities. It is clear that, 
particularly because of the Cuban experience, the 
concept of the necessity of a Bolshevik party was, to 
a certain extent, denied. 49 
Consequently, just as the J. V'. P. 's ideology was eclectic, so too 
were their tactics which were pragmatic and opportunist. Another 
aspect intrinsically linked to the J. V. P. 's ideology, was their 
proposed programme for a socialist state and society in Sri Lanka. 
6.11 Programme of the J. V. P. 
The proposed programme of the J. V. P. 's future state was based 
mainly on the issues discussed in the five indocrination classes. The 
J. V. P. aspired to establish an egalitarian socialist society and for 
this purpose they endeavoured to frame a programme of action. The 
J. V. P. failed, however, to produce a definite programme. They had no 
firm notion of what the future socialist state would be like,, nor any 
conviction as to how they would replace the existing parliamentary 
system of government or the administrative apparatus. 
Nonetheless, it is obvious that the J. V. P. was influenced by the 
Cuban and the Chinese models of a socialist state espousing a one- 
party system with the abolition of a multi-party parliamentary form of 
49 Niyamuwa (The Pilot) newspaper of the J. V. P. (29 May 1977), 
cited by G. B. Kerawella, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 
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government-50 Their strong opposition to the parliamentary system was 
explained as follows: 
People must realize that parliament is an agency of 
the bourgeoisie, intended to confuse the people and 
divert their attention from the real problems of our 
country. 51 
In spite of their opposition to the existing system, the J. V. P. 
had paradoxically promised some of their members positions similar to 
those within the existing parliamentary system. Hence, their proposal 
of a orte-party dictatorship with little participation of the people 
did not evince a tendency for radical changes in the system. The 
J. V. P. further implied that they would adopt an anti-western foreign 
policy which would include the closure of the U. S. and the British 
embassies in Sri Lanka, and the termination of all ties with foreign 
donor agencies such as the P. L. 480 and the West German Ebert 
Foundation. 52 The J. V. P. 's strong nationalist ideology urged an 
unfavourable approach to the problem of the Indian plantation workers. 
The J. V. P. proposed a solution which called for forced repatriation 
and the prevention of further migration from South India. The 
J. V. P. also outlined an alternate economic model for Sri Lanka, as 
they found the existing system to be degenerate and a failure. They 
proposed a planned socialist economy which would revolve around 
systematic industrialisation and the collectivization of agro- 
industries. The existing trade-based economy, which depended heavily 
on the export of tea, rubber and coconut, was to be replaced by a 
system which would liquidate individual enterprise and in its place 
sponsor collective production. The traditional tea industry, which 
50 A. J. Wilson, "Ceylon: The People's Liberation Front and the 
Revolution That Failed", Pacific Community, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1972), pp. 
372-376. 
51 Janatha Vimukthi, (20 January 1971). 
50 A. J. Wilson, op. cit., p. 372-73. 
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was a colonial legacy, and the newly developed tourist industry were 
specifically criticised. The tea plantations which were concentrated 
in the central highlands were found to be the cause of several 
ecological problems. Hence, in the J. V. P. 's plans for economic 
reconstruction it was suggested that the tea plantations should be 
uprooted and replaced with reforestation to ensure an adequate 
rainfall and prevent soil erosion. Tea and rubber plantations would 
be cultivated only to suffice Sri Lanka's own needs. The J. V. P. 
further advocated a programme of new irrigation which would prevent 
floods in the wet zone and drought in the dry zone. This alternate 
economic policy was further clarified by Wijeweera when he said: 
We should change the entire economy. The neo- 
imperialist economy should be changed to a socialist 
economy. The basic aim is to do away with the 
plantation industry, the hill slopes should be 
reforested, reservoirs should be built, rivers should 
be tapped to harness electricity and diverted to the 
Dry Zone. 53 
The rural-based support for the J. V. P rendered it necessary to 
address Sri Lanka's agrarian crisis. To counter the existing economic 
policy which depended mainly on foreign aid and loans, and the import- 
export system, the J. V. P. advocated a policy of utilizing the 
indigenous resources and `know-how'. Their antipathy to the 
plantations had become so bitter that one youth who captured an estate 
superintendent in 1971 stated that they would uproot the tea and 
rubber estates and plant yams instead. 54 The J. V. P., however, did 
not have a coherent outline for the political future. As J. M. Van 
Der Kroef observes, in a general sense the J. V. P. programme did not 
significantly deviate from that of the Sri Lanka Communist Party (P). 
53 Rohana Wijeweera, Statement to the C. I. D., op. cit., p. 235. 
51 The Nation, A Paper of the L. S. S. P., (22 April 1971). 
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Some salient points mentioned by Van Der kroef are: the severing of 
the remaining ties with the Commonwealth; the completion of the 
nationalisation of foreign enterprise and banks; the implementation of 
an extensive agricultural subsidy and price support programme; the 
creation of workers' councils in industrial establishments; support 
for all national liberation movements against American "imperialism"; 
and the distribution of state-owned lands to the landless. 55 As James 
Jupp observes much of this was vague utopian rhetoric. 56 
6.12 Ideologies of the Tamil Guerrillas 
The author concentrates next on the ideology of those Tamil 
, guerrilla groups which never explicitly outlined their ideologies, 
strategies and programmes. These groups, like the J. V. P., stressed 
the importance of military tactics rather than ideological goals. The 
volatile situation in Sri Lanka as a result of the political violence 
there did not permit a widespread exposure of their different 
ideologies. The Taunil guerrilla organisations, however, did share 
the common characteristic of concentrating on military action rather 
than theoretical issues. Moreover, while the J. V. P. relied on 
indoctrination and conviction to mobilise the Sri Lanakn masses, the 
Tamil guerrillas depended on armed violence to mobilise the Tamil 
youth in particular. The L. T. T. E., the most powerful of these groups, 
strongly believed that what was necessary was action rather than not 
words. 57 None of the guerrilla groups has systematically documented 
55 Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "The Sri Lanka Insurgency of April 
1971: Its Development and Meaning", Asia Quarterly, Vol. 2, (1973), p. 
114. 
56 James Jupp, "The JVP Insurrection of 1971 and Its Impact On the 
Marxist and Socialist Movements in Ceylon", A Paper for the Conference 
on Sri Lanka, (London University, March 1974), p. 10. 
57 "Making of a Militant Leader: An Interview with V. Prabakaran, 
Lanka Guardian, Vol. 9, No. 11, (1986), p. 13. 
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any of these relevant aspects, but their literature, within certain 
limits, contains the basic rudiments of their political ideologies. 
In studying the basic structure of the political ideologies, 
strategies and programmes of these groups, the author found it 
necessary to make the following divisions for a clear explanation: 
objectives, origins of ideology, views of modern society, programmes, 
strategies and tactics. Towards this end, the author has relied on 
newspapers, journals, pamphlets, interviews and articles. 
6.13 Objectives 
The objectives of all the Tamil guerrillas were generally the same 
despite their internal and inter-group rivalries, and were mainly 
related to domestic matters. Their primary objective was to break 
away from the existing unitary Sri Lankan national state and form an 
independent Tamil or `Eelam' state comprised mainly of the Northern 
and Eastern provinces where a majority of the Tamil population is 
still concentrated. SS The Tamil guerrillas based this objective on 
the following assumptions: the rights of the Tamil people for self- 
determination, the recognition of Tamils as a distinct nationality and 
the calls among the Tamil community for the formation of a new Tamil 
state. 59 
These groups further aspired to an independent socialist state 
rather than to a democratically-elected provincial form of government. 
A. S. Balasingham, a political adviser to the L. T. T. E., summed tip their 
common objective of a socialist state in the following way: 
Ss From the 10th century A. D. onward there were three Dravidian or 
Tamil Kingdoms in South India. Among these the Chola was the 
mightiest, having conquered Sri Lanka. Eelam was the name given by 
the Chola Empire to what is now the island of Sri Lanka. 
59 These objectives were put forward by the Tamil guerrilla groups 
at the Thimphu Talks. 
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The political objective of our movement to advance 
the national struggle along with the class struggle 
or rather our fundamental objective is national 
emancipation and socialist transition of our social 
formation. " 
They were unanimous in their common objective which was the 
establishment of a separate socialist Tamil state by means of an armed 
revolutionary struggle. 61 
The political objectives of the Tamil guerrilla groups were a 
mixture of Tamil nationalism and Marxist ideology. The nationalistic 
element was mainly derived from the historic glory of a Tamil kingdom, 
while the Marxist ideology was more an influence of Marxism-Leninism 
than orthodox Marxism itself. Their ideological framework and 
strategies were designed to explain, achieve and justify their 
objectives. Dissimilar for the most part in their objectives, the 
guerrilla groups did not share a common ideology, programme and 
strategy. These differences were minor compared to the strength of 
their main common objective--that of the liberation and establishment 
of a separate socialist Tamil state. Prior to focusing on these 
ideologies the author wishes to trace their origins and sources. 
6.14 The Origin and Sources 
The sources of the ideologies of the Tamil guerrilla groups have 
been an issue of controversy and debate. Yet it is widely accepted 
that the various groups derived their ideological framework from 
Marxism-Leninism. The depth of this influence, however, is 
questionable as the incorporation of Marxist concepts in the ideology 
60 A. C. Balasingham, "Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom 
Struggle", No. 4, Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Eelam, 
(1983), p. 42. 
61 Political Committee of the L. T. T. E., Towards Liberation, 
Selected Political Documents of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam, 
(1984), p. 7. 
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of the Tamil guerrillas is exaggerated. Concepts and rhetoric which 
proved to be useful in justifying their objectives were borrowed from 
Marxism and utilized widely. For example, the concept of self- 
determination is a concept much overused by scholars to justify the 
Tamils' common objective of a separate state. The differences in 
ideology between the groups is mainly attributed to their different 
interpretations of Marxism. The E. P. R. L. F. advocated an orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist approach irrespective of any embellishments. The 
P. L. O. T. adhered to a socialist revolution of the workers and peasants 
based on a strong Marxist line. The E. R. O. S. on the contrary 
advocated an even firmer Marxist view of the struggle. The T. E. L. O., 
on the other hand, adopted an indifferent attitude towards a 
theoretical approach. Its leader Sri Sabarathnam presented T. E. L. O. 's 
position when he said that: 
Our people want. Eelam immediately. They are not. 
concerned with Marxism or any other "ism". It 
(ideology) is only the next step after Eelam is 
achieved. 62 
The L. T. T. E. had its own distinct approach to Marxism which was 
also mixed with the goal of achieving Eelam. In reply to questions 
posed by N. Rain of The Hindu, the leader of the L. T. T. E., V. 
Prabakaran, explained that socialism and Tamil Eelam formed the 
nucleus of the L. T. T. E. ideology. 63 The'aim, of forming a separate 
state, however, subsumed their socialist commitment. Anton 
Balasingham explained this twist of ideology as a commitment to being 
socialist revolutionaries who uphold democracy rather than being 
62 "The Terrorist Scourge Puts up the Ante", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, (12 June 1986), p. 29. 
63 "Making, of a Militant Leader: An Interview with V. Prabakaran", 
Lanka Guardian, Vol. 9, No. 10, (15 September 1986), p. 10. 
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totally committed to dogmatic Marxism. " Within this context it was 
indicated that the Tamil nationalism of the L. T. T. E. took some 
ideological support from a loose synthesis of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, 
it was the L. T. T. E. which took tip the cause of Tamil nationalism and 
emerged as the rallying force of all nationalistic elements within the 
Tamil community. This trend is further exemplified by the L. T. T. E. 's 
views pertaining to modern society and the would-be Tamil state. 
6.15 Perceptions 
A major part of the various Tamil guerrilla ideologies were based 
on the influence of Teenil legends and ethnic lore which had been 
imbibed into their culture over the years. One of their major 
perceptions which was fundamental to all of their ideologies was that 
of a traditional homeland. The concept of a traditional Tamil 
homeland was inextricably linked with the political ideologies of the 
Tamil guerrilla groups. The L. T. T. E. and the other guerrilla groups 
perceived that the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka were in 
fact the traditional homeland of the Tamil people. The L. T. T. E. 
expressed this belief to a representative of the Taunil Nadu state 
government. 
This "homeland" is a clearly identifiable, 
contiguous, single region composed of the Northern 
and Eastern provinces. This region is the 
historically constituted homeland of the of the Tamil 
speaking people and therefore indivisible. The 
recognition of the territorial integrity of the 
region as the "homeland" of the Tamil is cardinal to 
any meaningful lasting solutions to the Tamil 
national question. 65 
64 Frontline, (10-23 January 1987), p. 22. 
65 L. T. T. E., "Tamil Militants' Position on Government's Proposals: 
L. T. T. E. Comments", letter to M. G. Ramachandran Chief Minister of 
Tamil Nadu", Frontline, (15-28 November 1986), p. 116. 
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The L. T. T. E. found it imperative to demarcate a territorial base 
to foster and nurture a separate Tamil state where the Tamils' own 
cultural identity could flourish. Thus, the concept of a homeland was 
associated with the claim to constitute a community based on language, 
culture and tradition. Within this context the ethnocentric 
orientation of the L. T. T. E. heightened the intensity of their demand 
for a separate state and the depth of their claim of the right to the 
land where generations of Tamils had been born. The Tamils felt 
strongly that any attempts to settle Sinhalese in these areas should 
be resisted. They further emphasised and exaggerated the importance 
of the language, culture, tradition and level of achievement of the 
Tamil people to arouse nationalistic fervour in the Tamil populace. 
Their ultimate aim was to gain support for their armed struggle for a 
separate state. 66 Their concept of a separate state was based 
mainly on the historical Jaffna Kingdom which the L. T. T. E. perceived 
to have been the golden age of the Tamil culture in Sri Lanka. 
According to the L. T. T. E., a Tamil Kingdom had flourished in Sri 
Lanka between the 13th and the 17th centuries wherein the Tamil people 
had been ensured a stable national existence. The Portuguese annexed 
these predominantly Tamil areas in 1619, but governed them as a 
separate national entity. The Dutch who later annexed these areas 
adhered to the Portuguese system. It was the British who integrated 
this territory to the unitary system of government thus amalgamating 
the Sinhala and Tamil kingdoms. This integration, claimed the 
L. T. T. E., was the beginning of a bitter and long drawn out ethnic 
conflict. The L. T. T. E. summed up its views on this amalgamation as 
follows: 
66 Cociyalicat Tamil Ilattai Nokki, (Towards a Socialist Tamil 
Eelam), L. T. T. E. publication, p. 32, cited in Dagmar Hellmann- 
Rajanayagam, "The Tamil Tigers in Northern Sri Lanka: Origins, 
Factions, Programmes", Internationales Asienforum, Vol. 17, No. 
(1986), p. 74. 
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Until 1833, there existed separate states in Sri 
Lanka. After 1833 these separate states were brought 
under one central administrative organisation for 
reasons of administrative convenience and 
disregarding the opposition of the Tamils and 
Sinhalese. 67 
The L. T. T. E. was influenced by the historical past in formulating 
its ideology rather than by more current socio-economic and political 
developments. According to Eric Hoffer, preoccupation with the past 
stems not only from a desire to demonstrate the legitimacy of a new 
movement and the illegitimacy of the old order but also to show the 
present as a mere interlude between past and future. 69 As a result, 
the L. T. T. E. 's ideology was exclusively nationalist and ethnocentric 
as reflected in their approach to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
The L. T. T. E. extended to post-independent Sri Lanka its ideological 
vision in which the granting of independence was viewed as a transfer 
of power from the British to a Sinhala national bourgeoisie. 69 This 
transfer of power, according to the L. T. T. E., marked the beginning of 
a state-sponsored system of genocide which continued into the post- 
independent period. The examples cited for this genocide were: the 
Sinhala Only Act of 1956, the ethnic riots in 1956 and 1958, the 
government intervention against the Satyagraha campaign in 1961, the 
new constitution in 1972, and the ethnic violence in 1977,1981 and 
1983.70 
G7 "! iakkalin Vitutalaiyai Venretuppom. (We Will Obtain People's 
Liberation)", P. L. O. T. publication, p. 2, cited in Dagmer, op. cit., 
p. 76. 
6 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts On the Nature of Mass 
Movements, (New York: New American Library, 1958), p. 71. 
69 Towards Liberation, op. cit., p. 4. 
70 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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The ideological sustenance of the L. T. T. E. was derived from Tamil 
nationalism and was expressed in their views regarding S. J. V. 
Chelvanayagam, who was referred to as `Tantai Selva' which means 
'Father Selva'. 71 The L. T. T. E. was the only guerrilla group which 
acknowledged Chelvanayagam as the father figure, and believed that 
they had taken up his cause for separatism and, therefore, were the 
authentic successors of Chelvanayagam and the Federal Party he 
represented. Their support for him was expressed publicly as follows: 
The gun in their hands, the fire of freedom in their 
hearts, arises the third generation: Tantai Selva's 
(Father Selva ) heroic policies cwnnot be bartered 
away, in strength his heirs rise up.... L. T. T. E. 
members have come into his heritage on the 
battlefield. 72 
It is thus evident that the L. T. T. E. viewed itself as part of a 
long, tradition of nationalism whose task was to succeed and pursue the 
goals of prior nationalists. The L. T. T. E. alone among the Tamil 
, guerrilla , groups had the distinction of adhering to the ideological 
traditions of the Tamil nationalist politicians and further developing 
and adapting their ideas. 
Just as the J. V. P. 's choice of the emblem of a lion on its flag 
was symbolic of its ideological emphasis, so too was the choice of the 
L. T. T. E. 's emblem of a tiger. According to the L. T. T. E. 's leader 
Prabakaran, the tiger had deeper connotations of an historic Taunil 
patriotic resurgence, and was derived from the royal emblem of the 
ancient Chola Empire. 73 D. B. Jeyaraj concludes that this symbol 
71 S. J. V. Chelvanayagam was the leader of the Federal Party who 
pioneered the demand for a federal government and later for a separate 
state. From 1949 to 1976 he led the demands for a federal state, but 
afterwards he abandoned his demands for federalism and opted for a 
policy of separatism based on the concept of Eelam. 
72 Putiya Patai [New Path], (January 1986), p. 5. 
73 Interview with V. Prabakaran, in Sunday, (11-17 March 1984), 
reprinted in Towards Liberation, op. cit., p. 80. 
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aroused a deep-seated nostalgia for a golden age which is said to have 
existed during the Chola Empire. 74 Furthermore, it also represented 
a counterpart to the Sinhala emblem of a lion. 
The strong influence of Tamil nationalism was further evident in 
the code of discipline adapted by the L. T. T. E. This disciplinary code 
was based on the ethics advocated by Hinduism and those which were 
inherent in the traditional Tamil culture. Thus, the L. T. T. E. was 
committed to a resurgence of Tamil culture thereby rejecting the 
influences of western culture. Consequently, its ideology was one 
that depended heavily on the glory of the past and a culture which had 
gradually been eroded. 
The L. T. T. E. 's nationalist image called for an ideologically anti- 
Sinhala stand, and so they opposed the Sinhalese community as a 
repressive majority community. Though the E. P. R. L. F. and P. L. O. T. 
were willing to cooperate with the left-wing movement and socialist 
groups of the Sinhalese community, the L. T. T. E. was not open to any 
form of dialogue with the Sinhalese. For the L. T. T. E. the primary 
contradiction in Sri Lanka was not capitalism but nationalism. 75 
Viewed from this perspective, any form of cooperation with the 
Sinhalese was to be rejected. The extent of this rejection is 
indicated in the L. T. T. E. 's shooting in 1985 of the headmaster of St. 
John's College in Jaffna after he organised a cricket match between 
the government army and the students "76 The L. T. T. E. 's extreme stand 
was not shared by either the E. P. R. L. F. or P. L. O. T. which were 
ideologically more Marxist-oriented than Tamil nationalistic. The 
7 S. B. Jeyaraj, "How Strong are Boys", Frontline, (23 March-5 
April 1985), p. 62. 
75 Viravenkai, [Brave Tiger], L. T. T. E. publication, (October 
1986), p. 3. 
76 The reason was that he organinised a Cricket match between the 
students and the armed forces. See Daily Telegraph, (28 June 1985). 
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P. L. O. T. expresses its ideological orientation on the subject of the 
Sinhala majority as follows: 
Our propaganda is not only intended to prepare people 
for armed combat, but also to let the Sinhalese= 
people know that we are not its enemies, that our 
fight is one against imperialism and that for this 
fight we want to help the Sinhalese. 77 
The L. T. T. E. 's approach to other minority communities within the 
country was quite contrary to that of the Sinhala majority. We to 
linguistic bonds Sri Lankan Muslims were also considered to be part of 
the Tamil community irrespective of the marked differences in 
religion. The Muslim community was given priority over the Indian 
Tamil plantation workers because the L. T. T. E. aspired for a merger 
between the Tamil-dominated Northern Province and the Eastern Province 
where a large part of the Muslim population is still concentrated. 7S 
Although the Indian Tamil plantation workers were not considered as an 
integral part of the Tamil guerrillas liberation struggle, they were 
to be accommodated in the state of Eelam. 79 E. R. O. S., however, did 
not share the views of the L. T. T. E. on the role of the plantation 
workers. To E. R. O. S., the plantation workers of Indian origin also 
represented part of the proletariat which was crucial to achieving the 
concept of an Eelam. SO 
In addressing some of the pressing social problems prevalent in 
Sri Lankan Tamil society, the L. T. T. E. was faced with the conflicts of 
77 Putiya Patai [New Path], P. L. O. T. publication, (June-July, 
1985), p. 2, cited in Dagmar, op. cit., p. 73. 
75 The Ethnic composition in the Eastern Province is as follows: 
Tamils 41%, Muslims 31%, and Sinhalese 21%. 
79 T. S. Subramaniam, "Spotlight on the L. T. T. E", Frontline, (10-23 
January 1987), p. 22. 
SO T. S. Subramaniam, "Eros, The Dark Horse", Frontline, (28 June- 
4 July 1986), p. 18. 
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caste and class. According, to its ideological convictions, the 
L. T. T. E. strongly believed in a classless, casteless society which 
would ensure equality for all. It is known that they favoured the 
lower castes to eradicate any discrimination. 81 Another significant 
social consideration was the status of women in Talnil society. In a 
society where women are culturally bound by traditions of dowry and 
castes their position was perceived to be vulnerable and suppressed. 
The L. T. T. E. failed, however, to present a definite perception of how 
such conditions would be changed. The L. T. T. E. obviously failed to 
come to grips with the social and economic problems of Sri Lankan 
Tamil society. The L. T. T. E. addressed a few obvious grievances, but 
not the ones which were the crux of the socio-economic fabric. The 
L. T. T. E. strove for reforms but not for radical social changes; 
changes were not an inherent part of the L. T. T. E. 's ideology. 
The analysis of the L. T. T. E. 's ideology thus far strongly 
indicates that they not only rejected the unitary political system in 
Sri Lanka, which they believed was against their socio-economic and 
political interests, but also rejected the more moderate Tamil 
political stand which was represented by T. U. L. F. To the L. T. T. E., 
T. U. L. F. represented the Tamil bourgeoisie who had made futile 
attempts to secure an egalitarian position for the Tamil people. 
Prabakaran, the L. T. T. E. 's leader, found the "opportunistic" politics 
of T. U. L. F. a barrier to the Tamil liberation struggle in Sri Lanka. 
He perceived T. U. L. F. to be governed by motives of self-advancement 
rather than a party structured to achieve the "liberation" of the 
oppressed Tamil people. Furthermore, T. U. L. F. failed to grasp the 
realities of a revolutionary force which was motivated by a political 
desire to achieve a state of Eelam, and, therefore, its memberswere 
S1 Diary of Combat, p. 44, cited in Dagmar, op. cit., p. 73. 
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seen as traitors to the revolutionary cause. SZ The L. T. T. E. 's 
disillusionment regarding the policies and strategies of T. U. L. F. are 
indicated in the following statement: 
The political structure of the Tamil United Front, 
founded on a conservative bourgeois ideology, could 
not provide the basis for the articulation of 
revolutionary politics. It became very clear to the 
Tamil masses and particularly to the revolutionary 
youth that the Tamil national leaders, though they 
fiercely championed the cause of the Tamils, have 
failed to formulate any concrete practical programme 
of political action to liberate the oppressed Tamil 
nation. Having exhausted all forms of popular 
struggle for the last three decades, having been 
alienated from the power structure of the Sinhala 
state, the Tamil politicians still cling to 
parliament to air their disgruntlement which went 
unheard, unheeded like vain cries in the 
wilderness. S3 
The Tamil guerrillas not only opposed the Sinhala-dominated 
government. but also any of their own political leaders who failed to 
support their demands. 
Just as the J. V. P. stressed the word 'patriotism' in its 
indoctrination classes and propaganda literature, so too did the 
L. T. T. E. rely on this word over and over again, defining it as 
follows: 
If a national race loves its history, filled with 
greatness and its language and culture, its 
traditions and ancient customs, that we call 
patriotism. One who discards this progressive 
patriotism, this love of the nation and calls for 
cosmopolitanism, is not a true socialist. People 
like these are bourgeois cosmopolitans. 84 
g2 Towards Liberation, op. cit., p. 84. 
43 A. Balasingham, Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom 
Struggle, Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Eeiam Book 
Publication, No. 4, (1983), p. 25. 
84 Cociya licat Tamil Ilattai Nokki, p. 32, cited in Dagmar, op. 
cit.., p. 74. 
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'The absolute commitment which the L. T. T. E. demanded from its 
members is indicative of its ideological orientation towards 
extremism. The cyanide capsules which were worn around the necks of 
their fighter cadres were seen as a symbolic expression of the 
commitment, determination and courage of its members. 85 The symbolic 
revival of the ancient tradition of the warriors following their 
chieftain to the battlefield and death appear to have been assimilated 
by the L. T. T. E. from the legendary accounts of the Tamil kingdoms. K. 
Subramaniam concludes that the Tamil Tigers were inculcated with a 
"Masada" type cult which was manifest in the cyanide capsules. 96 
The basic framework of the L. T. T. E. ideology was dependent on the 
search for causes and explanations of the repression of the Tamils by 
the Sinhala-dominated governments, which they felt was extreme enough 
to annihilate the Tamil people. The result was an eclectic body of 
thought which was geared to a liberation struggle. In spite of its 
extreme nationalistic strain and predominantly anti-Sinhala feelings, 
the L. T. T. E. 's ideology was pragmatic and subtle in comparison with 
that of some of the other Tamil' guerrilla groups. Most of the other 
groups derived support for the state of Eelam from the existence of a 
Tamil kingdom in Jaffna prior to being conquered by the Portuguese. 
The territorial base of the Jaffna Kingdom, however, was complex: 
there is strong evidence that the Eastern Province had been excluded 
from the said kingdom. Hence, the L. T. T. E. used a more subtle 
argument harking back even further in history to the powerful Chola 
Empire whose territorial limits remain vague. Furthermore, there is 
evidence of a mutual antagonism between the people of the Vellalar 
caste in Jaffna and the Mukkuar caste of Batticaloa. With such an 
ambience of conflict the argument for a Jaffna Kingdom could not 
S5 Lanka Guardian, (October 1986), p. 12. 
56 Frontline, (14-27 November 1987), p. 23. 
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possibly have served as a truly uniting factor. Therefore, the 
L. T. T. E. had more subtly adapted the supposed idea of a glorious 
`Choler Kingdom' in order to unite and mobilise the Tamil people in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces. The pragmatic character of the 
L. T. T. E. 's ideology is further obvious in the following statement by 
an area leader: 
Well I do have some political principles. Basically, 
it is what the L. T. T. E. stands for, I adhere to it 
fully. I am a practical man, more of a pragmatist. 
I also prefer practical action to merely talking or 
discussing theory. That is what is important. I 
don't talk about ideology. I don't know ideology. I 
believe in actions"' 
The ideological differences apart, the L. T. T. E. emerged as the 
most prominent guerrilla group due to its strong nationalist stand and 
action-oriented approach. The guerrilla groups differed in their 
approaches to the socio-economic aspects, which they discussed at a 
superficial level and which were superseded by the more blatant 
differences in their strategic and tactical approaches to 
revolutionary struggle. This is a crucial area of controversy. 
6.16 Strategy and Tactics 
The military strategies of the Tamil guerrilla groups is a topic 
which has received scant attention though it is a crucial area of the 
phenomenon of insurgency. Of all the Tamil guerrilla groups, only the 
L. T. T. E. ever formed a definite strategy of political violence to 
achieve its ends. The L. T. T. E. in their literature claimed to stand 
for national liberation and socialist revolution. Their aim was to 
overthrow the Sri Lankan national government through a protracted 
armed struggle or at least to gain control in the Tamil areas. 
S7 Frontline, (15-28 November 1986), p. 117. 
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According to the L. T. T. E., guerrilla warfare marked the beginning of a 
people's war which is one of the most effective means of gaining a 
separate state. They believed that unrelentless guerrilla warfare 
would eventually rally the mobilisation of the general populace, and 
that until the final war of liberation united the guerrilla factions 
they should continue with a protracted guerrilla war based mainly on 
hit-and-run tactics. --58 Thus, the final goal of urban guerrilla 
warfare was to politicise the broader masses for a war of national 
liberation and socialist revolution. 89 The L. T. T. E. claimed that this 
particular strategy was adapted to suit the specific political 
conditions in Sri Lanka. 90 
The L. T. T. E. 's interpretation of a people's war, did not actually 
include the active participation of the people, but rather only the 
moral support of the populace. This strategy of urban guerrilla-ctun- 
rural guerrilla warfare, was complex and multi-faceted. Dagmar found 
it necessary to view this complex strategy under the following three 
stages: (1) individual terror; (2) armed confrontation with the 
police, state symbols of repression and Tamil collaborators; and (3) 
armed confrontation with the military forces. 91 The L. T. T. E. further 
adapted, when necessary, some of the tactics advocated by Mao and Che 
Guevara namely that of confusing the enemy, attacking unexpectedly, 
and destroying one's targets. 92 
The L. T. T. E. 's strategy was found to be unacceptable by the other 
Tamil guerrilla groups. Notably, P. L. O. T. viewed a guerrilla war as 
88S. B. Jeyaraj, op. cit., p. 65. 
89 "Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle", op. cit., 
1983, p. 42. 
90 Ibid., p. 42. 
91 Dagmar, op. cit., pp. 70-71. 
92 Diary of Armed Combat, L. T. T. E. publication, p. 11-13, cited in 
Dagmar, op. cit., p. 71. 
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useless and counter-productive, especially when considering the 
vulnerability of the Tamil civilians to army reprisals after each 
guerrilla attack. P. L. O. T. 's fundamental argument was that the 
strategy of an armed struggle should be closely related to the 
indigenous conditions. On the basis of these premises, P. L. O. T. 
rejected the idea that strategies which were successful in one state 
could be applied in another without modification or adaptation. 93 In 
this way it was similar to the J. V. P. which had great antipathy to 
outside influences, even revolutionary ones. According to the 
P. L. O. T., the strategy which would be most successful in Sri Lanka 
would be one which stressed mass mobilisation and a full-fledged 
battle once this mobilisation was complete. 94 The P. L. O. T. 's 
interpretation of a mass base is as follows: 
Extending mass bases means creating . -Irassroot party branches in villages, towns and districts and 
strengthening the alliance with important population 
groups and classes like landless peasants, students, 
artisans etc. 95 
E. R. O. S. too was committed to deriving an indigenous revolutionary 
strategy rather than importing one. 96 They further found the 
L. T. T. E. 's hit-and-run strategy to be redundant as such a strategy is 
only effective at the beginning of a guerrilla war. 97 Under 
E. R. O. S. 's strategy, the sensitive areas of the economy would be 
93 Putiya Patai, (September 1984), p. 10, cited in Dagmar, op. 
cit., p. 70. 
94 Putiya Patai, (June-July 1985), p. 6, cited in Dagmar, op. 
cit., p. 74. 
95 Ibid., p. 70. 
96 Putiya Patai, (March 1985), pp. 4-5, cited in Dagmar, op. cit., 
p. 70. 
97 T. S. Subramanyam, "EROS the Dark Horse", Frontline, (28 June- 
11 July 1986), P. 18. 
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destabilized, to be followed by an attack on military targets. As a 
result, although some of its guerrilla operations particularly in 
Southern Sri Lanka, were concentrated on sabotage and subversion of 
economic targets, those in the Northern and Eastern provinces were 
directed at military personnel and installations in the form of 
ambushes, landmines, bombings and raids. 98 
The E. P. R. L. F. was influenced by Leninism rather than Guevaraism 
and, therefore, also attempted to mobilise the masses, especially the 
lower classes in the Tamil areas. They rejected guerrilla warfare as 
a strategy but accepted such methods as mere tactics. 99 T. E. L. O. 's 
strategy was generally vague and undefined, but did include hit-and- 
run tactics especially when its members were unable to engage the 
enemy in open confrontation. T. E. L. O. advocated a strategy of a 
protracted war of national liberation which would be fought by all 
factions in a united effort. 
From the above discussion it becomes increasingly evident that the 
Tamil guerrillas differed in their strategic and tactical approaches. 
They were influenced by Maoism, Guevaraism and the strategies of 
Margihella, typifying the strategies of other politically violent 
groups in the Third World. 
6.17 Programme of the Tamil Guerrilla Groups 
The various revolutionary programmes of the Tamil guerrilla 
movement revolved around the groups' shared envisaged strategy for an 
independent Tamil state, Eelam. At this juncture the author will 
concentrate on the political aspects, the foreign policy and the 
economic proposals of the said state of Eelam, as proposed by the 
Tamil guerrilla groups. Despite their deeply committed demands for a 
9g Frontline, (23 March-5 April 1985), p. 65. 
99 Ibid. 
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separate state, none of the Tamil groups presented a precise 
alternative to the existing socio-economic and political system in Sri 
Lanka. Their various programmes were vague, unformulated and 
ambivalent. The L. T. T. E., for example, discussed its own programme at 
a superficial level in its propaganda literature. On the basis of 
this literature, and in order to facilitate a clear explication, the 
author focuses on the following aspects: the proposed boundaries or 
territorial limits of the state of Eelam, the nature of its 
government, its foreign policy and economic programme. 
Regarding the territorial limits, the Tamil guerrilla groups 
failed to reach an agreement and engaged in a constant debate. Nor 
was there a consensus as to the ideology of the proposed state 
government. The only factor they agreed upon was that a separate 
state should be established in the area claimed to be the traditional 
homeland. There was disagreement, however, as to the historical 
boundaries of the imagined homeland. The nucleus of the Tamil state 
was generally comprised of the Northern and Eastern provinces but 
again the peripheral limits were subjectively defined. The L. T. T. E., 
for instance, while accepting the Northern and Eastern provinces as 
the foundation of a Tamil state, extended the territorial limits to 
Puttlam in Western Sri Lanka and Pottuvil in the East. 100 T. E. L. O. 
and P. L. O. T., on the other hand, did not define the boundaries 
precisely but rather signaled that they were in agreement with the 
L. T. T. E. in this respect. E. R. O. S. and the E. P. R. L. F. devised a more 
ambitious plan which also included the central highland areas, 
populated by the Indian plantation workers. Accordingly E. R. O. S. 
claimed that an area ranging from Point Pedro to Badulla in the 
100 Frontline, (25 March-5 April 1985), p. 65. 
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central highlands, and from Mannar to Batticoloa including Potuvil in 
the East should be included in the state of Eelam. 101 
Just as the territorial limits of an independent Eelam state were 
open to controversy, so too was the political nature of the state a 
factor of dispute. The L. T. T. E. had a more precise format for the 
political and constitutional elements of the independent Tamil state, 
and claimed that it would be an egalitarian socialist state. 
Prabakaran explained the L. T. T. E. 's conception-of the character of an 
Eelam socialist society in the following excerpt: 
By socialism I mean the construction of an 
egalitarian society where there is no class 
contradiction and exploitation of man by man, a free 
rational society where human freedom and rights are 
protected and progress enhanced. '02 
The L. T. T. E. rejected parliamentary democracy based on a multi- 
party system, and instead advocated the advantages of a one-party 
system. Prabakaran claimed that the necessary socio-economic and 
political changes would actually be accelerated under a socialist 
constitution based on a one-party system. Within such a system, the 
L. T. T. E said, priority would be given to the needs of the people. 103 
The L. T. T. E. 's rejection of a British-oriented parliamentary democracy 
as bourgeois, however, did not mean a preference for the Russian one- 
party model. The L. T. T. E's peculiar form of socialist orientation 
opposed the Russian model on the premise that the party becomes the 
state. Rather, the L. T. T. E. selected a one-party state similar to 
that of the Yugoslavian model. The L. T. T. E. called it a 'socialist 
democratic' model, but a closer review of their literature strongly 
101 See Appendix 6 for a map of proposed Eelam state. 
102 Frontline, (28 June-11 July 1986), p. 18. 
103 S. O. L. T., a magazine of the Student Organisation of the 
L. T. T. E., (1986), p. 16 , 
304 
suggests that their aspirations for an egalitarian state were more 
along the lines of a benevolent dictatorship. The other Tamil groups 
gave scant attention to this aspect of their ideologies although all 
expressed a basic belief in a socialist state rather than a 
parliamentary democracy. 
The foreign policies of all the Tamil guerrilla groups were also 
vague and ambivalent. At first the L. T. T. E. claimed that they had 
been strongly influenced by the socialist block, but then claimed that 
they were not partial to any international ideology and were committed 
to non-alignment. 104 Due to Sri Lanka's geographical proximity to 
India, the L. T. T. E. adapted a pro-Indian stand and supported proposals 
to declare the Indian Ocean a 'zone of peace'. 105 Their partiality to 
India, in general, compelled them to adopt a stand in opposition to 
Pakistan and the People's Republic of China. The L. T. T. E. 's 
propaganda, however, was rife with attacks on the U. S. A. and Israel. 
The U. S. A. was branded as an `imperialist force' and Israel was 
condemned as an 'international Zionist force'. These aspersions were 
merely rhetoric meant to signify a preference for a purely indigenous 
solution to the ethno-political conflicts in Sri Lanka, but were not 
intended to incite physical attacks against those foreign powers or 
their interests. 
The ultimate commitment to guerrilla warfare and political 
violence distracted the major groups from discussing their programmes 
theoretically and explicitly. Economics was perhaps the most 
neglected area, with little or no attention given to that issue in the 
groups' propaganda literature. Nevertheless, the author has derived 
his insight from the activities of the L. T. T. E. from 1985, when'they 
began a parallel administration in Jaffna. During this period the 
104 India Today, (30 June 1986). 
105 Towards Liberation, op. cit. p. 87. 
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L. T. T. E. strove to develop local industries based on the available 
agrarian and other local resources. Their primary focus was on 
maximizing the utilization of those resources in the manufacture of 
Palmyrah syrup, jams, soft drinks and soap. The L. T. T. E. 's economic 
programme also concentrated on reforms rather than on revolutionary 
changes. 
The L. T. T. E. 's organisational structure offers an insight into the 
proposed political pattern within a state of Eelam. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the L. T. T. E. was the most tightly structured, disciplined 
and autocratically-led group with an absolutely committed membership. 
It also had the reputation for being the most intransigent of the 
Tamil groups, and thus would have imposed a benevolent dictatorship 
rather than a democracy despite its claimed preference for a socialist 
state. After the L. T. T. E. 's takeover of Jaffna in 1985, the L. T. T. E. 
did not disturb the existing administrative and judicial structure, 
but actually adopted the same direction and style of the existing 
system. What emerged was a mere de facto government void of any 
significant changes. 
6.18 Summary 
The discussion so far has revealed distinct differences between 
the ideologies, strategies and programmes of the Sinhala-dominated 
left-wing J. V. P. and the Tamil guerrilla organisations. The 
objectives of the J. V. P. were basically anti-government and non- 
capitalistic. Its ideology was a mixture of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, 
Guevaraism and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. The complexity and 
fusion of diverse sources reduced its ability to postulate a coherent 
ideology, effective strategy and a viable programme for waging 
guerrilla warfare and installing a distinctly strong socialist state. 
The ideologies of the Tamil guerrillas too were diverse and incoherent 
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due to the proliferation of factions, though they shared a common 
inspiration of Tamil nationalism rather than Marxism. Hence, all the 
ideologies of the Tamil guerrilla groups were preoccupied with the 
survival and preservation of the Tamil race, nation, language, culture 
and traditional homeland. Moreover, they believed that the supposed 
racial superiority of the Tamils justified their ethnic prejudice 
against the Sri Lankan Sinhalese majority. Thus, their ideology was 
limited to the confines of their own community and lacked a wider 
societal perspective. 
Neither the J. V. P. nor the L. T. T. E. and other Tamil groups fit 
into either of the ideological categories of hard-line leftists or 
communists. Rather all may be categorised as hard-line nationalists 
with leftist leanings. This fundamental nationalism which was fused 
with the revolutionist theories of the major Marxist-Leninist thinkers 
is common to other underground movements in many Third World 
countries. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 the author will examine the pattern and 
sequence of political violence waged by the organisations discussed 
above. 
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Chapter 7 
PA717E NS OF POLITICAL VIOWICE: 1971-1987 
7.1 Introduction 
Political violence in Sri Lanka, as characterized by its divisive 
social, economic. and political conflicts, is organised and pre- 
planned, and is a potent development of the country's prolonged 
modernisation process. The form of organisation and manifestation of 
this violence, is dependent on the contrary ideologies, strategies and 
tactics adopted by its various perpetrators. The author has already 
examined these aspects of political violence as experienced in Sri 
Lanka. Nevertheless, the two main strains of political violence as 
organised by the left-wing J. V. P. and the Tamil guerrilla groups have 
featured their own distinct patterns and sequences of commission. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the overall 
patterns and consequences of political violence in Sri Lanka from 1971 
to 1987. The first half of the chapter addresses the unmitigated 
violence resorted to by the J. V. P. in 1971. The latter half examines 
the political violence generated and protracted by the Tamil guerrilla 
groups through 1987. Therefore, the author has subdivided this 
chapter under the following headings which contribute to a more lucid 
analysis of the political violence as follows: short-term factors, 
aims and planning, modes of warfare (forms of warfare), the 
governmental response, magnitude of violence, the patterns and 
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outcome. 
7.2 Short-term Factors 
The first major manifestation of political violence in post- 
independent Sri Lanka was the-left-wing guerrilla insurrection of 
April 1971. It was a pre-planned armed attack which was motivated and 
launched by the J. V. P. The combination of two immediate factors 
impelled the J. V. P. to plunge into an armed struggle against the Sri 
Lankan Government. The first was the inherent propensity for 
political violence which was deeply entrenched in the J. V. P. 's 
political ideology. As a result. of the method of indoctrination and 
mobilisation practiced by the J. V. P., its members held the conviction 
that a socialist society, which was their panacea for the problems of 
the existing society, would be ushered in through an armed struggle. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the J. V. P. had prepared for armed 
resistance prior to the General Election of 1970, anticipating a 
prospective dictatorship of the incumbent U. N. P. Government with 
military backing. ' Although the election of 1970 brought the U. F. 
Government to power, the U. N. P. 's defeat did not stall the J. V. P. 's 
preparation for armed confrontation. Instead, the J. V. P. began 
criticising the U. F. Government for its delay in bringing about major 
and constructive changes. Furthermore, at a rally in Colombo on the 
28th of February 1971, the J. V. P. verbally attacked the U. F. 
Government and promised to commence an armed revolt if police 
persecution of the J. V. P. did not stop. 
Consequently, the continued process of preparation for an initial 
offensive resulted in a growing restlessness and an urgency among the 
J. V. P. 's members. By 1971 the members of the J. V. P. were impatient 
to launch an armed attack, having secured a ready supply of weaponry, 
1 See, Chapter Six. 
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ammunition and uniforms, and many of them having sacrificed their jobs 
and careers to become full-time members of the J. V. P. In light of 
their presumed preparedness, there was a growing clamour among the 
J. V. P. 's members to begin the violent campaign to capture power as 
quickly as possible. According to Chalmers Johnson, the belief held 
by an insurgent group that it can succeed in overcoming the elite's 
armed might is an accelerator of revolution. 2 
The second manifestation of the violence to come was the 
disposition of government forces to prepare for a military solution to 
the J. V. P. 's armed threat. Generally, the government's counter- 
offensive was based on reports submitted by the local police and the 
intelligence services. The U. N. P. during its term of government from 
1965 to 1970, had studied the changes in Sri Lanka's political climate 
and compiled a report on the subversive movement, its pattern of 
activities and the key players involved. The first such report was 
compiled on the basis of information procured in 1967; the next was 
compiled in 1969.3 Though the U. F. Government initially adopted a 
liberal attitude towards the J. V. P., this posture was soon replaced 
by a policy of repression. 
In 1970 the U. F. Government set up a special police unit nicknamed 
the `Guevara Bureau', through which all intelligence pertaining to the 
subversive movement was channelled. The government also prepared for 
legal action which would be crucial in the event of the outbreak of 
political violence. The laws then were far from adequate for dealing 
with guerrilla warfare. A proposed law entitled "The Prevention of 
Violent Insurrection Act" was submitted to the Cabinet for 
consideration. The Act bestowed the police with special powers of 
2 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1966), p. 99. 
3 Those reports were prepared by General John Attyagale who later 
became Advisor to the Ministry of Defence. 
310 
custody, arrest and trial of insurgents on charges of sedition. } The 
initial outcome of this pre-insurrectionary measure was the immediate 
arrest of about 500 members and sympathizers of the J. V. P. 5 
Regardless of the new legal measures, the government's programme for 
counterviolence depended most heavily on the strength and ability of 
the military and the police forces. An additional 1,500 men were 
recruited to the police service which already had a manpower strength 
of about 11,000 regulars. 6 Furthermore, in early March 1971 army 
units were deployed in Anuradhapura, Matara and Kandy. 
While the U. F. Government was preparing for its own military 
offensive, the government launched a political programme under the 
direction of a parliamentary committee to counter J. V. P. propaganda 
and reduce the guerrilla groups channels of mobilisation. This 
programme was a mixture of slander and theory, rather than a viable 
politico-economic programme. The government's propaganda campaign 
sought to discredit the J. V. P. by accusing them of responsibility for 
a right-wing plot supposedly backed by the C. I. A. 7 The potential 
channels of dialogue between the U. F. and J. V. P. were thus blocked by 
the government's unwillingness to consider the deeper understanding of 
the nature of the J. V. P. 's movement. The gap, thus breached, widened 
even further, and continued to do so even after the government's 
quelling of the J. V. P. 's armed struggle later in 1971. The military 
approach to the J. V. P. 's uprising was one of well-planned tactics and 
overwhelming superiority of combatants and materiel, while the 
political approach lacked coherence, co-ordination and strategy. It 
} Ceylon Daily News, (3 March 1971). 
5 Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection", in Robin Blackburn, 
(ed), Explosion in a Sub-Continent, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1975), p. 195. 
6 Ceylon Daily News, (10 January 1971). 
7 Ceylon Observer, (9 August 1971). 
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is evident that the government's counter-insurgency programme before 
the eruption of the armed struggle was characterized by a lack of 
genuine socio-economic and political measures-. 
The main action taken by the U. F. Government to deter violence 
before the uprising began was the declaration of a state of emergency 
on the 6th of March 1971, including the enforcement of a strict 
curfew. Two major incidents led the government to make the 
declaraction: first, was the discovery of large stocks of handbombs, 
arms and ammunition in some parts of the island; second, was an attack 
earlier that day on the U. S. Embassy. 3 Then on the 10th of March 
1971, a bomb exploded at Dedigama in the Kegalle district; and on the 
16th of March 1971 sui explosion occurred at the University of 
Peradeniya. 9 These incidents alerted the government to the likelihood 
of an imminent concerted guerrilla attack. The police began to 
arrest more members of the J. V. P., sowing further fears of suppression 
within the J. V. P. movement. Nearly 500 members of the J. V. P. were 
already in custody, including Rohana Wijeweera, the leader of the 
movement. The J. V. P. countered with the ominous threat that 
provocative acts by the police would goad the movement into violent 
retaliation. 
7.3 Aims and Planning 
The J. V. P. 's long-term political objectives in the uprising were 
to overthrow the ruling regime and to capture state power. The 
strategy that had been devised to capture state power was based on the 
strength and effectiveness of a one-day armed struggle, which the 
S The Maoist Youth Front was responsible for the attack on the 
U. S. Embassy during which a police inspector was killed. 
9 The accidental explosion at Nelundeniya in the Dedigama 
electorate took place in a thatched mud hut which was the venue of 
manufacturing handbombs. It thus claimed the lives of five youths. 
The explosion in the university took place in a room at Mars Hall. 
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J. V. P. referred to as the `socialist revolution'. The J. V. P. was 
convinced as to the feasibility of their strategy because of the 
government's meagre military presence throughout Sri Lanka and its 
relatively ill-equipped apparatus for internal security. 
Consequently, the primary objective of the J. V. P. was to launch a vast 
frontal attack on the state apparatus and thereby seize power. 
In order to achieve this long-term objective, the J. V. P. had to 
fulfil certain immediate aims, the first of which was to capture and 
amass weapons and ammunition from police stations and military bases. 
Their second objective was to rescue their leader, Wijeweera, who had 
been confined in Jaffna Prison in the Northern Province of Sri 
Lanka. 10 Given the pre-insurrectionary objectives of the J. V. P., it 
is evident that their strategy was based on limited political 
objectives. 
The decision to launch an armed struggle was arrived at by the 
politburo of the J. V. P. on the 2nd of April 1971 when they met at the 
hostel for the Buddhist clergy at the University of Vidyodaya. 11 The 
date and time of attack were set for the 5th of April 1971 at 11 p. m. 
The decision to attack and the date and time of the attack were 
10 Rohana Wijeweera, the leader of the J. V. P., was taken into 
custody by the police on the 12th of March 1971, and kept in the 
Jaffna prison under the emergency regulations. At the trial of 
suspected J. V. P. members in 1972 Wijeweera received a life sentence. 
He was released in 1978 when the United National Party, which was 
elected in 1977, abolished the Criminal Justice Commission Act under 
which Wijeweera had been tried. He contested the Presidential 
Election in 1982. He was again forced underground, when the J. V. P. - 
was proscribed in 1983. He led a violent campaign against the Indo- 
Sri Lanka Accord in 1987, and against the presence of the I. P. K. F. in 
Sri Lanka. In 1989 he was executed after being captured by Sri Lankan 
troops. 
11 The following nine members of the J. V. P. 's Central Committee 
were present at the meeting: S. V. A. Piyatilleke, W. P. Witharana 
(Sanath), U. M. Jamis (Oo Mahataya), W. T. Karunarathne, Lionel Bopage, 
Susil Wickrama, W. M. Sunanda Deshapriya, B. A. R. Kurukulasuriys and 
W. U. N. Hayasinghe (Loku Athula). W. P. Vitharana (Sanath) and Susil 
Wickrama were killed in the insurrection. Others left the J. V. P. 
during and after the trial proceedings. 
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communicated to the district cadres and local leaders, and through 
them were transmitted to all other members of the J. V. P. 
7.4 Mode of Attack 
The J. V. P. 's strategy for mounting the insurrection against the 
U. F. Government in April 1971 was developed in three phases. The 
first phase of the attack was focused on overpowering the police 
stations and military bases. The police forces in 1970 numbered 
10,605, and were assigned to 266 police stations of which 53 were 
regional headquarters, 1T2 were staffed by 20 or fewer policemen, and 
41 were smaller offices. 12 There were five major military bases 
widely dispersed throughout Sri Lanka in the following areas: Panagoda 
and Gallface in the Western Province, Diyatalawa in the Uva Province, 
Kandy in the Central Province, Matara in the Southern Province, and 
Anuradhapura in the North Central Province. In addition, there was an 
air force base located in Katunayake in the Western Province. Since 
the J. V. P. 's leader, Wijeweera, was then imprisoned in Jaffna, it was 
deemed necessary to attack concurrently the police station, the naval 
base and the prison in Jaffna in order to rescue him. The Prime 
Minister and other key officials were considered important targets for 
capture. 
What is significant in their strategic plans was that the rural- 
based police stations, rather than the more strategically-based 
targets within the capital, were marked as prime targets. The 
J. V. P. 's preoccupation with rural-based targets may be attributed to 
their assumption that the government was more unpopular in the rural 
areas, and that a larger stock of arms and ammunition could be 
i2 H. F. Nyrop, et al., Area Hand Book for Ceylon, (Washington, 
Foreign Area Studies of the American Universities, 1971), p. 452. 
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procured with greater ease within those areas. 13 According to J. M. 
Van Der Kroef, the J. V. P. 's tactics appeared to call for a series of 
ever more violent confrontations with the police designed for the 
following two objectives: i. to create the impression that the 
government was losing control; and ii. to win new recruits in the 
aftermath of the government's suppressive measures. 11 
The plan of attack devised for the police stations and military 
bases did not differ. Accordingly, the attack was preceded by 
collecting shotguns which were available within the vicinity. The 
attackers were outfitted in home-sewn dark blue uniforms and were 
armed mainly with shotguns, locally-made handbombs and `Molotov 
cocktails'. 15 Groups of youth ranging from 40 to 50 in number were 
responsible for launching the respective attacks on police stations on 
the 5th of April 1971. First, all communications were disrupted and 
electricity supplies were disconnected. Their approach in attack 
varied. Some launched frontal attacks arriving in buses and lorries 
which had been forcibly commandeered, while others resorted to more 
surreptitious approaches. The overall method of launching surprise 
attacks, under the cover of darkness, is a valid form of guerrilla 
warfare. 
Consequently, on the night of the 5th of April, the J. V. P. was 
responsible for the tumultuous violence, on a scale of which had never 
been experienced in Sri Lanka. The J. V. P. did not, however, 
successfully implement its full plan of action as its members failed 
............... 13 James Jupp, "The JVP Insurrection of 1971 and Its Impact on the 
Marxist and Socialist Movements in Ceylon", A Paper for Conference on 
Sri Lanka, (London University, March 1974), p. 14. 
14 J. M. Van Der Kroef, "The Sri Lanka Insurgency of April 1971: 
Its Development and Meaning", Asia Quarterly, Vol. 2, (1973), p. 122. 
is Robert N. Kearney and Janice Jiggins, "The Ceylon Insurrection 
of 1971", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 
(1975), p. 41. 
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to launch attacks in the following districts: Ampara, Nuwara Eliya, 
Baddulla, Rathnapura and Monaragala. Their failure to launch attacks 
within those districts is largely attributed to the curfew imposed by 
the government after being alerted earlier that day by a premature 
attack on the Wellawaya police station in the Uva Province. More 
importantly, the J. V. P. 's entire plan of attack had been revealed to 
the security forces by an informant. Likewise, the J. V. P. failed to 
attack any of the military bases as anticipated in their strategy. 
The number of police stations attacked is an area of dispute amongst 
scholars. A. C. Alles states that the J. V. P. attacked i4 police 
stations in the initial stage of the insurrection. 16 J. Jupp 
maintains that 93 police stations were attacked within the first two 
days. 17 Fred Halliday states that at the height of the armed 
struggle between 90 to 100 police stations were abandoned or fell 
under the pressure of repeated attacks. 18 The J. V. P. was able to 
capture a mere five police stations in the initial wave of the attack 
perhaps because a majority of these police stations were based in the 
rural sector and thus were dispersed over a vast area. 19 This may 
have led to the thin application of J. V. P. fighters across a wide line 
of attack. 
The aftermath of the overall failure of the initial attack was 
characterized by a series of unfulfilled short term objectives. The 
J. V. P. had failed to capture a single major police station which would 
have been vital to the overall realization of their strategy. Second, 
_ ..................... . 16 A. C. Alles, Insurgency 1971, (Colombo: The Colombo 
Apothecaries, 1976), Appendix 1. 
17 J. Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy, (London: Frank Cass 
1978), p. 311. 
13 Fred Halliday, op. cit., p. 197. 
19 The following police stations were captured by the J. V. P. in 
their first day of attacks: Rajanganaya, Deniyaya, Uragaha, Kataragama 
and Warakapola. 
316 
they had failed to seize the Prime Minister or key members of her 
cabinet; nor had they succeeded in causing any disruption in the 
capital. Third, their feeble attempt to rescue their leader, 
Wijeweera, foundered. The J. V. P. not only failed to meet their 
immediate objectives, but also failed to ignite the mass uprising 
which had been anticipated in their-military strategy. 
The failure of the initial attack on the 5th of April 1971, gave 
rise to a second phase which was confined to the following districts: 
Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa in the North Central Province, Kurunagala 
in the Central Province, Monaragala in the Uva Province, and Kegalle, 
Matara, Galle and Hambarrtota in the Southern Province. Long-term 
occupation and open fighting with the military was confined to those 
areas. The earlier tactics, which had depended on a one-day attack to 
deal a single swift blow, were changed in favor of a protracted 
guerrilla warfare within the districts mentioned above. The police 
stations within those areas were either attacked or were likely to be 
attacked. Therefore, it was prudent if not necessary for the Sri 
Lankan Police to abandon their more isolated stations. Until about 
the 11th of April the police stations continued to be the most likely 
targets, especially in the rural areas. Several stations were either 
seized or destroyed, main roads and rail tracks were damaged, and 
communications were disrupted by the guerrillas. The J. V. P assumed 
command in areas where the police had withdrawn and the civil 
administration was in disarray. They implemented the basic functions 
of distributing food, running the post offices, and, in some areas, 
conducting the judicial functions. 20 
During the first few days of the insurrection, the armed forces 
were not equipped to launch a significant counterattack as they lacked 
20 "The Statement of the Inspector-General of Police", Judgement 
of the Criminal Justice Commission (Insurgency Inquiry), No. 1, 
(Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1976), p. 410. 
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the military strength for such an operation. As a result they were on 
the defensive during the first two weeks of the uprising. 21 
Consequently, the J. V. P. took advantage of this low resistance from 
the police and military forces, and thus occupied several major towns 
in semi-urban and rural areas. In these and in other towns which the 
J. V. P. successfully occupied, the police and public servants were 
besieged in public buildings. In some cases the J. V. P. passed over 
towns to instead secure the surrounding countryside, thereby isolating 
the government forces in the town centres. For instance, an army 
officer reported that on the lOt. h of April within the Kegalle District 
in the Sabaragamuwa Province, an area of about three acres where the 
Kachcheri (District Office), the police station and the Courts of Law 
are located, was held by the armed forces while the J. V. P. dominated 
the rest of the district. 22 Once the J. V. P. had taken over these 
areas they successfully , disrupted the transport system, 
telecommunications, power supplies and food distribution. -The 
Inspector General of Police explained the situation as follows: 
As police stations were withdrawn and civil 
administration collapsed in these areas the 
insurgents took over. They distributed food from 
cooperative stores and even held their courts of 
Justice. 23 
The J. V. P. 's immediate objective during the first few weeks of the 
insurgency was to consolidate their power in areas where they had 
already gained a foothold, and then to launch attacks from these power 
bases. As a result they were engaged in fierce confrontations in some 
21 Keesings Contemporary Archives, (21-28 August 1971), p. 24774. 
22 Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission (Insurgency 
Inquiry) op. cit., p. 417. 
23 The Statement of the Inspector General of Police, op. cit., p. 
410. 
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areas along the main road from Kegalle to Colombo, in a few areas in 
the Anuradhapura District, and in the South mainly centred around the 
small towns of Elpitiya and Deniya. Elpitiya was controlled for 
nearly three weeks by the J. V. P. The districts of Matara, Galle and 
Kegalle provided the J. V. P. with the most consistent and hard fighting 
support from the populace. 24 
The J. V. P. failed, however, to achieve its objectives during the 
second phase as it had in the first phase of its armed struggle. They 
not only failed to organise or mobilise mass support, but also 
neglected to launch an extensive propaganda to explain their ideology 
and objectives to the Sri Lankern people. Hence, when the Sri Lankan 
military forces launched their counter-attack in the areas which the 
J. V. P. had occupied, the less-committed guerrillas retreated to areas 
of refuge in the hills and forests for lack of local assistance. 
Subsequently, the hard core members of the J. V. P. were also forced to 
retreat to the remote jungle areas and national parks with the aim of 
conducting protracted rural guerrilla warfare. The retreat itself was 
the third and final phase of the armed struggle. 
The guerrillas retreated to the jungle or national park nearest 
the areas they had formerly occupied. The steadfast members in the 
South made their way to the Sinharaja Rain Forest which is a Strict 
Natural Reserve of about 24,000 acres. The members in the 
Anuradhapura, Kegalle and Kurunagala districts decided upon either the 
Wilpattu Sanctuary (National Park) or the Ritigala Mountains, which 
are about 2,500 ft high. Those based in Dambulla and Polonnaruwa 
retreated to the vast surrounding jungles. A group of 103 members 
from the South who intended to retreat to the Sinharaja Forest failed 
to do so largely due to their ignorance of the terrain and environs. 
24 J. Jupp, Sri Lanka-Third World Democracy, 1978, p. 299. 
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By the 30th of June the few who had made it to this forest were either 
captured or surrendered. 25 
On the other hand, the retreat from the Kegalle and Kurunagala 
districts assumed a different dimension. On the 23rd of June the 200 
guerrillas from those two areas decided to retreat to the Wilpattu 
National Park, and made their way there in two lots. The retreat 
took place under the cover of darkness and along unpopulated tracks to 
avoid any major confrontation with the armed forces. During the day 
they camped in isolated areas either on the mountains or in the 
jungles. A. C. Alles observes that this retreat was marked by murder, 
arson and looting commonly associated with terrorist activity. 26 This 
could only have offset their attempts at surreptitiousness and created 
new informants to tip the armed forces as to the guerrillas' 
whereabouts. of the 200 who set out, only about 30 reached their 
destination. By the end of August 1971,69 guerrillas were hiding in 
Wilpattu and about 50 in the forest surrounding Dambulla. Although 
these guerrillas intended to continue rural guerrilla warfare, the 
J. V. P. was not in a position to support such a protracted struggle for 
the following reasons: lack of manpower due to capture, desertion or 
defection; lack of mass support; the recapturing of base areas by the 
Sri Lankan armed forces; lack of adequate food supplies, weapons and 
ammunition; lack of adequate training for such warfare; and the poor 
knowledge of the terrain and environs to which the remaining 
guerrillas had retreated. 
According to V. I. Lenin, an insurrection should have two 
capabilities: the physical ability to overthrow a government; and the 
political ability to retain power for the insurgents. 27 Neither of 
25 A. C. Alles, Insurgency-1971, op. cit., p. 179. 
26 Ibid., p. 136. 
27 V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Insurrection", in Collected Works, 
Vol. 26, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), pp. 22-27. 
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these aspects were evident in the Insurrection of 1971. Moreover, 
there were several factors which subsequently resulted in the entire 
collapse of the J. V. P. 's armed struggle. One of the main reasons 
behind the J. V. P. 's defeat was the lack of a revolutionary 
environment. Charles Tilley asserts that revolution depends on the 
following proximate conditions: 
i. The appearance of contenders, or coalitions of 
contenders, advancing exclusive alternative claims to 
the control over the government currently exerted by 
the members of the polity; 
ii. commitment to those claims by a significant 
segment of the subject populations (especially when 
those commitments are not simply acknowledged in 
principle, but activated in the face of prohibitions 
or contrary directives from the government); 
iii. formation of coalitions between members of the 
polity and the contenders advancing the alternative 
claims; and 
iv. incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the 
government to suppress the alternative coalition or 
the commitment to its claims. 2S 
None of these conditions were prevalent when the J. V. P. launched 
its armed attack. Nevertheless, by attacking the police and security 
forces, the J. V. P. attempted to create a revolutionary ambience. 
Moreover, there was a lack of widespread mass discontent aimed at the 
U. F. Government and no visible erosion of its legitimacy when the 
J. V. P. decided to launch its armed attack. Ernesto Che Guevara 
categorically stated: 
Where a government has come into power through some 
form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and 
maintains at least an appearance of constitutional 
legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, 
2S Charles Tilley, "Revolution and Collective Violence", in Fred 
I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, (eds), Macropolitical Theory, 
Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley 
1975), p. 521. 
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since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not 
yet been e.. xhausted. 29 
Another reason for the rapid failure of the insurrection was the 
J. V. P. 's omission of strategic provision for a sustained protracted 
military effort.. The members who were engaged in the insurrection 
were not physically or psychologically prepared to continue an armed 
struggle, largely due to their scanty and inadequate training in 
military tactics and weapons use, and, after their initial defeats, to 
their inadequate supply of arms and ammunition. The supply of arms to 
which the J. V. P. gained access was inferior and often out-dated. The 
shotguns and locally made hand-thrown bombs were not only inferior in 
quality but were in short. supply, thereby placing the guerrillas in a 
vulnerable position as compared to their adversaries, the Sri Lank-an 
armed forces who had superior training and fire power. The 
guerrillas' poor military training was clearly exemplified in their 
armed attack on the Polonnaruwa police station in the North Central 
Province where 39 activists of the J. V. P. were killed and many were 
wounded compared to few government casualties. 30 
According to Andrew C. Janos, the existence of a potential mass 
base that lends itself to mobilisation through organisational channels 
or through mere physical concentration, effect the feasibility and 
success of insurrectionary warfare. 31 As in Guevara's theory of 
guerrilla warfare, an inherent part of the J. V. P. strategy was to 
mobilise the support of the masses once the insurrection had been 
initiated. The J. V. P. anticipated the support of the urban working 
29 Ernesto Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Brian 
Loveman and Thomas Davies, Jr., (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 1986), p. 48. 
30 A. C. Alles, op. cit., p. 145. 
31 Andrew C. Janos, "Unconventional Warfare: Framework and 
Analysis", World Politics, Vol. 15, (1962-63), p. 642. 
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class, the rural peasants and even the armed forces. In spite of the 
J. V. P. 's critical reliance on the masses, however, it did little or 
nothing to inform the general populace about its ideology or 
objectives. Its failure to launch an effective propaganda campaign 
against the government not only resulted in the non-mobilisation of 
the masses during the insurrection, but also placed the J. V. P. 's 
sympathizers in a vulnerable position and inhibited new recruitment 
before the attack. The final outcome was that the masses were 
suspicious of the J. V. P. 's motives and opposed its activities, while 
the trade unions, including that of the Indian Tamil Workers employed 
in the plantations, pledged their support to the U. F. Government. 
The left-wing unions in the Joint Council of Trade Union Organisation 
(J. C. T. tC. O. ) also pledged their full support to the government and 
began organising vigilance committees. Furthermore, T. H. Green 
observes that the guerrillas attacked local villages and isolated 
peasants in order to steal food and money, thereby alienating the 
population on which they depended and signalling the imminent defeat 
of the guerrillas by the government forces. 32 Consequently, one of 
the fundamental characteristics of the Maoist and Guevaran lines of 
guerrilla warfare, namely mass base, mass support and mass 
involvement, was not manifest in the case of the 1971 uprising. 
The J. V. P. failed to gain the support of army and security forces 
as anticipated. The left-wing parties too were opposed to the armed 
attack of the J. V. P. As Chalmers Johnson observes, the activists of 
the 1971 uprising hoped for intervention by international socialist 
forces. 33 As discussed in detail later in this chapter, the socialist 
countries such as the Soviet Union and China assisted the U. F. 
32 T. H. Green, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 96. 
33 Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on People's War, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), p. 97. 
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Government instead of the J. V. P. Johnson suggests that the socialist 
countries did not come to the J. V. P. 's aid probably because the U. F. 
Government was already sufficiently left-oriented to suit both Moscow 
and Peking. 34 Although the Sri Lankan Government denied external 
involvement, the North Korean Embassy was ordered to close down, on 
the premise that its propaganda activities encouraged insurgency. 35 
As a result the J. V. P. 's insurrection was almost totally isolated. 
The lack of smooth co-ordination was another salient factor in 
this context. The armed attack was insufficiently co-ordinated to 
overawe the government security forces. The curfew and emergency 
imposed by the government and the suspension of public transport 
crippled the J. V. P. 's own communication network with their fighting 
units. The organisational structure which was based on a 
hierarchical system of cells not. only isolated its members into 
pockets but. also prevented vital interaction. Although its 
conspiratorial structure excelled for surprise armed attack, it was 
too fragmented for long drawn-out guerrilla warfare. 
The low morale of the J. V. P. membership was another cause of the 
failure. The first surrender of nearly 4,000 members in response to 
an amnesty granted by the government from May 1st to May 4th shook the 
faith of the more committed members. The second request for surrender 
was issued on the 5th of June and was aimed at the guerrillas who had 
retreated to bases in secluded jungles. Finally, the failure to 
rescue their leader from prison left the J. V. P. hierarchy in disarray 
and ill-equipped to continue a protracted struggle. Considering the 
overall weaknesses inherent in the J. V. P. 's organisational structure 
34 Ibid., p. 98. 
35 The North Korean Embassy staff had been engaged in 
revolutionary propaganda, including the placing of full-page 
advertisements in Sri Lankan newspapers quoting from the works of Kim 
I1 Sung on revolutionary thoughts and techniques. 
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arid in their bid to capture state power, it is apparent that they were 
not authentically prepared to launch such an attack. Therefore, these 
cadres achieved only sporadic raids which continued until August 1971, 
and thereafter only occasional raids and hold-ups until mid-1972.36 
It was concentrated in terms of effort, but failed because it wasn't 
broad in actual force. According to Jupp, the failure of the single 
concentrated attack became such a liability that an effective long- 
term guerrilla warfare did not follow the initial defeat. 37 
In spite of the defeat of the J. V. P., its last guerrilla fighters 
were not captured until 1976. The overwhelming defeat of the J. V. P. 
within three months of the initial attack did not mean that the impact 
of the uprising had abated. It not only left an indelible mark on Sri 
Lankati politics but marked the advent of a new trend in political 
violence. 
7.5 U. F. Government's Response 
Gurr surmises that a regime's basic options in the face of 
political violence are to increase coercive measures or to meet some 
or all dissident. demands. 33 In the case of the 1971 Insurrection, 
the J. V. P. made no immediate demands other than state power. Thus, 
the U. F. Government's response to the uprising could be broadly 
perceived from two main aspects: the military and legal response, and 
the political response. The response had been tentatively planned 
from 1969 by the U. N. P. then by the U. F., as has been discussed above. 
Therefore, the author broadly examines the government's counter- 
offensive in early April 1971. 
J6 J. Jupp, "The J. V. P. Insurrection of 1971 and Its impact on the 
Marxist and Socialist Movement in Ceylon", p. 3. 
37 Ibid., p. 15. 
35 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., p. 351. 
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When the J. V. P. attacked on the 5th of April the government forces 
were ill-prepared to cope with the ensuing anarchy and disruptions in 
some areas. As mentioned earlier, during the first two weeks the 
armed forces were on the defensive, and the police stations in remote 
areas were temporarily closed. Consequently, 43 police stations in 
Kegalle, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Galle and Ambalangoda districts 
were abandoned. 39 An all-island curfew was declared on the 6th of 
April and lasted until mid-July, except in the Western Province where 
it continued through November 1971. The J. V. P. as a political 
organisation was proscribed and their publications including their 
newspapers were banned. 4° This ban also included any publications of 
other left-wing groups which propagated revolution. 
The police force was far from equipped to confront the J. V. P. 
Therefore, the ontis of combating the J. V. P. was undertaken by the Sri 
Lankan Army and the Air Force. A breakdown of manpower of the 
military and police as of April 1971 is as follows: Police, 12,500; 
Army, 7,000; Navy, 1,900; and Air Force, 1,500.11 The security forces 
were small in number and the army commander stated that he had fewer 
than 7,000 trained men to crush the uprising. 42 
Realizing their weakness in numbers of trained men, the government 
sought volunteers for the military forces from amongst persons between 
the ages of 35 and 55 years because people in that age range were 
considered poor candidates for J. V. P. infiltration. Furthermore, the 
...... ......... . 39 Judgement of the C. J. C., op. cit., p. 434. 
40 The government imposed a ban on the following newspapers: 
Janatha Vimukthi (People's Liberation); Rathu Balaya (Red Power); 
Rathu Lanka (Red Lanka); Gini Pupura (The Spark); Peradiga Sulaga 
(East Wind); Kamkaru Puwath (Workers News) and Tholilali Seydi 
(Worker' s News). 
41 Urmila Phadnis, "Insurgency in Ceylonese Politics: Problems and 
Prospects", Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal, Vol. 
3, (1971), p. 610. 
12 The New York Times, (22 April 1971). 
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existing government forces were not adequately equipped to confront a 
mainly local-based uprising. The government, as a result, appealed to 
foreign governments for assistance in the form of military equipment 
and advisers. The United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union 
India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Egypt responded to this appeal by 
providing arms, ammunition, other materiel and personnel. The 
strength of their response was significant, for they not only supplied 
military equipment but also gave legitimacy to the Sri Lankan 
Government's counter-insurgent policies. The assistance of the 
external powers, however, was designed to sway the U. F. Government due 
to Sri Lanka's strategic importance in the world and regional balances 
of power. 
The U. K. was the first foreign state to respond positively to the 
Sri Lankan Government's request for military assistance. During the 
early period of the insurrection, small arms and ammunition were 
provided from the British bases in Singapore. The British Government 
mediated to enable the Sri Lankan Government to purchase six Bell 
helicopters from the U. S. A. Several scout cars, evidently in the 
range of 12-18, were supplied between the 20th and 25th of April. 43 
Nevertheless, in spite of Britain being Sri Lanka's historical defence 
partner and the traditional source of military supplies, it is evident 
that the degree of British assistance was very limited. 
The assistance from the U. S. A. during the early period of the 
insurrection was tepid. In addition to the six Bell helicopters 
supplied through the U. K. on a commercial basis, the U. S. A. shipped 
spare parts in mid-April. In early May the U. S. A. contemplated 
supplying several additional Bell helicopters, as well as mortars, 
small arms and ammunition, and a large amount of medical supplies from 
43 This information is based on reports appearing in the British 
newspapers in late April 1971. 
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U. S. bases. 4 The very limited nature of the assistance offered by 
the U. S. A. indicated its reluctance to get involved in the counter- 
insurgent operation in Sri Lanka. 
The Sri Lankan Government received more significant military 
assistance from the U. S. S. R., including five ölig-17 fighter air-craft 
and six helicopters, 60 pilots and air-craft technicians, an 
unspecified number of ground maintenance crew,. and 20 armoured cars 
and transport facilities for delivering police communication equipment 
from the German Democratic Republic. 45 
Of these countries, no other country was more deeply, involved in 
the April 1971 insurrection than India whose intervention was partly 
based on the Indian Government's assumption that the People's Republic 
of China stood behind the J. V. P. insurrection. 46 India dispatched a 
large quantity of small arms and ammunition, six helicopters with 
crew, 150 Gurkha soldiers, and four naval frigates reportedly carrying 
2,500 other military personnel. {? The Gurkha forces were deployed to 
guard the- international airport in Katunayake. The four naval 
frigates patrolled Sri Lanka's coastal waters to prevent the smuggling 
of arms to the J. V. P. 4 Furthermore, had an extreme movement gained 
power in Sri Lanka, it was believed that India was prepared to invade 
the island and that plans to that effect had been drawn by the Indian 
Army staff-19 
}} The New York Times, (11 May 1971). 
45 Daily Telegraph, (21 April 1971). 
16 Ferenc A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The 
Balance of Power, (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 103. 
17 The Ceylon Daily Mirror, (20 July 1971). 
4S Sunday Times, (7 June 1971). 
49 Ference A. Vali, op. cit., p. 103. 
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Pakistan not only supplied arms but went further in offering 
military experts and forces. There was widespread belief in Sri Lanka 
that Communist China was linked to the J. V. P. 's insurrection as it had 
been to some of the other Asian insurrections. It was obvious, in any 
case, that Communist China was not as willing as Britain or the U. S. A. 
to come to Sri Lanka's aid. During the first week of the 
insurrection, a Communist Chinese ship carrying small arms to Tanzania 
entered Colombo Harbour. The Sri Lankan Government sought, without 
success, to persuade the Chinese and Tanzanian governments to release 
a portion of the arms for the U. F. 's counter-offensive against the 
J. V'. P.. 50 The Communist. Chinese later announced full support for the 
Sri Lankan Government, offered an interest free long-term loan of Rs. 
150 million in convertible currency, and provided five patrol boats. 
In spite of the J. V. P. 's apparently Maoist nature, the J. V. P., given 
its rejection of Maoist theory, would never have been acceptable to 
the Communist Chinese. Consequently, as James Manor and Gerald Segal 
observe, Sri Lanka became the only state to have received military aid 
simultaneously from the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A., the U. K., India and 
Communist China. 51 There is no evidence, however, of any foreign 
personnel being used in the military operations against the J. V. P. 
guerrillas. 
The military aid was received by the Sri Lankan Government within 
three weeks of the J. V. P. 's first attack. Thus reprovisioned, the 
U. F. Government was prepared to launch its counter-offensive with the 
objective of total capitulation by the J. V. P. This objective was 
further specified in the statement made by a Sri Lankan Army official: 
50 James Manor and Gerald Segal, "Causes of Conflict, Sri Lanka 
and Indian Ocean Strategy", Asian Survey, Vol. 25, (1985), p. 1170. 
51 Ibid., p. 1183. 
329 
We have learned too many lessons from Vietnam and 
Malaysia. We must destroy them (the insurgents) 
completely. We have no choice. 52 
The primary outcome of the counter-attack was the recapturing of 
the abandoned police stations by the armed forces. : Military co- 
ordinators were `appointed to govern the districts where political 
violence was intense, and the armed forces had to assist the police in 
safeguarding police stations. Then the J. V. P. 's camps were attacked 
by air and land, the air attacks serving as a means of preliminary 
attack before the army moved in. The army used mortars before 
proceeding on masse to confront the J. V. P. bases. There are many 
reported instances of the military and the police using, dissenters and 
captured insurgents to further the government's counter-insurgent 
warfare. Consequently, by the end of April the government forces had 
recovered from their initial set backs. According to T. H. Green, the 
isolation of the guerrillas reinforced effectiveness of the 
government's counter-insurgent programme. 53 The Prime Minister 
offered an amnesty between the Ist and 4th of May to those who were 
willing, to surrender. 5 It is reported that 3,978 surrendered in 
response to this amnesty. Yet another amnesty was offered from the 
7th to 9th of June when 236 surrendered. 55 The J. V. P. members who 
surrendered and those who were captured were kept in detention without 
trial. 
52 International Herald Tribune, (20 April 1971), and Statesman, 
[India] (20 April 1971). 
53 T. H. Green, op. cit., p. 96. 
54 Keesings Contemporary Archives, (22-29 May 1971), pp. 24606- 
24607. 
55 Swaroop Rani Dubey, One-day Revolution in Sri Lanka: Anatomy of 
1971 Insurrection, (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1988), p. 134. 
330 
7.6 Magnitude of the Violence During the 1971 Insurrection 
For Gurr the magnitude of political violence is likely to be 
greatest when regimes and their rebellious opponents are more or less 
evenly matched in coercive control and institutional support. 56 In 
this context the author wishes to focus attention on how and where the 
violence originated and spread, its duration and its perpetrators. 
The political violence that broke out in April 1971 was mainly 
confined to certain predominantly rural areas. The centers of 
insurgent violence were: Matara and Galle Districts in the Southern 
Province; the huruuiagala District in the North Western Province; 
Kegalle in the Sabaragamuwa Province; Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa 
Districts manifested in the North Central Province. 57 The areas 
mentioned above include some of the least urbanized areas in Sri 
Lanka, which shows the rural dimension of the insurrection. It is 
further evident that the uprising was not confined to any particular 
region but was a phenomenon which was scattered throughout Sri Lanka, 
polarising the rural sector. The fact that insurgent violence was 
concentrated in Sri Lanka's rural areas during the 1971 Insurrection 
contradicts Huntington's observation that in the poor nations, acts of 
political violence may very well occur in the more prosperous 
regions. 58 The 1971 uprising, however, failed to gain ground in the 
more urbanised or modernised Western Province which according to 
Huntington's modernisation theory should have proven to be the most 
susceptible region. 
The duration of political violence, it is contended by Gurr, is a 
factor which determines the final outcome of violence. The history of 
56 Ted Robert Gurr, op. cit., p. 330. 
57 See map in Appendix 7 for areas affected by political violence 
in 1971. 
58 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 44. 
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Third World insurgencies since the Second World War has indicated that 
guerrilla conflicts which were terminated in less than three years 
were often unsuccessful. The duration of a war for three to nine 
years meant that there was a fifty-fifty chance of success. Conflicts 
which lasted beyond ten years demonstrated a perceptible decline in 
the prospects for a successful revolution, though the chance of a 
compromise settlement was high. 59 The Insurrection of 1971 did not 
last for more than three months and thus, according to empirical 
evidence, was doomed to failure. 
The level of participation in the political violence of 1971 
varied according to the ethnic distribution throughout Sri Lanka. It 
is evident that ethnically, the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Indian Tamils 
and the Muslims excluded themselves from the armed struggle. The Sri 
Lankan Tamils dominated the Northern Province, while the Indian Tamils 
had settled in the up-country plantation areas, and the Muslims and 
some Sri Lankan Tamils resided in the Eastern Province. All of these 
areas were totally alienated from the J. V. P. 's armed struggle. 
Examined demographically in terms of religion, the Hindus, Muslims and 
Christians, mainly Catholics, who dominated the west coast of Sri 
Lanka, did not take part in the 1971 uprising. Consequently, the 
indications are that the 1971 political violence was instigated and 
perpetuated only by secular Sinhalese and Sinhala-Buddhists. 
In terms of profession, the non-participation of the urban working 
class in the 1971 Insurrection is evident. S. P. Huntington observes 
that the participation of the peasantry in political violence in the 
Third World is also crucial. 60 Nevertheless, data pertaining to the 
participants in the uprising in terms of profession indicates the 
59 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfattrgraff, Contending 
Theories of International Relations A Comprehensive Survey, (New York: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1981), p. 325. 
60 Samuel P. Hungtington, op. cit., pp. 291-300 
332 
exclusion of the rural peasantry from the armed struggle. The 
uprising was exclusive not only to the J. V. P.; the dominant youth 
representation within the J. V. P. meant that the insurgents and their 
collaborators were mainly limited to the Sinhala-Buddhist youth from 
the rural sector. 
In the absence of accurate data pertaining to the number of 
participants in the uprising, defining accurate figures has become a 
matter of conjecture. The statistics which have been made available 
are subject to dispute and are contradictory. The most reliable 
indicators may be the total casualties during the period of 
insurrection from early April to August 1971, and the number taken 
into custody by the police and armed forces. As in most armed 
conflicts the method of determining kills in the field may be deemed 
flawed as deaths are often merely assumed. As for the number of 
detainees, a differentiation must be made between J. V. P. members who 
were captured before the attack, those who surrendered during the two 
amnesty periods and thus may never have even participated in the 
attack, and the guerrillas who were taken prisoner in the field. It 
is widely believed, therefore, that the true number of attackers and 
the human toll of the 1971 Insurrection may never be known. 
The government version of the number of deaths from the 1971 
uprising is exemplified in the statement of the Prime Minister, which 
revealed that 1,200 guerrillas, civilians and government forces had 
been killed as a result of the uprising. 61 The following Table 7.1 is 
an official estimate of the number of deaths and casualties based on 
the total number of known participants. 
61 The Statement on Insurgency Made in Parliament on 20.7.1971 by 
the Honourable Prime Minister, Department of Information on Press 
Release, [no date] cited in Kearney and Jiggins, op. cit., p. 42. 
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Table 7.1 Number of Deaths and Wounded in the Events 
of 1971 
Persons Number Killed Casualties 
Guerrillas 1096 Not Known 
Civil 41 193 
Police 37 87 
army 19 15 
Air Force 4 28 
Navy 3 - 
Total 1200 323 
Source: A. C. Alles, Insurgency 1971, (Colombo: The 
Colombo Apothecaries' Co. Ltd., 1976), p. Appendix 
1, p. iii. 
According to Table 7.1, the death ratio between the government 
awned forces and the J. V. P. fighters was 1: 19. There is no doubt 
regarding the government estimates of the number of deaths among the 
security forces. As mentioned earlier, the numbers of deaths ninon; 
the J. V. P., however, could be highly inaccurate. Some of the figures 
that have been suggested in this context are discussed below. 
Tillman Durdun, the political correspondent of The New York Times, 
reported that the death toll reached a figure of 6,000 deZths. 62 Rene 
Domount, Who was in Sri Lanka at the time of the insurrection 
estimated that 8,000 were killed by the government forces. 63 Rohana 
Wijeweera, the leader of the J. V. P., issued a statement from prison in 
1972 arguing that nearly 15,000 members of his movement had been 
killed as a direct result of the government's campaign to suppress the 
violence. 64 The major reason for the government's understatement of 
the casualties was to avoid national political and security 
62 The New York Times, (25 April 1971). 
63 Fred Halliday, "The Ceylon Insurrection", New Left Review, No. 
69, (1971), p. -12. 
64 Fred Halliday, "The Ceylon Insurrection" in Robin Blackburn, 
(ed), Explosion in a Sub-Continent, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1975), p. 
201. 
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implications, and international accusations of human rights 
violations. 65 
The contradictory statistics declared by these sources indicate 
the ambiguous nature of the statistics pertaining to the 1971 
uprising. It has been noted that these unofficial statistics do not 
stipulate a breakdown in numbers according to the role of the 
participants, either as guerrillas, civilians or the branches of the 
armed forces and police. In spite of these ambiguities it could be 
safely claimed that the actual number of deaths ranged between a 
minimum of 6,000 to a maximum of 8,000. 
As discussed earlier, the number of deaths and the number of 
J. V. P. members and sympathizers in custody indicate, as closely as 
possible, the number of participants in the 1971 uprising. when the 
uprising was curbed in August 1971, there were a total of 17,951 in 
custody as a result of the violence. This total is subdivided as 
follows: 11,748 arrested and 6,025 surrendered. 66 Not all of those 
prisoners were members of the J. V. P. On the contrary, it is obvious 
that some of them were never involved in the armed struggle. 
Therefore, the author assumes that only about 20,000 to 25,000, 
actually participated in the insurrection. 
7.7 Pattern and Outcome 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical analysis of the 
65 A. J. Wilson, "Ceylon: The People's Liberation Front and the 
Revolution that Failed", Pacific Community, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1972), p. 
374. 
66 R. N. Kearney, "A Note on the Fate of the 1971 Insurgents in Sri 
Lanka", A Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 37, (1977), pp. 515-519. 
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Insurrection of 1971 varies according, to the theoretical orientation 
of each theorist-67 Chalmers Johnson's typology of violence places 
the Insurrection of 1971 within the typology of mass insurrection. 
According to Gurr's analysis this insurrection represents an internal 
war, while S. P. Huntington's typology perceives it to be a 
revolutionary war conforming to the eastern pattern. - The macro 
perspective of these theories limits their applicability to the 
specific pattern and sequence of political violence in Sri Lanka. 
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the pattern of 
the 1971 armed uprising. In this context the author has thus far 
examined its aims, mode of warfare, magnitude of violence and 
government response. All of these aspects of the uprising indicate 
the revolutionary objective and the pre-planned strategy of the armed 
struggle. On the other hand, the insurrection was also one of 
exclusivity and isolation in terms of the lack of mass participation 
or awareness. As discussed in Chapter 5, the inherent emphasis on the 
participation of Sinhala-Buddhist rural youth defines the Insurrection 
of 1971 as a rural insurrection launched by the Sinhala-Buddhist youth 
from the semi-urban and rural sector. 
There are no systematic studies based on the outcome of the 1971 
Insurrection. Therefore, the author wishes to examine its 
consequences from the following two aspects: the fate of the 
participants of the armed. struggle, and its impact on the country's 
socio-economic and political fabric. In the aftermath of the armed 
struggle of 1971, the U. F. Government devoted itself to the process of 
liquidating the J. V. P. as a movement and dealing with its known 
members. The ban on the J. V. P. was enforced with more vigour after 
the insurrection, and the movement was suppressed to an extent that it 
was forced to go completely underground. The government devised a 
67 See, Chapter 2. 
336 
dual approach in dealing with the participants of the armed struggle 
in 1971. There were approximately 18,000 supposed J. V. P. members and 
collaborators in custody by the end of 1971. Of this total, charges 
were brought against 3,872 persons who were believed to have been 
involved in armed attacks on police stations and other acts of 
political violence. A special court called the Criminal Justice 
Commission (C. J. C. ) was set up in May 1972 to try those prisoners. 
There were nearly 140 inquiries which led to the identification and 
prosecution of 41 leaders at the main trial. In addition, another 139 
inquiries were in progress involving nearly 3,000 accused of whom 
2,336 had pleaded guilt-. when the C. J. C. trials concluded in 1975, 
92 of the accused had been acquitted, 2,519 had been released on 
suspended sentences, and 365 had been sentenced to prison terms. f5 
Those who were not formally charged were subject to rehabilitation 
programmes . 
According to Sri Lankan Government statistics, about 12,000 
suspects were placed in rehabilitation camps, including two 
universities which were temporarily converted into rehabilitation 
centres. At the same time, the government began releasing detainees, 
but as Douglas Hyde has observed, this process, was slow. 69 
Nevertheless, compared to release rates in other Third World 
countries, the rate of release in Sri Lanka was quite fair and timely. 
Table 7.2 below illustrates this process of release over the period 
1971 through 1975. 
65 R. V. Kearney, "A Note On the Fate of the 1971 Insurgents in Sri 
Lanka", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, (1977), pp. 516-517. 
69 Duglas Hyde, Ceylon's Programme for the Rehabilitation of 
Political Detainees, (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 
Press, 1972), pp. 12-14. 
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Table 7.2 The Number of Custody: 1971-75 
Year Number in Custody 
1971 14,000-18,0000 
1972 10,000 
1973 4,600 
1974 600 
1975 295 
Source: R. N. Kearney, "Note on the Fate of the 1971 
Insurgents in Sri Lanka", Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 37, No. 3, (1977), pp. 515-519. 
Those who were never taken into custody went underground with the 
objective of re-organising the J. V. P. Their further clandestine 
existence, however, was short-lived. When the U. N. P. Government 
offered yet another amnesty in 1977 the remaining detainees, including 
the J. V. P. 's leader, Wijeweera, were released, and the J. V. F. entered 
the mainstream of Sri Lankan politics. 
The inimediate economic cost of the armed uprising was high. 
According to the Minister of Finance in 1971, the total economic cost 
was estimated to be Rs. 333 million. 70 Another significant economic 
outcome of the political violence in April 1971 was the Land Reform 
Act of 1972 (L. R. A. ) which established a Land Reform Commission 
(L. R. C. ) with the power to expropriate privately-owned agricultural 
land above a ceiling of 50 acres per person. 71 The economic cost and 
land reform apart, the insurrection also had far reaching political 
consequences for the political parties within the government, the 
S. L. F. P., the L. S. S. P. and the C. P. The insurrection marked the 
beginning of conflicts within the coalition government and 
subsequently led to its break-up. 72 The L. S. S. P. broke away from the 
70 Rs. 5.95 equals approximately one U. S. dollar. N. M. Perera, 
Ceylon Daily News, (13 September 1971). 
71 Nimal Sanderatne, "Sri Lanka's New Land Reform", South Asian 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1972), p. 8. 
72 W. A. W. Warnapala, "The Marxist Parties of Sri Lanka and the 
1971 Insurrection", Asian Survey, Vol. 15, (1975), pp. 745-757. 
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S. L. F. P. coalition government in 1975, while the C. P. broke away in 
1977. 
Moreover, the insurrection had an adverse effect on those parties 
in the General Election of 1977. The S. L. F. P., L. S. S. P. and C. P. 
suffered a severe defeat in the areas where the insurrection had 
spread in 1971. As a more long-term impact, the insurrection 
seriously challenged the legitimacy of the centre-left and orthodox 
left-wing political parties in Sri Lanka. The more immediate outcome 
was the increased attention paid to the armed forces and their 
expansion. There was not. only a significant rise in enlistments but 
also an acceleration of the expenditure for arms and equipment. 
Consequently, the Sri Lankan military establishment which until then 
had remained in the political background gained significance and came 
to the fore after the uprising. According to Fred Halliday, the 
uprising revealed to the left-wing parties that left-wing-orientated 
armed struggle is possible in colonial and former colonial 
countries. 73 whether or not insurgents could succeed in such an 
ethnically-mixed social and multi-party political environment is 
another matter. The uprising also unintentionally influenced the 
emergence of the Tamil guerrilla organisations who were opposed to the 
Sinhalese aims of the J. V. P. In the long run, the Insurrection of 
1971 raised a question about the continuing viability of political 
institutions in Sri Lanka. 
7.8 The Tamil Guerrilla Warfare 
The second part of this study concentrates on the political 
violence which gathered momentum among the Tamil community during the 
year following the abortive armed struggle in 1971. There are certain 
73 Fred Halliday, op. cit., p. 218. 
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significant factors which should be considered in studying the Tamil 
guerrilla warfare which did not apply in the case of the J. V. P. 's 
insurrection. First, 'the political violence committed by the Tamil 
groups was protracted, unlike the uprising of April 1971 of which the 
government was in total control within a few months. The Tamil 
political violence continued to assume additional diverse facets and 
dimensions which cannot be included in this study. Secondly, the Sri 
Lankan Government imposed a censorship on news items and other 
information pertaining to the guerrilla organisations and their 
activities. To circumvent these limitations, the author has limited 
the scope of this study to a period between 1972 and July 1987 when 
the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was reached, although some 
observations on the more recent developments are included in the 
conclusion. As in the study of political violence in 1971, the author 
concentrates on certain aspects, which are as follows: short-term 
factors, aims and objectives, forms of warfare, magnitude of violence, 
government response and outcome. 
7.9 Short-term Factors in Tamil Guerrila Warfare 
The political violence waged by the Taunil guerrilla organisations 
like that of the J. V. P. insurrection of 1971 was pre-planned and 
organised. Unlike the J. V. P. insurrection which was staged solely by 
one organisation, the Tamil violence was motivated and launched by 
factional groups such as the L. T. T. E., T. E. L. O., the E. P. R. L. F., 
P. L. O. T. and E. R. O. S. The L. T. T. E. has nevertheless emerged as the 
most potent of the surviving groups. The possibility of a violent 
confrontation between these groups and government forces had been 
imminent since 1972. 
A combination of two strategic features are cited as the short- 
term factors which heightened the potentiality for Tamil-inspired 
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political violence and confrontation in Sri Lanka. The first is the 
commitment to, and planning and preparation for guerrilla warfare. 
The strategy adapted by those underground groups was multi-faceted. 
Government property and Tamil politicians who supported the political 
party in power were prime targets. A campaign of assassination was 
launched against Tamil politicians who were deemed to have 
'collaborated' with the Sinhala-dominated U. F. Government. Another 
aspect of this strategy included large-scale bank robberies which were 
apparently intended to finance the purchase of arms for the guerrilla 
movement. The violation of state property on the Republican Day 
anniversary in 1973 was yet another example of this campaign. On that 
day, 49 buses were attacked resulting in six being burned, and an 
attempt was made to derail a train. Chalmers Johnson postulates that 
guerrilla warfare serves as a short-term factor for political 
violence. 71 A detailed analysis of the strategy of the Tamil groups 
is examined in section 7.11 on their forms of warfare. 
The second factor is inherent in- the political and security 
policies adopted by the U. F. Government to counter the Tamil guerrilla 
violence. In applying those policies, the government failed to 
address the legitimate demands for redress among the Tamils' 
grievances, namely: language, land, unemployment and university 
education. The government's approach led to the further escalation 
and militarisation of an ethnic conflict which had hitherto depended 
on agitation, political negotiation and other non-violent activities. 
The, U. F. Government launched a political campaign spearheaded by the 
mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Durayappah, to secure a party base in Northern 
Sri Lanka. There, he utilized attractive incentives, such as state 
employment and other material benefits to expand party cadres and 
74 C. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: "Little, Brown, 
1966), p. 99. 
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organisations. These policies, however, clashed with the objectives 
and demands of the Tamil youth underground organisations for an 
independent Tanii1 state. Furthermore, when the leader of the moderate 
T. U. L. F., S. V. Chelvanayakam, resigned his parliamentary seat to 
crusade for a mandate calling for a sovereign `Eelam Tamil state', the 
by-election was delayed until February 1975.75 
The military intervention was comprised mainly of the deployment 
of police and armed forces, and the revival of the state of emergency 
from the previous year, 1971. A more overt military campaign, came 
into effect after 1972, when the Tamil underground movements became 
increasingly active. The heightened activity of the Sri Lankan 
security forces only deepened the tension between the Tamil youth and 
the police in the Northern Province. The Sinhala-dominated police 
came to be identified as an enemy of occupation. In this context, two 
incidents are recounted here as events which generated a fear of 
further repression amongst the Tamil youth and led directly to the 
first Tamil guerrilla violence. The first was the role of the police 
at the fourth meeting of the International Association of Tamil 
Research (I. A. T. R. ) held in Jaffna in 1974. On the final day of 
this conference a speaker from India, whose application for an entry 
visa had been rejected by the Sri Lankan Government, appeared on 
stage. The police intervened to disperse the crowd, resulting in the 
death of nine people and many wounded. The other incident concerned 
the death of the Tamil pioneer guerrilla activist, Ponnadurai 
Sathyaseelan, who committed suicide while in police custody, having 
been accused of numerous bank robberies. His death had an emotional 
impact on the other Tamil activists. The initial acts of political 
violence by the Tamil guerrillas in retaliation against the police, 
75 A. J. Wilson, Politics of Sri Lanka, 1948-1979, (London: 
Macmilan, 1979), p. 43. 
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marked the beginning of a protracted guerrilla warfare led by the 
Tamil youth. 
7.10 Aims and Objectives 
The major long-term political objective and driving force of the 
Tamil guerrilla movement was always clear: the creation of an 
independent sovereign socialist state of Tamil Eelam. The primary 
means of achieving this goal was the mobilisation of a people's war of 
national liberation and socialist revolution. There were also certain 
secondary, more immediate objectives which had to be achieved before 
the final aim could be realised. Some of those short-term objectives 
were as follows: to inflict terror upon the Tamil population in 
Northern Sri Lanka so that no one would extend any co-operation to the 
government; to assassinate Tamil politicians and their political 
supporters as a warning against interference; to paralyse the 
government administrative apparatus in the Northern Province; to 
politicise the Tamil population; and to publicise their cause to gain 
grassroot support throughout Sri Lanka toward a people's war. In 
order to determine the relation of those objectives to the growth and 
development of political violence among the Tamil community, the 
author examines the forms of warfare adopted by the Tamil guerrilla 
organisations. 
7.11 Forms of Warfare 
The political violence which gained ground among the Tamil 
community throughout the 1970s assumed a different dimension from that 
of the armed struggle of 1971. Whereas the Insurrection in 1971 had 
concentrated on an intense confrontation with the government, the 
Tamil guerrillas rejected that strategy in favor of protracted attacks 
over many years. Consequently, in spite of their insurrectionary 
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orientation they depended on terrorism and guerrilla warfare as their 
prime strategy. According to Brian Crozier, whatever the country or 
the circumstances, insurrection tends to follow a sequence of three 
stages: terrorism, guerrilla warfare and full-scale war. 76 T. P. 
Thornton made a related observation that a rigid classification is not 
valid, and terror can extend throughout all three stages. 77 The Tamil 
guerrilla violence, however, did not follow the third phase 
completely. The initial attacks were activated by the Tamil 
guerrillas as early as 1972. Although these attacks were sporadic, 
they were carefully planned against selected targets of strategic 
importance. As the scope of their activities expanded, a distinct 
pattern began to emerge as the guerrillas moved from seemingly 
haphazard attacks to more structured operations. This pattern of 
political violence can be broadly divided into three phases in 
chronological order as follows: 
i. The first phase: 1972-1976 
ii. The second phase: 1977 through the ethnic violence of 1983 
iii. The third phase: 1983 to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 
1987. 
It is evident that the objectives, targets and mode of attack 
varied from one phase to another. Nevertheless, due to the factors 
mentioned earlier, this aspect of the study is confined to sources 
which deal with the subject in general. 
76 Brian Crozier, The Rebel: A Study of Post-War Insurrections, 
(London: 1960), p. 126. 
77 T. P. Thornton, "Terrorism a Weapon of Political Agitation", 
in H. Eckstein, (ed), Internal War: Problems and Approaches, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 91. 
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7.12 The First Phase: 1972-1976 
When the Tamil guerrillas committed their first acts of the 
political violence in 1972, their intention, at first, was confined to 
arousing nationalism and a consciousness among the Tamil community of 
the need for political organisation. On the basis of those initial 
objectives, the Tamil guerrillas concentrated on symbolic targets such 
as government buildings and public transport. The guerrillas' first 
attacks, and the U. F. Government's harsh response to them, widened the 
implications of non-cooperation with the government. The guerrillas 
sought to use the government's cotinterviolence to their advantage by 
mountin an immediate propaganda campaign through the foreign press to 
embarrass the Sri Lankan Government internationally. They also hoped 
to obtain foreign assistance by demonstrating the urgency of the 
ethnic problem. 
The Tamil guerrillas resorted to terrorism in the form of sabotage 
and robbery without the appearance of a coordinated plan. 's 
according to T. P. Thornton, terrorism may gain political ends in one 
of two ways: either by mobilising forces and reserves sympathetic to 
the cause of the insurgents; or by immobilising forces and reserves 
that would normally be available to the incuunbents. 79 Terrorism in 
this phase was aimed at immobilising pro-government forces, which will 
be discussed below in detail. The post-1975 period was not a 
profoundly active period for the the Tamil guerrilla organisations, 
but rather was an intermediate interval devoted to strengthening them. 
This does not mean to imply that they were inactive during those 
years. In the 1972 alone, 22 terrorist incidents were reported mainly 
78 According to P. Wilkinson, political terrorism is the use of 
murder and destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction to 
terrorise individuals, groups, communities or governments into 
conceding to the terrorists' political demands. See. Terrorism and the 
Liberal State, (London: Macmillian, 1986), p. 51. 
79 T. P. Thornton, op. cit., p. 73. 
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confined in the Jaffna peninsula. -50 Tamil politicians who cooperated 
with the government in office were deemed to be collaborators with a 
repressive system and thus became the targets of assassination. 
Alfred Duraippah, the mayor of Jaffna, in 1975 was the first Tamil 
politician to be assassinated. His death marked the beginning of 
organised political terrorism in the North. 81 
This assassination of Duraippah also signaled a new trend in 
political violence in which the emphasis shifted from symbolic targets 
to practical ones such as political personalities. Organised gang 
robberies of public institutions served not only to weaken the 
government's position, but also as a means of gathering resources and 
gaining much needed domestic and international publicity. The Tamil 
guerrillas also assassinated a number of other Tamil politicians of 
the S. L. F. P. and U. V. P. in the Jaffna Peninsula. 32 According to S. P. 
Huntington, the elimination of prominent members of the target group 
who refuse to cooperate with the rebels convinces other members of the 
group that the only prudent course is to buy safety by contributing 
money to the rebels, furnishing them with information, or cooperating 
with them in other ways. 33 
The weapons which were utilized during this first phase of 
violence were self-manufactured handbombs and time bombs, shotguns and 
pistols. 34 According to P. Wilkinson, the symbolic and propagandist 
80 Sinha Ranatunga, Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lanka 
E, cperience, (Melbourne: Globe Press, 1988), p. 226. 
81 Alfred Duraippah was a main organiser of the U. F. Government in 
Jaffna. 
S2 An ASIA Watch Report, Cycles of Violence in Sri Lanka: Human 
Rights in Sri Lanka Since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, (1987), p. 37. 
43 Samuel P. Huntington, "Pattern of Violence in World Politics", 
in S. P. Huntington, (ed), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 25. 
S4 Sinha Ranatunga, op. cit., p. 227. 
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functions of terrorist acts may be rather more important in the early 
stages of insurgency, and should be recognised by the governmental 
authorities as key indicators of immediate danger and of the likely 
escalation of violence to come-85 
7.13 The Second Phase: 1977-1983 
During the second phase of Tamil political violence, the 
guerrillas"scope of activity expanded, accompanied by the use of more 
and more sophisticated weaponry. Of the many factions which emerged 
during this second period, the L. T. T. E., T. E. L. O. and P. L. O. T. gained 
supremacy. The main aims of their guerrilla activities were to block 
all police investigations pertaining to terrorist acts, accumulate 
arms and ammunition, collect funds, and provoke the Sinhalese 
population into ethnic-based violence which would create the 
appropriate ambience for Tamil agitation for a separate state. In 
this context the most likely targets were the police and other armed 
forces, banks and police informers. 
At the outset the assassinations were confined to Tamil police 
officers who were responsible for investigating the Tamil terrorist 
acts in the North. The L. T. T. E. was responsible for the murder of 
four G. I. D. officers in 1978. Until 1980 the L. T. T. E. and T. E. L. O. 
were responsible for most of the attacks against members of the Sri 
Lankan forces. 86 With the expansion of their scope of activity, the 
nature of the targets widened to include Muslim and Sinhala members of 
the police forces. From 1977 to July 1983,50 police officers and 
servicemen, 11 Tamil politicians, 13 police informers and 16 civilians 
S5 P. Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, (London: Macmillian, 1974), 
p. 18. 
S6 W. I. Sireweera, "Recent Development in Sinhala-Tamil 
Relations", Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 9, (1980), p. 907. 
347 
were killed. Sl These attacks triggered the ethnic violence of 1977 
and 1981.88 The outbreaks of ethnic violence, which followed the 
Taunil guerrilla assaults, heightened national and international 
support for Tamil separatism. According to government sources, during 
the seven years from 1971 until the introduction in 1978 of the bill 
proscribing the Tiger movement, the total number of crimes attributed 
to terrorist activity amounted to 75. During the following year this 
total rose to 84.89 
The L. T. T. E., which had established itself as the foremost 
guerrilla group, planted a bomb in a civil aircraft which was due for 
an internal flight on September 7 1978, the date on which the new 
constitution was promul-gated. 90 other than the overt manifestations 
of such violent incidents, the sensationalism achieved by the sheer 
magnitude and intensity of these episodes was crucial to the 
international attention drawn to the question of Tamil Eelam. From 
August 1979 the Tamil guerrilla groups had the ability to operate from 
base areas located in the sanctuary of the state of Tamil Nadu in 
Southern India. This provided a safer refuge than did Sri Lanka's 
jungle and national reserves which had been the only haven for left- 
wing J. V. P. guerrillas after the 1971 Insurrection. The bases in 
Southern India also gave the Tamil guerrillas ample opportunity for 
continued flora-military training, and offered them a secure location 
for weapons storage. According to S. P. Huntington, the existence of an 
.............. ...... . S7 Truth of Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Associated Newspapers of Ceylon 
Ltd, (Colombo 1883), pp. 6-9. 
gs For details of Ethnic Violence see, T. D. S. A. Disanayake, The 
Agony of Sri Lanka, (Colombo: Swastika Press, 1984). 
39 Parliamentary Debate [Hansard] (19 July 1979), cited in W. I. 
Sirewera, op. cit., pp. 907-908. 
90 Ibid., p. 908. 
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external base of support beyond the territory of the target government 
is obviously a major aid to revolutionary forces. 91 
From 1981 the scope of activity of the Tamil guerrillas expanded 
to include attacks in the North on police stations and on military 
convoys and patrols, which proved to be vulnerable targets for hit- 
and-run attacks. For example, the police station at Anaicodai was 
attacked by the P. L. O. T. in 1981, and in 1982 the police station at 
Chavakachcheri was attacked by the L. T. T. E. Yet, the guerrilla groups 
failed to coordinate their actions despite their like tactics. 
The following Table 7.3 illustrates the extent of the terrorist. 
activities from 1977 to 1983. 
Table 7.3 Summary of Terrorist incidents from 1977-1983 
Year Casualties Casualties Murders of Attacks on 
of Forces of Civilians Politicians Police Stations 
1977 03 03 1- 
1978 08 011 -- 
1979 03 03 -- 
1980 00 - 1- 
1981 09 04 11 
1982 09 10 11 
1983 18 05 7- 
Total 50 29 11 2 
Source: This is the Truth... The Associated Newspapers 
of Sri Lanka Ltd. (Colombo 1983), pp. 6-9. 
Table 7.3 clearly indicates that the political violence generated 
by the Tamil youth acquired other diverse facets as they strengthened 
in numbers and military supplies. During this period the civilian 
targets were confined to police informers who were perceived to be 
traitors to the Tamil cause-92 Government statistics for the period 
91 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 43. 
92 Sinha Ranatunga, op. cit., 1988, p. 231. 
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1978 to 1983 credit the Tamil guerrillas with more than 265 bombings, 
robberies, assaults and other criminal activities. 93 
Following their attacks on the police stations, the Tamil 
guerrillas widened their activities against the Sri Lankan military 
units. From July 1982 to July 1983 several major attacks were 
launched against the security forces, the most crucial of which was 
the ambush . of an army patrol by the L. T. T. E. which killed 13 
soldiers. 94 Although the attack was not decisive in magnitude or 
intensity, it triggered an outbreak of ethnic violence which had been 
imminent for some time. From the perspective of the Tamil guerrillas 
the ethnic violence of July 1983 proved to be a much anticipated 
opportunity to internationalise their cause. Thereafter, the Tamil 
guerrillas, particularly the L. T. T. E., stepped up their raids at an 
alarming rate and, as K. M. de Silva observes, concentrated their 
attacks on the security forces and carefully selected targets. 95 
7.14 The Third Phase: 1983 to 1987 
The third and final phase which began with the acceleration of 
guerrilla attacks, ended with the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. The 
significance of this period in terms of Tamil political violence lies 
in the determination and purpose with which the Tamil guerrillas 
intensified their activities. The attacks were primarily motivated by 
the increasing demand amongst the Sri Lankan Tamil community for a 
separate state. As a result, a new wave of armed attacks was launched 
s3 Government of Sri Lanka, "Tamil Terrorists: A Record of Murder 
and Robbery", A Ministry of State Publication, Overseas Information 
Series No. 6, (Colombo: Department of Government Printing), 
[pamphlet, no date]. 
94 T. D. S. A. Disanayake, The Agony of Sri Lanka, op. cit., (1984) 
pp. 53-54. 
95 K. M. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic 
Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880-1985, (New York: University Press, 1987), 
p. 351. 
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against police stations, army convoys and civilian targets. There was 
not only a sharp increase in political violence in terms of scope and 
frequency but it also became an all-encompassing phenomenon. Although 
the Tamil guerrillas confined their operations mainly to the Northern 
and Eastern provinces, they also made their impact felt beyond those 
administrative boundaries. As mentioned before, the imposition of 
censorship by the government has put serious constraints on studying 
the entire scope and depth of the activities of the Tamil guerrillas. 
Nevertheless, the author delves further into the recorded incidents 
and the likely motives which determined the extent of the political 
violence. 
After the ethnic violence of 1983, it is evident that the pattern 
of political violence took yet another turn. From 1984 to 1985 the 
hit-and-run guerrilla strategies adopted by the L. T. T. E., P. L. O. T., 
and T. E. L. O., and the newer factions, the E. P. R. L. F. and E. R. O. S., 
resulted in attacks on police stations in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces, with the specific intention to capture arms and ammunition. 
Large guerrilla units numbering between 50 to 250 participated in 
these attacks. Table 7.4 displays the number of police stations which 
were subject to attack and the number of weapons which fell into the 
hands of the Tamil guerrillas. 
Table 7.4 Police Stations Attacked by Tamil Guerrillas 
Year No. of Police No No. of Weapons Groups 
Stations Attacked killed Removed Responsible 
1981 01 02 23 P. L. O. T. 
1982 01 03 30 L. T. T. E. 
1983 - - - ------ 
1984 12 29 103 LTTE. PLOT, TELO 
1985 12 17 316 L TM EROS 
1986 08 01 -- 'ItiIPP 
1987 01 - - 
Total 34 53 453 
Source: Sri Lankan Research Centre, Tamil Terrorists Destroy 
Police Stations in the North and East, [leaflet, no date]. 
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According 
. 2-1y, 
34 police stations in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces were attacked by the Tamil guerrillas, resulting in the 
death of 53 police officers and the loss of 153 weapons. Other than 
the single attack on the Nikawaratiya police station in the North 
Western Province in April 1985 by P. L. O. T., the other attacks were 
confined to police stations in the Northern and Eastern provinces. 
The attack on the Chavakachcheri station is significant because it was 
the largest single armed operation launched by the Tamil guerrillas 
since they had begun their campaign of violence in 1972.96 
As indicated in Table 7.4, a majority of the attacks on police 
stations were master-minded by the L. T. T. E. These sporadic attacks 
compelled the government to withdraw personnel from nine police 
stations in the Northern Province. After 1984 the activities of the 
existing police stations were seriously curtailed. The Jaffna police 
ceased patrolling and instead relied on the army for protection. 97 
The assassination of police informers was intrinsically linked to 
the attacks on police stations. The guerrillas branded the 
informants as traitors to the Tamil cause for an independent state. 9g 
These killings came to be known as `lamp post' killings because most 
of the victims were tied to lamp posts before they were executed. A 
note was pinned to each of the bodies identifying them as 
collaborators. The primary objective of these murders was to prevent 
any information from being leaked to the police and armed forces; the 
second objective was to warn potential collaborators of their fate and 
to prove the certain reach of guerrilla justice. According to 
96 Sinha Ranatunga, op. cit., (1988), p. 239. 
97 Asia Week, (2 June 1985), p. 32. 
98 The Asia Watch Committee, Cycles of Violence: Human Rights in 
Sri Lanka Since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, An Asia Watch Report, 
(Washington, 1987), p. 36. 
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government sources there were about 60 lamp post killings in 1985, and 
80 to 120 in 1986.99 
The successful attacks on police stations gave sufficient 
confidence to the Tamil guerrillas to engage the Sri Lankan Army, 
Navy and Air Force. The dates of these confrontations were often 
marked as `confidential' information and, therefore, the author is 
confined to the incidents which have been made public. At the 
initial stages, the attacks on the armed forces were aimed at army 
convoys by means of landmines, ambushes and booby traps. A majority 
of the army casualties were attributed to landmine attacks. Edgar 
O'Ballance has recorded 14 landmine attacks from 1983 to 1986.100 
The army and navy camps within the Northern and Eastern provinces 
were also vulnerable targets for the Tamil guerrilla attacks. By 
early 1984, encouraged by their initial successess, the guerrillas had 
escalated their operations against military bases, prompting vigorous 
counteraction by the Sri Lank-an armed forces. Of the attacks launched 
by the guerrillas, three attacks are significant because they show 
that the guerrillas had overcome their previous deviseness. The 
attacks which took place between January and February 1985 were 
Launched against the Karainagar Naval Centre, the Kokkilai Army Camp 
and the Kilinochchi Police/Army Camp. The naval centre was attacked 
by the E. P. R. L. F. 101 T. E. L. O. was responsible for the attack on the 
Kokkavil army camp in May 1985.102 The land-based attacks launched by 
the major factions were followed by confrontations at sea between the 
Sri Lankan Navy and the guerrillas enroute to their own bases. The 
99 Ibid. p. 36. 
100 See, Edgar O'Ballance, The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in 
Sri Lanka 1973-1988, (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1989). 
101 India Today, (28 February 1985), p. 25. 
102 Sinha Ranatunga, op. cit., p. 251. 
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navy sought to halt completely the smuggling of arms and the increased 
mobility of the guerrillas to and from their bases in the South Indian 
state of Tamil Nadu. In 1987 the guerrillas, in another combined 
operation, attacked the army camp in Kankasanthurai, killing 18 
soldiers. 103 
The overriding objective of the guerrillas' persistent attacks on 
military bases was to compel the government to withdraw the armed 
forces from the Northern and Eastern provinces. The procurement of 
arms and ammunition was an important, but, at that stage, only a 
secondary objective. The guerrillas also hoped to provoke the armed 
forces into making indiscriminate assaults on the civilian population 
thus inducing a mass uprising against the government in those 
provinces. 104 
Slightly more long-range were their designs to transform a 
political crisis concentrated in the Tamil areas in Sri Lanka into a 
broader military confrontation with the government, and thereby secure 
the support of the Taunil masses in the fight for a Taunil state. By 
July 1985 the government forces considered the northern part of the 
Jaffna peninsula an area to be avoided. The guerrillas strategy and 
tactics thus achieved half of the desired effect. 
! Another major development during the third phase were the attacks 
on Sinhala civilians residing in isolated villages in and around the 
Northern and Eastern provinces. The first of successive attacks 
occurred on the 30th of November 1984, when Tamil guerrillas attacked 
and killed Sinhala civilians residing on the Kent and Dollar farms in 
the Nullaitivu district. In December 1984, guerrillas killed 80 
Sinhala civilians in the fishing communities of Kokilai and Nayaru in 
103 Ibid., p. 364. 
104 R. N. Kearney, "Sri Lanka in 1984: The Politics of Communal 
Violence", Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 2, (1985), p. 908. 
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the North Central Province. Fourteen Sinhala fishermen and` their 
families were killed by the Tamil guerrillas in early 1985 in the 
Eastern Province. 105 Other incidents of political violence resulting 
in the death of Sinhala civilians were reported throughout 1985 in the 
Eastern Province. The obvious objective was to drive out all Sinhala 
settlers from the `traditional homeland' claimed by the Tamils. 
In addition to=the direct attacks on civilians, in August 1984 a 
bomb which was planted aboard an Air Lanka flight to Colombo exploded 
at a terminal of the Madras Airport in India killing 29 people. 106 
This was the first terrorist attack outside Sri Lanka attributed to 
the Taunil guerrillas and was carried out by the Tamil Eelam Army 
(T. E. A. ), a breakaway faction of Tamil Eelam Liberation Army 
(T. E. L. A. ) . 
As the activities of the Tamil guerrillas became more assured and 
daring, their terrorist activities began to impinge on the lives of 
the Sinhala civilians residing outside the Northern and Eastern 
provinces. The first such attack took place in May 1985 in 
Anuradhapura, the historical capital of the North Central Province. 107 
A group of Tamil guerrillas belonging to the L. T. T. E. disguised 
themselves as government soldiers and fired their weapons 
indiscriminately killing 146 civilians within the city centre. 108 In 
April 1987 the L. T. T. E. stopped three buses, two lorries and a private 
automobile within the Trincomalee district and shot the passengers, 
105 Penelope Tremayne, "Sri Lanka Chronology of a Conflict", in 
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Year- 
book 1988, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989), p. 406. 
106 Centre for Ethnic Amity, "Massacre in Madras by Eelamist 
Terrorists" in The Ethnic Problem in Sri Lanka: A Collection of 
Articles and Essays, [no date], pp. 128-137. 
107 Anuradhapura was the capital of Sri Lanka from 4th Century 
B. C. to the 10th Century A. D. 
los Penelope Tremayne, op. cit., p. 421. 
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amounting to 126 deaths. 109 Carrying their terrorist onslaught still 
further, members of E. R. O. S. exploded a car bomb in May 1987 in 
Colombo, killing nearly 200 people. "" On the 2nd of June 1987,33 
Sinhala passengers on a bus, 29 of whom were Buddhist monks from the 
Eastern Province were killed. 111 From 1984 to 1987, irrespective of 
the urban/rural dichotomy or any other differences, Sinhala civilians 
were targeted for Tamil terrorist attacks. 
Table 7.5 illustrates the number of civilian deaths as a result of 
terrorist attacks from 1984 to 1987. As depicted in Table 7.5, the 
L. T. T. E. and E. R. O. S. were responsible for all of those terrorist. 
activities. 
Table 7.5. Deaths of Civilians As a Result of 
Terrorist Activity 
Year Place Number The Group 
killed Responsible 
1984 Nulativu 70 LTTE 
1984 Kokilai 80 LTTE 
1985 Anuradhapura 132 LTTE 
1986 Colombo 200 EROS 
1987 Colombo 200 EROS 
1987 Eastern 
Province 175 LTTE 
Source: Penelope Tremayne, "Sri Lanka Chronology of a 
Conflict", in Defence Year Book 1988, The Royal 
United Services Institute For Defence Studies, 
(London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989), pp. 
387-431. 
The objectives of the attacks on Sinhalese were threefold. First 
the attacks on Sinhala civilians residing within the Northern and 
Eastern provinces and in the peripheral areas were carried out with 
the purpose of establishing the dominance of the Tamils within the 
areas deemed to represent the 'traditional homeland'. The second 
109 Penelope Tremayne, op. cit., 1988, p. 421. 
110 Far Eastern Economic Review, (May 1987), p. 15. 
111 The ASIA Watch Committee, op. cit., p. 40. 
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objective was to provoke the Sinhala population into resorting to 
ethnic violence which would boost the Tamils propaganda-mill and 
create an appropriate ambience for their agitation. Finally, the acts 
of political violence in Southern Sri Lanka were expected to compel 
the government to concede and negotiate. As observed in The 
Economist, the Tamil guerrillas had to persuade more Tamils of the 
need for a separate state. The most effective mode of persuasion was 
to provoke ethnic violence against the Tamil populace and the best way 
of doing so was to murder large numbers of ordinary Sinhalese. 112 
The sabotage of economic targets was another aspect of the 
violence organised and carried out by the Tamil guerrillas. Until 
1984, public property, including the transport service, was sabotaged 
only in the Northern and Eastern regions. After 1984 attacks on 
public property spread to other areas in Sri Lanka. The first attack 
on property outside the Northern and Eastern provinces occurred on 
January 28 1984, when E. R. O. S. detonated a bomb in the Hotel Oberoff in 
Colombo. The intention of E. R. O. S. was to disrupt the "All Party 
Conference" convened by the government as a preliminary step towards 
negotiations. 
In October 1984, E. R. O. S. was responsible for blowing up an oil 
pipeline in the north of Colombo. 113 E. R. O. S. launched a similar 
bombing attack on the 3rd of May 1986, against an Air Lanka Tristar 
Jet at the Katunayake International Airport killing 21 people, 
seventeen of whom were foreigners, and injuring forty-one. 114 The 
incident was the first in which non-Sri Lankans were the victims. 
E. R. O. S. carried out another attack that day at the Central Telegraph 
112 The Economist, (18 May 1985), p. 49. 
113 Penelope Tremayne, op. cit., p. 40. 
114 Sri Lanka News, A Weekly Digest of News, Vol. 53, No. 17, (7 
May 1986), p. 1. 
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office in Colombo, killing 14 people. ''5 By mid-1986 the Tamil 
terrorist attacks which had previously been confined mainly to the 
Tamil-dominated areas had become a grim reality in the city of 
Colombo. In June 1986 the Tokyo Cement Factory in Trincomalee was yet 
another target. The factory was jointly owned by the Japanese Mitsui 
Cement Company and a group of Colombo investors. 116 The Tamil 
guerrillas thus expanded their terrorist activities to deter any 
foreign investors from investing within Tamil-dominated areas. The 
strategy to debilitate the Sri Lankan economy not only encompassed the 
tourist industry; the tea industry was also vulnerable. Rumors that 
Sri Lankan tea had been poisoned alarmed foreign buyers, leading them 
to apply more stringent tests before purchasing Sri Lankan tea. 117 
E. R. O. S. was intent on sabotaging the economy, thereby touching the 
nerve centre of power. 115 
Public transport and communications were two nother relevant 
aspects which came tidier terrorist attack. A train was blown up on 
the 19th of January 1985 resulting in 34 deaths. 119 In addition, main 
bridges, including five in Jaffna, were blown up. The magnitude of 
this sabotage campaign was partly concealed by censorship and the 
reluctance of the government to divulge the exact nature of the 
problem. Although the sabotage was aimed primarily at economic 
targets, however, ironically, it resulted in more civilian casualties 
than did any other form of guerrilla violence in Sri Lanka. 
115 The ASIA Watch Committee, op. cit., (1987), p. 39. 
116 Frontline, (June-July 1986), p. 19. 
117 Eugene Mastrangelo, "International Terrorism: A Regional and 
Global Overview, 1970-1986", in Yonah Alexander, (ed), The Annual on 
Terrorism, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 56. 
115 Frontline, (1986), p. 19. 
119 Penelope Tremayne, op. cit., p. 407. 
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The Tamil guerrillas also expanded their activities to include 
kidnapping for ransom as a source of funding their operations. 
According to Penelope Tremayne, the Tamil -guerrillas kidnapped 120 
civilians during 1986. A majority of the kidnapping incidents ended 
in the release of the hostages despite the rejection of the ransom 
demands. Kidnapping was also a means of gaining national and 
international attention, as for example in the kidnapping of an 
American couple in 1984 and a British journalist in 1985. An American 
couple, Stanley and Mary : Alen, were seized from their home in Jaffna 
on May 10th 1984. The kidnappers, who threatened to kill them, 
demanded a ransom of 50,000,000 rupees in gold (U. S. $2,000,000) and 
the release of 20 guerrilla suspects. The government rejected those 
demands and the couple was released on May 11th 1984.120 Mrs. 
Penelope Willis was seized in Mullaittivu sometime between January 
17th and the 22nd 1986, by the E. R. O. S. She was accused by her 
captors of being a British spy working in collusion with the Sri 
Lankan Government. She was released on the 18th of February 1986, 
following negotiations between British diplomats and the Tamil 
guerrillas and the intervention of the International Red Cross. 121 
Thus kidnapping proved to be, at least for the Tamil guerrillas, an 
unfruitful strategy. 
The third phase of political violence strongly indicates that the 
Tamil guerrillas widened the scope of their activities further with 
ever more sophisticated and lethal weapons. In tracing the steady 
growth of violence Mastrangelo reports that from 1974, to 1982 only 
seven incidents of terrorist activity were reported; in 1983 the total 
rose to 13 incidents; in 1984 it escalated considerably to 92 events; 
120 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 30, (September 1984), p. 
33099. 
121 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 32, (May 1986), p. 
31363. 
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and in 1985 the level of political violence rose further to 110 
incidents. 122 
This phase is also significant as the period during which the 
Tamil guerrillas resorted to conventional warfare and comparatively 
open armed confrontations with the Sri Lankan military forces and 
police. The L. T. T. E. emerged as the dominant force both amongst the 
other Tamil guerrilla factions and in the fight against government 
units. The L. T. T. E. succeeded literally in confining the government 
troops to their barracks. The L. T. T. E. was largely responsible for 
limiting the activities of the government forces to the Central and 
Southern provinces. 123 Consequently, by July 1985 the northern part 
of Jaffna had been abandoned by the Sri Lankan forces. The L. T. T. E. 
assumed the procedures of civil administration as the U. N. P. 's 
influence receded. By 1986 Jaffna was totally controlled by the 
L. T. T. E., who had successfully outmanoeuvred the government. Their 
civil duties included collecting taxes and promoting primary 
education. As a prelude to declaring an independent Tamil state, and 
to insure law and order, the L. T. T. E. `assumed judicial 
responsibilities' by establishing 116 national courts. 124 While 
engaged in civil administration, however, the L. T. T. E. was still 
committed to an all-out war against the Sri Lankan Government. Hence, 
until July 1987 there were intermittent confrontations with the armed 
forces. The L. T. T. E. 's intention to declare the Jaffna peninsula as 
an independent region on the Ist of January 1987 failed. 125 
Ultimately the L. T. T. E. failed in its objective to defeat the army in 
122 Eugene Mastrangelo, op. cit., p. 55. 
123 Sinha Ranatunga, op. cit., p. 250. 
124 Penolope, op. cit., p. 413. 
125 C. Manogaram, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliations in Sri 
Lanka, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 175. 
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successive battles and to compel the government to negotiate for 
peace. A. S. Balasingham exemplifies these objectives in the following 
statement: 
We will force the government to negotiate on our 
terms when we are able to break the backbone of the 
Sri Lankan (Sinhala) Army. The negotiations will be 
over the demarcation of boundaries for Eelam. 126 
The Tamil guerrillas goal proved to be overly ambitious. The 
security forces were able to recapture most of the areas conceded to 
the L. T. T. E. There are several reasons for this set back, the 
complexity of which prevents the author from delving very deeply. The 
following factors, however, are salient in surmising the guerrillas' 
failure to realise their main objective. The first was the lack of 
unity and the keen competition for dominance amongst the Tamil 
guerrilla factions. They fought amongst themselves for supremacy over 
the Tamil community. In 1986 the L. T. T. E. eliminated the T. E. L. O. all 
together and dispersed the E. P. R. L. F. by murdering its leading 
hierarchy. P. L. O. T. was also compelled to suspend its activities 
after its leader died under mysterious circumstances. Secondly, as 
Bruce Matthews observes, there was a profound lack of coordination 
amongst the various factions pertaining to ideology and strategy. 127 
As a result, the Tamil guerrillas were eventually outclassed by the 
security forces. Thirdly, the guerrillas were unsuccessful in 
obtaining the support of the Tamil masses. The Tamils of Sri Lanka 
have never been a coherent community. Nor did a majority of them ever 
embrace Marxism-Leninism or support the concept of socialist Eelam. 
The moral support for the Tamil guerrillas in Northern Sri Lanka, 
126 Frontline, (5 April 1985), p. 83. 
127 Bruce Matthews, "Radical Conflict and the Rationalization of 
Violence in Sri Lanka", Pacific Affairs, Vol, 59, No. 1, (1986), p. 
40. 
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however, was generally high. It was mainly derived from both the 
failure of the government to reach an equitable solution and the 
repression by the government security forces in the Tamil areas. 
Furthermore, the fierce ethnic attacks on the Tamil community in the 
South in July 1983 converted many Tamils in the Tamil-dominated North 
into guerrilla sympathizers. The Sri Lankan Tatnils residing outside 
the Northern Province, however, were in the minority and thus were 
unsupportive of the guerrillas' objective of a separate Tamil state. 
The Indian Tamils in the plantation sector and the Muslims in the 
Eastern Province mainly supported the U. N. P. Government rather than 
the guerrilla organisations. 12 S 
Finally, the Indian Federal Government did not intervene as 
anticipated by the Tamil guerrilla organisations. According to the 
Tamil insurgents, the indiscriminate abuses by the Sri Lankan armed 
forces against both the guerrillas and civilians, combined with the 
refugee problem in the Indian state of South India, were supposedly 
adequate reasons for an Indian intervention on the side of the 
guerrillas. They also hoped to appeal to India on the basis of its 
protective image as `mother India'. 129 As Bruce Matthews observes, 
none of these appeals for Indian assistance worked to the advantage of 
the guerrillas. 130 Moreover, the assistance provided by the Indian 
state of South India proved inadequate, and was eventually thwarted by 
the Indian and Sri Lankan national governments. The author concludes 
that the Tamil guerrillas were heavily though unrealistically 
dependent on the Indian national government, and particularly the 
state government of South India. Their dependency went unfulfilled, 
12S Muslim and Indian Tamils are mainly supporters of the 
government. 
129 Tamil Information, Vol. 1. No. 7. (15 November 1984), p. 6. 
130 Bruce Matthews, op. cit., p. 40. 
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thus contributing to their eventual defeat at the hands of the better 
trained and equipped Sri Lankan military forces. 
7.15 Government Response 
The response of the Sri Lankan Government was critical in the 
context of the Tamil guerrilla warfare. According to S. P. Huntington, 
the reaction of the government in a revolutionary war goes through two 
phases: first, the government tends to treat the insurrection as a 
traditional problem for the police and military, and minimizes the 
threat of the revolutionary forces; second, the government recognizes 
that the revolution requires not only a much larger and different 
military effort to suppress it, but also demands an integrated 
politico-economic effort to counter the appeals of the revolutionaries 
to the masses. It also recognizes the need to overhaul its 
organisational structure dealing with the rebellion and to merge 
political and military responsibilities in a single individual. 131 
As in the Insurrection of 1971, however, the government's initial 
response relied on coercive measures, which could be broadly divided 
into two periods: The first was before 1983; and the second was after 
the ethnic violence of 1983. All of these measures were conditional 
upon the following factors: the strength and the competence of the 
armed forces, the availability of foreign military aid, the 
ideological orientation of the government's domestic and foreign 
policies, and the nature and the changing magnitude of the Tamil 
insurrection. 
At the initial stages of the guerrilla violence in 1972 the Sri 
Lank-an Government dealt with each incident individually as an act of 
political violence. Therefore, the police were responsible for 
dealing with the acts of violence in the North and were empowered by 
131 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 27. 
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emergency laws to do so. As the level of political violence gradually 
escalated through the 1970's the police were incapable of dealing with 
an organised campaign of violence. Consequently, the government was 
compelled to deploy the Sri Lankan Army and the Navy around the 
Northern Province to assist the police. Simultaneously, Brigadier 
Tissa Weeratunga was commissioned by the government as the Commander 
of the security forces in Jaffna. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(Temporary Provision) of 1979 empowered the police and armed forces 
with the capacity to search and seize people and property, and to 
internment those arrested. The act also declared kidnapping and 
abduction punishable offences entailing life imprisonment. 132 The 
other measures taken to discourage the growth and expansion of 
political violence were as follows: abolishing the standardisation 
rules pertaining to university admissions; according Tamil with the 
status of a national language in the Constitution of 1978133; and 
decentralising local political structures with the District 
Development Councils (D. D. C. ) Act in August 1981. The U. U. C. Act was 
intended to decentralise local administration and devolve powers to 
the 25 districts in Sri Lanka. Within two years of its 
implementation, however, the U. D. C. scheme proved to be a failure due 
to the lack of finances and the absence of an authentic devolution of 
power. 134 Following the ethnic violence of 1983, the government 
132 Prevention of Terrorism Temporary Provisions Act 1979, No. 48, 
Prevention of Terrorism Temporary Provisions of 1982, No. 10, in Yonah 
Alexander, and Allan S. Naues, (eds), Legislative Response to 
Terrorism, (Martinus, U. S. A. Nishoff Publishers, 1986), pp. 215-228. 
133 The 13th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka in 
November 1987 made the Tamil Language an official language along with 
the Sinhala Language. This language concession appears to have been 
too little, too late, to appease the Tamil guerrilla movement. 
134 B. Matthews, "District Development Councils in Sri Lanka", 
Asian Survey, Vol. 22, (1982), pp. 1117-34, and B. Matthews, "The 
Situation in Jaffna", The Round Table, No. 290, (April 1984), p. 200. 
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response was an ill-defined mixture of political and military 
approaches. 
The following discussion views first the military measures, and 
subsequently the political measures. The military measures were taken 
in conjuction with legal action to counter the guerrilla violence. 
The state of emergency imposed in 1983 was subsequently extended 
monthly until December 1988. The introduction of the state of 
emergency imposed censorship of domestic media coverage of both 
guerrilla activities and the government's counter measures. The 
Sixth amendment to the Constitution in July 1983 prohibited the public 
expression of separatist arguments. 135 
The Sri Lankern security forces, too, were found to be ill-equipped 
and ill-trained to confront the Tamil guerrilla forces. The security 
forces were also overwhelmingly Sinhalese-Buddhist. Consequently, the 
Tamil guerrillas, who were predominantly Hindu, came to regard them as 
an alien army of occupation. Hence, the structure of the forces were 
reorganised, the enlistment was increased, and the quality of the 
training improved. By the end of 1983, however, the government had 
changed their approach to the violence and had assimilated a new 
institutional structure and new policies. As a result, in May 1984 a 
new Ministry of Defence was established to coordinate the activities 
of the security forces and the police in activating the counter- 
insurgent and counter-terrorist programme. 
In addition, two auxiliary militia units were formed in an effort 
to awaken the public to the dangers of complacency. The two services 
were the National Security Services under the direction of the Prime 
Minister, and the Man Power Mobilisation Office which came within the 
purview of the Ministry of Youth Affairs. The security services were 
135 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Record of World Events, Vol. 
30, (January 1984), p. 32632. 
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deployed at the district level in collaboration with the police and 
the office of the local government agent. These forces were ascribed 
a surveillance role involving the collection of information and the 
protection of public institutions. They came under the direct 
supervision of the Minister for Transport in his role as Chief of 
Industrial Security. The `mobilisation of manpower' meant that the 
youth were being trained in military combat in order to supplement the 
armed forces. In a further move towards consolidation, in 1985 the 
government initiated new operational arrangements which brought 
together the Sri lankan Army, Navy, Air Force and police under one 
command tinder a merged unit called `Combined Operations'. 136 Appendix 
8 further illustrates this organisational structure which was meant to 
counter the Tamil guerrilla warfare. 137 
In order to adequately strengthen and reinforce the Sri Lankan 
armed forces, the government had to appeal to foreign governments for 
assistance, as it had during the 1971 Insurrection. This dependency 
provided yet another opportunity for foreign states to become directly 
involved in Sri Lankan internal affairs, and thus to compete again for 
the strategic advantages offered by Sri Lanka's geographic location. 
The Sri Lankan Government's request for foreign assistance 
internationalised the Tamil conflict. S. P. Huntington aptly observes 
that the longer the domestic violence continues in a society, the more 
likely are foreign governments to become involved on one side or the 
other. 138 Moreover, according to George Modelski, the search for 
outside aid and the effort to counteract that search make every 
136 Frontline, (5 April 1985), p. 70. 
137 See, Appendix 8. 
13s S. P. Htuitington, op. cit., p. 44. 
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internal war of international concern. 139 yodelski further observes 
that given an internal war in one state, the foreign policy of the 
second state faces the following three choices: 
i. helping the weaker party--usually, but not invariably, the 
insurgents, and thus embarking on subversion. 
ii. helping the stronger party--usually but not invariably, the 
incumbents, and thus engaging in foreign aid; or 
iii. working for a conciliatory solution to the conflict by 
attempting mediation-140 
The response of foreign governments to the renewed appeals for 
military aid, however, was rather limited when compared to the aid 
extended in 1971. The U. S. and British governments were reluctant to 
become involved overtly in the Sri Lankan conflict as they had in 
1971.141 In spite of that reluctance, however, covert aid was 
forthcoming. Former British Special Air Services (S. A. S. ) commandos 
who, while ostensibly working for a private security organisation 
called the Reenie Meenie Services Ltd (K. N. S. ), helped train the Sri 
Lankan anti-terrorist forces. 142 The Sri Lankan Government was also 
successful in contacting the Israeli Government through the U. S. 
Government to request further military training. The Israeli Secret 
Service, Hossad, was invited to train the Sri Lankan security forces 
in counter-insurgency. 143 For this purpose the Israel Foreign Service 
139 George Modelski, "The International Relation of Internal War", 
in James N. Rosenau, (ed), International Aspects of Civil War, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964)', p. 22. 
140 Ibid., p. 23. 
141 p. Venkateshwar Rao, "Foreign Involvement in Sri Lanka", The 
Round Table, Vol. 309, (1989), pp. 88-100. 
142 p. Venkateskwar Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka; India's 
Role and Perception", Asian Survey Vol. 28, No, 4, (April 1988), p. 
-125. 
143 A. J. Wilson, The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil 
Conflict, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1988), p. 200. 
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set up an interest section at the U. S. Embassy in Colombo. On the 
other hand, the Soviet Union expressed no interest in supporting the 
Sri Lankan Government. This was in sharp contrast to the aircraft, 
weapons and the military advisers the U. S. S. R. had supplied during the 
1971 Insurrection. The pro-government media in Sri Lanka alleged that 
the Soviet Union was supporting the Tamil guerrillas although there 
was no evidence to support that claim. Pakistan, however, not only 
supplied arms but was also involved in training Sri Lankan security 
personnel. The other countries that supplied arms were Communist 
China, South Africa, Singapore and Malaysia. ''4 In July 1984 
Communist China agreed to supply new military equipment., some of which 
was designed for sophisticated counter-terrorist operations. 115 The 
Communist Chinese support seemed meagre in light of their much 
expanded global arms- export drive to earn foreign currency. The 
following Table 7.6 shows arms purchases by Sri Lanka from 1983 to 
1988. 
Table 7.6 Arms Purchases by Sri Lanka: 1983-1988 
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
U. S. A. 3 1 28 29 10 - 
USSR - - - - - - 
China - - - 2 8 - 
Italy - - - 5 - - 
U. K. - - 15 15 - - 
Israel - 31 26 - 9 44 
Singapore - 38 - 4 - - 
South Africa - - 12 10 - 10 
Total 3 70 81 65 27 54 
All figures are in millions of U. S. dollars at 
constant 1985 prices. 
Source: Deepak Tripathi, Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy 
Dilemmas, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
(1989), p. 33. 
144 P. Venkateshwar Rao, op. cit., p. 425. 
145 James Manor and Gerald Segal, op. cit., p. 1184. 
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No other external power was more deeply involved in Sri Lanka's 
ethnic conflict than India. The role of India is undoubtedly 
important, but is not a subject of detailed inquiry in this study due 
to its complexity and magnitude. Nevertheless, the Indian response 
was a crucial factor in moulding the Sri Lank-an Government's counter- 
insurgency policies pertaining to the Tamil insurgency. Therefore, 
the author wishes to examine the salient aspects of India's role in 
the conflict. 
The Indian response, unlike that of the other external powers, was 
neither automatic nor inevitable. Two factors determined India's 
involvement and limited her options vis-a-vis the Taunil insurrection. 
The first factor virtually constituted the basis of India's security 
doctrine. ' India's perception of South Asia as a security zone, which 
India alone was entitled to dominate and manipulate, did not in the 
opinion of the Indian Government, permit the involvement of other 
external forces within the region. India's regional doctrine for 
South Asia is best articulated by the following statements: 
India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs 
of any states in the region, unless requested to do 
so, nor tolerate such intervention by an outside 
power. If external assistance is needed to meet an 
internal crisis, states should first look within the 
region for help. '46 
Secondly, there was growing unease in the South Indian state of 
Tamil Nadu especially among more than 50 million Indian Tamils who had 
traditionally been close to the Sri Lankan Tamils regarding the 
political developments there. Therefore, the government and political 
parties in Tamil Nadu pressurized the Indian central government to 
mediate with Sri Lanka. As in the Insurrection of 1971, India chose 
to assist the Sri Lankan Government not in terms of military aid, 
146 Strategic Survey, 1983-1984, IISS, (London: 1985), p. 90. 
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but rather as a mediator with the Tamil guerrillas and as a regulator 
of the stability of the crisis. The nature and extent of India's 
involvement in the conflict, however, varied substantially throughout 
the 15-year period under study. It is also noteworthy that the 
governments of the U. S. A., the U. K. and the U. S. S. R., chose not to 
extend at least overt military assistance during the Tamil insurgency 
as those states had during the J. V. P. insurrection in 1971. As 
previously observed, other powers such as China and Pakistan provided 
limited assistance. Consequently the Sri Lankan Government was left 
with no other option than to depend heavily on the Indian Government 
as mediator. 
From 1983 onward, the security forces were enlarged. The police 
service employed 11,500 personnel in 1983; this increased to 24,000 by 
1988. The following Table 7.7 indicates the expansion of the security 
forces in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1988. 
Table 7.7. The Security Strength of Sri 
Forces 1983/1984 1987/1988 
Regular- Reserves Regular - Reserves 
Police 14,500. - 21,000 -28,000. 
Army 11,000. 14,000. 40.000 
Navy 2,960. 582. 4,000 
Air Force 2,600. 1,000. 3,700 
Home Guards 5,000. 
Special Task Force 1,500 
National Auxiliary 
Volunteer Force 5,000 
Total 31,060 25,582 75,200 28,000 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1983-1984, p. 99 
and The Military Balance, 1987-1988, p. 172. 
Thus by 1987 the total strength of the Sri Lankan security forces 
stood at about 60,000.147 The number of security forces were also 
bolstered after 1984 by the establishment of para-military forces for 
147 Rohan Gunasekera, "Sri Lankan Armed Forces Switch Focus", 
International Defence Review, Vol. 5, (1988), p. 509. 
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internal security. 14S In addition to the growth of the security 
forces, the Ministry of National Security in 1985 created a special 
`Naval Surveillance Zone' under the purview of the Sri Lankan Navy 
within Sri Lankan waters encompassing the north western, northern and 
eastern coasts. The purpose of this surveillance zone was to curb the 
activities of the Tamil guerrillas who were receiving training and 
equipment from the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. 149 Another 
significant step was the formulation of a new government policy on 
peasant resettlement in 1985 within the boundaries of the Tamil- 
dominated provinces. Its main objective was to confine the Tamil 
guerrillas to Jaffna. 150 The policy initiated the programme to 
resettle 200,000 peasants, including 150,000 Sinhalese and 50,000 
peasants of mixed descent in the Northern Province. The settlement of 
these peasants was a security-cum-development strategy which aimed at 
creating a security cordon across the North. What the Sri Lankan 
Government did not foresee, however, were the fierce attacks inflicted 
upon these migrants by the Tamil guerrillas. The attacks not only 
halted any subsequent resettlement but drove away those who had 
already recolonised the area. 
By the end of 1985, however, the government had reinforced its 
position sufficiently to launch a counter-attack in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces. 151 The government relied heavily on the army for 
the forces and materiel needed to launch the offensive. By then 111 
army camps had been dispersed in the Northern and Eastern provinces. 
148 These forces were identified as follows: The National Armed 
Reserve (N. A. R. ) The National Auxiliary Force (N. A. F. ), Civil Defence 
Units, Homeguards, Towns Guards and Green Tigers. 
149 Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third 
World, 1971-1985, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 36. 
150 Marks Thomas, "People's liar in Sri Lanka: Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency", Issues and Studies, (1986), p. 84. 
151 C. Slanogaram. op. cit., p. 167. 
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Twenty-three camps were concentrated around the town of Trincomalee in 
the East which was the scene of a major military confrontation 
later. 152 Thus, the counter-insurgency policy relied on small unit 
warfare. 
In late 1986 the government launched an enhanced offensive from 
land, air and sea putting the guerrillas on a defensive position and 
into retreat. 153 The Sri Lankan Government was soon forced to abandon 
the offensive due to the pressure from the Indian Government to find a 
non-military solution to the political violence. Hence, the Sri 
Lankan Government sought to arrive at a political solution through 
peaceful negotiations while apparently rejecting the military course. 
P. Veniketeshwar Rao observes that both domestic and international 
pressures compelled the Sri Lankan Government to concede the necessity 
to negotiate with the Tamil political parties and to accept the role 
of India as mediator. 154 Consequently, the government followed a two- 
pronged policy: pressuring the guerrillas surrepticiously by military 
means, while negotiating concurrently with them through the Indian 
mediators. 
Consequently, the Sri Lankan Government called for an All Party 
Conference (A. P. C. ) to discuss the crisis of ethnic conflict and 
terrorism. R. N. Kearney, on the other hand, interprets the A. P. C. as 
a response made to appease the Indian Government by showing that the 
Sri Lankan Government was striving to arrive at a negotiated 
settlement-155 Sixteen political, religious and ethnic organisations 
152 Trincomalee, although an area of mixed population, would have 
been the capital of the proposed Eelam state. 
153 C. Manogaram, op. cit.. , p. 169. 
151 P. Venl: eteshwar Rao, op. cit., P. 422. 
155 R. N. Kearney, "Tension and Conflict in Sri Lanka", Current 
History, (March 1986), p. 112. 
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participated in the A. P. C. 156 The areas set for negotiation had been 
predetermined and memorialised in a document known as `ýnnexure C' 
during late 1983 after talks between the Sri Lankan President, J. R. 
Jayawardena, and the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and her 
special envoy, G. Parthasarathy. '57 Jayawardena's proposals for the 
devolution of a limited measure of autonomy to regional councils were 
abandoned, however, due largely to the opposition from both the Tamil 
and Sinhalese communities in Sri Lankaa. 153 
Until the end of 1984, the government refused to negotiate with 
the Tamil guerrilla organisations. 159 Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan 
President and the new Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, met on four 
occasions during the next two years to forge a political settlement. 
The first decisive measure to emerge from these talks was the 
scheduling of the Thimphu (Bhutan) Talks in June 1985. The Sri Lankan 
Government and representatives of the Tamil guerrilla groups met on 
the 18th of June 1985, for introductory discussions. 160 Those 
discussions were also made possible by agreement between the Sri 
Lankan Government and the Tamil guerrillas to cease hostilities for 
three months. The two groups of representatives met twice in Thimphu 
for talks, the first time in July and the second in September 1985. 
The talks ended in deadlock, however, when the Tamil guerrillas 
rejected the government's offer to devolve more power and authority to 
156 The following political parties and organisations did not 
attend the A. P. C.: the S. L. F. P., the M. E. P., and the T. U. L. F. 
157 See, Appendix 9. 
158 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 31, (May 1985), p. 
33581. 
159 K. M. De Silva, op. cit., (1987), p. 348. 
160 The L. T. T. E. and the P. L. O. T. did not participate in the talks 
but sent representatives, to Bhutan. The Times, (9 July 1985). 
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the District Couzicils, and the government refused the Tamils' request 
for a separatist charter. 161 
The failure of the Thimphu Talks, which had been seen as a 
breakthrough in negotiations toward a peaceful settlement, gave the 
Sri Lankan Government no alternative than to resume its course toward 
a military solution. The government perceived the Tamil problem as 
an illegimate armed threat which had to be tackled by the Sri Lankan 
military services. With the failure of the Thimphu Talks, the 
government and the guerrillas resumed their military confrontations. 
By the end of 1985, the government was in a much stronger position to 
launch more intense military operations against. the Tamil guerrillas 
in the Northern and Eastern provinces. 162 Initially, the military 
operations were launched in the Eastern Province. As previously 
noted, later that year Trincomalee became the site for a major 
confrontation with the T mil guerrillas. 163 Thus, the confrontations 
which became a cycle of terror and counter-terror soon developed into 
a full-blown internal war. By September 1986, more than 100,000 
civilians both Sinhala and Tamil, had been rendered homeless in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces as a result of these subsequent 
developments. 
In March 1986, the government launched an all-out offensive 
against the guerrilla bases in Jaffna. 164 The Indian response to 
these operations, however, was negative. The Sri Lankan Government 
was once again compelled by the the Indian Government to negotiate 
161 Frontline, (1985), Ministry of State (Sri Lanka) The Thimphu 
Talks: The Stand Taken by the Sri Lanka Government, (Colombo: 
Department of Information, 1985). 
162 C. : 'fano; aram, op. cit., p. 167. 
163 C. R. de Silva, "Ethnic Crisis", Asian Thought and Society, 
(1985), pp. 137-141. 
164 C. Manogaram, op. cit., p. 169. 
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with the T. C. L. F., which represented the Tamil moderates. Once again 
there was deadlock with the T. U. L. F. and the guerrilla groups rejected 
the government proposals. The second breakdown of negotiations was 
decisive for the Sri Lankan Government as they hoped to launch 
`Operation Liberation', which was to be the final all-out offensive. 
The three-pronged attack was` coordinated to simultaneously shell the 
guerrilla bases by sea and air from the north, and mount a land 
invasion by the army from the south. The fact that the army and other 
forces were almost entirely composed of Sinhalese proved to be a major 
barrier in mobilising the support of the civilians behind the 
government forces. This was contrary to the experience of 1971, and 
due mainly to the earlier reprisals of the armed forces against 
civilians. By 1986 the army camps were under siege, and were isolated 
by guerrilla mines and booby traps along the roads and trails. 165 The 
government's full-scale operations did not yield its anticipated 
results due to international pressure on the Sri Lankan Government to 
withdraw its forces and accusations of brutality to civilians. Yet 
again an attempt was made to summon a Political Party Conference 
(P. P. C. ). The guerrillas again rejected the government's proposals 
leading to the launching of the government's third major offensive in 
1986, this time concentrated in the Jaffna Peninsula. In January 1987 
the Sri Lankan Government imposed a total economic blockade on the 
peninsula-166 This action effected the civilian population more than 
the Tamil guerrillas, and thus hardened the resistance of the Jaffna 
populace to the government's position. 
All military operations came to a standstill in April 1987 when a 
unilateral cessation of hostilities was announced by the government, 
to be effective from the 11th to the 21st of April 1987. 
165 The Economist, (28 February 1987), p. 51. 
166 Far Eastern Economic'Review, (26 February 1987), p. 19. 
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Nevertheless, the acceleration of >guerrilla activities activated the 
government's plans for `Operation Liberation' which had been held in 
abeyance. The main objective of the government's plan to recapture 
the areas which the L. T. T. E. had occupied. The army succeeded in 
reaching the Jaffna Peninsula. Once more the Indian Government 
decided to intervene, this time more directly in the form of air drops 
of relief supplies to Jaffna in June 1987 to end the blockade. 167 
Following India's aid to the Tamils, 'Operation Liberation' collapsed. 
According to George Modelski there are three types of endings to civil 
wars: an outright win by one party, a lasting separation or a 
negotiated settlement. 1ss What the Indian intervention achieved was 
a denial of victory for the government and a separate state for the 
Tamil guerrillas. Consequently, the final outcome was a negotiated 
settlement agreement signed by the Sri Lankan President and the Indian 
Prime Minister in Juane 1987 in Colombo. The agreement which came to 
be known as the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord marked the end of the third 
phase of Tamil political violence, and was followed by yet another 
phase of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lc-uika. 169 
7.16 Magnitude of Political Violence 
The author now focuses on the following aspects of political 
violence activated by the Tamil guerrilla groups: duration, area of 
expansion and participation. The duration of the Tamil guerrilla 
167 The Indian Government first attempted to send food supplies to 
Jaffna in a flotilla of fishing. boats but it was turned back by the 
Sri Lankan Navy. Within 24 hours, however, India reacted by air- 
dropping supplies. The main purpose of this action was to display 
India's disapproval of the Sri Lankan Government's military action 
against the Tamil guerrillas. 
163 George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War", 
in James N. Rosenau, (ed), International Aspects of Civil War, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 123. 
169 For details on the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, see, Appendix 10. 
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warfare eludes accurate assessment as their activities were not 
divulged by the Sri Lankan Government until about 1975. Although the 
Tamil guerrillas had been active since 1972, they did not emerge as a 
bone fide threat to the central government until the eruption of the 
ethnic violence in 1977. The ethnic violence in 1983 served to 
further expand their activities. The subsequent Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 
in June 1987 succeeded in disarming P. L. O. T., T. E. L. O., the E. P. R. L. F. 
and E. R. O. S., but failed to disarm the L. T. T. E., the major guerrilla 
group. As a result, the L. T. T. E. 's guerrilla-cum-terrorist activities 
did not cease and are still on-going. The author notes again that 
this study is limited to a period of 15 years, beginning in 1972 and 
ending in 1987 
The guerrilla activities which were initiated within the Jaffna 
Peninsula in 1972, had by 1982 gradually spread to the Tamil- 
dominated districts in the Eastern Province. The districts in which 
these activities occurred are: Vaunia, Mannar, Trincomalee, 
Batticoloa, Jaffna, Ampara and Mulativu. 170 It should be noted that 
this strain of violence spread in areas which had remained undisturbed 
during the 1971 Insurrection. For example, after 1984 civilian 
targets in Colombo and Anuradhapura were also vulnerable to attack. 
In spite of their bases in Tamil Nadu, the Tamil guerrilla movement 
was regionally-based in Northern Sri Lanka, unlike the 1971 
Insurrection which had been nationwide. 
The undercover nature of the Tamil movement restricts an 
assessment of the actual number of guerrillas who were mobilised. Yet 
it is clearly evident that the overwhelming majority were, in terms of 
ethnicity, from the Sri Lankan Tamil community. The participation of 
Muslims or Indian Tamils was marginal while the Sinhalese remained 
totally aloof from the Tamil guerrilla movement. In terms of 
170 All these districts are Tamil majority areas. 
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religion, a majority were Hindus with only marginal representation of 
Christians. Although the contribution by expatriate Tamils was 
significant in terms of their financial aid and public protests, 
there is no evidence of their having had direct participation in the 
armed struggle. Nor is there any evidence of the involvement of 
mercenaries or of the Tamil peasants. 171 The role of women in the 
guerrilla movement is still viewed ambiguously in spite of some 
evidence of their direct involvement in the guerrilla groups. There 
is no tangible evidence of their involvement in any armed warfare, 
reflecting the traditional role ascribed to women within the Tamil 
society. In contrast to the rural-based Sinhalese youth who 
perpetrated the armed struggle of 1971, the Tamil youth who 
participated in the political violence during the period 1972-87 were 
from both the rural and urban sectors. 
Like the number of guerrillas in the Insurrection of 1971, the 
number of participants in the Tamil guerrilla warfare has been hard to 
assess. It is evident that the number of guerrilla fighters and 
sympathizers varied from one stage to another. Prior to 1977 there 
were less than 50 Tamil guerrillas, but by July 1983 the total 
membership had risen to nearly 200. The number of participants 
increased after the ethnic violence of 1983. By 1987 the total had 
seemingly exploded to between 5,000-10,000.172 
The human costs of the Tamil political violence in terms of the 
number of deaths have also been ambiguous and difficult to determine. 
As in 1971 Insurrection, the casualties in the long Tamil campaign 
were high but never accurately assessed. According to Bruce Matthews, 
171 V. Nithiyanandan, "An Analysis of Economic factors Behind the 
Origin and- Development of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka", in C. 
Abeysekera, and N. Gunesinghe, (ed), Facets of Ethnicity in Sri Lanka, 
(Colombo: Karunaratne and Sons Ltd., 1987), p. 136. 
172 See, Chapter 5. 
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by 1984 over 2,500 Sri Lankans had been killed as a result of this 
conflict. 173 Sri Lankan Government statisticians have arrived at 
6,000 deaths broken down as follows: 600 Sinhala civilians, 500 
military and police personnel and 5,000 Tamils. 174 Pro-Tamil human 
rights organisations claim that the number of deaths is closer to 
10,000.175 Sinha Ranatunga also claims that over 7,000 were killed 
from 1983 onward. 176 Other sources have assessed the number killed 
between 1983 and 1987 to be 5,000.171 Considering the conflicting 
assessments it could be safely estimated that from 6,000 to 10,000 
persons have been killed as a result of this political violence. 
There were also 6,000 to 8,000 political prisoners. These statistics 
further indicate that the Tamil guerrilla violence was a protracted 
struggle of a magnitude and intensity, hitherto unsurpassed in post- 
independent Sri Lanka. 
7.17 Pattern and Outcome 
In the final part of this section of the analysis, the pattern of 
violence, the subsequent development of'the Tamil guerrilla groups, 
and the short-term socio-economic and political impact of the violence 
will be viewed. The protracted nature of the Tamil political violence 
in Sri Lanka makes it difficult to define a distinct pattern. Certain, 
salient features, however, have emerged which indicate a general 
pattern of violence. First, the objective of the political violence 
was primarily secessionist. Almost all of the participants in the 
173 Bruce Matthews, op. cit. p. 43. 
174 Ralph R. Premdas, and S. W. R. de Samarasinghe, "Sri Lanka's 
Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord", Asian Survey, Vol. 28, 
No. 6, (1988), p. 677. 
175 Time, (June 1986), p. 12. 
176 Sinha Ratnatunga, op. cit., p. 386 
177 Armed Forces, (June 1988), p. 280. 
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violence were Tamil-Hindu youth. Moreover, it was an ethnic 
insurgency which depended heavily on urban terrorism and rural 
guerrilla warfare to achieve its objective. In comparison to the 
Insurrection of 1971, the political violence perpetuated by the Tamil 
guerrillas was not a mere domestic conflict. Apart from foreign aid 
the Tamil conflict also had an international dimension given the 
guerrilla bases located in South India and arms training in the Middle 
East. It was thus secessionist guerrilla warfare heavily influenced 
by external factors. 
In addition to the human toll, the socio-economic and political 
impact of the Tamil guerrilla warfare was high. The devolution of 
power was a major political outcome, which resulted from the Indo-Sri 
Lanka Accord of 1987. Thus, eight autonomous provincial councils were 
created in Sri Lanka. 1 Four of the guerrilla groups which had been 
actively involved decided to support the Indo-Sri Lanka accord and 
surrender their arms. The L. T. T. E., which had been the most overtly 
involved group, continued their guerrilla warfare against the Indian 
Peace Keeping Force (I. P. K. F. ) despite the agreement. The conflict 
gave rise to a dramatic increase of human rights violations such as 
torture, disappearances, extra-judicial killings, detention without 
trial and reprisal killings of civilians. The violation of human 
rights both by the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil guerrillas has 
been heavily criticized by human rights, organisations. 179 More than 
150,000 Sri Lankans fled to India and other foreign countries, and 
the prolonged state of emergency created anenvironment that 
constricted all civil liberties. 
1778 One of councils oversees the Northern and Eastern provinces 
which is governed by the E. P. R. L. F. The continuation of the merger of 
the Northern and Eastern provinces, however, will be subject to a 
referendum in 1992. 
179 AN ASIA Watch Report, op. cit., pp. 28-40. 
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Furthermore, the rapid deterioration of relations between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamil communities is evident. The degree of the 
rift between the two communities is clearly reflected by the outbreaks 
of ethnic violence in 1977,1979,1981 and 1983. Tourism, which at 
its peak had attracted over 400,000 visitors annually, had generated 
about U. S. S150 million in foreign exchange, and had provided about 
64,000 jobs. 180 The monetary cost of the civil war amounted to some 
15 billion Sri Lankan rupees (U. S. $500 million) annually. 181 By 
1986,17 per cent of the national budget was allotted to defence 
expenditure, leading to curtailment of other infrastructural 
expenditure in Sri Lanka. The increasing intrusion of military issues 
into politics resulted from the urgency of the Tamil guerrilla 
warfare. The rapid militarisation of the country led to an increased 
centralization of power and a constitutionally authoritarian state. 
To this extent the sphere of party politics was made less significant. 
The democratic processes which had functioned undisturbed were 
gradually eroded with the centralization of power. Consequently, a 
veritable authoritarian state was established. 
the role of the Indian Government was transformed from a 
diplomatic ally to a force that was directly involved in Sri Lanka's 
internal affairs. Moreover, the Tamil insurgency provided a good 
opportunity for India to assert its superiority over Sri Lanka and its 
dominance in South Asia to any outside power interested in the region. 
The conflict also paved the way for the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(I. P. K. F. ) to be deployed in June 1987 in Sri Lanka causing much 
concern to the Sinhalese population. This concern led to the revival' 
of the J. V. P. 's insurrection in 1987 which upheld the sentiments of 
the Sinhalese-Buddhist people. Finally, Indian intervention led to 
180 Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de Samarasinghe, op. cit., p. 677. 
151 Ibid. p. 676. 
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the prolonged civil war developing new complexities, which must be 
studied separately. Political violence was subsequently 
institutionalised. The immediate impact of the guerrilla war were the 
consequences mentioned above; but the long-lasting effects are yet to 
be assessed. It is too early yet to examine the long-term outcome of 
the Tamil political violence. As perceived from the above 
discussion, the socio-economic and political fabric of the country has 
been permeated by the effects of an intense and protracted struggle 
quite different from the Insurrection of 1971. The immediate 
objective of this struggle was confined to the Northern and Eastern 
provinces but its national and regional impact has been more far- 
reaching. This aspect will be further examined in the concluding 
chapter. 
7.18 Summary 
Since 1971 the political developments in Sri Lanka have been 
characterized by political violence. The first overt manifestation of 
such violence was in April 1971. The armed struggle of 1971 was a 
textbook case which was pre-planned and organised with the objective 
of capturing state power. This uprising which marked the culmination 
of the J. V. P. activities assumed three stages. 
During the first stage, in spite of the' J. V. P. succeeding in 
capturing only five police stations, they were able to control a much 
wider area due to the total unpreparedness of the Sri Lankan 
Government and the armed forces and police. Forty police stations 
were abandoned during this stage as the government forces were put on 
the defensive. This trend of events, however, was not to last as the 
government received military assistance from foreign governments 
thereby strengthening the Sri Lankan Government's forces to launch a 
counter-offensive. 
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During the second stage, the J. V. P. planned to continue their 
armed assault by converting the abandoned police areas, and the few 
other areas they had successfully captured, into base camps. These 
plans proved futile, however, and the guerrillas were compelled to 
seek refuge in the jungles of the dry zone with the intention of 
continuing protracted guerrilla warfare. The members of the J. V. P. 
were ill-prepared and ill-equipped to resort to long-term guerrilla 
warfare and, as a result, the armed uprising collapsed. 
Given these circumstances it was not long before the Sri Lankan 
Government crushed the uprising with the aid of foreign assistance. 
The government, on the other hand, adapted a dual policy for the 
participants of the uprising. Some members were brought to trial 
before the Criminal Justice Commission (C. J. C. ) while others were 
rehabilitated. The significance of the armed struggle lay in its 
short duration of three months, and in the exclusivity of its 
membership: the J. V. P. were predominately Sinhala Buddhist youth from 
the rural sector. Contrary to the compressed nature of the rural 
guerrilla warfare of 1971, the political violence which gained ground 
among the Tamil community developed into a prolonged and intense 
struggle. Its long-term objective was to establish a separate Tamil 
state. At the initial stages from 1972 to 1977, these activities were 
confined to political terrorism. During the second phase of violence 
which covers a period from 1977 to 1983, however, the guerrilla 
activities expanded to include terrorist bombings, assassinations and 
bank robberies. Other than the expansion of activities, their 
territorial limits of action also expanded to include occasional 
terrorist attacks on targets outside the Northern and Eastern 
provinces. During the third phase from 1983 to 1987, there was a 
marked escalation of terrorist activity and guerrilla warfare. 
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The initial stages of 'Tamil political violence were confronted by 
the army and police who were intent on crushing this movement. The 
ethnic violence of 1983 introduced an alternate course of political 
negotiations, with the Indian Government acting as a mediator. This 
dual approach failed as well, and the Sri Lankan Government was 
incapable of successfully controlling the guerrilla activities. The 
continued thwarting of the government's efforts subsequently led to 
the agreement between India and Sri Lanka, better known as the Indo- 
Sri Lanka Accord. This accord succeeded in disarming the E. P. R. L. F., 
E. R. O. S., T. E. L. O. and P. L. O. T., but failed to disarm the most 
fundamentalist and hard-core group, the L. T. T. E. 
The common characteristic shared by the political violence of 1971 
and the protracted guerrilla struggle of the Tamils was the dominance 
of the youth component. The Tamil youth took up arms in 1972 for the 
cause of a separate Tmil state, while the Sinhala youth did so in 
1971 with revolutionary objectives for Sri Lanka as a whole. The 
differences also lie in the nature of the warfare. Were the uprising 
of 1971 was a rural guerrilla warfare, the struggle of the Tamil youth 
assumed the dimensions of both urban guerrilla warfare and insurgency 
in the rural areas. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The concluding chapter has four objectives. First, the author 
undertakes a overview of the entire study, emphasizing its main 
arguments. Secondly, the chapter goes on to discuss the ensuing 
findings of this research study and the author's observations about 
them. Thirdly, it examines the implications of this study for future 
research. Finally, it presents a discussion of some recommendations 
for a solution to the problem of political violence in Sri Lanka. To 
accommodate all those aspects, this chapter is subdivided into the 
following sections: overview, findings and observations, 
implementations and consequences, recommendations and summary. 
8.2 Overview 
Political violence in the Third World represents a new strain of 
inquiry in modern politics and international relations. Since the end 
of the Second World War, there has been a growing tendency for 
different manifestations of political violence within the countries 
of the Third World. The causes of these manifestations are complex 
and manifold. In its earliest appearances political violence was 
concentrated either in Colonial or post-Colonial countries such as 
China, North Vietnam, Algeria, North Korea, and Malaya. The process 
of decolonization, however, was not the sole cause of the outbreak of 
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political violence in the Third World. Independent countries such as 
Laos, Guatemala, Colombia, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Nicaragua have 
also experienced political violence during their post-Colonial 
periods. The indiscriminate trend toward political violence is 
evident in its manifestation in capitalist countries, e. g., South 
Korea, the Philippines, Lebanon, and India, as well as in pro- 
communist countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia and 
Nicaragua. One characteristic that has emerged in Third World 
political violence is that a majority of the governments of these 
countries have not been overthrown by guerrilla forces; but, nor have 
the governments in these regions been able to eradicate the guerrilla 
threat. 
The, basic focusci of this study are the causes, patterns and 
consequences of political violence. This investigation empirically 
analyses Sri Lanka as a case study of Third World political violence, 
and is based on a comparative approach where the revolutionary- 
motivated and secessionist violence are viewed in a wider contest.. 
The left-wing insurgency waged by the J. V. P. on a recurring basis 
since 1971, and the Tamil guerrilla warfare pioneered and fought by 
the L. T. T. E., P. L. O. T., E. R. O. S., T. E. L. O. and the E. P. R. L. F. since 
1972, appear interminable when compared to other political violence in 
the Third World. Left-wing insurrections and ethnic-insurgency are 
the two main manifestations of political violence evident in many 
Third World countries such as. Burma, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and 
India. This study, however, is confined to political violence waged 
by organised groups or movements. The main focal points of this study 
are the socio-economic and political factors which serve as 
preconditions for the origin of political violence movements. The 
author's 'modus operandi' is to apply a theoretical framework to trace 
the nexus between the socio-economic background of the members of the 
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politically violent organisations and the pattern of political 
violence. 
Given the main objectives of this study, the following hypotheses 
have been utilized to test the basic premises: (1) political violence 
in Sri Lanka is not spontaneous but pre-planned and organised; (2) the 
failure of the existing political system to assimilate a newly 
emerging social class has given rise to political violence movements; 
(3) political factors are more conducive for the origin and 
development of politically violent movements and political violence 
itself than are socio-economic and psychological factors; and (4) 
there is a close nexus between the socio-economic background of the 
members of the political violence movements and the pattern of 
political violence. The data gathered by the author is presented and 
analysed to support the above hypotheses. 
The second chapter focuses on the analytical framework of the 
study, which is comprised of a critique aid review of selected 
literature on definitions, theories and typologies of political 
violence. Political violence is a concept that has diverse definitions 
depending on each theorist's approach. ' The main controversy 
surrounding the concept is derived from the debate as to whether it 
embraces all forms of violent attempts to despose or merely compromise 
extant states or governments. There is strong evidence to indicate 
that in many Third World countries, political violence is not confined 
to parties, groups and movements. States also resort to violence 
covertly or overtly either to gain additional power or retain power. 
The concept of political violence eludes a precise definition due to 
1 The components of the set of phenomena referred to as political 
violence are often identified with or include some of the same 
phenomena which have been referred to as internal wars (Eckstein), 
domestic conflict (Tanter, Rummel), intrasocietal war (Huntington), 
revolution (Johnson) or civil strife (Gurr). The author's approach is 
limited to internal domestic forms of political conflict and thus 
excludes foreign wars and invasion. 
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its complexity and applicability to various situations. As a result, 
the present study examined political violence as pre-planned armed 
attacks by an organised group or groups to capture or change political 
power in a domestic political system. 
By the early 1960s, theories of political violence had been 
perfected to a great extent. Since then, political violence has been 
attributed to a variety of factors, giving rise to a large body of 
theoretical literature. In spite of the multiplicity of socio- 
economic, psychological and political literature, the author focuses 
on the main representative theories, such as the social system theory 
of C. Joluison's, the J-curve theory of D. C. Davies, the relative 
deprivation theory of Ted Robert Gurr, and the modernisation theory of 
S. P. Huntington. The theoretical analysis has led the author to 
conclude that the primary obstacles in studying political violence in 
the Third World are the diverse aspects emphasized in the theories. 
The theories of political violence summarised, discussed and 
criticised in this study share two common features. The first is that 
the four theories are primarily based on empirical studies concerned 
with domestic forms of political violence. Secondly, these theories 
are mainly based on one single factor, either socio-economic, 
psychological or political. Although, the theories offer important 
approaches in the field of political violence and emphasize 
significant aspects of the subject, an alarming number of 
methodological weaknesses have marred their effectiveness. Generally, 
they are unable to cope with the apparent correlation between 
political violence on the one hand, and socio-economic and political 
development on the other.: Another common weakness of the four 
theories is their inability to explain the frequency and intensity of 
political violence in the given countries. 
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In light of these limitations, the modernisation theory presented 
by S. P. Huntington is an exception in its applicability to the Third 
World. It attempts to explain why revolution occurs predominantly in 
Third World countries, and argues that the process of modernisation 
causes political instability by undermining traditional political 
authority and institutions. According to Huntington, revolution is 
most likely to occur during the transition period between traditional 
and modern society. It should be noted, however, that Huntington's 
theory of modernisation has also been subject to severe and often 
valid criticism. There is a large body of literature which debates 
the utility of the term 'modernisation', which is a basic tenet of 
Huntington's approach. Despite these criticisms, the modernisation 
theory is the only available theory which adequately addresses 
political violence in the Third World. Due to the apparent 
correlation between political violence and socio-economic and 
political development in Sri Lanka, the author has selected this 
theory with modification as a analytical framework. Moreover, an 
analysis of the literature on typologies of political violence has led 
to the conclusion that accurate measurement is another very complex 
problem to be faced in the study of political violence. 
In Chapter 3, the socio-economic and political factors which were 
the preconditions for the origin and development of the J. V. P. as a 
political violence movement are examined. In this context, 
Huntington's modernisation theory is applied with some modification. 
Sri Lanka is a Third World country with a long history of colonialism. 
The European colonial powers first conquered part of Sri Lanka in 
1505, and in 1815 conquered the entire country. In spite of the 
colonial occupation, the socio-economic and political fabric of the 
country remained intact until 1829. The socio-economic and political 
reforms initiated by the British in 1829 marked the beginning of a 
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transition from the traditional to Colonial, and finally, to a modern 
form of society, economy and polity. The wheels of economic 
modernisation were set in motion with the introduction of a plantation 
economy. Sri Lanka's integration into the global economy marked a 
decline of the traditional agricultural economy. The agrarian crisis 
was manifest in the acute shortage of land, in land fragmentation and 
rural indebtedness. This agrarian crisis was further aggravated by 
the expansion of social mobilisation in the form of a rapid growth of 
population, urbanisation, and educational opportunities, a high rate 
of literacy and the expansion of the media. 
These social processes gave rise to new social classes within the 
semi-urban and rural sectors whose expectations and aspirations were 
high. The economic growth of Sri Lanka, however, did not. keep 
abreast of these rapid social changes. The economy was beset by 
foreign debt, inflation, a high rate of unemployment. and 
underemployment.. The economic stagnation thwarted any fulfilment of 
the aspirations of the newly emerging social classes. Consequently, 
they were subject to a process of disillusionment and an increasing 
trend of politicisation from the mid-1960s onwards. 
The socio-economic changes during the British colonial period were 
accompanied by political changes as well. A traditional indigenous 
polity was replaced by a colonial polity and subsequently by a modern 
independent polity. Since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has 
maintained a parliamentary structure of government akin to the British 
Westminster model. Furthermore, the granting of universal franchise 
in 1931 and the growth of a competitive political party system have 
expanded the level of political participation in Sri Lanka. As a 
result of the introduction of the competitive party system the 
election of 1956 marked the advent of crucial changes. From. 1956 to 
1977 governments were elected at six general elections. The 
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development of a competitive party system further expanded the 
political participation in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, 1956 also 
marked the beginning of the alienation of a section of Sri Lankan 
society. An alternative government was available in the General 
Election of 1956, which was thus a landmark in the Sri Lanka's modern 
political history. The reduction in the eligible age for voting from 
21 to 18 years heightened the youth interest in politics and expanded 
political participation. The political parties, however, were not 
sufficiently flexible then to assimilate the newly emerging 
politicised radical youth into the existing political system. 
The political parties in Sri Lanka during the 1960s were poorly 
organised and their power was centralised in the ruling elite. 
Consequently, the greater majority of the semi-urban and rural youth 
who were involved in politics during elections were alienated and 
rendered apathetic. In the context of economic underdevelopment, the 
democratic processes in Sri Lanka were constricted and suffocated by 
alternate governments. The widening gap between the election promises 
and the performance of elected governments, and their inability to 
solve the problem of unemployment created unrest among the youth. 
Given the failures of the political parties, more and more 
educated youth were drawn toward the left-orientated parties in Sri 
Lanka. There were several factors, however, which prevented the rural 
youth from being assimilated into these left-wing political parties. 
The disunity among the political parties was rooted mainly in 
ideological and personal differences, their electoral failure and the 
elite nature of the leadership. The failure of the major political 
parties, including the left-wing parties, to absorb the youth cadres 
into the political system generated a realization amongst a large 
segment of the youth population of the need for an organisation 
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committed to revolutionary changes in the socio-economic and political 
system of Sri Lanka. 
Chapter 4 of this study examines the preconditions which gave rise 
to organised underground political violence movements among Sri 
Lanka's Tamil community. The socio-economic and political changes 
which occurred during the British Colonial period created a 
competition for limited resources between the Sinhalese majority and 
the Tamil minority. The political changes in Sri Lanka further 
exacerbated these trends. The constitutional reforms during the 
British period weakened the political strength of the Tamil community. 
The policy innovations during the post-independence period, however, 
had a more serious impact on the relationship between the two 
communities. The main issues after 1948 were the peasant resettlement 
schemes and the legislation of Sinhala as the official language. 
Consequently, the major political parties gravitated towards an ethnic 
identification. The Sinhalese felt their majority position threatened 
by the Tamils mainly due to the Tamils' domination in the professions, 
trades and university education. The Tamils, on the other hand, 
became increasingly conscious of a separate identity. These 
developments led the Federal Party to demand autonomy within a federal 
system of government. 
The Sri Lankan Government was slow, if not inert, in introducing 
the necessary political reforms to accommodate the demands of the 
Tornils. This lack of change made the Tamil youth restive. The lack of 
adequate access to land, employment, business enterprise and 
university education, together with the lack of political reform, 
created a discontented and frustrated Tamil youth. The Tamil youth 
believed that they were being discriminated against by the successive 
Sinhalese-majority governments as no better than second-class 
citizens. As a result of this added dimension, the level of political 
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participation among the Tamils escalated, and their demands became 
more radical in 1972 with the formation of the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (T. U. L. F. ). The continued inertia of the Tamil youth movement 
following the government's rebuff of their initially modest demand for 
federalism, led to the radical demand for a separate Tamil state. 
Peaceful demands by the Tamil community for political changes went 
relatively unheeded by the Sri Lank-an Government due essentially to 
pressures from the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority. Furthermore, the 
political activities of the young Tamils were suppressed by the 
national government. Thus the failure of post-independence 
governments to address the deep-rooted grievances of the politically 
energated Tamil youth led to the origin and development of the Tamil 
guerrilla organisations, which sought to achieve a separate Tamil 
state by means of violence. 
Chapter ä examines the organisational aspects of the J. V. P. and 
the Tamil guerrilla organisations, which are the key aspects in this 
study of political violence in Sri Lanka. The origin of the J. V. P. is 
closely linked to the development of the left-wing movement in Sri 
Lanka. The J. V. P. was it breakaway group from the Maoist-wing of the 
Sri Lankan Communist Party. From its inception in the mid-1960s, the 
J. V. P. developed as a clandestine group. The development of the 
J. V. P. largely depended on propaganda and indoctrination classes 
conducted by a small revolutionary cadre. The J. V. P., therefore, is 
very different from the theoretical stipulations of the foco theory of 
Che Guevera. According to the foco theory an outside force intervenes 
to instigate a military movement and then undertakes to create a 
political movement. 2 The J. V. P., on the other hand, first undertook 
to create a political movement which was transformed into a military 
2 Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution: Armed Struggle and 
political Struggle in Latin America, (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 
106. 
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movement. Therefore, the J. V. P. may be classified as an independent 
left-wing guerrilla movement. 
The socio-economic background of the leaders and members of the 
Sri Lankan guerrilla groups is an important aspect of this study. In 
terms of ethnicity nearly the entire leadership and membership of the 
J. V. P. were members of the Sinhalese community and, by religion, were 
Buddhists. According to Walker Connor, it is a normal characteristic 
of political violence movements in multi-ethnic societies in the Third 
World to be identified closely with a single ethnic group. 3 Thus, the 
fIuk guerrilla movement in the Philippines was seen as essentially 
Pampangan by non-Pampangan ethnicities; the Communist guerrilla 
movement in Malaysia was confined to the Chinese community; and the 
Shining Path in Peru has been confined to the Indian community. A 
noteworthy and curious disparity in the organisational structure of 
the J. V. P. was that its leaders were from the urban sector, while a 
majority of its members were from the rural sector. The social class 
of the leaders, was primarily petit bourgeois rather than middle 
class. The representation of the peasantry in the results of was 
negligible. Students and unemployed rural youth swelled its party 
cadres. The J. V. P. was a clandestine movement until the General 
Election of 1970 after which it turned into an open political 
organisation. The organisational structure of the J. V. P. was 
pyramidical whereby decision-making and policy-setting authority 
converged at the top and filtered down. Members were controlled by a 
tight command structure. Foreign involvement in the J. V. P. was non- 
existent--the movement depended entirely on domestic support. 
Unlike the J. V. P., the Tamil guerrilla groups originated from the 
Tamil ethno-nationalist movement which was represented by the moderate 
3 Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism", Journal of 
InternaLiona. Affairs, Vol. 27, (1973), pp. 16-17. 
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F. P. and the T. U. L. F. The Tamil guerrilla organisations were mainly 
represented by the following five organ isations: the L. T. T. E., 
E. R. O. S., the T. E. L. O., P. L. O. T., and the E. P. R. L. F. Of these 
organisations, the L. T. T. E. has emerged as the most potent group. 
Theoretically, the origin and development of these groups fit the 
pattern of the foco theory in that they were challenging the concept 
of a 'vanguard' party, which was the basic premise of Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary theory. The ethno-religious background of the 
leadership and general membership of these groups were, for the most 
part, Tamil-Hindu. The Tamil guerrilla groups, like the J. V. P., were 
youth-centred, organised as liberation armies, drawn from both the 
rural and urban sectors, and fairly well educated. Yet another shared 
characteristic with the J. V. P. was negligible participation of the 
peasantry. 
Although both the J. V. P. and the Tamil groups were action- 
orientated, the Tamils were far better trained and equipped than were 
the J. V. P. All of the Tamil guerrilla groups were supported by an 
international network of guerrilla movements and received support from 
the state of Tamil Nadu in Southern India. Military bases, arms and 
training, unofficial political asylum and propaganda were provided by 
the state government and other political parties in Tamil Nadu. Most 
of the propaganda, however, was carried out by-expatriate-Tamil groups 
in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, West Germany, 
Australia and Canada. 
The study has revealed that the contrasting ideologies, strategies 
and programmes of the J. V. P. and the Tamil guerrilla organisations are 
an important aspect of political violence as it occurred in Sri Lanka. 
The objectives of the J. V. P. were not based on any socio-economic 
demands, but rather were aimed at overthrowing the existing national 
government, capturing state power, and working towards a socialist 
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state. Accordingly, the J. V. P. 's main objectives were the violent 
overthrow of the Sri Lankan Government and the bringing about of 
revolutionary changes in the existing socio-economic and political 
system. Thus, the politico-military objectives of the J. V. P. were 
based on the reasoning of justifying the means by the end result. 
The J. V. P. enlarged its membership by formulating a distinct 
ideology which was adapted from Marxism-Leninism to suit the 
indigenous socio-economic conditions in Sri Lanka. Moreover, the 
radical thinkers from the Third World such as Mao, Che Guevara and 
Regis Debray influenced the ideology of the J. V. P. This ideology was 
tainted by the influence of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism which was 
manifest in the battle cry: "Mavu Bima Nathinam Maranaya" (The 
motherland or death). 4 The ideology of many political violence 
movements in the Third World, like the Pfau Mau in Kenya, the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation in Palestine, and the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua, owe little to Marxism-Leninism. Neither were the 
revolutionary movements in Algeria and Cuba in the late 1950s 
influenced by the doctrine of Marxist-Leninism. It is evident that 
the J. V. P. sought to present itself as a native challenge to the 
tradition of peaceful and constitutional means of socio-economic 
reconstruction in Sri Lanka. The ideology of the J. V. P. was, 
therefore, openly anti-western, anti-establishment and anti-Indian. 
The strategy of the. J. V. P. was based on a concept of launching a 
one-day armed insurrection. This strategy was not derived from Mao's 
model of a people's war or Che Guevara's model of guerrilla warfare, 
but was influenced by the strategy adapted by the Zanzibar 
revolutionists in 1964. The tactical plan was to launch simultaneous 
armed attacks on all police stations and military bases at the same 
4 Similarly, the battle cry of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua 
against the Samoza regime was: `motherland free or death'. 
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hour, and to capture weapons, key government personnel and the main 
administrative centres in Sri Lanka in one day. The J. V. P. 's military 
strategy thus emphasized the importance of subjective factors such as 
will and dedication rather than objective socio-economic and political 
conditions. The strategy also sought to exploit the strength of a 
surprise armed attack which would alleviate the disadvantages of their 
military weakness and disparity in number. The weakness in the 
J. V. P. 's strategy was two-fold: first, their limited fighting forces 
were spread over too wide a line of attack; secondly, the government 
forces were stronger in number, training and equipment. According to 
the J. V. P. 's strategy there was no basis for the involvement of the 
masses. The J. V. P. viewed the Sri Lanan populace as mere spectators 
to the drama of political violence between government forces and 
guerrilla fighters. In essence this type of strategy has many 
similarities with the theory of insurrection of Louis Auguste Blanqui 
(1803-1881) who advocated a two-phase strategy to achieve socialism in 
France. ' The postrevolutionary programme of the J. V. P. was based 
vaguely on the socialist models in Asia such as in Communist China and 
North Korea. The economic policies of the J. V. P. emphasized the 
necessity of a self-sufficient, planned economy dependent solely on 
domestic resources. This was a utopian rather than a practical 
programme. Politically, the J. V. P. proposed a one-party government 
which it would lead, rather than a parliamentary democracy based on a 
multi-party system. 
The ideology, strategy and programme of the Tamil guerrilla 
organisations contrasted sharply to that of the J. V. P. The long-term 
5 In the first phase of insurrection, tightly organised 
professional revolutionaries were to take over the key points and 
buildings of Paris. Then in the second phase, they were to call for a 
popular uprising to ward off an eventual counterattack by the 
military. For further detail see, Alan B. Spitzer, The Revolutionary 
Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, (New York: 1957), pp. 171-182. 
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objective of all the major Tamil groups was to establish a separate 
Tamil state more popularly known as Eelam. Their main objective was 
not to overthrow the national government but to secede and establish 
an alternative seat of government encompassing the Northern and 
Eastern provinces in Sri Lanka. 
The Tamil demand for separatism called for an ethno-nationalist 
ideology which was preoccupied with the survival and preservation of 
the Tamil ethnicity, language, culture and traditional homeland. The 
guerrilla groups perceived themselves to be the emancipators of the 
Tamil community. The ethno-nationalist ideology of the Tamil 
guerrillas, however, included a tendency toward leftist leanings. In 
contrast to the J. V. P. 's concept of a motherland, the Tamil guerrilla 
organisat. ions used the concept of a `traditional homeland'. 
Considering the primary objective of revolution, and in the 
Tamils'case, secession, both the J. V. P. and Tamil guerrilla movements 
were more action-orientated than theory-orientated. Both the J. V. P. 
and Tamil movements shared the view that they had a right to rebel 
against discrimination in Sri Lanka and to fight for national self- 
determination. 
In spite of the shared ideology of the Tamil guerrilla groups, 
their strategies differed. The L. T. T. E. relied heavily on the 
classical type of terrorism-cum-guerrilla warfare. The L. T. T. E. 's 
strategy included the use of acts of terror and sabotage to goad the 
government forces into repressive countermeasures which would cause a 
rift between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil population. This 
plan was derived from the strategies of Che Guevara and Carlos 
Narighella, the underlying logic being that an army of Tamil youth 
organised along those lines could emancipate the Sri Lankan Tamils 
from the Sinhalese rule. The T. E. L. O. and E. R. O. S. shared a very 
similar strategy while the E. P. R. L. F. and P. L. O. T. advocated a 
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protracted people's war. All groups anticipated an Ipdian 
intervention though it proved to be a key factor only in the 
secessionist violence of the Tamil guerrillas. It is evident that 
none of the Tamil guerrilla groups had a viable socio-economic and 
political programme. Politically, the L. T. T. E. postulated a one-party 
government similar to the East European countries, and an economic 
programme which aimed at national self-sufficiency. 
As examined in Chapter 7, political violence occurred with greater 
frequency during the period from 1971 to 1987. Each incident of 
political violence displayed its own distinct pattern and course. 
Class conflicts leading to revolutionary transformations, however, 
have yet to occur in Third World countries. The J. V. P. Insurrection 
of April 1971 in Sri Lanka is an important instance to ' examine in 
this respect as it was the first political violence during Sri Lanka's 
modern period aimed at capturing state power. 
Unlike many uprisings in the post-colonial period in the Third 
World, the insurrection was carefully devised rather than spontaneous. 
Furthermore, the pattern of the Insurrection of 1971 was not 
characteristic of the general pattern of planned guerrilla warfare and 
insurgency in the Third World. The J. V. P. overlooked the usual first 
stage which is the terrorist stage, and planned insufficiently for the 
second stage which is the guerrilla warfare stage. Their strategy 
instead was to launch a sudden all-out frontal attack on the police 
stations and military bases under the cover of darkness. It assumed 
the most advanced and the most complex form of a widespread armed 
insurrection. At the outset of the insurrection, the J. V. P. was on 
the offensive and the Sri Lankan armed forces were on the defensive. 
This situation was soon reversed, however, when the government was 
able to reinforce its military strength with materiel received through 
international assistance. Strategically, the J. V. P. depended on the 
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advantages of a surprise attack, and on the initiative and commitment 
of its members, thereby avoiding the need for a full-scale guerrilla 
campaign. When the surprise attack failed, they became involved in 
protracted guerrilla warfare for which they were ill-prepared. 
Furthermore, there was no revolutionary environment in Sri Lanka at 
the time of insurrection. The U. F. Government had been recently 
elected to office by an overwhelming majority and enjoyed the 
allegiance of the security forces. The Sri Lankan people did not want 
a revolution. 6 There were no justifiable causes which would have 
convinced the people of a need for an insurrection. Nor did the 
J. V. P. command any tangible or moral support from any inter- 
governmental organisation (I. G. O. ). Non-governmental organisations 
(N. G. O. ), such as amnesty International, did focus on the J. V. P. after 
the Insurrection of 1971. 
The international support extended to the Sri Lankan Government in 
1971 was a significant factor. Sri Lanka was one of the few Third 
World countries which received assistance from both the western and 
the socialist blocks for their counter-insurgency policies. The Sri 
Lankan Government considered the insurrection to be a security threat 
rather than a socio-economic and political crisis. Thus, the 
government's counter-insurgent policies relied on military action 
rather than socio-economic and political reforms. The failure of the 
insurrection drove the J. V. P. back underground once more. In spite of 
the failure of the insurrection, the surviving discontent and 
frustrations of the Sinhala-Buddhist rural youth over the contemporary 
socio-economic and political conditions were indisputable. According 
to C. Johnson, the case of 1971 is interesting in its illustration of 
a `reverse flow' of revolutionary ideas from Latin America (i. e. 
6 The United Front won 116 seats out of 145 seats in the 
parliamentary election of 1970. 
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Guevaraism) back to Asia.? It is also similar to the Communist 
insurrection of Hamburg in 1923.8 
The pattern of the Tamil guerrilla warfare was without precedent 
in the contemporary political history of Sri Lanka. This strain of 
political violence differed widely from that of the Insurrection of 
1971. The politico-military objectives of the Tamil guerrilla warfare 
did not threaten to overthrow the government in power; rather it was 
aimed at setting up an alternative seat of government encompassing Sri 
Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces. The J. V. P. Insurrection of 
1971 was launched by one guerrilla group whereas the Tamil guerrilla 
warfare was waged by five main guerrilla organisations. Moreover, the 
Talnil guerrilla warfare was a protracted warfare defined by three 
principal focusci of terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional 
warfare. Nevertheless, terrorism, played the prominent role 
throughout the Tamil insurgency. - 
According to this study, the first phase of the Tamil guerrilla 
warfare was the organisational phase from 1972 to 1977. It was 
characterized mainly by urban guerrilla warfare which depended upon 
sabotage and terrorism, and avoided direct confrontation with the 
security forces. At this stage the violence was aimed against 
government supporters within the Tamil community, police and security 
personnel engaged in investigating terrorist activities, and police 
informers. The assassination of moderate Tamil politicians was a 
vital part of this violent programme. This phase conveyed a deep- 
rooted political dissatisfaction which assumed the character of 
protracted guerrilla warfare. 
7 C. Johnson, An Autopsy of People's War, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973), pp. 98-99. 
S For more detail see, Andrew C. Janos, "The Seizure of Power: A 
Study of Force and Popular Consent", Research Monograph No. 16, 
(Princeton, N. J.: Centre of International Studies, Princeton 
University, 1964), pp. 
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The second phase of the Tamil violence covers a period from 1977 
to 1983 when ethnic violence broke out. The major development of this 
phase was the emergence of the L. T. T. E. as the dominant Tamil 
guerrilla organisation, and the only one with clear-cut objectives and 
military training. The Tamil guerrilla activities were accompanied by 
occasional armed attacks on police stations in the Northern Province, 
the ambushing of army patrols arid convoys, kidnappings and bank 
robberies. The operations were masterminded from the guerrillas' 
bases in Tamil Nadu in South India, from where arms were smuggled into 
Sri Lanka's Northern Province. The escalation of terrorist arid 
guerrilla activities, especially attacks on Sri Lankan military 
personnel, triggered a spate of ethnic violence in 1977,1981 and 
1983. The most significant outbreak of ethnic violence was in 1983 
when the fierce and widespread attacks by Sri Lankan Sinhalese mobs on 
the Tamil community in the South proved to be a vital propaganda 
weapon to secure sympathy for the Tamil guerrilla cause in the western 
countries. More importantly, this violence gained them support from 
India and Tamil Nadu, and helped them to recruit the Tamil youth to 
their cause. 
The third phase of the Tamil guerrilla warfare in this study 
covers a period from 1983 to 1987. During this period Sinhalese 
civilians residing within and outside the Tamil-dominated areas became 
targets of terrorist activities. Another significant development 
during this period, but beyond the scope of this study, was infighting 
amongst the Tamil guerrilla groups for overall dominance. By 1985 the 
L. T. T. E. had emerged as the most powerful group, with control of the 
Jaffna peninsula. Thereafter, sporadic political violence developed 
into regular warfare. Unlike the J. V. P., the fundamental requirements 
for a successful guerrilla campaign, such as a cause to fight for, 
covert or overt support from the Tamil population in the Northern 
402 
Province, foreign bases and armed supplies, and access to mobility, 
were available to the Tamil guerrillas. 
At the initial stages of the Tamil campaign, the Sri Lankan 
Government was not prepared with a well-designed, coherent counter- 
insurgency programme which could subdue the Tamil guerrilla warfare. 
During this period the government were also engaged in quelling the 
J. V. P. insurgency and preoccupied with military policies. After 1977, 
however, the government adopted a number of conciliatory policies 
including amendment of the university admissions system, language 
concessions, and devolution of power through the District Development 
Council (D. D. C. ) system. The objectives of these policies of 
appeasement. were soon thwarted by the violent confrontations between 
the military and the T mil guerrilla movement, and by the ethnic 
violence in 1983. 
The involvement of external parties is an important aspect of the 
government's cotuiter-insurgent policies. The nature and type of 
involvement varied widely between that of the 1971 left-wing 
insurrection and the Tamil guerrilla warfare. Unlike the 1971 
Insurrection, the military assistance from the West, mainly the U. S. A. 
and the U. K., during the long period of Tamil guerrilla warfare was 
negligible thus indicating the non-strategic strength of Sri Lanka's 
position. As : Marshall Singer observes, the U. S. Government took a 
hands-off position on the Sri Lankan issue. When the Indian 
Government airlifted humanitarian aid to the Tamil guerrillas in May 
1987 against the Sri Lankan Government's wishes, the United States did 
nothing to help the Sri Lankan Government even though they had 
accommodated U. S. interests on some other matters. 9 The foreign 
9 Marshall Singer, "Prospects for Conflict Management in the Sri 
Lankan Ethnic Crisis", in Joseph V. Montville, (ed), Conflict and 
Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, (Lexington: D. C. Heath and 
Company, 1990), p. 279. 
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states primarily involved in aiding one side or the other during the 
Tamil insurgency were Israel, Pakistan and India. The P. L. O. 's 
participation in training the Tamil guerrilla groups accounts for 
Israel's interest in the conflict. 
India's covert involvement in the Tamil guerrilla warfare was the 
major reason for Pakistan extending support to the Sri Lankan 
Government. Thus external power struggles are reflected in the level 
of assistance extended to the Sri Lankan Government to counter Tamil 
guerrilla warfare. It was India's role as an external force which is 
more important here. The Indian Government's response during the 
prolonged Tamil insurgency differed widely from that during the short- 
lived Insurrection of 1971. The decision of the Indian Government to 
intervene in the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict was guided by India's 
regional interests and domestic pressure. The regional factor was 
India's geo-political interest as a regional superpower. 
Domestically, over 55 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu exerted sufficient 
pressure to force and shape India's role in the Tamil guerrilla 
warfare. 
Despite the intervention, India did not have a strong and 
unanimous policy on the conflict in Sri Lanka. At the beginning of 
the Tamil insurgency, the Janatha Party Government in India (1976- 
1980) perceived the Sri Lankan crisis as an internal problem and 
therefore, refrained from any involvement. This policy was reversed 
when the Congress Party assumed national state power under Indira 
Ghandhi. After the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka in 1983, the Indian 
state government of Tamil Nadu and the more moderate Tamil politicians 
in Sri Lanka prevailed upon the Indian Government for positive and 
vigorous intervention in the Sri Lank-an crisis. Under Rajive 
Ghandhi's premiership, however, India assumed only a moderate role. 
He urged the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil guerrillas to 
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negotiate for a peaceful solution. In 1987 when the government forces 
came close to defeating the Tamil guerrillas in a military operation, 
India directly intervened by airdropping food supplies to Jaffna, thus 
violating Sri Lanka's sovereignty. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 
resulted from Indian endeavours to resolve the Tamil insurgency. 
Two important consequences followed from the signing of the Indo- 
Sri Lanka Accord. The first was the deployment of the Indian Peace 
Keeping Force (I. P. K. F. ) with the intention of disarming the Tamil 
guerrilla groups. It was an attempt by the Indian Federal Government, 
as a third party, to impose a settlement on the contending parties, 
mainly by coercion and the threat of coercion. Consequently, the 
deployment of the Indian troops restructured the conflict and moved it 
into a new phase of insurgency and counter-insurgency. The I. P. K. F. 
failed, however, to totally disarm the L. T. T. E., the most intransigent 
Tamil guerrilla group. As a result, the I. P. K. F. was engaged in 
combating the Sri Lankan Government's counter-insurgency until they 
were withdrawn from Sri Lanka in late March 1990. It is estimated 
that, during this period, 1,155 soldiers of the I. P. K. F. were killed 
and 2,984 were wounded. 10 The second consequence of the Accord was 
the devolution of power through the introduction of eight provincial 
councils. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was a tangible recognition of 
India's regional paramountcy and its role as a regional crisis 
manager. 
8.3 Findings and Observations 
The findings of this study clearly suggest that more extensive and 
additional research is necessary to understand the causes, nature and 
sequence of political violence in the Third World. The observations 
10 Kenneth Bush, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka", Conflict 
Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, (1990), p. 52. 
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of this study are discussed in general terms, focusing on Sri Lanka in 
particular as a case study from 1971 to 1987. 
The political violence waged by the J. V. P. in 1971, and the Tamil 
guerrilla warfare from 1972 onward, was preplanned rather than 
spontaneous. The origins of the Sinhalese and Tamil political 
violence movements were deeply rooted in the socio-economic and 
political developments in Sri Lanka. The violence has been largely 
attributed to the emergence of new social forces during the processes 
of socio-economic and political modernisation. Of these factors, the 
political factors are the most important. Politics in Sri Lanka, as 
in many other Third World countries, is the main avenue for upward 
mobility. Sri Lanka's political system was incapable, however, of 
absorbing the large number of politically radicalised rural Sinhalese 
and Tamil youth. The central cause for this lack of political 
viability was the steady erosion of Sri Lanka's democratic process. 
The contributory factors for the political violence movements in Sri 
Lanka were, therefore, mainly internal rather than external. The 
Tamil guerrilla organisations originated with the failure of the 
successive Sri Lank-an governments to accommodate ethnic pluralism 
amidst perpetual economic and political under-development. These 
factors were basically internal but were subject to influence and 
pressures from external sources such as the state of Tamil Nadu in 
South India and the Tamil expatriates. 
This study reveals that political violence in Sri Lanka is not 
only a mere process set in motion by the vagaries of socio-economic or 
political factors, but also is the outcome of organisations, 
leadership, ideologies and strategies. The J. V. P. and the Tamil 
guerrilla organisations were capable of organising and providing 
leadership to the Sinhalese and Tamil youth respectively. Moreover, 
their ideologies formulated their group consciousness and objectives. 
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Their respective strategies mobilised the youth toward ultimately 
politico-military objectives. The J. V. P. was organised as a 
revolutionary army while the Tamil guerrilla groups organised 
themselves as national liberation armies. 
It is an error to assume that Sri Lankan society is a 
hierarchically-structured, ethnic society where one ethnic group can 
hold the other in a subordinate position. Political violence in Sri 
Lanka has been an outcome not merely of ethnic factors but also of 
politico-economic factors. The continued political violence in Sri 
Lanka has been based on class exploitation and ethnic discrimination, 
but the ethnic aspect has proved to be the for more important factor. 
The pattern and sequence of political violence as examined in this 
study indicates that the revolutionary insurrection in 1971 and the 
separatist Tamil insurgency from 1972 onward are two separate 
phenomenon in Sri Lanka's contemporary politics. Although there was 
no overt link between the Insurrection of 1971 and the Tamil guerrilla 
warfare, it is obvious that both strains of political violence shared 
common characteristics. The first was the significant youth 
participation in and leadership of the political violence movements. 
It becomes evident that the youth of Sri Lanka have been increasingly 
exposed to a culture of political violence. 
The pattern of insurrection of the J. V. P., however, differs widely 
in other respects from that of the Tamil guerrilla warfare. The 
J. V. P. violence assumes the pattern of sudden insurrections in which 
acts of terrorism are of minor significance. According to this 
pattern the possibilities of negotiation are minimal and the only 
outcome is either total victory or defeat. Yet the movement has re- 
emerged from time to time. The Tamil guerrilla warfare, on the other 
hand, has been characterized by protracted warfare where terrorism and 
selective political assassinations have played a decisive part. 
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The intervention by external forces have revealed the following 
characteristics. The secessionist-motivated guerrilla warfare waged 
by the Tamil youth did not attract a great deal of intervention from 
the western countries, whereas during the Insurrection of 1971 the 
western countries extended considerable support to the Sri Lankan 
Government. The second characteristic is that the incumbent 
governments in Sri Lanka tended to attract more international support 
than the J. V. P. and the Tamil guerrilla groups. Thirdly, India's role 
pertaining to the Tamil guerrilla warfare compared to the Insurrection 
of 1971 was contradictory. India continued to maintain a strong anti- 
secessionist policy particularly regarding its domestic politics, yet 
voiced concern about or provided assistance to the secessionist 
movements in mist Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 11 The support extended by 
the Indian Government. to the Tamil guerrillas differed widely from 
India's involvement with East Pakistan. 12 India's direct. involvement 
in the Tamil insurgency, by basing the Indian Peace Keeping Force in 
Sri Lanka, did not resolve or control the political violence there. 
The involvement of external forces contributed to the escalation of 
political violence rather than to the control and settlement of the 
political conflict. 
Both the political violence of 1971 and the Tamil secessionist 
violence were youth dominated, were mainly concerned with domestic 
issues, and were subject to intervention from external sources. The 
political violence within the Tamil community shared a dominant 
11 India faces the separatist movements within its own boarders in 
Kashmir, Nagaland, Dravidastan (Tamil Nadu), Khalistan (Sikhs), and 
Gurkhaland (Gurkhas). 
12 The secession of former East Pakistan from Pakistan occurred 
with India's full-scale military intervention and led to the Indo- 
Pakistan War of 1971. Thus, Bangladesh emerged as the only 
secessionist effort after World War 2 to succeed in its aim of 
independence. See John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 
(London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 128-138. 
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characteristic with that of the Insurrection of 1971 in its youth 
domination. The former was waged by Tamil-Hindu youth whereas the 
latter was waged by the Sinhalese-Buddhist rural youth. The 
disparities, however, are much wider especially in terms of duration, 
intensity of violence, area of operations, number of deaths, damage to 
property, and the number of groups involved. The outcome of the 
Insurrection of 1971 and the continuing Tamil guerrilla warfare point 
to the fact that it is impossible to eliminate political violence 
movements, when they are based on deep-rooted, socio-economic and 
political factors, by depending on military solutions. The Sri Lankan 
experience gives substance to the view that ethnic insurgency cannot 
be resolved and is harder to solve than political violence based on 
class conflict. The Insurrection of 1971, which was class based, was 
controlled within three months whereas the Tamil guerrilla warfare is 
now in its 18th year. Consequently, this prolonged ethnic insurgency 
has given rise to the wide opinion that political violence and ethnic 
conflict cannot be solved but can only be managed. Political conflict 
in Sri Lanka remains unsolved due to the fact that the parties 
involved in it have adopted different and incompatible views as to the 
solutions to the problem. The obvious means of defusing the problem, 
such as resolution through negotiation, have already been explored and 
exhausted. If peaceful means of resolving the'Tamil insurgency are 
not found soon, a full-blown civil war seems imminent. 
The L. T. T. E. have succeeded in crushing the other Tamil guerrilla 
groups and thus have gained stature among the Tamil community. The 
L. T. T. E. have laid claim to the Northern and Eastern provinces which 
would form a separate Tamil state, and have called for the 
establishment of a separate Tamil national army. The central 
government is unable to accede to such a turn of events and therefore, 
the crisis, remains deadlocked despite the -efforts by the parties 
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concerned to end it. The Sri Lankan Government and the L. T. T. E. have 
agreed several times to call a cease-fire and negotiate a settlement, 
but each time the process of negotiation has resulted in a resumption 
of fighting because neither side has been willing to compromise and 
negotiate a settlement. Consequently, peaceful negotiations toward 
achieving the goals of each party have been accompanied by open 
options for renewed violent confrontations as a bargaining chip to 
gain concessions. 
Of the theories examined in this study, S. P. Huntington's theory 
of modernisation offers a broad analysis of the factors conducive for 
the origin of political violence movements. The Sri Lankan experience 
confirms that political violence movements originate within districts 
which have been exposed to the process of modernisation in many 
crucial areas. The districts which were caught up in the process of 
modernisation in the South gave rise to the J. V. P., while the 
districts which were experiencing similar changes in the North gave 
rise to the Tamil guerrilla movement. 
The modernisation theory in its empirical analysis is subject, 
however, to modification in this study. Hence, the political 
conditions and the socio-economic and psychological factors are 
equally important in analysing the preconditions which were conducive 
to the origin of the political violence movements in Sri Lanka. All 
of these factors are dialectically interconnected and are equally 
relevant. The specific factors which are most important for an 
analysis of political violence are the organisational, ideological, 
and strategical characteristics of the guerrilla groups, and the 
government's response to each conflict. As in Huntington's theory, 
the urban middle class did not assume the leadership of the political 
violence in Sri Lanka. More precisely the leadership of the political 
violence movements there belonged to the petit-bourgeois or lower 
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middle class. Huntington's modernisation theory, however, fails to 
explain the actual social background of the participants in political 
violence in Sri Lanka. The main participants were not the peasantry 
as perceived in Huntington's theory, but were the youth, few of whom 
came from the peasant class. To grasp the role of the youth in the 
insurrection and the Tamil violence an additional theoretical 
perspective is needed. 
8.4 Implications and Consequences of Political Violence 
The political violence in Sri Lanka did not. impact or influence 
the global or regional balance of power. It did, however, inflict 
tremendous human casualties and material losses. The large number of 
civilian deaths, then, was the major outcome of political violence in 
Sri Lanka. It. is estimated that over 40,000 lives from 1971 to 1987 
were lost during the course of the insurgencies. According to the 
U. S. Committee for Refugees, in 1988 an estimated 250,000 Sri Lankans 
were displaced, thereby placing Sri Lanka as the 13th largest 
`producer' of refugees in the world. 13 Over 150,000 Tamils alone are 
estimated to have fled to the Southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. 
On the other hand, there is the danger that political violence 
could extend to other areas in Sri Lanka such as to the Muslim and the 
Indian Tamil communities and to other states in the region. The most 
important impact of the Tamil guerrilla warfare has been the 
resurgence of the J. V. P. as an insurgent group. The main objectives 
of the J. V. P. 's violence since 1987 has been to force India to 
withdraw the I. P. K. F. and the Sri Lankan Government to resign. After 
the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in 1987, the J. V. P. embarked on a 
strategy of assassination and occasional raids on police stations. 
The Sri Lankan Government was able to exert their military strength, 
13 Kenneth Bush, op. cit., p. 42. 
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however, and control the activities of the J. V. P., thereby forcing the 
J. V. P. to revert to the organisational phase. As an external factor, 
the attempted takeover of the Maldives in November 1988 by armed 
invaders serves as a good example. The invasion was carried out by a 
group of mercenaries who are believed to have been members of the 
P. L. O. T. 14 
The J. V. P., as well as the Tamil guerrilla organisations, have 
posed a credible military threat to the incumbent Sri Lankan 
Government as seen by the existence of a sizeable and active guerrilla 
force, and the dispatch of a considerable portion of the government's 
security forces to suppress it. The Tamil guerrilla movement has been 
able to attain a considerable level of legitimacy especially by 
endorsing regional autonomy through the provincial councils or any 
other form of devolution. Political violence was the means by which 
this legitimacy and bargaining position has been reached. 
In addition the political violence in Sri Lanka further widened 
the long-standing differences between the Sinhalese majority and the 
Tamil minority. This weakened the pursuit of national integration and 
threatened the existing socio-economic and political system. The 
ethnic violence has further deepened the gap between the Tamil and 
Sinhalese communities by arousing the fears of each against living in 
areas dominated by the other. Consequently, there has been a trend 
towards geographical polarization. The long-standing multi-ethnic 
polity has come under threat; disintegration seems an imminent 
possibility. Externally, the Tamil guerrilla warfare has become the 
most influential factor in Indo-Sri Lankan relationships. 
Consequently, this political violence has the potential of developing 
into a regional crisis in South Asia. 
1; Deepak Tripathi, "India's Maldives Mission and After", World 
Today, (January 1989), pp. 3-4. 
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The growing, tendency for political violence in Sri Lanka from 1971 
onward has moved the country from a relatively open democratic 
government to a pattern of constitutional authoritarianism, which is 
best illustrated by the declarations of emergency and curfew for 
prolonged periods. For example, a state of emergency was declared 
from 1971 to 1977 and again from 1983 to 1989. 
As in many Third World countries, political violence has become 
part of the modern political process, and is now viewed by 
disadvantaged or disgruntled societal factions as the most expeditious 
means of achieving political objectives. Pre-election and post- 
election violence between political parties, and ethnic violence 
between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, have served as 
a metuis of achieving a variety of political ends in Sri Lanka. Post- 
election violence and ethnic violence have contributed heavily to the 
growing political violence in Sri Lanka. Consequently, political 
violence has become institutionalised in Sri Lankan politics and 
society. .1 certainty in any occurrence of political violence is that 
the longer its duration, the deeper it becomes entrenched and the 
further it becomes institutionalised. It becomes increasingly evident 
that Sri Lanka is heading for widespread guerrilla war, and possibly 
civil war, neither of which would not bring victory to any of the 
participants. 
As a solution to this stalemate, it has been mooted that regional 
autonomy through provincial councils within the confines of a unified 
state would pave the way to resolving the quandary. The different 
notions on how these provincial councils should operate, however, has 
posed a further problem. The crux of the matter is whether or not the 
Northern Province and the Eastern Province would merge. The Tamils 
prefer to merge while the Sinhalese as well as'the Muslims oppose it. 
According to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, a merger should be ratified by 
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a referendum within the two provinces. There is little doubt that the 
referendum would pass in the Northern Province because the Tamils are 
in the majority there. In the Eastern Province, however, the Tamils, 
the Sinhalese and the Muslims are represented in equal numbers. The 
Sinhalese and the Muslims would not concede to a single provincial 
council, especially if the union would result in domination by the 
Tamils. Consequently, the devolution of power under such 
circumstances would counter the separatist demands. Hence, the Tamil 
guerrilla warfare remains unresolved and a major threat to Sri Lapkan 
geographical integrity and sovereignty. 
Political violence marked the redefinition of India's role from 
mediator to power broker. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was a landmark of 
this new development. Under the terms of the Accord, India acquired 
substantial control over Sri Lanka's foreign policy. The Accord 
excluded the involvement of outside powers in the conflict while 
permitting India to assert its status as a regional hegemonic state. 
8.5 Recommendations 
Like many Third World countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
Sri Lanka's Left-wing and ethnic insurgencies are symptomatic of a 
wider socio-economic and political crisis which needs careful and 
thorough analysis. The theories examined in this study pay little 
attention to the solutions for political violence. It is accepted 
that political violence in Sri Lanka is basically a socio-economic and 
political problem rather than a problem of law and order. The key to 
the solution does not lie in emphasizing the need to extinguish 
political violence, which is merely a symptom. It is more appropriate 
to focus on the causes of political violence movements and the 
violence itself. Therefore, this necessitates socio-economic and 
political reforms which will address the roots of the problem. 
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Resorting to military methods will only serve to suppress the 
political violence movements for the short term, as proven by the 
resurgence of the J. V. P. Political violence is a politico-military 
phenomenon. Therefore, the political violence represents not only a 
military challenge but is a political threat as well. According to 
Robert Thomson, the following should be included in the counter- 
insurgency programme of the government: the government should have a 
clear political aim; it should function in accordance with the law; it 
should have an overall plan containing not only the military measures 
but also the political, social, economic, administrative, police and 
any other measures needed; it must give priority to defeating 
political subversion, not the guerrillas; and in the guerrilla phase 
of an insurgency it must secure its base areas first. 15 
The Sri Lankan Taunils have the advantage of a territorial base in 
the North where the Tamils are in the majority. They also have access 
to bases in South India. Considering the military advantages of the 
Tamil guerrillas, a totally military approach, if adopted by the Sri 
Lankan Government, would lead to either heavy civilian casualties in 
the Tamil areas or a mass migration of refugees to South India. Both 
developments would result in an Indian intervention and a subsequent 
resurgence of the J. V. P. or a similar group. These factors strongly 
indicate that a military approach on its own is not a viable means of 
defeating political violence movements in Sri Lanka. There is, of 
course, no immediate solution to political violence in Sri Lanka. In 
order to resolve the conflict, the following four criteria must be 
addressed by the Sri Lankan Government: restore legitimacy to the Sri 
Lank-an political system; restore and maintain ethnic and political 
harmony; arrange a ceasefire and negotiotions with all guerrilla 
15 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1966), pp. 50-57. 
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groups; and maintain a good relationship with the Indian Government. 
Using the above-mentioned criteria, the author endeavours in this 
section to propose the following recommendations to resolve and to 
manage the political violence in Sri Lanka. 
In order to restore legitimacy to the national political system, 
democracy and rule of law should be maintained. According to P. 
Wilkinson, the primary objective of counter-violence strategy should 
be the protection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of 
law-16 He further maintains that any attempt to suspend parliamentary 
democracy, any recourse to rule by emergency decree, the abandonment 
of free elections, and all fundamental abridgements of a democratic 
constitution, must be resisted. 17 Therefore, a major effort towards 
the developnent of political democracy and its preservation should be 
made. Such an effort might be developed through free and fair 
elections, equal opportunities for political participation, mutual 
understanding between major political parties and the preservation of 
human rights. 
The long-term solution to the political violence in Sri Lanka lies 
in the protection of human rights and the upholding of the rule of 
law. In controlling the political violence it becomes increasingly 
necessary for the criminal procedure of the country to be upheld. The 
rule of law and the judicial system are vital institutions which in a 
context of crisis should be preserved. Moreover, the countermeasures 
adopted by the Sri Lankan Government should not infringe on the norms 
of human rights. 
Another important aspect of promoting Sri Lanka's democracy is 
that the central government should further explore the possibilities 
16 p. Wilkinson, Terrorism and Liberal. State, (London: Macmillan, 
1986), p. 125. 
1i' Ibid., p. 127. 
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of the policy of decentralisation. It appears to be the only hope in 
avoiding more widespread agitation by the Tamil guerrilla groups for a 
separate state. Whatever changes decentralisation introduces should 
address the grievances of the various communities and reflect the 
goals and values of the Sri Lankan society as a whole. It is also an 
effective mechanism to expand the system of local government in Sri 
Lanka and involve the people in the local decision-making process. 
In order to achieve ethnic and political harmony Sri Lanka has to 
accomodate it national and political consensus for evolving a modus 
vivendi among the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. Therefore, the 
government should seriously consider the ways and means of eliminating 
all forms of covert and overt political discrimination and ethnic 
discrimination. A commitment to eradicate political and racial 
injustice in Sri Lanka would contribute to the improvement of the 
political and ethnic climate there. A primary concern of the 
government should be to take precautions against future pre- or post- 
election violence and ethnic violence. The election violence is 
manifest in the attacks on opposition parties while ethnic violence is 
concentrated against the Tamil community. 
The government must negotiate a permanent cease-fire with the 
guerrilla organisations and bring them into the mainstream of Sri 
Lankan national politics. In this regard, it is appropriate that the 
government should call a new general election. 18 
Due to its geo-political reality Sri Lanka should maintain a 
friendly relationship with the central government of neighboring 
India. The non-alignment movement and the South Asian Regional 
Cooperation (S. A. R. C. ) may be of assistance in mending the strained 
P3 The turnout at the presidential election in December 1989 and 
National Pariliament. ary election in February 1990 were as follows: 
55.4 and 63.6 percent, respectively. It was a relatively low turnout 
by Sri Lankan standards, due to the continued boycott by both J. V. P. 
and the L. T. T. E. who threatened those who did vote with death. 
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relationship with India. Considering the wider context of the Tamil 
guerrilla warfare and the ethnic violence, it would been more 
appropriate had the United Nations or Non-Aligned Movement, rather 
than the Indian Peace Keeping Force been involved since 1987 in 
quelling, the Tamil insurgency. This error should not be repeated--the 
problem calls for the intercession of a neutral third party. 
8.6 Summary 
In the introduction, which is also the first chapter of this 
study, it was noted that this research study is confined basically to 
political violence in Sri Lanka from 1971 to 1987. It represents one 
of the first attempts of a theoretical-curs-empirical analysis of 
political violence in the Third World. It is an exploratory analysis 
rather than a comparative or conclusive examination. 
In analysing political violence over a sixteen year period, this 
study attempts to cover a wider canvas which includes socio-economic 
and political modernisation and its consequences. Many new 
developments such as the role of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in the 
conflict in Sri Lanka, the resurgence of the J. V. P. violence, and the 
continuation of the L. T. T. E. guerrilla warfare after the Indo-Sri 
Lanka Accord of 1987, have been left for purposes of future research. 
Moreover, the author has tested and examined the basic hypothesis 
postulated in this study. The immediate ramifications of the main 
findings of this study pertaining to the causes and pattern of 
political violence have been discussed, and precautionary measures for 
regarding the future political violence have been recommended. As 
intended in this study the author has illustrated the need to examine 
the ways in which different patterns of political violence occur, 
change and influence one another over a period of time. The author 
also hopes that the data, hypotheses, results and theories discussed 
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in this study will prove useful to other researchers who wish to 
examine the causes and pattern of political violence in the Third 
World in general and Sri Lanka in particular. 
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Appendix 1 
The Tamil Guerrilla Organisations 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) 
People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) 
Eelam Popular Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 
Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) 
Popular Liberation Army (PLA) 
Revolutionary Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO Splinter Group) 
Tamil Eelaxn Army (TEA ) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Cobras (TELC) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TEL. ) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF) 
Tamil Eelam Revolutionary People's Liberation Army (TERPLA) 
Tamil Eelam National Army (TENA) 
Tamil Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (TERO) 
National Liberation Front of Tamils (TNLF) 
Liberation Communist. Guerrilla Movement (LCGM) 
Tanil Marxist Liberation Tigers (TMLT) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Extremists ( TELE) 
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APPENDIX 2, The Theory o£ the J Curve 
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Appendix 4 
Ownership of Land Area Under Fort Crops, 1972, Prior to Land Reform 
(Percentage) 
Form of ownership Tea Rubber Coconut Total 
Sterling Companies (a) 24 11 - 9 
Rupee Companies (b) 25 13 - 10 
Non-Sri Lank-an Individuals 2 2 - 1 
Sri Lankan Individuals 26 42 49 42 
Public Sector Agencies 5 1 - 1 
Cooperative Farms - - - - 
Smallholdings 18 31 50 37 
Total 100 100 100 100 
a. incoporated in the U. K. 
b. incorporated in Sri Lanka 
Source: C. H. Peiris, "Land Reform and the Agrarian Change in Sri 
Lanka", Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1978, and B. Moore, The 
State and Peasant Politics in Sri Lanka, Camb ridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p. 67 
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Appendix 9 Annexure C 
In terms of paragraph six of President's statement of December 
Ist, 1983, the following proposal which have emerged as a result of 
discussions in Colombo and New Delhi are appended for consideration by 
the All-Party Conference. These prpposals are in the context of unity 
and integrity of Sri Lanka and will form the basis for formulating the 
Agenda of the All-Party Conference. 
1. The District Development. Councils in a Province be permitted to 
combine into one or more Regional Councils if they agree by decisions 
of the Councils and approved by Referendum in that district. 
2. In the case of District Councils of Northern and Eastern 
provinces, respect. ively, as they are not functionong due to the 
resignation of the majority of members, their union within each 
province to be accepted. 
3. Each region will have a Regional Council if so desired. The 
convention will be established that the leader of the party which 
commands a majority in the Regional Council would be formally 
appointed by the President as the chief ministers of the Region. The 
Chief Minister will constitute a Committee of ministers of the Region. 
4. The President and the Parliament will continue to have overall 
responsibility for all subjects not transferred to the Region and 
generally for all other matters relating to maintenance of 
sovereignty, integrity, unity, and security and progress and 
development of the Republic as a whole. 
5. The legislative power of the region would be vested in the 
Regional Councils which would be empowered to enact laws and exercise 
executive powers in relation thereto on certain specified listed 
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subjects including the maintenance of Internal Law and Order in the 
Region, the administration of justice, social and economic development 
cultural matters and land policy. The list of subjects to be 
allocated to the Regions will be worked out in detail. 
6. The Regional councils will have powers to levy taxes, cess of 
fees and to mobilize resources through loans, the proceeds of which 
will be credited to a Consolidated Fund set up for that particular 
Region to which also will be credited grants, allocations or 
subventions made by the Republic. Financial resources will be 
apportioned to the Region on the recommendations of the representative 
Finance Commission appointed from time to time. 
7. Provisions will be made to constitute High Courts in each 
region. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka will exercise appellate and 
constitutional jurisdiction. 
8. Each Region will have a Regional Service constituting (a) 
officers and public servants of the Region and (b) such other officers 
and public servants who may be seconded to the Region. Each Region 
will have a Regional Public Service Commission for recruitment and for 
exercising disciplinary powers relating to the members of the Regional 
Service. 
9. The armed forces of Sri Lanka will reflect the national ethnic 
composition. In the Northern and Eastern Provinces the police force 
for internal security will also reflect the ethnic composition of 
these Regions. 
10. A Port Authority under the Central Government will be set up 
for administering the Trincomalee Port and Harbour. The area that 
will come under the Port Authority as well as the powers to be 
assigned to it will be further discussed. 
11. A national policy on land settlement and the basis on which 
the government will undertake land colonization will have to be worked 
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out. All settlement schemes will be based on ethnic proportion so as 
not. to alter the demographic balance subject to agreements being 
reached on major projects. 
12. The Constitutions and other laws dealing with the official 
language Sinhala and the national language Tamil be accepted and 
implemented as well as similar laws dealing with the National Flag and 
Anthem. 
13. The Conference should appoint a committee to work out 
constitutional ans legal changes that may be necessary to implement 
these decisions. The Government will provide its secretariat and 
necessary legal offices. 
14. The consensus of opinion of the All-Party Conference will 
itself be considered by the United National Party Executive Committee 
and presumably by the executive body of the other parties as well 
before being placed before Parliament for legislative action. 
f 
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Appendix 10 Indo-Sri Lanka Agrement to Establish Peace and 
Normalcy in Sri Lanka 
The Prime Minister of Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi and the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J. R. Jayewardene having met at Colombo on 
July 29,1987. 
Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and 
strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka and 
acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of 
Sri L nka, and the consequent violence and for the safety, well-being 
and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka. 
Having this day entered into the following Agreement to fulfil 
this objective. 
1.1 desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Sri Lanka; 
1.2 acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi- 
lingual plural society consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, 
Muslims (Moors), and Burghers; 
1.3 recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and 
linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured; 
1.4 also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces 
have been areas of historical of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, 
who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with 
other ethnic groups; 
1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces 
contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Sri Lanka, and perserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi- 
lingual and multi-religious plural society, in which all citizens can 
live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their 
aspirations; 
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2. Resolve that: 
2.1 Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining 
Provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a 
Referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces as outlined below: 
2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim 
period(i. e) from the date of the elections to the provincial Council, 
as specified in Para 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in 
Para 2.3, the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will 
form one administrative unit, having, one elected Provincial Council. 
Such a wiit. Will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board 
of Ministers. 
2.3 There will be a referendum on or 31st December, 1988 to enable 
the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether: 
(A) The Eastern province should remain linked with the Northern 
province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed 
together with the Northern Province as specified in Para 2.2, or 
(B) The Eastern province should constitute a separate 
administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial with a separate 
Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers. 
The President may, at his discretion decide to postpone such a 
referendum. 
2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or 
other reasons, will have" right to vote in such a referendum. 
Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they 
were displaced will be created. 
2.5 The referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee 
headed by the Chief Justice, a member appointed by the President, 
nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by 
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the President., nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking 
people of the Eastern Province. 
2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result 
of the referendum. 
2.7 Meeting and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the 
laws of the country, will be allowed before the referendum. 
2.8 Election to Provincial Councils will be held within the next 
three months, in any event before December 31,1987. Indian observers 
will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council of the North 
and East. 
2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern 
provinces by August 15, `1987. A cessation of hostilities will come 
into effect all over the island within 48 hours of the signing of this 
agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be 
surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to 
be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the 
cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, 
the army and other security personel will be confined to barracks in 
camps as on May 25,1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the 
confining the security personnel moving back to barracks shall be 
completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into 
effect. 
2.10 The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of 
law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of Government 
as are used in the rest of the country. 
2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to 
political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well 
as to those persons accused, charged and or convicted under these 
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laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to 
rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back to the 
mainstream of national life. India will cooperate in the process. 
2.12 The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the 
above provisions and expect all others to do likewise. 
2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the 
Government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevent proposals 
forthwith. 
2.1.1 The Government of India will underwork and guarantee the 
resolutions, and co-operate in the implementation of these proposals. 
2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of proposals 
negotiated from 1.5 1986 to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not 
finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between 
India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this 
agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of 
India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their 
implementation. 
2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of 
India taking the following actions if any militant group operating in 
Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of prpposals for a settlement, 
namely: 
(A) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian 
territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, 
integrity and security of Sri Lanka. 
(B) The Indian Navy/Coast Guard will co-operate with the Sri 
Lankan Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri 
Lanka. 
(C) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka request the 
Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these 
proposals the Government of India will co-operate by giving to the 
434 
Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when 
requested. 
(D) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri 
Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident there concurrently 
with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from tamil Nadu. 
(E) The Government of India and Sri Lanka, will co-operate in 
ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities 
inhabiting the Northern and Eastern provinces. 
2.17 The Government of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and 
English will also be official languages. 
3. This agreement and the annexure there-to shall come in to force 
upon signature. 
In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto. Done 
in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty ninth day of July of the 
year one thousand nine hundred and eighty seven, in duplicate, both 
texts being equally authentic. 
Rajiv Gandhi 
Prime Minister of the Republic 
Junius Richard Jayewardene 
President of the Democratic 
of India Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 
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